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The  problem  of  violent  oppression  is  a  persistent  one.  Every  regime  –  autocratic  
or  democratic  –  has  an  obligation  to  prevent  the  violent  oppression  of  its  citizens.  My  
dissertation  “Good  Arms  and  Good  Laws:  Machiavelli,  Regime-­‐‑Type,  and  Violent  
Oppression”  uses  Machiavelli’s  understanding  of  different  regime-­‐‑types  and  their  
political  dynamics  to  explore  the  means  by  which  democracies  and  autocracies  alike  can  
prevent  violent  oppression  within  their  borders.  My  exploration  produces  a  standard  for  
praiseworthy  political  regimes  and  action,  based  on  what  Machiavelli  identifies  as  the  
people’s  desire  “not  to  be  oppressed.”  
Machiavelli’s  analysis  of  this  problem  of  political  violence  leads  to  the  conclusion  
that  all  types  of  regimes  are  united  in  needing  an  interdependent,  yet  competitive  
political  relationship  between  their  leading  political  figure(s)  and  the  people  at  large.  
Different  kinds  of  regimes  vary,  however,  in  the  roles  that  their  primary  political  classes  
must  play  in  order  to  prevent  oppression  within  their  borders.  After  using  the  Florentine  
Histories  to  identify  the  lines  of  thinking  central  to  Machiavelli’s  work,  in  chapter  1  I  turn  
to  Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  in  The  Art  of  War.  In  chapters  2  and  3,  I  
detail  Machiavelli’s  recommendations  for  praiseworthy  principalities  in  the  Prince,  
where  Machiavelli  actually  exhorts  princes  to  arm  their  people  (chapter  2)  while  
simultaneously  crafting  for  them  the  political  ethics  for  which  the  text  is  notorious  
    
v  
(chapter  3).  In  Chapters  4  and  5,  I  detail  Machiavelli’s  recommendations  for  
praiseworthy  republics  in  the  Discourses  on  Livy,  where  Machiavelli  charges  the  people  
with  policing  the  elites  that  would  engage  in  projects  of  oppression  if  left  to  their  own  
devices  (chapter  4)  while  simultaneously  praising  elites  who  help  to  create  and  maintain  
mechanisms  of  violence  (chapter  5).  Machiavelli’s  analysis  compels  us  to  recognize  that  
it  is  the  particulars  of  these  interdependent,  yet  competitive  relationships  between  the  
people  and  their  leading  political  figure(s)  that  define  a  regime  and  that  our  praise  of  
that  regime  ought  not  depend  categorically  on  whether  the  people  rule,  but  rather  
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The  consensus  that  has  emerged  around  the  idea  of  democracy  puts  policy-­‐‑
makers  in  a  difficult  bind.  They  correctly  take  healthy  democratic  rule  as  the  ultimate  
goal  for  every  society,  yet  must  also  contend  with  the  reality  that  rapid  democratization  
can  result  in  state  failure.  While  we  posit  an  intrinsic  value  to  democracy,  in  many  cases  
this  value  seems  to  be  outweighed  by  the  internal  conflict  and  economic  collapse  that  
democratization  may  bring.  This  conflict  arises  because  there  may  be  some  goods  that  
are  more  valuable  than  democratic  participation  or  the  legitimacy  it  confers  upon  a  
government.  Can  a  person  facing  brutal  civil  war  be  blamed  for  choosing  familiar  
stability  even  if  it  comes  at  the  cost  of  disenfranchisement?  Questions  such  as  these  get  
at  the  very  heart  of  what  politics  can  do  to  make  a  life  worth  living.  While  the  argument  
on  behalf  of  democracy’s  contribution  to  a  fully  human  life  is  very  strong,  the  arguments  
on  behalf  of  some  other  goods  are  equally  so.  
Niccolò  Machiavelli  makes  one  such  argument  on  behalf  of  freedom  from  
oppression.1    For  him,  violent  oppression  of  one’s  fellow  citizens  is  the  summum  malum  of  
                                                                                                              
I  will  make  all  citations  to  Machiavelli’s  major  works  in  text  and  will  use  the  following  format:  initials  for  
the  text  (AW  –  Art  of  War,  D  –  Discourses  on  Livy,  P  –  The  Prince,  FH  –  Florentine  Histories)  followed  by  book  
in  uppercase  Roman  numerals,  chapter  or  page  in  Arabic  numerals,  and  paragraph  in  lowercase  roman  
numerals  where  applicable.  Translations  used  are  listed  in  the  bibliography.  
1  I  take  Machiavelli’s  understanding  of  oppression  to  be  something  like  the  active  exercise  of  arbitrary  
power  of  one  person  over  another  person  in  a  position  of  dependence.  I  borrow  the  language  for  this  
formulation  from  Frank  Lovett  and  Philip  Pettit  who  separately  offer  a  definition  of  domination  that  has  the  
  2  
politics.  While  he  is  an  advocate  of  the  Renaissance  equivalent  of  a  democracy  –  a  
republic  –  his  advocacy  is  a  conditional  one  at  best  and  turns  upon  his  concerns  over  
violent  oppression.2  Where  regimes  fail  to  prevent  violent  oppression  in  their  territories,  
he  suggests  improvements.  Where  they  succeed,  he  suggests  imitation.  In  doing  so,  he  
becomes  a  rich  resource  for  us  in  evaluating  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  democracy  
as  a  regime-­‐‑type.  
Beyond  supporting  these  kinds  of  deliberations,  Machiavelli  also  helps  us  reflect  
on  the  nature  of  democratic  regimes  in  general.  Machiavelli  considered  himself  a  faithful  
servant  of  the  Florentine  Republic;  we  may  consider  him  a  faithful  servant  of  the  idea  of  
popular  rule,  but  not  an  uncritical  one.  Those  criticisms  confound  the  dichotomy  
between  democracy  on  the  one  hand  and  autocracy  on  the  other.  We  frequently  take  this  
dichotomy  to  be  a  strong  one,  but  Machiavelli  shows  how  the  most  successful  republics  
–  like  successful  principalities  –  sometimes  use  force  as  a  means  of  rule.  Similarly  he  
shows  how  the  most  successful  principalities  –  like  successful  republics  –  use  popular  
participation  as  a  source  of  stability  and  power.  For  Machiavelli,  the  best  republics  and  
                                                                                                              
  
arbitrary  exercise  of  power  at  its  core.  See  Frank  Lovett,  A  General  Theory  of  Domination  and  Justice  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2010),  2;  Philip  Pettit,  Republicanism:  a  Theory  of  Freedom  and  Government,  (Oxford:  
Clarendon  Press,  1997),  22-­‐‑26.  
2  There  are  important  differences  between  “principalities”  and  “republics”  on  the  one  hand  and  
“autocracies”  and  “democracies”  on  the  other,  but  for  the  most  part  they  can  be  used  interchangeably  when  
talking  about  regimes  where  the  people  at  large  participate  in  political  rule  and  those  where  they  do  not.  
Nevertheless,  I  will  use  Machiavelli’s  terms  when  discussing  his  thinking  in  detail,  particularly  in  chapters  
1-­‐‑5.  I  will  use  today’s  more  resonant  “democracy”  and  “non-­‐‑democracy”  when  explaining  the  importance  
and  implications  of  Machiavelli’s  ideas  at  present.  
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the  best  principalities  resemble  each  other  more  than  committed  partisans  of  either  
regime-­‐‑type  might  be  willing  to  accept.  
Accepting  the  idea  that  democracy  functions  better  by  using  means  typically  
associated  with  autocratic  rule  (and  vice  versa)  ought  not  diminish  our  support  for  
democracy,  but  it  ought  to  put  it  on  a  different  footing.  To  understand  that  footing  we  
have  to  understand  democracies  and  autocracies  as  Machiavelli  understood  republics  
and  principalities.  He  understood  these  different  types  of  regimes  as  composite  bodies,  
which  is  to  say  as  made  up  of  disparate  parts  meant  to  function  in  concert.  Prominent  
among  those  parts  are  two  political  classes:  the  people  at  large  and  the  elites.  We  tend  to  
think  of  autocracies  as  ruled  by  only  one  or  a  few  members  of  the  political  elite.  
Machiavelli,  we  shall  see,  offers  us  a  different  way  to  think  about  them.  According  to  
Machiavelli,  a  prince  –  the  analogue  of  an  autocrat  –  can  try  to  rule  alone,  over  and  
against  the  people,  but  to  do  so  would  be  to  cripple  his  power.  Instead,  a  prince  should  
solicit  popular  participation,  particularly  via  the  citizen-­‐‑militia,  in  order  to  partner  with  
the  people  in  marginalizing  the  greatest  sources  of  violent  oppression,  the  prince’s  
fellow  political  elites  and  rival  states  seeking  conquest.  Machiavelli  views  the  people  as  
fundamentally  motivated  to  avoid  being  oppressed,  rather  than  oppressing  others,  and  
so  as  the  greatest  guardians  of  liberty  even  in  a  principality.  Of  course,  Machiavelli  still  
endorses  the  prince’s  use  of  force  and  fraud,  but  he  endorses  these  shocking  practices  for  
the  purposes  of  intervening  against  rampant  violent  oppression  in  his  territory.    
  4  
He  endorses  similar  practices  in  republics  for  similar  reasons.  For  Machiavelli,  
avoiding  violent  oppression  justifies  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  even  in  regimes  where  
the  people  are  meant  to  rule.  Elites  in  republics  perform  many  of  the  same  functions  as  
princes  do  in  principalities.  In  contrast  to  those  regimes,  however,  the  people  participate  
in  rule  in  many  more  ways  than  only  participating  in  the  citizen-­‐‑militia.  In  particular,  
the  people  are  responsible  for  using  the  threat  of  force  to  police  elites,  who  they  in  turn  
rely  upon  to  intervene  against  each  other  when  one  steps  out  of  line  to  engage  in  
practices  of  oppression.  Both  classes  rely  upon  each  other  for  the  health  of  the  republic  –  
and  so  share  a  symbiotic  relationship  –  but  frequently  confront  and  compete  with  each  
other  –  and  so  share  an  agonistic  relationship.    
Machiavelli’s  view  of  a  praiseworthy  republic  clashes  strongly  with  the  vision  of  
democracy  that  has  triumphed  in  the  world.  A  praiseworthy  republic’s  political  classes  
will  be  far  more  antagonistic  in  their  political  interactions  than  democrats  of  today  might  
be  willing  to  accept.  Nevertheless,  the  popular  use  of  the  threat  of  violence  to  police  
elites  and  the  elite  use  of  force  and  fraud  to  police  themselves,  manipulate  the  people  
where  necessary,  and  defend  the  republic  are  all  essential  to  the  health  of  a  
Machiavellian  republic.  Machiavelli  would  be  a  defender  of  democracy  were  he  alive  
today,  but  for  the  sake  of  preventing  violent  oppression  he  would  temper  our  habit  of  
always  seeing  the  democratic  solution  as  the  best  one  for  a  given  problem.  For  instance,  
voting  may  not  always  be  enough  to  police  oppressive  elites  in  democracies,  the  use  of  
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force  that  saves  lives  may  be  legitimate  even  if  not  democratically  authorized,  and  
democratic  institutions  may  not  be  suitable  to  a  society  when  they  pave  the  way  to  
internecine  fighting.  
The  reading  that  follows  will  bring  to  light  the  framework  of  Machiavelli’s  
thought  that  would  undergird  such  criticism.  For  Machiavelli,  as  I  read  him,  the  
relationship  between  the  use  of  force  and  fraud,  class  politics,  and  regime-­‐‑type  
fundamentally  turned  on  the  pursuit  of  non-­‐‑oppression  within  a  given  territory.  
Principalities  and  republics  can  successfully  minimize  such  oppression  through  the  use  
of  force,  fraud,  and  appropriate  leveraging  of  class  politics,  in  addition  to  the  creation  of  
laws,  institutions,  and  political  norms.  While  Machiavelli  saw  republics  as  better  at  
minimizing  oppression  within  their  own  territories,  he  saw  principalities  as  capable  of  
being  successful  in  their  own  right.  More  importantly,  he  saw  the  kinds  of  practices  vital  
to  the  survival  of  a  principality  as  necessary  for  republican  success,  from  moments  of  
founding  to  moments  of  renewal  and  crisis.  Likewise,  he  saw  pure  autocracy  as  
impossible,  advising  princes  to  take  the  people  rather  than  a  clientelistic  machine  as  
their  basis  for  power.  My  Machiavelli,  to  put  the  matter  succinctly,  crafted  a  political  
theory  to  serve  the  interests  of  the  people  by  minimizing  violent  oppression  and  created  
a  rich  and  surprising  account  of  regime-­‐‑types  in  doing  so.  
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The State of Machiavelli Scholarship 
There  are  4  prominent  strands  of  existing  Machiavelli  scholarship  that  are  
relevant  to  the  question  at  hand.  To  those  4,  this  dissertation  adds  a  5th  perspective  from  
which  to  view  Machiavelli’s  work.  The  first  is  what  Yves  Winter  has  called  the  
“democratic  turn”  in  the  secondary  literature.  It  celebrates  Machiavelli  as  one  who  sees  
the  ends  of  the  people  as  the  touchstone  for  politics  and  one  who  regards  the  people  as  a  
tremendous  source  of  political  power.3  The  second  view  emphasizes  Machiavelli’s  
radical  newness,  most  often  insofar  as  this  view  sees  Machiavelli  describing  a  new  
understanding  of  politics  that  divorces  it  from  exogenous  sources  of  morality,  be  those  
sources  religion,  ancient  or  humanist  ethics,  or  natural  law.  The  third  sees  Machiavelli  as  
an  enthusiast  of  violence:  one  who  loved  war,  conquest,  and  the  pursuit  of  violence  for  
various  reasons  –  be  they  his  admiration  of  Roman  spiritedness  and  pagan  morality,  
aesthetic  understanding  of  politics,  or  anxieties  over  masculinity.  The  fourth  sees  
Machiavelli  as  an  extension  and  expression  of  various  Renaissance  worldviews,  
including  but  not  limited  to  civic  humanism,  republicanism,  and  Renaissance  
cosmology.    
The  unifying  contention  of  the  “democratic  turn”  is  that  the  people  will  be  the  
primary  beneficiary  of  a  Machiavelli  properly  understood.  Mary  Dietz,  for  example,  
argues  that  The  Prince  outlines  a  political  strategy  that,  if  followed  by  The  Prince’s  Medici  
                                                                                                              
3  Yves  Winter,  “Plebian  Politics:  Machiavelli  and  the  Ciompi  Uprising,”  Political  Theory  40,  no.  6  (2012):  737.  
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recipient,  would  result  in  a  regime  so  harsh  and  so  unstable  that  it  would  incite  a  
Florentine  revolution  and  the  reinstallation  of  a  republican  form  of  government.4  
Marxist  interpreters  such  as  Antonio  Gramsci  and  Louis  Althusser  see  Machiavelli  as  an  
analyst  of  hegemony  in  general  and  hegemony  in  Italy  specifically.5  For  them,  
Machiavelli’s  lasting  contribution  is  the  roadmap  to  a  popularly  grounded,  unified  
political  power  capable  of  overcoming  the  lasting  oppression  of  socioeconomic  elites.  
For  Maurice  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  populism  is  simply  the  axiom  from  which  Machiavelli’s  
ethics  begin.  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  writes  “[Machiavelli]  has  even  indicated  the  conditions  for  
a  politics  which  is  not  unjust:  it  will  be  the  one  which  satisfies  the  people.  Not  that  the  
people  know  everything,  but  because  if  anyone  is  innocent  they  are.”6  For  all  these  
scholars,  the  interests  of  the  people  are  the  moral  foundation  upon  which  Machiavellian  
politics  are  built.  
   John  McCormick’s  recent  book,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  is  perhaps  the  purest  
expression  of  this  view,  so  his  text  is  worth  a  closer  look  in  order  to  introduce  what  
follows.  For  McCormick,  Machiavelli’s  political  theory,  or  “Machiavellian  Democracy”  
as  he  calls  it,  “is  characterized  by  class-­‐‑specific,  popularly  empowering,  and  elite-­‐‑
constraining  institutions  that  accomplish  two  tasks:  they  raise  the  class  consciousness  of  
                                                                                                              
4  Mary  Dietz,  “Trapping  The  Prince:  Machiavelli  and  the  Politics  of  Deception,”  The  American  Political  Science  
Review  80,  no  3  (1986):  777.  
5  Louis  Althusser,  Machiavelli  and  Us,  (New  York:  Verso,  1999);  Antonio  Gramsci,  Selections  from  the  Prison  
Notebooks  (New  York:  International  Publishers,  1972),  123-­‐‑205.  
6  Maurice  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  “A  Note  on  Machiavelli,”  in  The  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  Reader,  edited  by  Ted  Toadvine,  
and  Leonard  Lawlor,  (Evanston,  Ill:  Northwestern  University  Press,  2007),  125.  
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common  citizens  and  formally  enable  them  to  patrol  more  exalted  citizens  with  a  vigor  
that  electoral  politics  in  and  of  itself  does  not  provide.”7  McCormick  is  absolutely  
correct,  and  the  reading  that  follows  in  this  dissertation  details  the  importance  of  
Machiavelli’s  recommendations  that  institutions  like  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  and  the  
tribunate,  which  are  fundamentally  grounded  in  the  popular  use  of  violence,  be  created  
to  that  end.8  That  said,  McCormick  overcompensates  in  his  corrective  to  the  popular  
image  of  Machiavelli.  He  writes,  “while  Machiavelli’s  most  famous  political  book,  The  
Prince,  appears  to  instruct  rulers  how  they  might  best  manipulate  the  people,  I  will  
demonstrate,  on  the  contrary,  that  his  most  important  and  perhaps  most  original  piece  
of  political  advice  is  something  quite  different:  how  common  people  might  control  
elites.”9  McCormick  is  right  on  the  second  count,  but  wrong  on  the  first.  The  Prince,  does  
not  simply  “appear”  to  teach  elites  how  to  manipulate  the  people,  it  does  so  in  fact.  This  
facet  of  The  Prince  cuts  against  the  grain  of  a  democratic  Machiavelli.  Many  of  the  
exercises  of  princely  power  that  Machiavelli  recommends  (including,  but  not  limited  to  
the  use  of  fraud)  are  in  tension  with  most  democratic  norms.10  
   In  fact,  Machiavelli  exhorts  the  leaders  of  principalities  and  republics  alike  to  use  
both  force  and  fraud  in  the  practice  of  politics.  This  exhortation  leads  the  second  strand  
                                                                                                              
7  John  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2011),16.  
8  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  34.  
9  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  3.  
10  They  are  also  not  limited  to  The  Prince  and  appear  as  well  in  Machiavelli’s  more  ‘democratic’  work,  The  
Discourses  on  Livy.  Compare  P18  to  DI.14  and  DIII.40.  
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of  literature  under  consideration  in  this  introduction  to  reevaluate  Machiavelli’s  ethics  
and  conclude  that,  in  the  words  of  Sheldon  Wolin,  “Machiavelli’s  conception  of  civic  
virtue  marked  an  important  stage  in  the  development  of  modern  political  thought  and  
practice,  for  it  symbolized  an  end  to  the  old  alliance  between  statecraft  and  soulcraft.”11  
Vickie  Sullivan,  for  example,  argues  that  Machiavelli  launches  an  attack  on  both  pagan  
and  Christian  Rome  in  order  to  develop  a  politics  in  which  “human  beings  are  to  be  
liberated  from  fear  of  the  gods,  but  not  from  human  beings,  for  human  beings  are  to  
assume  the  role  of  punisher  that  had  been  consigned  to  divine  beings.”12  For  Leo  
Strauss,  Machiavelli’s  separation  of  statecraft  and  soulcraft  is  an  artifact  of  Machiavelli’s  
placing  love  of  one’s  country  over  love  of  one’s  soul  and  opens  the  way  for  him  to  be  a  
“teacher  of  evil.”13  In  this  vein,  Steven  Forde  claims  “Machiavelli  insists  that  realist  logic  
inevitably  points  in  the  direction  of  universal  imperialism  and  the  repudiation  of  all  ethical  
restraints.”14  (Emphasis  mine)  In  doing  so,  to  return  to  the  words  of  Strauss,  Machiavelli  
“abandons  the  quest  for  the  best  political  order,  or  the  best  regime  as  a  regime  most  
conducive  to  the  practice  of  virtue  or  of  how  men  should  live”  and  in  his  wake  
                                                                                                              
11  Sheldon  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision;  Continuity  and  Innovation  in  Western  Political  Thought,  (Boston:  Little,  
Brown,  1960),  213.  
12  Vickie  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes:  Religion,  Human  Liberty,  and  Politics  Reformed.  (DeKalb,  Ill:  
Northern  Illinois  University  Press.  1996),  11.  
13  Leo  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1978),  9.  
14  Steven  Forde,  “International  Realism  and  the  Science  of  Politics:  Thucydides,  Machiavelli,  and  
Neorealism,”  International  Studies  Quarterly  39,  no.  2  (June  1995):  158.  
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modernity  is  left  not  with  the  aspiration  for  what  is  highest  in  human  beings,  but  rather  
the  mere  management  of  conflict.15  
This  view,  too,  captures  part  of  the  “effectual  truth”  of  Machiavelli.  Machiavelli  
does  launch  an  attack  on  his  ancient  and  Christian  antecedents  in  order  to  bring  about  
“new  modes  and  orders”  of  politics.  (D  PR.i)  In  place  of  those  antecedents,  Machiavelli  
must  formulate  a  code  of  political  conduct  capable  of  maintaining  political  and  social  
order.  Harvey  Mansfield  has  done  much  to  explain  this  dimension  of  Machiavelli’s  
thought.  In,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  Mansfield  encapsulates  the  task  Machiavelli  assigns  to  
political  leaders  in  principalities  and  republics  alike.  He  writes,  “when  fear  replaces  
justice  as  the  ground  for  politics,  acquisition  is  loosed  from  restraint;  political  science  
then  assumes  the  task  of  explaining  to  princes  how  they  must  acquire  and  keep  their  
states,  and  to  republics  how  they  must  overcome  corruption  and  expand.”16  
Machiavelli’s  teachings  on  force,  fraud,  and  “cruelties  badly  used  or  well  used,”  (P  8)  are  
thus  just  so  many  lessons  on  how  to  survive  and  even  thrive  in  a  world  where  others  can  
just  as  easily  resemble  foxes,  lions,  and  wolves  as  they  can  human  beings.  Politics,  on  
such  a  view,  is  a  life  and  death  contest  in  which  winners  earn  survival  and  even  acclaim,  
but  can  never  be  Aristotle’s  “Great  Souled  Man”  and  can  forget  about  entering  the  
                                                                                                              
15  Leo  Strauss,  “Three  Waves  of  Modernity,”  in  An  Introduction  to  Political  Philosophy:  Ten  Essays  By  Leo  
Strauss,  edited  by  Hilail  Gildin,  (Detroit:  Wayne  State  University  Press),  86.  
16  Harvey  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1996),  303.  
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kingdom  of  heaven.17  Mansfield  summarizes  this  trade-­‐‑off,  “On  our  behalf,  as  well  as  for  
his  own  glory,  Machiavelli  shuns  the  noble  and  closes  down  the  soul  in  the  belief  that  
these  uplifting  notions  are  sources  of  slavery.  He  keeps  virtue,  partly  as  a  sop  to  
virtuous  fools,  mostly  to  provide  the  energy  of  liberty.”18  Like  McCormick,  however,  
Mansfield  is  right  on  one  count  and  wrong  on  another.  Machiavelli  does  keep  virtue  to  
“provide  the  energy  of  liberty,”  but  to  say  that  Machiavelli  “shuns  the  noble”  is  
misleading.  Machiavelli  shuns  one  kind  of  nobility  for  another,  namely  the  pursuit  of  
non-­‐‑oppression  on  behalf  of  one’s  fellow  citizens.  This  pursuit  does  not  amount  to  state-­‐‑
sponsored  soulcraft  to  be  sure,  but  for  Machiavelli,  the  experience  of  violent  oppression  
nevertheless  results  in  moral  and  political  corruption.  Violent  oppression,  when  it  does  
not  simply  break  the  will  of  the  oppressed,  fuels  a  desire  for  vengeance  at  the  individual  
and  the  class  level.  As  Machiavelli  sees  it,  cycles  of  violent  civil  conflict  corrupt  social  
institutions  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  Thucydides’  depiction  of  the  Corcyrean  civil  
war.19  Fighting  that  corruption  is  an  unquestionably  noble  pursuit  and  requires  the  
ethical  innovations  for  which  Machiavelli  is  notorious.  
                                                                                                              
17  Aristotle,  The  Nichomachean  Ethics,  trans.  J.  A.  K.  Thomson  (New  York,  NY:  Penguin,  1976),  Book  IV,  
Chapter  3.  
18  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  52.  
19  “In  their  acts  of  vengeance  the  went  to  even  greater  lengths,  not  limiting  them  to  what  justice  or  the  good  
of  the  state  demanded,  but  making  the  party  caprice  of  the  moment  their  only  standard,  and  invoking  with  
equal  readiness  the  condemnation  of  an  unjust  verdict  or  the  authority  of  the  strong  arm  to  glut  the  
animosities  of  the  hour.”  Thucydides,  The  History  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  trans.  Richard  Crawley,  (New  
York:  Free  Press,  1996),  Book  3,  Chapters  82.  See  chapters  82-­‐‑84  for  further  discussion  of  the  corrupting  
effects  of  the  civil  war.  
  12  
Part  of  that  notoriety  stems  of  course,  from  the  apparent  gusto  with  which  
Machiavelli  discusses  acts  of  political  violence.  There  is  a  third  strand  of  the  literature  
which  seeks  to  explain  Machiavelli’s  enthusiasm  for  blood  and  gore  by  positing  on  
Machiavelli’s  part  a  commitment  to  something  other  than  the  necessities  of  power  
politics,  which  is  the  favored  position  of  the  strand  just  discussed.  Hannah  Pitkin,  for  
example,  identifies  autonomy  as  Machiavelli’s  “central  preoccupation,”  which  in  the  
context  of  what  she  sees  as  Machiavelli’s  “anxiety  about  being  sufficiently  masculine”  
produces  many  of  his  violent  tendencies.20  Diego  von  Vacano  advances  the  view  that  
Machiavelli’s  politics  –  and  his  imperial  politics  in  particular  –  must  be  understood  as  
part  of  an  aesthetic  framework.  Von  Vacano  writes  “Machiavelli  is  concerned  with  
drawing  a  picture  of  his  own  perspective  on  (political)  power  for  the  world  to  admire  as  
superior  to  others.  This  explains  why  he  is  able  to  follow  up  the  first  part  of  the  
Discourses  (often  considered  proto-­‐‑democratic  in  its  sense  of  liberty)  with  the  second  
part,  which  is  an  unflinching  admiration  of  Rome’s  expansion,  which-­‐‑like  any  empire  
took  the  freedom  of  the  many.”21  Mikael  Hörnqvist  and  Paul  Hulliung  need  no  such  
recourse  to  aesthetics  to  explain  Machiavelli’s  imperialism.  For  the  former,  it  is  the  
natural  extension  of  a  Florentine  twin  ideology  of  Libertas  and  Imperium  and  for  the  latter  
                                                                                                              
20  Hannah  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman:  Gender  and  Politics  in  the  Thought  of  Niccolò  Machiavelli.  (Berkeley:  
University  of  California  Press,  1984),  5-­‐‑7.  
21  Diego  von  Vacano,  The  Art  of  Power:  Machiavelli,  Nietzsche,  and  the  Making  of  Aesthetic  Political  Theory,  
(Lanham:  Lexington  Books,  2007)  15.  
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it  is  the  natural  extension  of  Machiavelli’s  fascination  with  Rome.22  Hulliung  writes,  “of  
all  republics  past  and  present  to  choose  from,  it  was  the  world-­‐‑conquering  Roman  
republic  that  arrested  Machiavelli’s  attention.”23  (Emphasis  mine)  All  of  the  readings  in  
this  strand  of  literature  rightly  seize  upon  Machiavelli’s  admiration  of  political  heroism  
in  general  and  martial  valor  in  particular.  
Patrick  Coby’s  Machiavelli’s  Romans  is  no  exception  and  is  particularly  insightful.  
To  call  forth  imagery  from  Plato’s  Republic,  Coby’s  Machiavelli  writes  for  the  timocrat  
who  has  usurped  the  power  of  the  philosopher  king.  “Machiavelli,”  he  writes,  “regards  
spiritedness  as  higher  than  reason,  which  is  its  auxiliary,  and  higher  than  appetite,  
which  is  its  rival.”24  Machiavelli  so  understood  values  liberty  as  an  ingredient  of  
greatness.25  A  liberated  people  is  a  people  that  will  defend  itself  at  home  and  pursue  
empire  abroad  with  the  greatest  spirit  and  vigor.  Liberated  peoples  competing  with  each  
other  will  produce  a  world  filled  with  exceptional  glory  and  strength  rather  than  
tediousness  and  weakness.  For  Coby’s  Machiavelli,  “glory  spread  round  is  the  common  
benefit,  plus  liberty  in  the  interim.  What  Machiavelli  wants  is  simply  this—a  first-­‐‑rate  
performance  by  champions  and  challengers  alike.”26    There  is  no  question  that  
Machiavelli  admires  an  aggressive,  masculine  form  of  politics.  Nevertheless,  Coby  and  
                                                                                                              
22  Mikael  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2004),  38.  
23  Mark  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli  (Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1983),  5.  
24  Patrick  Coby,  Machiavelli’s  Romans:  Liberty  and  Greatness  in  the  Discourses  on  Livy.  (Lanham,  Md:  Lexington  
Books.  1999),  17.  
25  Coby,  Machiavelli’s  Romans,  264.  
26  Coby,  Machiavelli’s  Romans,  283.  
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the  others  in  this  strand  of  literature  err  when  they  lose  sight  of  the  nature  of  
Machiavelli’s  ends  for  principalities  and  republics  alike.  Consider  Machiavelli’s  praise  of  
Rome.  The  Rome  that  Machiavelli  sees  as  having  the  most  virtuous  and  glorious  politics  
is  that  of  the  mature  republic.  This  republic  is  the  republic  of  the  Punic  wars.  It  is  the  
republic  that  looks  to  establish  its  dominance  within  and  around  the  Italian  peninsula.  
Once  Rome  became  the  ‘world-­‐‑conquering’  republic,  its  domestic  politics  became  
corrupt  and  it  fell  to  a  similar  kind  of  factional  strife  that  plagued  Machiavelli’s  beloved  
Florence.  Beyond  a  certain  point,  as  Rome’s  empire  expanded  outward,  violence  and  
violent  oppression  became  more  and  more  frequent  at  home.  So,  while  Machiavelli  
praises  the  Roman  army  and  Roman  elites  for  their  conquests,  there  is  a  reason  that  he  
spends  far  more  time  with  Roman  examples  like  Scipio  Africanus  and  Fabius  Maximus  
than  he  does  with  Julius  Caesar  and  Pompey.  
The  Roman  republic  as  it  expanded  outward  became  unbalanced  and  lost  its  
ability  to  maintain  itself  as  a  republic.  This  observation  is  one  common  to  the  fourth  
strand  of  Machiavelli  scholarship  under  consideration.  In  general,  this  strand  
emphasizes  Machiavelli’s  continuity  with  various  intellectual  traditions,  such  as  ancient  
political  philosophy,  civic  humanism,  and  renaissance  metaphysics  and  anthropology.  
These  readings  see  Machiavelli  as  drawing  upon  and  contributing  to  a  larger  tradition  of  
republican  thinking.  Some  of  these  scholars,  such  as  J.G.A.  Pocock,  agree  with  Coby  and  
Hörnqvist  that  Machiavelli  accepts  the  costs  of  republican  imperialism  and  endorses  it  
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anyway.  Pocock  says  that,  “Machiavelli’s  contributions  to  republican  theory  were  
extraordinarily  original,  but  were  based  on  and  limited  to  his  decision  that  military  
dynamism  was  to  be  preferred  before  the  search  for  stability.”27  While  Quentin  Skinner  
agrees  that  Machiavelli’s  preoccupation  with  military  matters  is  one  of  Machiavelli’s  
original  contributions  to  the  republican  tradition  of  which  he  is  a  part,  Skinner  
nevertheless  sees  Machiavelli  as  subordinating  his  militarism  to  communal  liberty.28  
Moreover,  Erica  Benner,  who  reads  Machiavelli  as  extending  and  elaborating  upon  the  
ideas  of  the  ancient  thinkers  who  were  his  sources,  cites  the  Tuscan  League  as  
Machiavelli’s  preferred  mode  of  expansion.  She  observes,  “compared  with  the  built-­‐‑in  
tendencies  of  the  Roman  mode  of  unchecked  ambition,  violence,  and  tyranny,  the  self-­‐‑
imposed  limits  found  in  the  mode  of  leagues  seem  more  likely  to  achieve  the  benefits  of  
strong  imperio  without  the  risks  of  dominio.”29  This  mode  of  “collaborative  self-­‐‑defense,”  
she  argues,  is  far  more  consistent  with  Machiavelli’s  aims  than  Roman  conquest.30  Given  
these  various  interpretations,  we  can  see  that  Machiavelli’s  record  on  the  question  of  
violence  and  its  use  to  prevent  or  cause  oppression  is  mixed  among  those  who  see  him  
as  expanding  or  building  upon  a  given  extant  tradition  of  thought.    
                                                                                                              
27  J.G.A.  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment:  Florentine  Political  Thought  and  the  Atlantic  Republican  Tradition.  
(Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1975),  209.  
28  Quentin  Skinner,  Foundations  of  Modern  Political  Thought:  Volume  1,  The  Renaissance,  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  1978),  130;  See  also  Quentin  Skinner,  “The  Idea  of  Negative  Liberty,”  in  
Philosophy  in  History:  Essays  in  the  Historiography  of  Philosophy,  ed.  Richard  Rorty,  Jerome  B.  Schneewind,  
Quentin  Skinner  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1984),  210.  
29  Erica  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics.  (Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  2009),  476.  
30  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  479.
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That  said,  this  strand  has  provided  considerable  insight  into  Machiavelli’s  
concerns,  motivations,  and  conceptual  frameworks,  and  are  particularly  helpful  in  
explaining  why  Machiavelli  would  endorses  the  use  of  violence  in  the  pursuit  of  
eliminating  or  at  least  reducing  oppression.  While  Quentin  Skinner  in  his  essay  “The  
Idea  of  Negative  Liberty,”  makes  an  incredibly  persuasive  argument  for  considering  the  
liberty  of  the  people  to  be  Machiavelli’s  central  priority,  it  is  Anthony  Parel  who  points  
out  that  Machiavelli’s  politics  from  The  Prince  and  the  Discourses  to  the  Art  of  War  and  
Florentine  Histories  are  geared  to  satisfy  the  demand  of  one’s  own  people  not  to  be  
oppressed,  that  is  to  be  left  alone.  In  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  Parel  explains  
Machiavelli’s  use  of  the  theory  of  the  humors,  which  was  dominant  in  the  Renaissance.  
The  theory  of  the  humors  originated  as  a  medical  theory  with  Hippocrates  and  retained  
its  dominance  in  medical  circles  till  the  eighteenth  century.  For  Machiavelli,  they  form  
the  basis  of  his  understanding  not  of  human  bodies,  but  of  political  ones.  Humors  are  
the  political  drives,  associated  with  political  classes,  which  fuel  the  behavior  of  a  
regime.31  In  one  of  his  rare  moments  of  consistency  across  The  Prince  and  the  Discourses,  
Machiavelli  associates  the  drive  to  oppress  with  political  elites  and  the  drive  to  not  be  
oppressed  with  the  people.  As  a  result,  principalities,  republics,  and  everything  in  
between  can  be  classified  in  terms  of  their  humoral  states,  i.e.,  who  is  and  who  is  not  
                                                                                                              
31  Anthony  Parel,  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  (New  Haven,  Yale  University  Press,  1992),  8.  
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oppressed  and  how.32  Parel  writes,  “seen  from  the  perspective  of  umore/i,  The  Prince  
appears  to  present  us  with  the  picture  of  a  body  politic  whose  humours  [sic]  are  not  in  
proper  proportion,  and  whose  cure  would  require  the  intervention  of  an  able  ‘doctor’  
prepared  to  administer  purges,  strong  medicines,  or  whatever  else  it  might  take  to  
improve  the  health  of  the  organism.”33  We  will  see  in  what  follows  that  the  prince  is  that  
“able  doctor”  who  must  use  “strong  medicines”  against  the  humor  associated  with  the  
elite’s  desire  to  oppress.  Parel  continues,  “the  Discourses,  on  the  other  hand,  presents  us  
with  the  picture  of  a  healthy  body  politic.  Rome  is  able  to  develop  itself  into  a  free,  
virtuous,  and  expanding  republic  precisely  because  here  the  humours  [sic]  were  
operating  in  an  ordered  manner.”34  I  agree  with  Parel  and  will  argue  below  that  Rome’s  
praiseworthy  political  outcomes  were  the  product  of  her  partnership  between  political  
classes  (i.e.,  a  product  of  her  properly  ordered  humors).  This  partnership,  though  it  may  
have  been  agonistic,  was  symbiotic,  satisfying  the  popular  humor  for  non-­‐‑oppression  
and  venting  the  elite  humor  outward  through  Rome’s  “mighty  enterprises.”  (D  I.53.iv)  
For  all  the  perspicacity  of  his  understanding  of  Machiavelli,  however,  Parel  
historicizes  him.  While  it  may  be  true  that  “philosophic  anthropology  is  no  longer  based  
on  fantasia,  humours  [sic],  and  temperament,”  one  need  not  abandon  them  as  metaphor  
                                                                                                              
32  “The  Florentine  Histories,  in  its  turn  present  us  with  the  picture  of  a  body  politic  whose  humours  [sic]  are  
malignant,  and  which  is  unlucky  enough  to  be  without  an  innovator  –  until,  that  is,  Machiavelli  himself  was  
asked  by  Leo  X  to  write  a  constitution  for  it.”  Parel,  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  8.  
33  Parel,  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  8.  
34  Parel,  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  8.  
  18  
or  guiding  idea.35  Indeed,  at  the  core  of  what  follows  is  a  presumption  in  favor  of  the  
ongoing  utility  of  the  idea  of  political  humors  because  they  create  a  foundation  for  non-­‐‑
oppression  of  one’s  fellow  citizens  as  the  guiding  standard  for  the  use  of  political  
violence  in  a  given  territory.  That  is  how  the  idea  operates  in  Machiavelli’s  body  of  
political  thought,  and  the  pages  that  follow  are  motivated  by  the  prima  facie  confidence  
in  the  value  of  that  political  thought.    
That  claim,  however,  can  only  be  verified  on  the  basis  of  an  accurate  portrait  of  
Machiavelli’s  thought.  Such  a  portrait  requires  that  one  first  view  Machiavelli  from  all  
four  perspectives  we  have  just  examined:  that  of  the  democratic  Machiavelli,  the  
Machiavelli  who  separates  statecraft  and  soulcraft,  the  Machiavelli  enthused  with  
violence,  and  the  Machiavelli  who  reflects  continuity  more  than  change  in  western  
political  and  philosophical  thought.  All  offer  something  necessary  to  understanding  
Machiavelli’s  views  on  the  use  of  violence  for  the  purposes  of  preventing  the  oppression  
of  one’s  fellow  citizens,  but  also  only  represent  a  partial  view  and  often  sit  in  tension  
with  the  others.  The  “democratic  turn”  for  example,  rightly  points  out  that  the  people,  
and  their  ends,  are  Machiavelli’s  moral  touchstone.  That  said,  this  view  often  ignores  or  
downplays  the  hardball  politics  that  Machiavelli  endorses,  especially  in  The  Prince.  
Those  who  separate  Machiavelli’s  statecraft  from  ancient  soulcraft,  attend  well  to  
Machiavelli’s  cutthroat  tactics,  but  ignore  the  fact  that  the  purpose  of  those  tactics  is  the  
                                                                                                              
35  Parel,  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  159.  
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liberation  of  large  numbers  of  one’s  fellow  citizens  from  violent  oppression,  which  
degrades  their  souls.  Likewise,  those  who  see  Machiavelli  as  an  enthusiast  for  violence  
rightly  observe  the  aggressive  and  muscular  nature  of  his  politics,  but  mistake  the  
means  for  the  ends.  Machiavelli  does  admire  a  kind  of  political  heroism,  especially  
among  the  elites  of  Rome,  but  they  are  not  heroes  solely  because  they  wielded  power.  It  
is  this  point,  especially  in  the  context  of  Machiavelli’s  thinking  on  republics,  that  those  
who  see  Machiavelli  as  situated  within  and  building  upon  various  traditions  make  so  
well.  Machiavelli  may  be  for  the  people,  but  relies  upon  the  people  and  the  elite  alike  to  
reduce  violent  oppression  within  their  shared  political  body.  This  strand,  however,  too  
often  historicizes  Machiavelli  and  relegates  him  to  whichever  tradition  with  which  it  
seeks  to  align  him,  be  it  civic  humanist,  Greco-­‐‑Roman,  Renaissance  cosmological  
thinking,  and  so  on.  Each  of  these  traditions,  in  turn  are  far  too  optimistic  about  the  
collegial  nature  of  class  politics.  Machiavelli  is  a  theorist  of  class  antagonism,  and  that  
antagonism  results  in  the  freedom  from  violent  oppression  for  the  many  and  only  
secondary  goods  for  the  few.  
   The  interpretation  of  Machiavelli  that  follows  draws  on  all  four  of  these  
perspectives  on  his  thought  and  adds  to  them  an  additional  motif:  the  intimacy  between  
Machiavelli’s  thinking  on  violence  and  Machiavelli’s  quest  to  discover  a  means  by  which  
states  –  principalities  and  republics  alike  –  can  prevent  or  at  least  minimize  violent  
oppression  within  their  borders.  This  quest  took  Machiavelli  down  various  roads.  As  a  
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military  thinker,  it  led  him  to  a  consideration  of  the  virtue  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia.  In  writing  
on  principalities,  it  led  him  to  develop  countermeasures  to  the  brutal  nature  of  elites  
bent  on  oppression  and  the  necessity  of  a  prince  allying  with  and  empowering  the  
people.  As  a  student  of  republics,  it  led  him  to  see  the  wisdom  in  recruiting  the  people  to  
police  the  elites  by  leveraging  their  authority  through  the  tribunate  to  intervene  by  force,  
if  necessary,  against  oppression  from  those  elites.  Simultaneously  it  led  him  to  see  the  
wisdom  in  opening  avenues  by  which  elites  could  satisfy  their  desire  for  glory  as  a  
substitute  for  satisfying  their  more  pernicious  drives.  Finally  as  a  lover  of  Florence,  he  
sought  means  by  which  the  Florentine  people  (and  Italians  in  general)  could  liberate  
themselves  from  their  own  condition  of  violent  oppression.  
Plan of the dissertation 
“I  love  my  native  city  more  than  my  soul,”  writes  Machiavelli  in  a  letter  to  
Francesco  Vettori  on  April  16,  1527.36  Given  this  claim,  it  seems  fitting  to  enter  into  
Machiavelli’s  thought  by  way  of  that  love.  If  Machiavelli  set  Florence  above  his  own  
soul,  then  Florence,  and  its  suffering,  probably  occupied  the  central  place  in  
Machiavelli’s  thought.  At  the  very  least,  the  problems  that  beset  Florence  defined  the  
questions  he  sought  to  answer.  In  order  to  preview  those  questions,  I  begin  with  a  
consideration  of  Machiavelli’s  Florentine  Histories  to  specify  the  problems  of  violent  
                                                                                                              
36  Niccolò  Machiavelli,  “Letter  to  Francesco  Vettori,  April  16,  1527,”  In  Machiavelli:  Chief  Works  and  Others,  
Vol.  2,  ed.  and  trans.  Allan  Gilbert,  (Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  1989),  1010.  
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oppression  that  he  addresses  in  his  other  principal  texts:  The  Art  of  War,  The  Prince,  and  
Discourses  on  Livy.    
The  Florentine  Histories  is  not  simply  a  discursive  account  of  events,  but  like  
Machiavelli’s  ancient  historical  sources,  featured  a  set  of  quasi-­‐‑fictional  speeches.  The  
use  of  such  speeches  was  common  among  renaissance  historians  as  well  as  the  ancient  
historians  who  frequently  served  as  their  models.  While  some  historians  explain  the  
purpose  of  the  use  of  such  speeches  in  their  texts,  Machiavelli  does  not.37  Machiavelli  
may  have  used  the  speeches  in  part  as  a  covert  way  to  critique  the  Medici,  the  family  to  
which  the  commissioner  (Pope  Leo  X)  and  the  dedicatee  (Pope  Clement  VII)  both  
belonged.38  The  speeches  may  simply  have  been  rhetorical  flourishes,  designed  to  
embellish  the  work.39  They  may  also  have  been  a  way  in  which  Machiavelli  could  make  
his  own  thinking  more  apparent.    In  any  case,  they  give  us  great  insight  into  
Machiavelli’s  understanding  of  the  historical  attempts  to  solve  the  chronic  problems  that  
resulted  from  the  relentless  pursuit  of  domination  that  plagued  Florentine  politics.  The  
speeches  may  have  been  fictitious,  but  the  arguments  they  made  and  their  proposed  
                                                                                                              
37  Thucydides,  The  History  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  Book  1,  Chapter  22.  
38  Machiavelli  never  confesses  to  this  bit  of  literary  deception  in  his  own  letters.  Donato  Giannotti,  a  friend  of  
Machiavelli’s  reports  it  in  a  letter  Antonio  Michieli,  dated  30  June  1533.  Donato  Giannotti,  “Letter  to  Antonio  
Michieli,  June  30  1533,”  in  Niccolò  Machiavelli,  Chief  Works,  and  Others,  vol.  2,  trans.  Allan  H.  Gilbert,  
(Durham,  NC:  Duke  University  Press,  1989),  1028.  
39  Felix  Gilbert,  “Machiavelli’s  Istorie  Fiorentine:  An  Essay  in  Interpretation,”  in  History,  Choice,  and  
Commitment  (Cambridge,  MA:  Belknap  Press,  1977),  137.  
  22  
solutions  to  the  problems  of  their  times  were  both  serious  enough  to  merit  space  in  
Machiavelli’s  history  of  the  city  that  he  loved  more  than  his  soul.  
With  this  in  mind,  I  will  examine  five  of  these  speeches  to  help  us  come  to  terms  
with  the  problems  of  violent  oppression  Machiavelli  tried  to  address  and  the  solutions  
he  recommends.  The  five  speeches  are  made  during  two  moments  of  Florentine  political  
upheaval:  the  rule  of  the  Duke  of  Athens  (Walter  VI,  Count  of  Brienne)  in  1342  and  the  
Ciompi  Revolt  in  1378.  Such  moments  are  prime  examples  of  Florence’s  chronic  political  
crises,  the  diagnosis  of  which  Machiavelli  declares  to  be  his  principal  interest  in  writing  
the  Florentine  Histories.  Extant  histories  of  Florence  by  Bruni  and  Bracciolini,  he  notes,  
failed  to  give  a  proper  account  of  civil  discord.  Detailed  accounts  of  civil  discord,  
however,  deserve  pride  of  place  in  histories  because  “if  no  other  lesson  is  useful  to  the  
citizens  who  govern  republics,  it  is  that  which  shows  the  causes  of  the  hatreds  and  
divisions  in  the  city.”  (FH  PR.1.i)  If  civil  discord  is  not  properly  managed,  Machiavelli  
goes  on  to  note,  it  undermines  political  unity.  In  Florence  it  resulted  in  “as  many  dead,  
as  many  exiles,  and  as  many  families  destroyed  as  in  recent  memory.”  (FH  PR.1.i)  Had  
Florence  not  suffered  from  improperly  managed  civil  discord,  Machiavelli  can  think  of  
“no  republic  either  modern  or  ancient  that  would  have  been  its  superior,  so  full  of  
virtue,  of  arms,  and  of  industry  it  would  have  been.”  (FH  PR.1.i)  Most  importantly,  civil  
discord  of  the  kind  experienced  by  Florence  ended  in  uncontrolled  violence  and  so  was  
a  tool  of  oppression  for  some,  a  scourge  for  many  others.  Compare  Florence  to  
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Machiavelli’s  aspirational  touchstone:  Rome.  In  Rome,  “the  grave  and  natural  enmities  
that  exist  between  the  men  and  the  nobles”  were  resolved  “by  disputing,”  “ended  with  
law,”  “and  always  increased  military  virtue.”  In  Florence,  they  were  resolved  by  
“fighting,”  ended  “with  the  exile  and  death  of  many  citizens,”  and  “eliminated  [military  
virtue]  altogether.”  (FH  III.1)  These  divergent  patterns  of  violence  and  conflict  resulted  
in  a  Rome  that  “by  growing  in  virtue,  grew  in  power,”  and  a  Florence  that  became  “ever  
more  humble  and  abject.”  (FH  III.1)  Did  Machiavelli,  who  signed  himself  “historico,  
comico  et  tragico”  in  a  letter  to  his  friend  Guicciardini,  find  Florence’s  struggles  to  be  
both  tragic  and  comic?40  Possibly.  Whatever  the  case,  Machiavelli’s  flare  for  the  dramatic  
certainly  makes  the  fictional  speeches  of  the  Florentine  Histories  a  good  place  to  take  
stock  of  the  puzzle  pieces  that  I  will  examine  in  my  discussion  of  the  Art  of  War,  the  
Prince,  and  The  Discourses  on  Livy.  
   When  Mastino  della  Scala,  Lord  of  Verona,  sought  to  divest  himself  of  his  
possession  of  Lucca  in  1341  by  selling  it  rather  than  losing  it  by  force,  he  struck  a  deal  
with  Florence  for  the  sale  of  the  city  for  250,000  florins.41  Lucca,  particularly  under  the  
able  rule  of  Castruccio  Castracani  in  the  early  14th  century,  had  long  been  a  counterpoint  
to  the  dysfunction  of  Florence  and,  like  Pisa,  a  counterweight  to  Florence’s  pursuit  of  
                                                                                                              
40  Niccolò  Machiavelli,  “Letter  To  Guicciardini,  Oct  21,  1525”  in  Niccolò  Machiavelli,  Chief  Works,  and  Others,  
vol.  2,  trans.  Allan  H.  Gilbert,  (Durham,  NC:  Duke  University  Press,  1989),  987.  
41  John  Najemy,  A  History  of  Florence:  1200-­‐‑1575,  (Malden,  MA:  Blackwell,  2006),  421.  
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regional  hegemony.42  As  a  result,  it  is  fitting  that  Florence’s  attempt  to  acquire  a  military  
and  political  rival  by  purchase  would  result  in  not  only  a  fiscal  crisis  within  Florence  but  
also  a  military  crisis  in  the  ensuing  war  with  Pisa  over  control  of  Lucca.  Florence’s  
attempt  to  buy  power  in  the  mid  14th  century  was  a  spectacular  failure.  In  the  case  of  the  
Lucchese  episode,  “the  Florentines  were  driven  off  with  a  loss  of  money  and  acquisition  
of  shame.”  (FH  II.33.i)  Florence  needed  her  own  arms.  Rather  than  taking  the  proper  
steps  to  arm  the  city  in  the  midst  of  a  chaotic  and  dangerous  interstate  system,  “the  
Twenty”  (a  council  of  leading  citizens  entrusted  with  emergency  powers)  wrote  to  
Robert,  King  of  Naples  for  assistance,  and  received  Walter  VI,  count  of  Brienne  (titularly  
“Duke  of  Athens”)  in  return.  (FH  II.33.i)  
   In  an  attempt  to  garner  public  support  and  to  come  under  the  protection  of  the  
Duke,  the  Twenty  turned  most  of  their  powers  over  to  him.43  (FH  II.33.i)  Their  intentions  
were  good  perhaps,  but  they  failed  to  attend  to  the  following  question:  “What  kind  of  
armed  forces  are  the  least  likely  to  engage  in  practices  of  oppression  and  most  likely  to  
be  sufficiently  capable  of  civil  defense?”  This  question  would  occupy  Machiavelli  for  
much  of  his  life.  The  political  crisis  that  followed  the  Duke’s  rise  to  power  was  a  case  
study  in  the  virtues  of  homegrown  arms  over  those  bought  or  borrowed,  which  is  the  
subject  of  Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War  and  chapter  1  of  this  dissertation.  To  the  shock  and  
                                                                                                              
42  Machiavelli  wrote  a  fictionalized  account  of  Castruccio’s  life  as  quasi-­‐‑parallel  to  that  of  Cesare  Borgia.  
Niccolò  Machiavelli,  “Life  of  Castruccio  Castracani,”  in  Chief  Works,  and  Others,  vol.  2,  trans.  Allan  H.  Gilbert,  
(Durham,  NC:  Duke  University  Press,  1989),  553.    
43  Najemy,  A  History  of  Florence,  135.  
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dismay  of  the  Twenty,  the  Duke  of  Athens  turned  on  them  as  the  parties  responsible  for  
Florence’s  ills.  To  consolidate  his  political  power,  the  Duke  of  Athens  marginalized  the  
power  of  the  noble  families  by  purchasing  in  mercenary  style  the  poorest  of  Florence’s  
citizens  into  his  service  and  importing  French  military  and  political  muscle.  As  
Machiavelli  tells  the  story  in  the  Florentine  Histories,  the  Duke  did  so  following  a  speech  
in  which  he  attempted  to  soothe  the  concerns  of  the  Signori  over  his  political  aims  and  
methods.  Indeed,  the  Duke  said  all  the  things  that  the  concerned  families  might  want  to  
hear.  He  promised  the  restoration  of  Florence’s  freedom  “for  only  disunited  cities  were  
enslaved  and  united  ones  free.”  (FH  II.35.i)  To  project  power  abroad,  the  Duke  promised  
to  pursue  the  elimination  of  “sects,  ambitions,  and  enmities.”  (FH  II.35.i)  While  
Machiavelli  would  not  counsel  the  complete  elimination  of  ambitions  and  enmities,  
because  the  agonistic  and  symbiotic  partnership  between  the  people  and  elite  can  be  
politically  useful,  the  Duke’s  intention  to  eliminate  sects  was  certainly  laudable  at  the  
time  in  Machiavelli’s  view.  The  Duke,  however,  did  not  do  as  he  promised,  eliminating  
no  sects  and  instead  created  his  own  clientelistic  military  and  political  structure.  This  
kind  of  rule,  for  Machiavelli,  is  among  the  most  damnable.  In  the  case  of  the  Duke’s  rule,  
“citizens  live(d)  full  of  indignation  as  they  saw  the  majesty  of  their  state  ruined,  the  
orders  laid  waste,  the  laws  annulled,  every  decent  being  corrupted,  all  civil  modesty  
eliminated.”  (FH  II.36.ii)  And  “above  all  else,  what  displeased  was  the  violence  that  he  
and  his  men  did,  without  any  respect  to  the  women”.  (FH  II.36.ii)  
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   Where  did  the  Twenty  go  wrong?  They  had  turned  to  the  Duke  as  a  protector,  
even  rendering  that  title  upon  him.  But  in  doing  so  they  failed  to  attend  to  the  question  
that  occupies  much  of  book  III  of  Plato’s  Republic:  the  control  of  those  vested  with  
military  and  police  power.  In  the  Republic,  the  interlocutors  focus  on  the  training  of  the  
“souls”  of  those  who  bear  arms  as  a  method  of  control.44  As  it  turns  out,  Machiavelli’s  
solution  to  this  particular  problem  of  violent  oppression,  as  I  shall  show  below,  also  
takes  up  the  question  of  the  character  of  those  who  bear  arms.  For  Machiavelli,  only  an  
armed  body  made  up  of  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  –  and  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  who  do  not  rely  on  the  
use  of  violence  for  income  –  is  both  capable  of  projecting  sufficient  force  abroad  and  can  
be  relied  upon  to  forswear  and  even  prevent  projects  of  oppression  at  home.  
Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War,  if  nothing  else,  is  a  defense  of  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  and  the  citizen-­‐‑
soldier  who  serves  in  it.  The  Duke  of  Athens  correctly  identified  political  sectarianism  as  
an  opening  for  political  violence.  But  whether  by  design  or  by  error,  he  created  a  
clientelistic  machine  that  operated  as  a  sect  to  oppress  everyone  else.  The  Duke  of  
Athens  was  right  to  bring  Florentine  citizens  into  the  fold,  but  the  citizens  he  recruited  
were  so  poor  and  so  eager  for  avenging  the  constant  abuse  that  they  suffered  at  the  
hands  of  Florentine  elites  that  they  used  their  newfound  power  to  commit  the  crimes  
mentioned  above.  The  Art  of  War  teaches  its  reader  how  to  balance  these  concerns.  It  
answers  questions  such  as:  What  kind  of  person  can  be  trusted  as  a  protector?  How  does  
                                                                                                              
44  Plato,  The  Republic,  trans.  Allan  Bloom  (New  York:  Basic  Books,  1991),  63-­‐‑96.  
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one  properly  balance  private  interests  with  public  duties?  And  what  kind  of  armed  
forces  resist  being  used  in  projects  of  oppression?  For  Machiavelli,  using  violence  to  
prevent  violent  oppression  begins  with  the  creation  of  mechanisms  for  the  reliable  and  
non-­‐‑oppressive  use  of  force.  I  begin  this  dissertation  there  as  well.  
Machiavelli’s  insistence  on  broad  citizen  participation  in  “guarding”  their  
“patria”  does  not,  however,  end  with  the  Art  of  War.  Florence  strived  to  be  a  republic,  
which  begs  the  question  of  whether  citizen  arms  are  meant  to  be  republican  arms  or  
universal  arms.  Machiavelli’s  answer  indicates  the  latter.  Chapter  2  turns  to  the  
prominent  role  played  by  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  in  The  Prince.  There,  Machiavelli  repeats  his  
assertion  that  citizen-­‐‑militias  are  the  most  reliable  mechanism  by  which  a  state  can  
defend  itself.  He  also  goes  on  to  tie  such  institutions  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  popular  
humor,  which  articulates  itself  as  a  desire  not  to  be  oppressed.  This  desire  is  so  strong  
and  of  such  moral  weight  that  Machiavelli  recommends  that  even  princes  cater  to  it.  
This  recommendation  is  underscored  by  the  prudence  of  doing  so.  The  ability  of  a  
regime,  republic  or  not,  to  satisfy  the  people’s  desire  not  to  be  oppressed  is  a  core  
element  of  the  goodness  of  a  regime,  both  in  terms  of  being  praiseworthy  and  sound.  
The  Duke  of  Athens,  who  did  not  “lack  anything  as  a  prince,  but  the  title,”  
should  have  understood  this  dynamic.  (FH  II.34.i)  His  rule  in  Florence  was  going  to  
succeed  or  fail  on  the  basis  of  his  ability  to  navigate  the  hatred  and  enmities  of  that  city.  
Indeed,  it  is  the  Florentine  Signori  that  warn  him  to  secure  himself  against  the  power  of  
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hatred.  “Amidst  universal  hatred,”  they  warn  the  Duke,  “one  can  never  find  any  
security.”  (FH  II.34.iii)  These  Florentine  nobles  counsel  the  Duke  to  maintain  his  alliance  
with  them,  condemning  foreign  support  as  dangerous  and  popular  support  as  fickle.  
This  self-­‐‑serving  argument  is  half-­‐‑right  and  half-­‐‑wrong.  Foreign  support  is  dangerous,  
but  popular  support  is  only  fickle  when  the  government  abuses  the  people.  A  
population  that  suffers  violence  becomes  one  that  is  willing  to  do  violence.  The  signori  
warn  the  Duke  “to  find  a  violent  state  with  a  good  prince  is  impossible,  for  of  necessity  
they  must  become  alike  or  the  one  quickly  ruins  the  other.”  (FH  II.34.iii)  How  right  they  
are  from  Machiavelli’s  perspective.  How  wrong,  however,  is  their  assumption  that  one  
should  eschew  popular  support.  Machiavelli  would  have  them  take  their  own  
exhortation  to  “Think,  lord,  how  much  force  will  be  necessary  to  keep  such  a  city  
enslaved.”  (FH  II.34.iii)  ‘Think,  Signori,  Machiavelli  might  say,  how  much  less  force  one  
requires  when  your  arms  are  those  of  people  you  have  not  abused.’    
In  Chapter  2  I  argue  that  Machiavelli’s  advice  in  The  Prince  very  much  turns  
upon  how  much  less  force  one  requires  to  maintain  power  by  using  citizen  arms.  By  
arming  the  people,  the  prince  arms  himself.  Contrary  to  the  claims  of  the  Signori,  
Machiavelli  asserts  that  the  people  are  the  prince’s  most  reliable  partners.  Machiavelli  
argues  that  their  humor  –  the  desire  not  to  be  oppressed  –  can  be  easily  satisfied  and  is  
“more  decent”  than  that  of  the  elites.  The  humor  of  the  elites  –  the  desire  to  engage  in  
oppressive  practices  –  is  not  so  easily  satisfied.  In  fact,  Machiavelli  argues,  it  is  
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insatiable;  so  much  so  that  the  elite  represent  a  dangerous  threat  to  the  prince  himself  
and  an  alliance  with  the  people  maximizes  the  prince’s  relative  security.  This  alliance  
also  has  the  effect  of  redounding  to  the  security  of  the  people  themselves,  and  so  helps  
them  avoid  the  oppression  of  the  elite,  the  prince  included.  The  people,  properly  armed  
and  properly  trained,  become  a  constraint  against  potential  abuses.    
Easier  said  than  done,  of  course.  The  Duke  of  Athens  rejected  at  least  in  part  the  
Signori’s  advice  and  behaved  partially  in  accordance  with  the  advice  Machiavelli’s  gives  
in  The  Prince.  Where  did  he  go  wrong?  Without  a  doubt,  his  liberal  incorporation  of  
foreigners  into  his  political  and  military  apparatus  contributed  to  the  abuses  of  his  rule  –  
but  what  of  those  committed  by  Florentines  themselves?  Machiavelli’s  exhortation  to  
use  a  citizen  militia  is  predicated  upon  the  loyalty  and  fidelity  of  the  people  and  the  fact  
that  abusive  practices  are  contrary  to  the  popular  humor.  The  answer  lies  in  the  fact  that  
the  popular  humor,  even  armed  and  embodied  in  the  citizen  militia,  is  not  always  
enough  to  curb  the  machinations  of  the  elites  that  seek  to  oppress  them.  The  steps  that  
Machiavelli  recommends  in  The  Prince  in  order  to  account  for  this  gap  are  the  subjects  of  
chapter  3.  They  make  up  Machiavelli’s  answer  to  question,  “when  is  the  prince  justified  
in  using  force  and  fraud  on  behalf  of  the  people  without  first  securing  their  consent?”  
Among  them  would  have  been  included  a  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  Duke  that  the  
lowest  of  Florence’s  economic  classes  –  upon  whom  he  relied  for  so  much  muscle  –  had  
been  so  abused,  so  “beaten  and  despoiled”  to  borrow  the  language  of  The  Prince  (P  26.i),  
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that  abuse  had  become  part  of  their  nature  and  a  desire  for  vengeance  was  in  their  
blood.  Sometimes  a  prince  must  move  the  people  away  from  a  dominant  strategy  of  
violence  before  he  can  rely  on  them  as  partners  against  the  elite.  Machiavelli  praises  
another  Duke  –  Cesare  Borgia  (Duke  Valentino)  –  for  taking  on  precisely  such  a  project  
in  the  Romagna.  Previous  lords  of  the  Romagna  had  “been  readier  to  despoil  their  
subjects”  than  to  promote  lawful  behavior.  (P  7.iv)  That  previous  behavior  created  an  
obstacle  that  Borgia  had  to  clear  because  “when  that  community  of  which  you  have  need  
to  maintain  yourself  is  corrupt,  whether  they  are  the  people  or  the  soldiers  or  the  great,  
you  must  follow  their  humor  to  satisfy  them,  and  then  good  deeds  are  your  enemy.”  
(Emphasis  mine,  P  19.vii)  Borgia  had  to  take  steps  to  bring  some  semblance  of  order  
back  to  the  region  before  he  could  rely  on  the  “decency”  of  the  popular  humor.  In  the  
case  of  Florence,  the  Duke  of  Athens  could  not  have  attempted  to  rule  virtuously,  even  if  
he  knew  and  wished  to  do  so,  till  he  had  brought  the  cycle  of  abuse  and  oppression  to  an  
end.  Stopping  that  cycle  may  have  required  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  on  his  part,  as  it  
did  on  the  part  of  Duke  Valentino  in  the  Romagna.  
That  Florence  suffered  from  a  people  that  had  come  to  mirror  the  elite  in  its  
destructive  tendencies  is  born  out  in  Machiavelli’s  description  of  the  Ciompi  Revolt,  a  
civil  crisis  that  took  place  nearly  four  decades  after  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  Duke  of  
Athens.  In  1378,  following  legislative  controversies  between  representatives  of  the  guild  
community  and  the  Guelf  Party,  guildsmen  attacked  and  burned  the  homes  of  party  
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leaders  in  response  to  the  resignation  of  Salvestro  Di  Medici  from  his  position  as  
Gonfaloniere  of  Justice.  While  Salvestro  would  later  be  a  major  player  in  the  counter-­‐‑
revolution  following  the  Ciompi  Revolt  his  resignation  represented,  at  the  time,  a  major  
blow  to  the  advancing  interests  of  the  guildsmen  as  a  whole  and  even  the  low-­‐‑skill  
wool-­‐‑workers  (the  ‘Ciompi’)  who  were  underrepresented  in  the  guild  system.  The  
ensuing  confrontations  led  to  the  armed  installation  of  Michele  Di  Lando  (a  wool-­‐‑carder  
and  former  corporal  in  the  communal  army)  and  the  reorganization  of  political  
representation,  which  was  greatly  expanded  to  include  minor  guildsman  in  general  and  
the  Ciompi  in  particular.45  Lando’s  government,  however,  proved  unsatisfactory  to  the  
Ciompi  who  had  installed  him,  which  led  to  a  confrontation  between  Lando  and  the  
most  radical  wing  of  his  governing  coalition.46  Fairly  or  unfairly,  the  Ciompi  thought  his  
reforms  were  insufficiently  radical.  Following  a  night  of  arson  and  burglary,  an  
unnamed  ciompo  gives  a  rousing  speech  to  his  comrades  in  favor  of  armed  insurrection  
and  being  “left  princes  of  the  city.”  (FH  III.13)  His  speech  –  the  only  one  for  which  
Machiavelli  did  not  have  a  model  in  his  sources  -­‐‑  makes  many  observations  that  
resonate  with  The  Prince.47  The  ciompo  claims  that  necessity  teaches  that  arms  may  be  
the  only  way  to  secure  oneself  from  evil;  those  who  “come  to  great  riches  and  great  
                                                                                                              
45  “Michele  di  Lando,  a  former  corporal  in  the  communal  army  and  variously  described  as  a  comber,  carder,  
and  supervisor  of  textile  workers,  entered  the  palace  with  the  Standard  of  Justice  and  declared  himself,  
obviously  by  prior  agreement  with  the  syndics  of  the  guilds,  Standardbearer  of  Justice.”  John  Najemy,  A  
History  of  Florence,  164.  
46  Najemy,  A  History  of  Florence,  166.  
47  Winter,  “Plebian  Politics:  Machiavelli  and  the  Ciompi  Uprising,”  751.  
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power”  use  force  or  fraud  and  then  cover  those  acts  in  a  false  patina  of  nobility;  those  
who  shun  “these  modes  always  suffocate  in  servitude  or  poverty;”  “when  necessity  
presses,  boldness  is  judged  prudence  and  spirited  men  never  take  account  of  danger  in  
great  things.”  (FH  III.13)  But  the  ciompo’s  insight  into  the  cutthroat  nature  of  politics  
nevertheless  oversteps  Machiavelli’s  counsel  to  a  prince  in  critical  ways.  While  the  
ciompo  sees  power  as  an  avenue  to  “more  freedom,”  he  also  sees  it  as  an  avenue  toward  
“greater  satisfaction.”  (FH.  III.13)  He  recommends,  “multiplying  evils”  as  a  way  of  
diluting  past  crimes.  He  suggests  that  one  cannot  escape  poverty  without  being  
“rapacious”  and  that  “one  should  use  force  whenever  the  occasion  for  it  is  given.”  (FH.  
III.13)  I  argue  in  chapter  3  that  the  half-­‐‑truths  of  the  ciompo  are  just  as  disastrous  as  the  
Duke  of  Athens  failure  to  understand  how  deeply  corrupted  the  Florentine  people  had  
become.  A  virtuous  prince  –  and  both  the  Duke  and  the  ciompo  sought  to  rule  as  princes  
–  takes  on  the  necessary  challenge  of  using  force  and  fraud  to  consolidate  power.  But  he  
does  not  do  so  for  “greater  satisfaction”  as  the  ciompo  puts  it,  but  rather  to  eliminate  
“evils”  and  not  multiply  them.  The  political  ethics  developed  in  The  Prince  places  a  limit  
on  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  even  as  it  endorses  their  use  where  necessary.  The  ciompo  
advocates  their  use  whenever  the  opportunity  arises  and  the  Duke  of  Athens  certainly  
created  a  political  apparatus  that  stooped  to  such  behavior.  The  Duke  failed  as  a  prince  
and  the  ciompo  certainly  would  have  as  well  because  they  each  in  turn  did  not  
understand  the  proper,  way  for  a  prince  to  use  violence  against  violent  oppression.  The  
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Duke  of  Athens  never  made  the  effort  to  reestablish  norms  of  lawfulness  and  the  ciompo  
advocated  a  dangerous  program  of  public  brutality.  Both  misunderstood  the  proper  
targets,  proper  use,  and  the  proper  ends  of  force  and  fraud  that  Machiavelli  develops  in  
The  Prince.  In  chapter  3,  I  identify  the  proper  target  of  violence  as  the  elites  who  are  the  
eternal  source  of  practices  of  oppression  and  the  cycles  of  violence  they  engender.  I  
show  further  that  the  use  of  force  must  be  limited  in  scope  and  concentrated  in  the  
hands  of  the  prince  and  that  the  proper  end  of  force  is  to  prevent  the  oppression  of  the  
people.  
   What  of  those  who  sought  to  rule  Florence  as  a  republic?  After  all,  Florence  was  
formally  a  republic  though  its  republicanism  vacillated  between  more  and  less  popular  
rule,  when  not  ruled  as  a  de  facto  principality.  The  other  two  speeches  from  the  Ciompi  
Revolt,  both  preceding  the  ciompo’s,  were  made  either  to  or  on  behalf  of  the  Signori.  
They  each  outline,  in  their  own  way,  the  ways  that  Florentine  republicans  could  have  
contained,  suppressed,  and  used  political  violence  to  liberate  rather  than  oppress  their  
fellow  citizens.  These  strategies  are  developed  in  far  greater  detail  in  Machiavelli’s  
Discourses  on  Livy  and  fall,  largely,  into  two  categories:  the  use  of  the  people  in  
addressing  problems  of  violent  oppression  and  the  use  of  the  elite  in  addressing  the  
same.  I  shall  detail  these  arguments  in  chapters  4  and  5.  These  two  speeches  underscore  
their  importance.  
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   A  persistent  question  for  Machiavelli  was  “what  are  the  best  means  by  which  
citizens  in  a  republic  can  both  defend  that  republic  from  rival  states  and  defend  
themselves  from  potentially  oppressive  elites?”  In  chapter  4  I  detail  Machiavelli’s  praise  
of  the  Roman  people  in  both  defending  the  state  and  influencing  domestic  politics  via  
the  use  of  the  tribunate.  The  people  in  Florence  had  the  opposite  experience,  becoming  a  
political  class  to  be  placated  and  pacified,  rather  than  an  agonistic  partner  in  rule.  A  
speech  by  Luigi  Guicciardini,  the  Gonfaloniere  of  Justice  deposed  by  the  people  during  
the  Ciompi  Revolt,  exemplifies  this  attitude.  Speaking  on  behalf  of  the  Signori,  he  
admonishes  the  people  for  abusing  the  Florentine  nobility.  “We  see  now  by  experience  
that  the  more  humbly  we  behave,  the  more  we  concede,  the  more  you  grow  proud  and  
the  more  indecent  things  you  demand.”  (FH  III.11)  And  he  goes  on  to  pose  the  costs  of  
continued  armed  conflict:  “Why  then  do  you  want  your  discords  to  make  a  slave  of  a  
city  in  peace  that  so  many  powerful  enemies  left  free  in  war?  What  do  you  get  out  of  
your  disunion  other  than  servitude?”  Given  that  Florence  faced  violent  insurrection,  
Machiavelli  endorses  Guicciardini’s  exhortation  to  civility  over  “tumult  and  arms.”  In  
part,  he  does  so  because  the  Florentine  citizens  that  Guicciardini  temporarily  talks  down  
from  revolt  had  no  outlet  for  productive  clashes  with  Florentine  elites.    
   Nevertheless,  while  Guicciardini  correctly  identifies  one  of  the  costs  of  civil  strife  
as  a  weakened  position  within  the  interstate  system,  he  incorrectly  assumes  that  the  
people  ought  “to  be  content  to  rest  quietly  with  the  things  that  have  been  ordered  
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through  [the  elite].”  (FH  III.3)  In  chapter  4  I  contrast  Machiavelli’s  treatment  with  this  
case  with  that  of  Rome.  There,  praiseworthy  political  dynamics  came  about  not  through  
the  quiet  rest  of  her  people,  but  rather  through  the  structured  political  participation  and  
challenges  to  Roman  elites  enabled  by  the  institutions  such  as  the  tribunate.  Rome  relied  
on  her  people  for  civic  defense  and  in  exchange  the  people  demanded  significant  
political  influence  and  received  it  in  the  form  of  the  tribunate.  This  institution  leveraged  
Rome’s  dependence  on  her  people  for  military  power  to  give  them  the  power  to  defend  
their  own  liberty  by  policing  the  ambitions  of  the  elites.  This  institution  was  at  the  heart  
of  Rome’s  response  to  a  variety  of  problems  of  violent  oppression.  Not  only  did  it  enable  
her  to  call  upon  her  citizens  for  civic  defense,  it  also  enabled  Roman  citizens  to  use  the  
threat  of  violence  against  elites  who  would  be  tempted  by  projects  of  oppression.    
   The  remaining  speech  related  to  the  Ciompi  Revolt,  is  delivered  by  an  unnamed  
group  of  citizens  to  the  Signori.  It  also  speaks  to  the  question  that  may  have  been  dearest  
to  Machiavelli’s  heart  and  which  I  take  up  in  chapter  5:  “how  can  elites  in  republics  be  
made  to  use  their  positions  as  elites  in  a  manner  that  strengthens  rather  than  enervates  
those  republics?”  The  speech  reflects  the  growing  factionalism  that,  in  part,  preceded  
and  precipitated  the  Ciompi  revolt.  The  unnamed  citizens  begin  by  speaking  of  a  
growing  evil  in  Florence,  namely  the  failure  to  create  political  orders  that  channel  
ambition,  punish  factionalism,  and  reward  political  virtues  such  as  fidelity  to  the  
republic.  Calling  this  failure  “the  common  corruption  of  all  the  Italian  cities,  “  they  go  on  
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to  detail  the  ways  in  which  avarice  and  the  “contemptible  honors  on  which  hatreds,  
enmities,  differences,  and  sects  depend;  and  [how]  from  these  arise  deaths,  exiles,  
persecution  of  the  good,  [and]  exaltation  of  the  wicked.”  (FH  III.5)  The  repeated  iteration  
of  factional  strife  produced  a  political  environment  precisely  the  opposite  of  that  created  
by  Romulus,  Numa,  Brutus  and  other  leading  citizens  in  Rome.  Florentine  political  elites  
maintained  an  order  that  exacerbated  both  Florence’s  weakness  and  her  penchant  for  
violent  internal  conflict.  For  Machiavelli,  elites  in  a  republic  have  a  crucial  role  to  play  in  
creating  and  defending  institutions  that  channel  and  constrain  the  ambitions  that  they  
have.  Across  his  works,  Machiavelli  treats  political  elites  as  restless  and  ambitious  
creatures.  In  Chapter  5  I  explain  how  those  restless  and  ambitious  men,  motivated  by  
glory  rather  than  oppression,  can  create  robust  political  institutions  that  support  –  to  
quote  the  petitioners  to  the  Signori  -­‐‑  a  “free  way  of  life.”  (FH  III.5)  Just  as  principalities  
rely  upon  the  prince  setting  aside  the  elite  humor  for  domination  in  favor  of  the  security  
of  an  armed  people  and  the  glory  of  a  strong  state,  republics  rely  upon  elites  setting  
aside  that  same  humor  in  favor  of  the  glory  that  founding,  reforming,  or  virtuously  
serving  a  republic  offers.  Not  only  does  that  shift  in  elite  behavior  reduce  incidents  of  
violent  oppression,  the  institutions  that  Machiavelli  exhorts  them  to  create  lead  to  a  state  
capable  of  projecting  strength  beyond  its  borders  and  thereby  secure  its  citizens  from  the  
threat  of  oppression  from  rival  states.  
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To  recapitulate  the  plan  of  the  dissertation  in  brief:  In  chapter  1,  I  use  
Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War  to  explore  his  insistence  on  citizen-­‐‑militias  in  all  regimes,  
because  all  regimes  need  armed  forces  to  prevent  violent  oppression  and  citizen-­‐‑militias  
are,  in  his  view,  best  equipped  to  do  so.  In  chapters  2  and  3,  I  detail  the  treatments  for  
violent  oppression  in  principalities  that  Machiavelli  describes  in  the  Prince,  explaining  
how  he  exhorts  princes  to  arm  their  people  (chapter  2),  while  he  simultaneously  crafts  
for  princes  the  political  ethics  for  which  the  text  is  notorious  (chapter  3).  In  chapters  4  
and  5,  I  describe  the  treatments  for  violent  oppression  in  republics  that  Machiavelli  
recommends  in  the  Discourses  on  Livy,  where  he  charges  the  people  with  policing  the  
elites  that  would  engage  in  projects  of  oppression  if  left  to  their  own  devices  (chapter  4),  
while  he  simultaneously  praises  elites  who  help  to  create  and  maintain  institutions  that  
prevent  violent  oppression  (chapter  5).  I  conclude  the  dissertation  by  describing  some  of  
the  possible  consequences  of  Machiavelli’s  ideas  for  the  way  we  think  about  different  
kinds  of  regimes  and  their  attempts  to  liberate  their  own  peoples  from  the  problem  of  
violent  oppression.
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1. Good Arms, Violent Oppression, and the Art of War 
Machiavelli  praises  the  virtue  of  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  and  condemns  the  vices  of  
mercenary  ones  in  each  of  his  major  works.1  Nowhere  is  his  praise  of  the  citizen-­‐‑soldier  
greater,  however,  than  in  the  Art  of  War.  A  careful  reading  of  the  Art  of  War  reveals  a  
strongly  forged  link  between  Machiavelli’s  praise  of  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  (and  the  citizen-­‐‑
militias  of  which  they  are  a  part)  and  his  concerns  over  violent  oppression.2  The  two  are  
related  as  cause  and  effect.  On  the  one  hand,  armies  and  police  forces  can  prevent  
violent  oppression  from  both  external  and  internal  sources  via  successful  civil  defense  
and  law  enforcement.  On  the  other  hand,  armies  are  capable  of  mounting  coups  against  
popularly  elected  governments,  police  forces  are  capable  of  suppressing  political  
dissent,  and  both  are  capable  of  general  abuse  of  the  people  they  are  supposed  to  
protect.  In  this  respect,  armed  forces  can  be  sources  of  violent  oppression  just  as  easily  as  
they  can  prevent  it.3  This  causal  link  makes  the  Art  of  War  a  good  place  to  begin  an  
                                                                                                              
1  See,  for  example,  P  12  and  D  II.20  
2  Machiavelli’s  praise  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  is  very  likely  also  a  defense  of  the  Florentine  Militia  Ordinance  of  
1506,  of  which  he  was  the  chief  Architect.  For  more  information  on  the  Militia  Ordinance  of  1506,  see  Mikael  
Hörnqvist,  “Perché  non  si  usa  allegare  i  Romani:  Machiavelli  and  the  Florentine  Militia  of  1506,”  
Renaissance  Quarterly.  55,  no.  1  (2002):  148-­‐‑191;  and  Felix  Gilbert:  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  
of  War”  in  Makers  of  modern  strategy:  from  Machiavelli  to  the  nuclear  age,  ed.  Peter  Paret,  (Princeton,  N.J.:  
Princeton  University  Press,  1986);  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  66.  
3  Machiavelli’s  central  concern  in  The  Art  of  War  is  militia  recruitment  and  practices,  rather  than  police  
recruitment  and  tactics.  Nevertheless,  many  the  same  principles  apply  and  I  will  skip  over  much  of  the  
distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of  arms  throughout  this  chapter.  Moreover,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  use  
and  the  language  of  the  legislation  Florentine  Militia  (created  under  Machiavelli’s  direction  in  1506)  
emphasized  policing  functions  as  much,  if  not  more  so,  than  those  of  civic  defense.  Mikael  Hörnqvist,  
“Machiavelli’s  military  project  and  the  Art  of  War”  in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Machiavelli,  ed.  John  M.  
Najemy,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2010),  115.  
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exploration  of  Machiavelli’s  proposed  treatments  for  the  problem  of  violent  oppression  
because  the  text  addresses  a  key  force-­‐‑using  institution  (the  military)  and  also  previews  
some  of  the  dynamics  of  the  citizen-­‐‑elite  relationship  that  will  be  so  important  for  his  
arguments  in  The  Prince  and  the  Discourses  on  Livy.  
Machiavelli  begins  the  Art  of  War  by  noting  the  apparent  incompatibility  of  
civilian  and  military  life  due  to  the  rough  and  ready  nature  of  soldiers.  (AW  PR,  4)  
Nevertheless,  Machiavelli  maintains,  “there  is  a  very  close,  intimate  relation  between  
these  two  conditions,  and  that  they  are  not  only  compatible,  and  consistent  with  each  
other,  but  necessarily  connected  and  interrelated.”  (AW  PR,  4)  Machiavelli’s  
recommendations  for  maintaining  that  compatibility,  we  shall  see,  are  political  in  nature  
rather  than  technical  or  tactical.  Specifically,  we  shall  see  how  Machiavelli  recommends  
leveraging  the  private  concerns  of  citizens,  which  fall  under  the  penumbra  of  non-­‐‑
oppression  or  “being  left  alone,”  and  politicizing  elite  participation  in  the  military  to  
minimize  violent  oppression.    
In  fact,  Machiavelli’s  political  observations  in  the  Art  of  War  may  be  the  text’s  
most  insightful  ones.  His  observations  on  combat  tactics  would  not  make  it  into  the  
canon  of  military  strategy  for  good  reason.  Later  military  thinkers  would  debunk  most  
of  Machiavelli’s  ideas  concerning  tactics  and  strategy  despite  their  praise  for  the  Art  of  
War’s  proposed  shift  from  Renaissance-­‐‑style  cavalry  skirmishes  to  infantry-­‐‑driven  
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warfare.4  His  treatment  of  artillery  as  a  foolish  trend,  for  example,  turned  out  to  be  an  
infamously  bad  prediction.5  His  recommendations  concerning  the  appropriate  size  for  
military  units  were  equally  misguided.  Many  of  his  general  principles  of  warfare  aside,  
Machiavelli  was  mistaken  in  almost  every  one  of  his  tactical  judgments.6    
Machiavelli’s  tactical  errors  should  come  as  no  surprise  to  us.  He  was  a  
notoriously  inexperienced  and  incompetent  military  commander.  There  is  little  doubt  
that  a  condottiero  of  Machiavelli’s  day  would  have  routed  him,  all  other  things  being  
equal,  had  Machiavelli  ever  taken  the  field  against  one.  However,  Machiavelli  was  a  
respected  military  recruiter  and  administrator.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  his  talents  and  
interests  lay  in  satisfying  political  concerns  more  than  tactical  ones.  As  a  result,  it  is  also  
safe  to  say  that  he  was  sensitive  to  political  concerns  in  a  way  that  other  military  
theorists  and  commanders  were  not.7  Moreover,  Machiavelli  was  confident  that  his  
political  solutions  to  military  problems  were  responsible  for  the  lion’s  share  of  military  
                                                                                                              
4  Neal  Wood  “Introduction”  in  the  Art  of  War,  trans.  Ellis  Farnsworth,  (New  York:  Da  Capo  Press,  2001),  
Xxxii;  Gilbert  notes  that  the  Art  of  War’s  emphasis  on  infantry  was  also  a  rejection  of  the  cavalry-­‐‑driven  style  
of  renaissance  condottieri.  Gilbert,  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  23.  
5  Wood,  “Introduction,”  xxxii.    
6  For  the  purposes  of  this  discussion,  we  must  also  note  that  Machiavelli’s  advocacy  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  
contrasts  with  both  his  predecessor  Vegetius,  on  whom  he  based  much  of  The  Art  of  War,  and  Machiavelli’s  
own  later  readers.  They  all  reject  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  in  favor  of  a  professional  army,  making  Machiavelli’s  
views  an  exception,  rather  than  the  rule.  Charles  Oman,  The  Art  of  War  in  the  Middle  Ages,  (New  York:  Ben  
Franklin,  1959);  Wood,  “Introduction,”  xxvii.  
7  Later  military  thinkers  did  praise  him  for  that  sensitivity,  especially  insofar  as  he  observes  that,  “politics  
and  war  constitute  a  kind  of  functional  unity.”  Wood,  “Introduction,”  xxvi;  Gilbert,  “Machiavelli:  the  
Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  11.  
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capability.8  Even  if  he  were  to  confess  to  his  errors  about  tactics,  he  would  still  claim  that  
the  citizen-­‐‑soldier  and  citizen-­‐‑militia  best  answer  the  question  of  what  kind  of  armed  
forces  are  the  least  likely  to  engage  in  practices  of  oppression  and  most  likely  to  be  
sufficiently  capable  of  civil  defense.9  
I  shall  address  the  way  Machiavelli’s  arguments  in  The  Art  of  War  answer  this  
question  via  two  related  sub-­‐‑questions.  1)  Why  is  a  citizen-­‐‑soldier  superior  to  other  
kinds  of  soldiers  for  the  purposes  of  minimizing  oppression?  2)  What  sort  of  
commander  does  the  minimization  of  oppression  require?  I  conclude  by  discussing  
some  of  the  features  of  a  Machiavellian  citizen-­‐‑militia  that  make  it  adept  at  minimizing  
oppression.  
1.1 Good Arms and Good Soldiers 
In  the  Art  of  War,  professional  soldiers  serve  as  the  primary  point  of  comparison  
to  the  citizen-­‐‑soldier.10  Of  course,  professional  soldiers  can  be  citizens,  so  the  two  terms  
are  not  conceptually  distinct  per  se.  As  I  lay  out  Machiavelli’s  argument,  however,  it  
should  become  clear  that  his  targets  of  criticism  are  soldiers  who  dedicate  their  lives  and  
                                                                                                              
8  Gilbert  notes  that  this  point  “is  usually  unrecognized”  by  the  Art  of  War’s  military  critics.  “Machiavelli:  the  
Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  29;  Hörnqvist  points  out  that  Machiavelli’s  correspondence  prior  to  the  
defeat  of  the  Florentine  Militia  in  1512  indicate  that  he  had  already  developed  a  “comprehensive  theory  
linking  military  and  political  concerns”  and  that  his  later  writings  simply  represent  “more  systematic  
treatments.”  “Machiavelli’s  military  project  and  the  Art  of  War,”  117;  See  also  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  
206.  
9  Gilbert,  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  19.  
10  Contrast  Machiavelli  with  his  principal  source,  Vegetius,  on  this  score.  Wood,  for  example  notes  that  
Vegetius  and  Machiavelli  also  differ  on  “recruitment,  promotion,  weapons,  combat  methods,  the  ordering  of  
troops,  and  encampment.”  “Introduction,”  Xxiii.  
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livelihoods  to  war  to  the  extent  that  it  eclipses  their  dedication  to  their  fellow  citizens.  
Today,  we  might  call  them  “soldiers  of  fortune.”11  The  kind  of  soldier  Machiavelli  
condemns  is  a  warrior  first,  and  one  whose  first  priority  is  the  identity  or  the  income  
that  war  brings.  The  kind  of  soldier  he  praises,  by  contrast,  does  not  depend  on  war  
either  for  their  identity  or  income.  This  kind  of  soldier  thinks  of  service  as  one  of  the  
duties  of  citizenship  rather  than  a  vocation  or  avocation.  Such  soldiers,  from  
Machiavelli’s  point  of  view,  offer  two  advantages  with  respect  to  minimizing  
oppression.  The  first  is  that  their  willingness  to  fight  is  limited  to  the  prevention  of  
violent  oppression.  We  know  from  elsewhere  in  Machiavelli’s  corpus  that  the  people’s  
dominant  motivation  –  its  humor  –  is  to  be  free  from  oppression.  Given  this  assessment  
of  popular  psychology,  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  a  citizen  army  will  fight  vigorously  in  
wars  of  self-­‐‑defense  (even  abroad),  but  will  not  cater  to  imperial  ambitions  as  willingly.  
The  second  advantage  is  that  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  are  less  likely,  according  to  Machiavelli,  to  
become  sources  of  oppression  themselves  because  they  are  less  likely  to  pose  threats  to  
their  fellow  citizens  at  the  individual  level.    
Both  of  these  advantages  stem  from  what  Machiavelli  sees  as  essential  to  the  
character  of  a  good  soldier.  The  thrust  of  the  Art  of  War’s  discussion  of  individual  
soldiers  celebrates  the  close  monitoring  and  management  of  mores  and  tendencies  of  
                                                                                                              
11  In  contrast  to  a  soldier  who  intends  to  serve  for  a  few  years  and  then  move  on  to  another  phase  of  life.  
Pace  Gilbert,  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  28.  
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citizen-­‐‑soldiers  by  the  ancients  and,  in  particular,  by  the  Romans.  Machiavelli  first  
praises  these  practices  in  the  dedicatory  preface  when  he  writes  “the  ancient  law  givers  
and  governors  of  kingdoms  and  republics  took  great  care,  therefore,  to  inspire  all  their  
subjects  -­‐‑  but  particularly  their  soldiers  -­‐‑  with  fidelity,  love  of  peace,  and  fear  of  god.”  (AW  PR,  
4;  emphasis  mine)  The  core  of  a  good  soldier,  from  this  perspective,  is  only  indirectly  
related  to  the  skills  needed  to  win  a  battle.  Political  loyalty,  love  of  peace,  and  piety  
(understood  as  fear  of  god),  are  not  discrete  skills.  They  are  also  not  specific  to  members  
of  the  military.  They  make  up  a  general  suite  of  personality  traits  that  are  valuable  in  
citizens  in  general,  but  that  Machiavelli  also  sees  as  having  special  utility  for  soldiers.12    
These  personality  traits  have  special  utility  for  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  because  they  
dictate  how  soldiers  behave  with  respect  to  their  specialization  in  violence.13  Consider  
“love  of  peace.”  The  utility  of  a  love  of  peace  in  a  citizen-­‐‑soldier  is  the  robustness  it  
lends  to  the  (peacetime)  identity  of  the  citizen  compared  to  the  (wartime)  identity  of  the  
soldier.  That  robustness  is  important  for  his  or  her  motivations  for  fighting  and  behavior  
in  battle.  A  soldier  who  has  no  love  of  peace  will  want  to  go  to  war,  whether  it  leads  to  
peace  or  not  and  whether  it  is  politically  mandated  or  not.  Moreover,  he  or  she  will  be  
an  unreliable  instrument  of  force.  In  the  heat  of  combat,  soldiers  who  love  war  and  
soldiers  who  love  peace  will  behave  differently.  The  former  are  more  likely  to  use  
                                                                                                              
12  Indeed,  Machiavelli  remarks  upon  the  spillover  effect  that  the  of  the  ancient  soldier’s  fidelity,  love  of  
peace,  and  fear  of  god  had  on  the  ancient  citizen.  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  39.  
13  Robert  Bates,  When  Things  Fell  Apart,  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2008),  Chapter  1.  
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excessive  force,  more  likely  to  defy  orders  to  stand  down,  and  less  likely  to  be  
discriminate  with  respect  to  their  targets  than  the  latter.14  
Now  consider  fidelity.  If  a  soldier  does  not  fight  out  of  a  sense  of  fidelity,  he  or  
she  might  fight  out  of  the  warrior  mentality  just  discussed,  or  –  more  likely  –  for  pay.  
This  latter  type  of  condottiero  was  common  in  the  15th  and  16th  centuries.  Fabrizio  
Colonna  (the  dialogue’s  chief  interlocutor  and  the  voice  I  take  to  be  representing  
Machiavelli  throughout  the  dialogue)  notes  that  for  such  soldiers  “war  will  not  maintain  
them  in  a  time  of  peace,  and  thus  they  are  under  a  necessity  either  of  endeavoring  to  
prevent  a  peace  or  of  taking  all  means  to  make  such  provisions  for  themselves  in  a  time  
of  war  so  that  they  may  not  lack  sustenance  when  it  is  over.”  15  (AW  I,  15)  Soldiers  who  
depend  on  war  for  profit  will  be  torn  between  the  political  objectives  of  the  war  and  
                                                                                                              
14  Stephen  Stedman  “Spoiler  Problems  in  Peace  Processes”.  International  Security  22,  no.  2  (Fall  1997):  10  
15  I  take  Fabrizio  to  be  speaking  for  Machiavelli  throughout  the  Art  of  War.  There  is  little  evidence  that  the  
dialogue  is  constructed  in  a  manner  such  that  there  is  a  gap  between  Fabrizio’s  position  and  the  position  of  
the  text  as  a  whole.  Most  scholarly  treatments  of  the  Art  of  War  assume  the  same.  Peter  Burke  claims,  for  
example,  that  the  Art  of  War  is  a  classic  example  of  a  ‘catechistism’  dialogue,  “in  which  the  ‘dialogue’  
between  student  and  teacher  is  little  more  than  a  monologue,  where  the  student  asks  the  questions  or  
mutters,  ‘Yes,  Socrates’,  from  time  to  time  while  the  master  expounds  the  answers.”  Peter  Burke,  “The  
Renaissance  dialogue,”  Renaissance  Studies  3  (1989):  1-­‐‑12.  Also  see:  William  Wiethoff,  “The  Martial  ‘Virtue’  
of  Rhetoric  in  Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War,”  Quarterly  Journal  of  Speech  64,  no.  3  (1978):  304-­‐‑12.  That  being  said,  
there  are  a  number  of  engaging  arguments  based  on  the  assumption  that  Fabrizio  is  not  Machiavelli’s  
mouthpiece  in  the  dialogue.  See  Michael  Mallett,  Mercenaries  and  their  Masters;  Warfare  in  Renaissance  Italy.  
(Totowa,  N.J.:  Rowan  and  Littlefield,  1974)  250-­‐‑251,  257.  A  more  perplexing  irony  may  be  the  fact  that  
Machiavelli  selected  a  consummate  mercenary  for  his  mouthpiece  in  a  work  that  condemns  mercenaries.  For  
an  explanation  of  this  puzzle,  see  Marcia  Colish,  “Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War:  A  Reconsideration.”  Renaissance  
Quarterly.  51  (1998):  1160.  Colish  notes  that  the  choice  of  Fabrizio  Colonna  is  ironic  on  certain  grounds,  but  
that  such  an  ironic  selection  was  standard  practice  for  dialogue  writers  of  the  late  quattrocento  and  designed  
to  underscore  rather  than  undercut  the  position  taken  by  the  primary  interlocutor  in  the  dialogue.  In  other  
words,  Machiavelli  uses  Fabrizio  as  if  to  say,  “see,  even  the  famed  condottiero  Fabrizio  Colonna  recognizes  
the  advantages  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia.’ ”  
  45  
their  own  personal  and  economic  ones.16  If  war  is  profitable  for  such  soldiers  –  and  it  
often  was  for  the  condottieri  of  Machiavelli’s  day  –  they  will  be  less  willing  to  fight  
decisive  battles  on  the  one  hand  and  less  willing  to  demobilize  when  necessary  on  the  
other.  In  both  cases,  their  interest  in  gain  trumps  their  fidelity  to  the  people  on  behalf  of  
whom  they  fight.  Their  interest  in  gain  similarly  trumps  their  fidelity  to  the  leaders  that  
have  hired  them.  Toward  the  close  of  book  1,  Fabrizio  lays  “down  as  a  certain  truth  that  
no  man  has  ever  founded  a  monarchy  or  a  republic  without  being  well-­‐‑assured  that  if  
his  subjects  were  armed,  they  would  always  be  ready  and  willing  to  defend  the  
monarchy  or  republic.”17  (AW  I,  31)  Fabrizio’s  claims  above  suggest,  however,  that  a  
monarch  or  governor  of  a  republic  cannot  be  “well-­‐‑assured”  of  the  motivations  of  those  
he  depends  upon  most  if  they  in  turn  depend  on  war  for  gain.  A  soldier  who  depends  
on  war  in  such  a  way  will  be  willing  to  take  up  arms,  but  only  when  it  is  profitable.    
There  may  be  moments  where  a  dependency  on  war  stimulates  behavior  that  
coincides  with  the  needs  of  the  principality  or  commonwealth,  but  Machiavelli  
consistently  argues  against  institutionalizing  one  sort  of  behavior  and  hoping  that  
Fortuna  will  cater  to  that  mode  of  proceeding.  Only  a  soldier  who  does  not  depend  on  
                                                                                                              
16  A  monarch  or  a  governor  of  a  republic  faces  the  opposite  problem  when  standing  armies  are  no  longer  
motivated  to  fight  because  they  receive  a  peacetime  salary,  creating  a  situation  in  which  soldiers  have  
become  dependent  upon  peace.  Again,  the  professionalization  of  the  military  poses  a  challenge  to  the  
political  needs  of  the  citizens  employing  them.    
17  Pace  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  35;  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  177.  There  is  nothing  essentially  
republican  about  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  in  the  Art  of  War  or  elsewhere.  Popular  arms  shift  the  center  of  political  
gravity  towards  the  popular  humor,  but  that  shift  is  compatible  with  and  salutary  for  principalities  and  
republics  alike.  For  a  more  nuanced  view,  see  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  67-­‐‑8.  
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war  can  offer  a  monarch  or  a  governor  of  a  republic  the  kind  of  responsiveness  he  or  she  
needs.  One  can  think  of  a  good  soldier  as  being  properly  drilled  and  having  technical  
prowess.  But  a  more  fundamental  concern  is  his  or  her  willingness  to  both  mobilize  and  
demobilize.  Fabrizio  recommends  that  “A  middle  course  ought  to  be  taken  whereby-­‐‑
without  either  using  men  with  outright  violence  or  depending  entirely  upon  their  own  
voluntary  offers—they  may  be  motivated  by  the  obedience  they  think  due  to  their  
governors  to  expose  themselves  to  a  little  immediate  hardship.”  (AW  I,  29)  That  kind  of  
responsiveness  was  one  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  the  Roman  model  set  forth  in  the  
Art  of  War.  Fabrizio  celebrates  the  willingness  of  Roman  citizens  to  go  to  war  -­‐‑  or  not  -­‐‑  
according  to  the  wishes  of  the  republic.  Roman  citizenship,  as  understood  by  Fabrizio,  
was  characterized  by  a  degree  of  deference  to  the  republic  itself.18  He  does  not  see  a  
Roman  citizen’s  desire  for  peace  as  overwhelming  or  being  overwhelmed  by  an  
eagerness  for  war.  Rather,  he  sees  roman  citizens  as  characterized  by  a  willingness  to  
put  aside  private  commitments  out  of  respect  for  the  republic  of  which  they  were  a  
part.19  “The  common  soldiers,”  Fabrizio  notes,  “laid  down  their  arms  with  much  more  
pleasure  than  they  had  taken  them  up.  Each  resumed  the  calling  by  which  he  had  gotten  his  
bread  before,  and  none  had  any  hopes  of  advancing  himself  by  plunder  and  rapine.”  
(AW  I,  18;  emphasis  mine)  It  makes  sense  to  assume  that  “the  common  soldiers”  
                                                                                                              
18  As  soldiers  they  understood  that  “true  glory  is  collective,  organized,  effective,  and  in  its  fulfillment  is  a  
work  of  art  and  thing  of  beauty.”  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  21.  
19  Gilbert,  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  26.  
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demobilized  “with  much  more  pleasure”  than  they  mobilized  because  their  humor  is  
“not  to  be  oppressed,”  which  is  to  say  left  alone  and  free  to  follow  their  various  pursuits,  
rather  than  the  oppression  of  others.  Going  to  war,  from  this  perspective,  is  a  regrettable  
necessity.  Correspondingly,  wars  are  least  consistent  with  the  popular  humor  when  they  
are  extended,  open-­‐‑ended  affairs,  and  most  consistent  when  they  are  short  and  
decisive.20    
Fabrizio  also  argues  that  constant  war  making  is  inimical  to  a  soldier’s  ability  to  
coexist  with  his  or  her  fellow  citizens  during  peacetime,  which  brings  us  to  the  second  
problem  that  the  use  of  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  addresses.  Fabrizio  laments  that  “no  one  can  be  
called  a  good  man  who,  in  order  to  support  himself,  takes  up  a  profession  that  obliges  
him  at  all  times  to  be  rapacious,  fraudulent,  and  cruel.”  (AW  I,  15;  emphasis  mine)  There  
are  two  ways  in  which  constant  war-­‐‑making  has  a  corrupting  influence  on  those  who  
participate  in  it.  First,  it  increases  the  likelihood  that  soldiers  will  use  those  skills  in  
which  they  have  a  comparative  advantage  (i.e.,  the  use  of  force)  to  get  by  in  peacetime.  
Fabrizio  approvingly  cites  the  proverb,  “War  makes  thieves,  and  peace  hangs  them.”  He  
then  explains,  “When  those  who  do  not  know  how  to  get  their  bread  any  other  way  find  
no  one  who  has  occasion  for  their  service,  and  do  not  themselves  have  sufficient  virtú  to  
suffer  honorably  in  poverty  and  obscurity,  they  are  forced  to  resort  to  ways  of  
                                                                                                              
20  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  125;  Pocock  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  200.  
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supporting  themselves  that  generally  bring  them  to  the  gallows.”21  (AW  I,  16)  In  other  
words,  a  lack  of  peacetime  skills  and  moral  fortitude  drive  professional  soldiers  to  
become  sources  of  violent  oppression  when  not  occupied  with  war-­‐‑making.22    Of  course,  
individual  acts  of  theft  or  peacetime  violence  do  not  themselves  amount  to  violent  
oppression  per  se,  but  the  term  still  makes  sense  as  a  description  for  a  situation  in  which  
a  large  segment  of  a  population  regularly  violates  their  fellow  citizens,  even  if  no  single  
oppressor  is  responsible  for  the  condition  as  a  whole.  
Moreover,  Fabrizio  observes  that  this  kind  of  corruption  tends  to  spread,  which  
deepens  the  problem  of  having  soldiers  of  poor  character.  Whether  they  come  to  that  
poor  character  by  birth  or  by  the  experience  of  war,  they  “will  not  only  become  
mutinous  and  ungovernable  themselves,  but  sow  the  seeds  of  corruption  among  
others.”  (AW  I,  34)  Two  politically  salient  characteristics,  being  mutinous  and  
ungovernable,  make  up  the  core  of  that  corruption.23  Such  characteristics  are  deeply  
troubling  when  violent  oppression  is  an  object  of  concern.  If  a  corrupt  soldier  is  
ungovernable  in  the  army,  we  might  rightly  wonder  how  he  or  she  will  behave  among  
civilians.  And  if  “corrupt  soldiers  sow  the  seeds  of  corruption”  among  their  comrades  in  
arms,  what  sort  of  seeds  will  corrupt  soldiers  sow  among  their  fellow  citizens?  I  cannot  
answer  this  question  in  detail  here,  but  Machiavelli  certainly  saw  a  connection  between  
                                                                                                              
21  See  Bates,  Things  Fell  Apart,  Chapter  1.  
22  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  200.  
23  Loyalty  and  governability,  by  contrast,  are  the  hallmarks  of  a  good  citizen-­‐‑soldier.  See  McCormick,  
Machiavellian  Democracy  on  this  point,  33.  
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the  corruption  of  Florence’s  politics  and  the  corrupting  effects  of  the  many  
“professional”  soldiers  in,  around,  and  employed  by  Florence.24  (P  12.vi)  We  can  infer  
that  many  of  the  forgoing  considerations  spell  out  why  he  did  so.  
Given  that  Rome  frequently  served  as  the  praiseworthy  counterpoint  to  
Florence’s  dysfunction,  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  the  dialogue  turns  to  the  
Roman  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  professional  soldier.25  Take,  for  example,  the  
question  of  mobilization  and  demobilization.  I  quote  Fabrizio  at  length:  
As  for  the  common  soldiers,  we  see  that  they  also  were  of  the  same  disposition;  
although  they  entered  voluntarily  into  the  service,  they  were  no  less  glad  to  
return  to  their  families  when  they  were  no  longer  wanted.  The  truth  of  this  is  
manifest  from  many  circumstances,  particularly  from  the  important  privilege  
accorded  Roman  citizens  of  not  being  forced  into  the  army  against  their  will.  At  
any  rate,  as  long  as  Rome  continued  to  be  well  governed  (which  was  until  the  
time  of  the  Gracchi)  there  was  never  any  soldier  who  made  war  his  only  
occupation.  (AW  I,  18)    
  
“The  time  of  the  Gracchi,”  we  shall  see  when  I  discuss  it  in  detail  in  Chapter  4,  
marks  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  Roman  virtue  in  Machiavelli’s  eyes.  The  shift  in  
military  structures  around  the  time  of  the  late  republic  is  one  of  the  key  drivers  of  that  
decline.  The  empire  had  grown  so  large  and  campaigns  had  grown  so  long  that,  by  the  
time  of  the  Gracchi’s  attempted  agrarian  reforms,  soldiers  were  in  a  position  to  make  
war  their  only  occupation.  Many  did  so  and  often  became  clientelistically  linked  to  their  
                                                                                                              
24  Michael  Mallett  “The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Warfare  in  Machiavelli’  s  Republic”  in  Machiavelli  and  
Republicanism,  edited  by  Gisela  Bock,  Quentin  Skinner  and  Maurizio  Viroli  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1990),  175.  
25  Gilbert  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  22;  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  48.  
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commanders.26  These  patterns  only  deepened  after  the  Marian  reforms  of  107BCE,  when  
Rome  eased  the  property  qualifications  for  serving  in  the  army.  The  “capite  censei”  
(Romans  who  had  no  property  to  be  counted  in  the  census  and  so  had  to  be  counted  “by  
head”)  flocked  to  the  army  for  an  enlistment  term  of  16  years,  which  Augustus  would  
later  raise  to  20  and  offer  an  additional  5  years  of  voluntary  service.27  Before  these  
changes,  Roman  citizens  served  in  the  army  as  a  matter  of  duty,  but  were  willing  if  not  
eager  to  demobilize  when  a  given  threat  had  abated.  “This,”  Fabrizio  observes,  “is  
always  the  case  with  those  who  have  other  occupations  and  employments  by  which  to  
live.”  (AW  I,  21)    
We  do  not  know  what  the  particulars  of  these  other  occupations  should  be.  
Fabrizio  does  not  tell  us  because  he  does  not  take  it  to  be  important.  “For  my  own  part,”  
Fabrizio  confesses,  “I  should  not  so  much  consider  the  nature  of  their  profession  as  the  
moral  virtue  of  the  men,  and  which  of  them  could  perform  the  most  services.”  (AW  I,  
33)  The  soulcraft  of  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  extends  only  so  far.28  Machiavelli’s  citizens  need  to  
be  members  of  the  militia  and  display  the  characteristics  compatible  therewith,  but  the  
rest  of  their  lives,  especially  their  livelihoods,  receive  little  attention  in  the  Art  of  War.  
                                                                                                              
26  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  88.  
27  Erik  Hildinger,  Swords  Against  the  Senate,  (Cambridge,  MA:  2002)  Kindle  edition,  locs  33,  1721,  Marius  
additionally  took  steps  to  reinforce  the  espirit  de  corps  of  the  Roman  legion,  which  normally  disbanded  after  
each  campaign.  These  steps  further  augmented  clientelistic  linkages  between  commander  and  soldier.  Loc.  
1764.  
28  Pace  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  40;  there  is  a  degree  of  soul-­‐‑craft  nevertheless,  pace  Mansfield,  Taming  
the  Prince,  124,  128.  
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Here  we  return  to  the  idea  of  catering  to  and  protecting  the  popular  desire  to  not  be  
oppressed  (i.e.,  left  alone).  Military  participation  that  demands  this  or  that  trade  while  
not  on  active  duty  would  be  its  own  kind  of  oppression.    
Likewise  we  see  how  professional  soldiers  are  oppressed  by  their  chosen  
profession  insofar  as  it  renders  them  unfit  for  doing  anything  other  than  violence.  The  
most  deleterious  consequence  seems  to  be  that  professional  soldiers  take  on  a  humor  for  
oppression  itself.  The  abuse  they  take  from  a  lifetime  of  war  transforms  them  into  
abusers  of  others.  The  result,  for  Machiavelli,  is  transformation  of  what  should  be  the  
strength  of  any  regime  for  defending  itself  from  oppression  abroad  –  the  service  of  its  
citizens  –  into  a  source  of  oppression  at  home.    
1.2 Good arms and good generals 
Fabrizio’s  insistence  that  individual  citizens  not  professionalize  has  one  major  
exception:  elites  are  permitted  to  follow  war  “as  a  business.”  Fabrizio  explains,  
“Since  war  is  not  an  occupation  by  which  a  man  can  at  all  times  make  an  
honorable  living,  it  ought  not  be  followed  as  a  business  by  anyone  but  a  prince  or  
a  governor  of  a  commonwealth;  and  if  he  is  a  wise  man,  he  will  not  allow  any  of  
his  subjects  or  citizens  to  make  that  his  only  profession-­‐‑indeed,  no  good  man  
ever  did.”  (AW  I,  15)    
  
This  exception  to  what  initially  seems  like  an  ironclad  rule  falls  along  the  citizen-­‐‑
elite  dichotomy  that  runs  throughout  Machiavelli’s  work.  When  we  come  to  chapters  3  
and  5,  we  will  see  Machiavelli  assigning  special  duties  and  privileges  to  elites  in  
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principalities  and  republics  alike.  One  such  duty  is  that  of  military  command.29  Both  The  
Prince  and  the  Discourses  on  Livy  feature  extended  discussions  of  the  responsibility  that  
princes  and  republican  elites  have  to  form,  maintain,  and  command  the  arms  of  their  
respective  states.30  The  Art  of  War  similarly  charges  political  elites  with  these  
responsibilities.31  Citizen-­‐‑militias  cannot  form  themselves  ex  nihilo  because  it  takes  
specialized  knowledge  to  train  other  soldiers.  Similarly,  citizen-­‐‑militias  cannot  simply  
lead  themselves  because  competent  tacticians  are  seasoned  by  experience.32  So,  while  the  
Art  of  War  bars  military  professionalization  on  the  part  of  individual  citizens,  it  does  not  
do  so  on  the  part  of  elites  because  some  should  make  war  their  “business”  in  order  to  
form,  field,  and  direct  a  capable  army.  
Moreover,  this  exception  to  Machiavelli’s  rule  against  military  
professionalization  does  not  contradict  his  interest  in  satisfying  the  popular  desire  to  be  
free  from  oppression.  Military  professionalization  by  elites  is  consistent  with  that  desire  
despite  the  dangers  that  military  professionalization  brings.  The  key  wrinkle  to  bear  in  
                                                                                                              
29  Of  course,  distinguished  military  service  is  one  of  the  means  by  which  one  can  become  a  member  of  the  
elite,  for  Machiavelli.  Indeed,  he  was  probably  more  sensitive  to  the  importance  of  social  mobility  than  his  
more  aristocratically  minded  republican  peers  such  as  Guicciardini.  In  this  chapter,  and  throughout  this  
dissertation,  when  I  refer  to  elites,  I  mean  those  who  have  joined  the  upper  echelons  of  the  socio-­‐‑political  
spheres  birth  or  by  talent.  For  Machiavelli  distinction  between  the  elite  and  the  people  is  functional  rather  
than  genealogical.  
30  They  also  discuss  the  advantages,  such  as  enjoying  glory  and  success,  which  accrue  to  elites  who  do  so.  
See  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy  61.  
31  According  to  Mansfield,  “Fabrizio  almost  makes  his  captain  into  a  Machiavellian  prince,  but  not  quite.”  
Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  215,  emphasis  mine.  The  difference,  for  Mansfield,  seems  to  be  that  the  Machiavellian  
captain  is  not  deceptive  or  cruel  all  the  way  down.    
32  Machiavelli  does  note  elsewhere  that  “heads”  of  militaries  can  emerge  from  their  bodies  in  the  field,  but  
one  can  see  how  retaining  seasoned  commanders  is  consistent  with  Machiavelli’s  emphasis  on  
preparedness.    
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mind  is  that,  for  Machiavelli’s  elites,  professionalization  in  war  is  a  function  of  political  
duty.  Machiavelli’s  political  elites  must  be  practiced  in  the  management  of  violence  
given  his  view  of  the  competitive  nature  of  the  interstate  system  and  the  persistence  of  
violent  conflict  therein.  Even  where  these  elites  are  not  prosecuting  wars  in  the  
conventional  sense,  the  constant  threat  of  war  infuses  political  activities  with  
considerations  of  violent  conflict.  Both  the  rejection  of  war  on  principle  and  the  
accidental  oversight  of  preparations  for  war  leave  the  state  in  a  position  of  dependence  
upon  prevailing  interstate  conditions.  Defeat,  enslavement,  and  death  result  if  Fortuna  
does  not  smile  upon  a  policy  of  peace.  So  understood,  elite  readiness  for  war  is  a  
prudent  step  toward  non-­‐‑oppression.  
Moreover,  we  should  not  confuse  that  preparedness  with  professionalization  in  
war  per  se.  It  is  a  professionalization  in  politics,  of  which  war  is  a  part.  In  this  sense,  
Machiavelli  collapses  the  space  between  politics  and  war,  making  professional  
politicians  also  professional  warriors.33  Fabrizio  –  a  well-­‐‑known  condottiero  himself  –  
puts  it  the  following  way,    
“My  profession  is  to  govern  my  subjects  well  and  to  defend  and  protect  them;  to  this  
purpose  I  study  the  arts  of  both  peace  and  of  war.  And  if  I  am  rewarded  and  esteemed  
by  the  prince  whom  I  have  the  honor  to  serve,  it  is  not  so  much  because  I  am  
experienced  in  military  affairs  as  because  he  is  pleased  to  retain  me  as  one  of  his  
counselors  in  time  of  peace.”  (AW  I,  23;  emphasis  mine)    
  
                                                                                                              
33  Pocock  observes  that,  for  Machiavelli,  “Military  virtú  necessitates  political  virtue  because  both  can  be  
presented  in  terms  of  the  same  end.”  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  201.  
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For  Machiavelli,  the  service  of  political  elites  in  the  military  is  a  political  act.  It  
remains  a  constant  part  of  their  profession  insofar  as  violent  oppression  remains  a  
constant  threat.  But,  as  Fabrizio  points  out  in  his  own  case,  this  kind  of  elite  
professionalization  should  not  entail  abandoning  the  “arts  of  peace.”  He  thereby  
indicates  that  both  are  important  for  competent  rule.  
We  shall  see  this  tension  between  the  use  of  the  arts  of  war  and  the  arts  of  peace  
by  political  elites  developed  later  in  chapters  3  and  5.  But  we  also  see  elements  of  this  
tension  in  the  Art  of  War.  We  should  begin  with  Fabrizio’s  claim  that  war  is  not  a  
profession  by  which  one  can  make  an  honorable  living  at  all  times  (though  one  can  
certainly  earn  “glory”  on  the  battlefield).  He  does  not  suspend  this  judgment  in  the  case  
of  command.  It  requires  acting  in  ways  that  certainly  seem  dishonorable  on  the  surface.  
This  observation  echoes  observations  made  in  The  Prince  and  the  Discourses  on  Livy.  For  
example,  the  use  of  force,  however  justified,  always  counts  as  cruelty  for  Machiavelli  (P  
8.iv).  And  the  use  of  fraud  is  not  compatible  with  honor  in  a  conventional  sense,  even  if  
Machiavelli  does  concede  that  winning  a  battle  through  fraud  is  a  “glorious  thing.”  (D  
III.40.i)  When  we  come  to  chapter  3,  we  shall  see  why  a  ‘good’  ruler  does  not  commit  
him  or  herself  to  acting  honorably  in  all  instances  because  that  commitment  would  
enervate  his  or  her  strategic  potency.  Likewise,  when  we  come  to  chapter  5,  we  shall  see  
how  important  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  were  for  the  foundation,  formation,  and  
maintenance  of  the  Roman  state.  These  observations  will  only  serve  to  collapse  the  space  
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between  elite-­‐‑level  military  and  political  service  even  further.  As  with  the  profession  of  
war,  one  cannot  make  an  honorable  living  at  all  times  in  the  profession  of  politics.    
In  the  meantime,  we  should  note  that  Fabrizio  tracks  the  rise  and  fall  of  Rome  by  
the  behavior  of  its  leaders  with  respect  to  military  service,  just  as  he  did  with  average  
Roman  citizens.  For  example,  he  observes,  “as  long  as  the  Roman  republic  continued  
incorrupt,  no  citizen,  however  powerful,  ever  presumed  to  avail  himself  of  that  
profession  in  peacetime  so  as  to  trample  upon  the  laws,  to  plunder  provinces,  or  to  turn  
tyrant  and  enslave  his  country.”34  (AW  I,  17)  While  the  Roman  republic  was  virtuous,  
her  leaders  effectively  balanced  their  use  of  the  arts  of  peace  and  those  of  war  –  and  they  
certainly  never  preyed  upon  the  people.  When  Rome  had  become  corrupt,  a  different  
sort  of  leader  emerged.  According  to  Fabrizio,  “Caesar  and  Pompey,  and  almost  all  the  
Roman  generals  who  lived  after  the  Second  Punic  War,  acquired  their  reputation  as  skillful  
men,  not  as  good  citizens;  but  those  who  lived  before  won  glory  by  being  both  civic  
minded  and  skillful…  …Now  the  reason  for  this  was  that  the  former  made  war  their  
sole  occupation  and  the  latter  did  not.”35  (AW  I,  17;  emphasis  mine)  We  can  see  a  
guiding  standard  emerging  here.  Praiseworthy  leaders  are  military  “professionals”  
insofar  as  they  never  lose  sight  of  the  possibility  of  using  force,  but  they  do  not  let  that  
occupation  eclipse  their  other  civic  duties.  If  they  do,  they  are  not  “civic  minded”  or  
                                                                                                              
34  Wood,  “Introduction,”  xxvii.  
35  This  language  echoes  his  characterization  of  Agathocles  and  Severus  in  The  Prince.    
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“good  citizens.”  Caesar,  Pompey,  and  “almost  all”  the  Roman  generals  following  the  
Second  Punic  War  lost  sight  of  their  civic  duties,  focusing  their  considerable  skill  only  on  
war-­‐‑making  and  forgetting  the  maintenance  of  the  republic  as  a  whole.36    
For  example,  these  generals  of  the  late  Roman  Republic  and  the  Roman  Empire  
ignored  the  factional  nature  of  their  own  political  entrepreneurship.  A  good,  civic  
minded  leader  would  have  kept  growing  factionalism  squarely  in  view  and  worked  to  
curb  it  rather  than  using  it  as  a  springboard  to  power.  We  have  already  discussed  how  
changes  to  the  military  in  the  late  republic  led  to  the  formation  of  clientelistic  linkages  
between  soldier  and  commander.  Fabrizio  places  the  responsibility  for  that  development  
squarely  upon  the  shoulders  of  Roman  leadership.  He  even  makes  a  general  observation  
that  a  poor  leader  will  assist  his  own  factional  clients  in  perpetuating  cycles  of  violence  
“in  order  to  keep  up  his  interest  and  reputation,”  while  “a  leader  appointed  by  public  
authority  acts  in  quite  a  different  manner.”  In  the  case  of  military  affairs,  “by  
establishing  a  good  militia,  divisions  are  extinguished,  peace  restored.”  (AW  I,  41)  On  
this  count,  Roman  leaders  prior  to  the  Second  Punic  War  succeeded  and  those  following  
it  failed.  That  failure  ultimately  led  to  the  civil  wars  of  the  first  century  BCE  and  the  end  
of  the  republican  era  in  Rome.  
We  see  further  evidence  of  ongoing  failure  after  the  foundation  of  the  empire  in  
the  growing  and  intensifying  clientelism  of  Rome’s  military,  which  reached  a  fever  pitch  
                                                                                                              
36  For  a  discussion  of  this  process,  see  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  469-­‐‑472.  
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with  the  rise  of  the  Praetorian  Guard.  Fabrizio  observes,  “thinking  [the  standing]  armies  
insufficient  to  keep  the  senate  and  the  people  in  due  awe,  [the  emperors]  raised  another  
force,  called  the  Praetorian  Guard,  which  was  always  quartered  in  or  near  the  city,  and  
served  not  only  to  guard  the  emperor’s  person  but  to  bridle  the  people.”  (AW  I,  20)  
Taking  this  clientelistic  machine  par  excellence  as  a  negative  example,  we  see  once  again  
that  corruption  of  the  military  leads  to  violent  oppression.    
Leaders  who  attend  to  their  responsibility  to  satisfy  the  popular  desire  to  be  free  
from  oppression  will  hew  closely  to  the  advice  that  Fabrizio  offers  with  respect  to  
maintaining  military  discipline  and  disrupting  clientelistic  linkages.  They  will  avoid  
assigning  soldiers  to  commanders  who  share  any  ascriptive  identities  (kinship,  tribal,  
ethno-­‐‑linguistic,  shared  origin,  etc.)  with  them.  They  will  also  “oblige  citizens  to  love  
one  another,  to  decline  faction,  and  to  prefer  the  good  of  the  public  to  any  private  
interest.”  (AW  I,  12)  They  will,  in  other  words,  prioritize  the  citizenship  of  their  soldiers  
in  forming  and  maintaining  the  citizen-­‐‑militia.  
1.3 Good arms, per se  
Taking  a  step  back,  then,  we  can  see  that  Machiavelli  views  armed  forces  as  
either  reducing  or  increasing  violent  oppression  on  the  basis  of  how  they  are  formed  and  
maintained.  Two  sine  qua  nons  for  praiseworthy  armed  forces  emerge  from  this  
discussion:  citizen  participation  and  politicized  leadership.  On  the  one  hand,  
Machiavelli  only  trusts  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  with  the  arms  of  the  state.  Fabrizio  declares,  “A  
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state  employing  no  troops  except  those  composed  of  its  own  subjects  has  only  one  
enemy  to  fear.”  (AW  I,  31)  So  long  as  those  citizens  do  not  become  corrupted  by  war  all  
enemies  will  remain  external  ones.  Forestalling  that  corruption  is,  of  course,  the  
responsibility  of  military  commanders.  Making  sure  that  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  remain  citizens  
is  not  an  exclusively  military  question.  In  fact,  it  is  a  highly  political  one,  at  least  as  
Machiavelli  treats  it  in  the  Art  of  War.  Consider  Fabrizio’s  judgment  that  “tyranny  and  
usurpation  are  not  a  result  of  arming  the  citizens,  but  of  leading  a  government  weakly,  
and  that  while  a  state  is  well  led,  it  has  nothing  to  fear  from  its  subjects’  arms.”  (AW,  I  
32)  We  can  surmise  that  one  core  element  of  leading  a  state  ‘strongly’  is  the  maintenance  
of  a  robust  citizen-­‐‑militia.    
   Of  course,  leading  a  state  ‘strongly’  means  catering  to  the  interest  of  the  popular  
humor:  the  desire  not  to  be  oppressed.  With  this  in  mind,  we  can  see  that  Machiavelli’s  
citizen-­‐‑militia  does  not  empower  a  state  to  pursue  any  foreign  policy  it  wants.37  Rather  it  
constrains  the  state  to  wars  that  are  directly  connected  to  its  citizens’  freedom  from  
oppression.38  The  very  nature  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  itself  leverages  the  popular  humor  by  
using  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  rather  than  professional  ones.  A  body  of  professional  soldiers  will  
follow  money  or  affirmation  of  their  warrior  mentality  into  the  fray;  a  body  of  citizens  
will  only  follow  the  prospect  of  their  own  freedom  from  oppression.  
                                                                                                              
37  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  350;  Pace  Parel,  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  135.  
38  “The  mercenary  soldier  is  a  mere  instrument  in  another  man’s  hand;  but  the  citizen-­‐‑warrior  is  more  than  
an  instrument  in  the  public  hand,  since  his  virtú  is  his  own  and  he  fights  out  of  the  knowledge  of  what  it  is  
he  fights  for.”  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  203.  
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Fabrizio’s  extended  discussion  on  the  importance  of  a  citizen-­‐‑soldier’s  private  
commitments  underscores  this  dynamic.39  It  is  only  when  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  have  such  
commitments  that  they  will  be  capable  of  the  love  of  peace  that  Machiavelli  cites  as  a  
key  virtue  in  the  preface  of  the  Art  of  War.  Soldiers  must  have  something  to  fight  for  
other  than  fighting  itself.40  They  must  want  to  fight  a  war  in  order  to  end  it,  not  to  
continue  it.  Private  commitments  (and  the  freedom  from  oppression  they  require)  serve  
as  those  motivations.  A  citizen-­‐‑soldier’s  family,  property,  and  occupation  must  both  
spur  him  or  her  to  war  and  call  him  or  her  back  from  it.  Tangible,  constitutive  elements  
of  a  person’s  life  -­‐‑  such  as  a  livelihood  -­‐‑  render  the  fomentation  of  war  undesirable.  War  
must  only  be  a  means  to  an  end.  Even  mercenaries  use  it  as  a  means  for  income.  But  
mercenaries  will  seek  to  promote  war  under  any  circumstance  where  it  leads  to  profit.  A  
citizen-­‐‑soldier,  driven  by  considerations  for  his  or  her  livelihood,  property,  family,  and  
friends  will  not  share  those  same  motivations.  A  citizen-­‐‑soldier  will  look  upon  going  to  
war  according  to  a  very  different  decision-­‐‑making  framework,  one  that  emphasizes  non-­‐‑
oppression  above  all  else.  
                                                                                                              
39  Pace  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  201.  
40  Contrast  this  image  with  Coby’s  claim  that  “The  strong  timocrat  is  Machiavelli’s  idea,  whether  he  is  
fighting  in  defense  of  freedom  or  in  pursuit  of  greatness.”  Machiavelli’s  Romans,  294.  See  also,  Pocock,  The  
Machiavellian  Moment,  203.  
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This  feature  of  a  well-­‐‑constituted  citizen-­‐‑militia  further  underscores  the  political  
nature  of  leading  one.41  The  political  nature  of  military  command  crops  up  in  Book  IV  
(on  command  and  battle  formations)  and  Book  VI  (on  the  maintenance  of  order  in  
camp),  where  Fabrizio  notes  that  generals  must  practice  certain  political  arts.  They  must  
be  talented  orators  in  order  to  motivate  their  soldiers.  They  must  also  be  willing  to  
accentuate  a  sense  of  necessity  among  their  soldiers.  That  Fabrizio  feels  that  persuasive  
oratory  or  the  deliberate  engineering  of  situations  in  which  victory  is  the  only  option  
must  be  in  the  repertoire  of  any  decent  commander  indicates  his  acknowledgement  that  
the  popular  humor  must  be  the  military’s  animating  one.  He  recommends  that  
commanders  work  around,  rather  than  eliminate  it.  Military  elites  must  conform  to  and  
work  within  the  boundaries  of  the  popular  humor.42  In  this  respect,  the  extent  to  which  
elite  military  service  is  professional  is  the  extent  to  which  that  professionalism  serves  the  
popular  humor  to  be  free  from  oppression.  
1.4 Good arms and Good Books 
It  should  be  clear  by  now  that  the  Art  of  War  argues  that  determining  patterns  of  
military  participation  according  to  one’s  membership  in  either  the  political  elite  or  the  
people  at  large  minimize  the  potential  for  violent  oppression.  The  claim  that  politics  and  
war  are  identical  is  less  self-­‐‑evident.  Nevertheless,  Machiavelli’s  depiction  of  military  
                                                                                                              
41  Wood,  “Introduction,”  xlvii,  liii-­‐‑lxv;  Pace  Hörnqvist  “Machiavelli’s  Military  Project  and  the  Art  of  War,”  
123;  Mansfield  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  191.  
42  Parel,  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  89.  
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and  political  affairs  overlap  with  each  other  so  much,  that  we  should  expect  to  see  these  
recommendations  for  elite  and  citizen  participation  repeated  across  Machiavelli’s  other  
texts,  especially  The  Prince  and  the  Discourses  on  Livy.43  In  other  words,  freedom  from  
oppression  governs  the  patterns  of  military  participation  in  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  described  
above;  we  shall  see  that  it  also  governs  patterns  of  political  participation  in  The  Prince  
and  the  Discourses  on  Livy.  I  turn  to  those  texts  in  the  next  four  chapters.  If  I  am  right  
about  their  compatibility  with  the  Art  of  War,  then  the  Art  of  War  offers  a  new  avenue  of  
understanding  into  The  Prince  and  the  Discourses  on  Livy  (and  vice  versa).44  And  if  
Machiavelli  turns  out  to  be  right  about  the  intimacy  between  political  and  military  
questions,  then  we  have  in  his  corpus  an  avenue  to  a  richer  understanding  of  the  means  
by  which  democracies  and  autocracies  alike  can  minimize  violent  oppression  within  
their  borders.  
                                                                                                              
43  Gilbert,  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War,”  21.  
44  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  293.    
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2. Violent Oppression and Machiavelli’s Citizen-Militia in 
The Prince 
As  we  saw  in  chapter  1,  it  matters  a  great  deal  for  politics  who  is  armed  and  how  
they  are  trained.  In  the  Art  of  War,  Machiavelli  links  political  and  military  affairs  with  
the  problem  of  violent  oppression.  The  Prince,  written  six  years  earlier,  demonstrates  a  
compatible  line  of  thinking.  One  of  Machiavelli’s  core  observations  there  is  that  the  best  
means  to  address  the  problem  of  violent  oppression  is  a  partnership  between  a  properly  
motivated  prince  and  the  people  at  large.  He  encourages  the  prince  to  find  a  popular  
basis  for  his  political  and  military  power.  In  fact,  as  we  shall  see  in  chapters  4  and  5  
when  I  discuss  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  republics,  every  regime  worth  emulating  must  
find  a  popular  basis  for  its  power,  though  patterns  of  political  participation  vary  across  
regime-­‐‑type.  In  the  case  of  Machiavelli’s  principalities,  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  most  clearly  
embodies  the  popular  basis  for  power  and  means  of  popular  participation.  A  prince  who  
tries  to  minimize  violent  oppression  by  trying  to  work  with  other  elites  will,  in  
Machiavelli’s  terms,  “come  to  ruin”  because  he  will  necessarily  have  to  depend  on  
unreliable  and  dangerous  political  rivals.  (P  15.i)  An  armed  people,  by  contrast,  will  not  
ruin  the  prince  or  the  principality.  On  the  contrary,  an  armed  people  will  secure  it  from  
external  threats.  Moreover,  the  people  make  an  attractive  partner  for  the  prince  in  
founding  or  maintaining  a  state  because  individual  citizens  do  not  see  themselves  as  
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natural  rivals  to  him,  whereas  elites  do.1  According  to  Machiavelli’s  understanding  of  
political  humors,  which  he  makes  explicit  in  chapter  9,  elites  crave  oppression  and  the  
people  crave  freedom  from  that  oppression.  (P  9.i)  These  “diverse  humors”  drive  
political  behavior  in  principalities  and  republics  alike.2  According  to  this  understanding  
of  political  behavior,  appetites  guide  actions  and  institutions  of  violence  should  be  
populated  by  people  whose  appetites  lead  them  to  minimize  oppression.  
Machiavelli  argues  in  the  Art  of  war  that  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  acts  as  a  guarantor  of  
non-­‐‑oppression;  in  The  Prince,  this  characteristic  of  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  enhances  its  moral  
and  strategic  value.  In  conjunction  with  Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  the  political  humors  
in  chapter  9,  Machiavelli’s  discussions  of  founders  in  chapter  6  adds  a  moral  dimension  
to  the  founding  and  maintenance  of  states  and  their  institutions.3  Machiavelli’s  “greatest  
examples”  are  great  because  of  their  strategic  efficacy  and  their  popular  service.  The  
citizen-­‐‑militia  also  has  the  attributes  of  strategic  efficacy  and  popular  service.  With  these  
attributes  in  mind,  I  use  this  chapter  to  explain  how  Machiavelli’s  proposal  for  the  
citizen-­‐‑militia  in  chapter  13  is  the  key  to  Machiavelli’s  response  to  the  problem  of  violent  
oppression  in  principalities  and,  as  a  result,  decisive  for  the  text  as  a  whole.  First,  I  
                                                                                                              
1  Parel,  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  118.  
2  Principalities:  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  1986;  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  23-­‐‑24;  Republics:  
Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  414;  Sullivan,  Machiavelli,  Hobbes,  and  the  Formation  of  a  Liberal  Republicanism  in  
England,  45;  Coby,  Machiavelli’s  Romans,  64.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Machiavelli’s  humoral  theory  is  one  of  the  
few  ideas  that  gets  repeated,  without  contradiction,  in  The  Discourses  on  Livy  (D  I.4.i)  and  The  Florentine  
Histories  (FH  II.12.i),  though  it  does  get  modified  in  the  latter.  See,  Ben-­‐‑Ami  Scharfstein,  Amoral  Politics  the  
Persistent  Truth  of  Machiavellism.  (Albany:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1995),  107.    
3  For  a  contrasting  view,  see  Steven  Forde,  “International  Realism  and  the  Science  of  Politics,”  153,  156.  
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discuss  the  virtues  of  the  people  at  large  and  the  strategic  and  moral  value  that  an  
alliance  with  them  has  for  the  prince.  Second,  I  use  Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  his  
“greatest  examples”  to  show  how  the  people’s  desire  to  be  free  from  oppression  is  the  
central  value  of  the  text.  Third,  I  discuss  Machiavelli’s  attempt  to  appeal  to  both  the  self-­‐‑
interest  and  the  sense  of  duty  of  his  reader  when  he  advocates  for  the  citizen-­‐‑militia.  
Fourth,  I  detail  the  ways  in  which  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  shifts  the  balance  of  power  in  a  
principality  in  order  to  promote  non-­‐‑oppression.  Fifth  (and  finally),  I  contrast  
Machiavelli’s  advocacy  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  with  the  paramilitaries  and  security  forces  
more  commonly  used  by  autocrats.  This  contrast  throws  into  relief  the  moral  and  
strategic  value  of  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  for  the  prince  and  the  people  alike.    
2.1 The people as basis for princely power 
There  is  a  distinctive  vision  of  power  animating  Machiavelli’s  thinking  in  The  
Prince.  The  prince  must  wield  power  just  as  much  for  the  people  as  for  himself.4  The  
commonplace  understanding  according  to  which  The  Prince  teaches  its  reader  to  acquire  
and  maintain  power  per  se  mistakes  the  instruments  Machiavelli  describes  in  detail  for  
their  designed  ends.  For  Machiavelli,  the  possession  of  power  is  conditional  upon  the  
prince’s  ability  to  cater  to  popular  humors  and  to  suppress  elite  ones.  Political  
institutions  are  made  up  of  people  who  have  wills  and  are  capable  of  independent  
action.  The  existence  of  such  institutions,  and  thus  the  existence  of  a  certain  kind  of  
                                                                                                              
4  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  “A  Note  on  Machiavelli,”  217;  Mansfield,  Taming  the  Prince,  130.  
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power,  always  depends  on  a  number  of  wills  working  in  concert.5  Machiavelli  bases  his  
recommendations  in  The  Prince  on  this  understanding  of  power  and  its  relation  to  
political  institutions.    
When  faced  with  the  choice  between  catering  to  the  many  and  catering  to  the  
few,  Machiavelli  chooses  the  former  as  the  most  praiseworthy  way  to  handle  political  
power.  (P  9.iv)  This  choice  defines  proper  execution  of  state  power  in  terms  of  the  needs  
of  the  people.6  The  people  are  the  starting  point  for  addressing  the  problem  of  violent  
oppression  because  they  place  such  great  value  in  freedom  from  it.  While  it  is  the  prince  
who  must  form  the  citizen-­‐‑militia,  the  people  themselves  are  the  means  by  which  a  
principality  as  a  whole  can  best  minimize  violent  oppression.    
In  chapter  9  (“Of  the  Civil  Principality”)  Machiavelli  claims  that  the  people  are,  
in  fact,  the  best  foundation  for  princely  power  both  in  moral  and  strategic  terms.  (P  9.v)  
Machiavelli  writes:  “one  cannot  satisfy  the  great  with  decency  and  without  injury  to  
others,  but  one  can  satisfy  the  people;  for  the  end  of  the  people  is  more  decent  than  that  
of  the  great,  since  the  great  want  to  oppress  and  the  people  want  not  to  be  oppressed.”  
(P  9.ii)  The  elite  have  the  opposite  impulse  and  they  make  their  decisions  in  terms  of  
their  capacity  to  oppress,  rather  than  power,  profit,  or  long-­‐‑term  security.  When  
Machiavelli  metaphorically  divides  the  political  world  into  beasts  and  men,  those  who  
                                                                                                              
5  Hannah  Arendt,  On  Violence,  (New  York:  Harcourt  Brace,  1970),  44  
6  For  contrasting  views  see  Herbert  Butterfield,  The  Statecraft  of  Machiavelli,  (New  York:  Macmillan,  1956),  
110;  and  Cary  Nederman,  “Machiavelli  and  Moral  Character:  principality,  republic,  and  the  psychology  of  
virtú,”  History  of  Political  Thought  21,  no.  3  (Autumn  2000),  354.  
  66  
have  the  drive  to  oppress  the  people  play  the  part  of  the  wolves  (P  18.iii).  Wolves,  
though  social  and  intelligent,  have  no  place  in  a  stable  political  association.  Their  drives  
are  too  strong  to  respect  any  order  other  than  the  one  that  caters  to  those  drives.    
Anthony  Parel  correctly  observes  that  the  questions  that  structure  The  Prince,  
“require  a  knowledge  of  how  the  humours  [sic]  of  principalities  are  related  to  one  
another  and  the  prince.”7  Every  type  of  principality  (hereditary,  mixed,  new,  
ecclesiastical,  and  -­‐‑  especially  -­‐‑  civic)  can  only  function  when  the  prince  competently  
responds  to  the  particular  configuration  of  humors  in  that  principality.  In  a  hereditary  
principality,  this  task  requires  only  “ordinary”  industry  because  the  existing  sinews  of  
state  bind  the  humors  together.  Matters  are  trickier  in  mixed  principalities,  where  the  
prince  must  satisfy  the  wants  of  the  subpopulation  that  supported  his  conquest  and  
either  soothe  or  eliminate  the  subpopulation  that  opposed  him.  Failure  to  secure  the  
support  of  the  strongest  humor  (usually  the  people)  renders  a  prince’s  acquisition  
tenuous  at  best,  malignant  at  worst.8  The  articulated  strength  of  the  popular  humor  in  
republics  makes  them  difficult  to  conquer  and  keep  for  this  very  reason.  Even  new  
princes  in  new  principalities  must  take  care  to  manage  the  humoral  structure  of  their  
people.  This  management  is  “the  test  of  their  virtú  and  innovative  enterprise.”9  Typically  
(but  especially  in  civic  principalities)  this  management  requires  an  alliance  between  the  
                                                                                                              
7  Parel,  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  112.  
8  Parel,  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  116.  
9  Parel,  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  117.  
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prince  and  the  people  wherein  the  prince  respects  the  property  and  honor  of  the  people  
and  the  prince  and  the  people  work  in  tandem  (the  latter  via  the  citizen-­‐‑militia)  to  keep  
normally  oppressive  elites  in  check.  It  also  puts  the  prince  in  a  position  to  have  cleaner  
hands  because  the  humor  of  the  people  is  more  decent  than  that  of  the  elite.  Where  the  
elite  humor  is  dominant,  the  prince  must  support  acts  of  oppression  in  order  to  satisfy  it.  
(P  19.vii)    
Machiavelli  would  also  have  his  reader  take  note  of  the  strategic  advantage  of  
the  limited  nature  of  the  people’s  desire.10  The  people  ask  only  not  to  be  oppressed  (P  
9.iv).  The  people  can  be  satisfied  in  its  freedom  from  oppression,  but  Machiavelli  
presents  the  elite  as  far  more  difficult  to  satisfy  in  their  desire  for  oppression.11  As  a  
result,  he  sees  it  as  possible  to  find  a  stable  equilibrium  in  the  political  game  when  the  
people  play  a  major  role.12  The  insatiable  nature  of  elite  appetites  places  political  
institutions  and  outcomes  into  flux.  Popular  appetites  do  not.  Their  desired  end  (non-­‐‑
oppression)  is  a  fixed  goal  and  thus  is  a  solid  and  predictable  basis  for  political  order.13  
Most  importantly,  the  princely  pursuit  of  non-­‐‑oppression  indicates  a  standard  by  
which  one  can  judge  uses  of  political  violence  and  the  institutions  that  structure  it.  The  
                                                                                                              
10  Dietz,  “Trapping  the  Prince,”  784.  
11  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  181;  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  20.  In  this  respect,  Pitkin  is  wrong  when  she  
claims  that  the  prince  can  ‘command’  and  ‘manage’  his  popular  support  at  will.  She  is  right  insofar  as  the  
prince  does  have  a  greater  degree  of  freedom  to  operate  when  he  allies  himself  with  the  people,  but  he  
cannot  command  the  people  at  will.  The  humor  for  non-­‐‑oppression  defines  the  limit  of  his  command.  
12  For  a  contrasting  view,  see  Nederman,  “Machiavelli  and  Moral  Character:  principality,  republic,  and  the  
psychology  of  virtú,”  394.  
13  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  24.  
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prince  must  determine  which  humor  the  use  of  political  violence  satisfies,  the  one  for  
oppression  or  the  one  for  the  freedom  from  oppression.  This  feat,  of  course,  is  no  easy  
one  because  the  pursuit  of  freedom  from  oppression  and  oppression  per  se  can  easily  
resemble  each  other  where  the  exercise  of  violence  is  concerned.  Even  when  these  
pursuits  do  not  resemble  each  other,  crafty  political  actors  can  reappropriate  institutions  
of  violence  such  as  militaries  and  penal  systems  from  projects  of  liberation  to  projects  of  
oppression.  Nevertheless,  the  difficulty  of  judging  between  projects  of  oppression  and  
projects  of  liberation  should  not  overshadow  the  importance  of  having  the  right  basis  for  
judgment.  In  fact,  that  difficulty  makes  having  a  clear  view  of  the  end  –  non-­‐‑oppression  
–  that  much  more  important.  
2.2 Machiavelli’s “Greatest” Examples 
The  Prince  seeks  to  align  the  interest  of  the  prince  and  the  people  by  praising  
politicians  who  are  defined  by  their  successful  popular  service  over  those  who  are  not.  
The  people’s  freedom  from  oppression  is  the  value  against  which  princely  actions  –  
particularly  the  use  of  violence  –  are  measured.  Chapter  6  of  The  Prince  features  
Machiavelli’s  “greatest  examples,”  a  group  of  political  figures  who  engage  in  the  most  
praiseworthy  political  action  (and  are  thus  the  ‘greatest’  per  se)  and  from  whom  
Machiavelli’s  reader  can  learn  the  most  (and  are  thus  the  ‘greatest  examples’)  (P  6.i).  
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They  each  put  their  peoples  in  a  position  to  avoid  oppression.14  Moses  finds  “the  people  
of  Israel  in  Egypt,  enslaved  and  oppressed  by  the  Egyptians.”  Cyrus  finds  “the  Persians  
malcontent  with  the  empire  of  the  Medes,  and  the  Medes  soft  and  effeminate  because  of  
a  long  peace.”  Theseus  finds  the  Athenians  “dispersed.”  Romulus  is  not  cited  for  
liberating  the  Romans,  but  is  praised  instead  for  overcoming  exposure  at  birth  (P  6.iii).  
Nevertheless,  he  shares  with  the  others  the  distinction  of  succeeding  in  founding  a  
thriving  state.  And  should  any  doubt  remain  about  the  lesson  that  the  reader  must  take  
away  from  chapter  6,  it  is  put  to  rest  in  Chapter  26  where  Machiavelli  calls  for  an  Italian  
founder  and  characterizes  Italy  as  “more  enslaved  than  the  Hebrews,  more  servile  than  
the  Persians,  more  dispersed  than  the  Athenians,  without  a  head,  without  order,  beaten,  
despoiled,  torn,  pillaged,  and  having  endured  ruin  of  every  sort.”  (P  26.i)  These  
redemptions  reveal  the  central  value  animating  Machiavelli’s  thought  in  general  and  The  
Prince  in  particular.15  Any  other  strategies  and  arguments  are  connected  to  and  arrayed  
around  the  value  of  popular  non-­‐‑oppression.  Consider  the  outright  bans  Machiavelli  
recommends  against  theft  of  subject  property  and  sexual  assault  by  the  prince.  (P  17.iv)  
                                                                                                              
14  It  is  here  that  Pocock  (The  Machiavellian  Moment,  206)  errs,  for  example,  when  he  describes  political  life  
before  a  founding  as  anomic.  The  situation  of  the  people  on  behalf  of  whom  the  founder  works  is  only  
anomic  in  the  sense  that  no  state  that  effectively  imposes  law  exists.  While  the  diverse  humors  are  not  
‘nomoi’  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  term,  the  moral  and  practical  constraints  of  those  humors  already  
constitute  a  form  that  the  founder  must  respect,  rather  than  impose.    
15  For  contrasting  accounts  of  the  central  normative  thrust  of  The  Prince,  see  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  
67,  80;  Butterfield,  Statecraft  of  Machiavelli,  110;  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  5;  Steven  Forde,  Varieties  of  
Realism:  Thucydides  and  Machiavelli,  The  Journal  of  Politics  54,  no.  2  (May  1992),  381.  For  complimentary  
ones,  see  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  186-­‐‑7;  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  21-­‐‑28;  Maurizio  Viroli,  
Machiavelli,  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998),  1.      
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Such  activities  are  completely  at  odds  with  the  people’s  desire  to  be  free  from  
oppression.  To  practice  these  activities  –  and  to  allow  citizens  to  practice  them  on  each  
other  –  would  be  consistent  with  a  political  order  that  accepts  oppression  as  normal.  The  
princes  who  Machiavelli  condemns  for  abuses  of  power  –  Agathocles  in  chapter  8,  
Emperor  Severus  in  chapter  19,  and  Ferdinand  of  Aragon  in  chapter  21,  for  example  –  all  
commit  unnecessary  ‘cruelties,’  which  is  to  say  that  they  act  at  some  point  or  another  
contrary  to  the  people’s  desire  to  be  free  from  oppression.  Agathocles’s  “savage  
inhumanity”  and  “infinite  crimes,”  (P  8.ii)  Severus’s  being  “very  cruel  and  very  
rapacious,”  (P  19.viii)  and  Ferdinand’s  “wretched”  example  of  pious  cruelty  (P  21.i)  bar  
each  in  turn  from  being  praised  beyond  their  strategic  skill.16  
For  Machiavelli,  violent  oppression  is  the  hallmark  of  a  failed  political  order  and  
liberation  requires  the  creation  of  a  new  one  (P  6.iv  and  26.i).  The  creation  of  such  orders  
requires  the  violent  wresting  of  political  power  from  abusive  actors  invested  in  an  order  
of  oppression.17  When  Machiavelli  heaps  praise  upon  those  who  do  so,  it  is  with  an  eye  
towards  the  challenges  built  into  that  struggle.  “Nothing  is  more  difficult  to  handle,  
more  doubtful  to  manage,”  than  replacing  an  order  that  facilitates  oppression  with  one  
that  does  not,  because  “the  introducer  has  all  those  who  benefit  from  the  old  orders  as  
enemies  and  lukewarm  defenders  in  all  those  who  might  benefit  from  the  new  orders.”  
                                                                                                              
16  Pace  Virginia  Cox,  “Rhetoric  and  Ethics  in  Machiavelli,”  in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Machiavelli,  ed.  
John  Najemy,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2010),  185  
17  In  chapter  3,  I  shall  delve  more  deeply  into  the  princes  use  of  violence  outside  the  context  of  his  alliance  
with  the  people  
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(P  6.iv)  Political  innovation  requires  virtuosic  skill  because  the  members  of  the  old,  
oppressive  order  are  so  deeply  invested  in  it  that  they  will  defend  that  order  without  
regard  to  the  costs  to  others.  It  is  no  wonder  that  Machiavelli,  like  Marx  or  Fanon  after  
him,  sees  political  violence  as  a  legitimate  means  for  liberating  the  people.18  
If  we  take  chapters  6,  9,  and  26  as  decisive  for  the  normative  thrust  of  the  text  as  
a  whole,  then  a  few  conclusions  about  Machiavelli’s  counsel  follow.  First,  non-­‐‑
oppression  is  the  central  motivation  for  both  political  innovation  (i.e.,  founding  and  
reforming  states)  and  praiseworthy  political  violence.  Second,  in  the  context  of  political  
oppression,  Machiavelli  assumes  that  the  creation  of  a  new  political  order  may  require  
the  use  of  political  violence.  Third,  again  in  the  context  of  political  oppression,  
innovation  may  require  the  use  of  political  violence  because  the  enmity  of  dominating  
parties  makes  such  innovation  difficult  and  doubtful.  These  operational  parameters  
provide  Machiavelli’s  reader  with  opportunities  to  evaluate  past  and  future  princely  
action.  A  good  prince  will  imitate  the  founders  of  chapter  6  in  having  non-­‐‑oppressive  
rule  as  a  central  motivation,  tying  both  political  violence  and  political  innovation  to  the  
pursuit  of  non-­‐‑oppression  and  the  marginalization  of  the  elite.  On  these  grounds,  
princes  like  Severus,  Agathocles  and  Ferdinand  receive  praise  for  skillful  political  action,  
but  are  not  praised  as  highly  as  the  founders  of  chapter  6.  None  join  Machiavelli’s  class  
                                                                                                              
18  Karl  Marx,  “The  Communist  Manifesto,”  in  The  Marx-­‐‑Engels  Reader,  ed.  Robert  Tucker  (New  York:  Norton,  
1978),  490-­‐‑491;  Franz  Fanon,  The  Wretched  of  the  Earth,  trans.  Constance  Farrington,  (New  York:  Grove  Press,  
1968),  35.  
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of  truly  praiseworthy  actors  because  each,  in  his  own  way,  behaved  contrary  to  the  
popular  desire  for  non-­‐‑oppression.  Severus  catered  to  a  client  military  that  had  taken  on  
the  elite  appetite  for  oppression  (P  19.viii),  Agathocles  committed  “infinite  crimes”  (P  
8.ii)  and  Machiavelli  rightly  condemns  Ferdinand  for  his  expulsion  of  the  Marranos  
from  Spain  (P  21.i).  In  both  cases,  the  violence  that  these  princes  exercise  fails  to  pass  
muster  at  the  bar  of  popular  non-­‐‑oppression.    
2.3 The Prince’s Motivational Strategy 
Machiavelli’s  use  of  his  ‘greatest  examples’  indicates  the  normative  stance  of  The  
Prince,  but  the  motivational  strategy  of  the  argument  does  not  lie  only  in  its  deep  
appreciation  for  the  people’s  desire  not  to  be  oppressed.  The  motivational  strategy  of  
Machiavelli’s  argument  also  lies  in  the  way  in  which  he  yokes  the  self-­‐‑interest  of  princes  
to  popular  service.  In  chapter  6,  Machiavelli  encourages  princes  to  imitate  four  
exemplary  founders.  In  chapter  26,  Machiavelli  paints  Italy’s  political  situation  in  the  
16th  century  in  the  same  hues  as  those  of  the  peoples  who  his  favored  founders  liberated  
from  oppression.  In  praising  these  examples  as  the  “greatest,”  Machiavelli  is  making  the  
case  for  what  his  reader  should  take  as  the  highest  political  action.  Most  of  The  Prince,  
however,  is  not  couched  in  terms  of  political  heroism,  but  rather  in  terms  of  the  pursuit  
of  self-­‐‑interest.  In  this  respect,  The  Prince  is  not  only  written  for  a  would-­‐‑be  Theseus  or  
Moses,  who  already  value  popular  liberation  for  its  own  sake,  rather  The  Prince  is  also  
accessible  and  useful  to  readers  of  many  stripes,  including  more  self-­‐‑interested  readers  
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like  the  Medici.  Above  all,  it  is  useful  to  the  people  as  a  whole  because  the  strategies  
recommended  for  a  self-­‐‑interested  prince  cater  just  as  much  to  popular  desires  as  those  
recommended  for  a  would-­‐‑be  Theseus  or  Moses.  While  we  see  this  idea  embodied  most  
clearly  in  The  Prince’s  central  chapters  on  military  affairs,  we  also  see  Machiavelli  
recommending  popular  empowerment  as  the  prudent  course  in  almost  every  kind  of  
principality.  Both  the  prince  moved  by  noble  aspiration  to  found  a  new  regime  and  the  
prince  moved  by  narrow  self-­‐‑interest  to  merely  maintain  power  gain  by  creating  a  
citizen-­‐‑militia  and  thereby  taking  the  people  as  the  basis  for  their  power.    
We  can  see  The  Prince’s  normative  bent  in  its  heterodox  treatment  of  political  
virtue,  as  well.19  Unlike  many  of  the  other  texts  in  the  mirror-­‐‑for-­‐‑princes  genre,  The  
Prince  frequently  couches  the  obligations  of  its  reader  in  terms  of  imitation,  semblance,  
and  appearance,  rather  than  the  actual  possession  of  typical  humanist  values.  “A  prudent  
man,”  Machiavelli  claims,  will  emulate  these  examples  “so  that  if  his  own  virtue  does  
not  reach  that  far,  he  is  at  least  in  odor  of  it”  (P  6.i;  emphasis  mine).  On  the  one  hand,  we  
can  take  this  injunction  to  mean  that  though  one  may  not  be  in  a  position  to  unify  the  
Athenian  tribes  or  liberate  the  Israelites  from  bondage  in  Egypt,  one  can  still  act  
prudently  by  imitating  these  legendary  examples.  But,  in  defining  prudence  (as  opposed  
to  dutifulness  or  public-­‐‑spiritedness)  as  imitation  of  these  examples,  Machiavelli  is  
                                                                                                              
19  See,  for  example,  the  contrasting  treatments  of  political  virtue  by  Xenophon,  Cyropaedia,  trans.  Walter  
Miller,  (London:  W.  Heinemann,  1914);  Cicero,  De  officiis,  trans.  Walter  Miller  (London:  W.  Heinemann,  
1913);  and  Erasmus,  The  Education  of  a  Christian  Prince,  trans.  Lisa  Jardine  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  
University  Press.  1997).  
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opening  up  the  profitability  of  imitating  these  examples  to  a  whole  other  class  of  
political  actors:  those  who  may  not  have  the  intentions  of  Moses  or  Theseus,  but  may  
nevertheless  profit  by  “their  odor.”  The  second  meaning  of  this  statement  is  that  no  
matter  the  praiseworthiness  of  one’s  intention,  the  imitation  of  the  examples  that  
Machiavelli  cites  will  contribute  to  a  maximum  strategic  efficacy  in  any  social  endeavor,  
particularly  in  politics.    In  this  sense,  Machiavelli  appeals  to  both  the  self-­‐‑interest  and  
the  sense  of  conventional  virtue  of  the  reader.  Therein  lies  much  of  The  Prince’s  
motivational  strategy.  
Machiavelli’s  reader,  the  Florentine  must  have  understood,  would  probably  not  
possess  the  kind  of  duty-­‐‑bound  selflessness  praised  by  the  humanists  of  Machiavelli’s  
day.  Such  men  were  too  rare.  And  even  if  they  were  abundant,  the  conditions  for  their  
success  in  politics  rarely  existed.  Machiavelli  knew  that  the  human  material  before  him  
could  be  moved  best  by  levers  of  self-­‐‑interest.  When  Machiavelli  composed  The  Prince,  
Giulio  di  Giuliano  de’  Medici  (the  de  facto  administrator  of  Florence  in  1513),  could  not  
have  been  far  from  his  mind.  Giulio  was  a  competent  political  operator,  functioning  as  
both  Archbishop  of  Florence  and  chief  minister  to  his  brother,  Pope  Leo  X.  Yet  
Machiavelli  could  not  have  seen  Giulio  as  motivated  by  the  same  republican  patriotism  
that  burned  in  his  heart.  The  problem  of  motivation  would  have  only  been  compounded  
by  a  problem  of  competence  when  Giulio  ceded  rule  of  Florence  in  1514  to  The  Prince’s  
ultimate  recipient,  his  nephew  Lorenzo.  Machiavelli  needed  some  way  to  get  a  
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nobleman  like  Giulio  (and  then  Lorenzo)  to  act  in  the  interest  of  the  Florentine  people.20  I  
take  it  that  Machiavelli’s  solution  to  this  particular  political  problem  was  to  harness  the  
self-­‐‑interest  of  the  member  of  the  Medici  to  whom  the  text  would  be  sent  (Giulio  at  the  
time  of  composition,  Lorenzo  at  the  time  of  submission)  by  emphasizing  the  connection  
between  popular  empowerment  and  the  pursuit  of  that  self-­‐‑interest.  I  would  not  go  so  
far  as  to  suggest  that  Machiavelli  presents  a  view  of  politics  meant  for  his  Medici  reader  
alone.  The  Medici  must  have  been  on  Machiavelli’s  mind  while  he  wrote,  but  
Machiavelli’s  other  claims  in  The  Prince  (and  repeated  in  The  Discourses)  about  the  
tendency  of  elites  to  behave  self-­‐‑interestedly  suggest  that  these  arguments  apply  to  other  
nobles  as  well.  Machiavelli’s  primary  aim  must  have  been  to  motivate  his  Medici  reader  
to  strengthen  the  Florentine  state  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  popular  humor  and  
with  an  eye  toward  the  unification  of  Italy,  but  the  ideas  that  animate  The  Prince  go  
beyond  his  native  Tuscany  to  any  situation  of  state  formation  and  stabilization.    
2.4 Arming the People 
At  this  point,  a  prudent  reader  will  ask  if  Machiavelli,  as  I  have  described  him,  
effectively  addresses  the  central  problem  of  political  violence.  After  all,  teaching  a  prince  
to  be  virtuous  is  different  from  designing  a  set  of  institutions  that  both  reduce  violence  
and  stop  short  of  overwhelming  the  political  order  that  they  are  meant  to  protect.  
                                                                                                              
20  For  a  discussion  of  the  tension  between  the  particular  advice  written  for  Giulio/Lorenzo  and  the  general  
teaching  of  The  Prince,  see  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  61.  
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Perhaps  more  to  the  point,  we  can  turn  to  Locke’s  observation  that  the  greatest  threat  to  
the  liberty  of  a  people  is  a  virtuous  prince.  The  people,  Locke  reasons,  will  grow  
accustomed  to  broad  princely  powers  if  they  have  been  used  well.21  This  complacency  
poses  a  threat  to  liberty.22  Unlimited  power  may  be  able  to  create  order,  but  only  when  
used  well.  When  used  badly,  unlimited  power  is  a  mechanism  of  oppression.  If  
Machiavelli’s  recommendations  were  limited  to  the  imitation  of  the  personal  virtues  of  
his  “most  excellent”  examples,  Machiavelli  would  certainly  seem  susceptible  to  Locke’s  
critique.  Machiavelli  would  seem  to  secure  peace  with  only  the  equity  of  princely  virtue  
–  a  policy  which  would  be  successful  in  the  presence  of  an  adequately  skilled  and  
properly  disposed  prince,  but  a  dismal  failure  in  the  presence  of  a  corrupt  and/or  inept  
one.23  Yet  Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  praiseworthy  princes  does  not  end  with  their  
characters.  It  extends  itself  into  institutional  recommendations.  For  example,  a  prince  
must  use  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  not  a  mercenary  or  a  foreign  army,  (P  12-­‐‑13)  he  must  not  rely  
on  fortresses  or  fixed  fortifications  (P  20.ix),  he  must  live  in  those  territories  he  annexes  
and,  if  possible,  leave  standing  laws  and  customs  alone  (P  3.iii).  This  set  of  
recommendations  is  noteworthy  for  the  position  in  which  they  put  the  prince  with  
respect  to  the  people.  When  followed,  they  result  in  an  armed  citizenry  and  a  
                                                                                                              
21  John  Locke,  Two  Treatise  of  Government.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1988)  Paragraph  166.  
22  Benjamin  Kleinerman,  “Can  the  Prince  Really  Be  Tamed?  Executive  Prerogative,  Popular  Apathy,  and  the  
Constitutional  Frame  in  Locke’s  Second  Treatise,”  American  Political  Science  Review  101,  no.  2  (February  
2007),  209.  
23  Nederman,  “Machiavelli  and  moral  character,”  361.  
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defenseless  prince  but  for  that  armed  citizenry.  From  Machiavelli’s  perspective,  such  a  
relationship  is  ideal  for  minimizing  violent  oppression  in  a  principality.  It  creates  a  
fighting  force  that  is  eager  to  defend  the  homeland  while  severely  limiting  the  prince’s  
ability  to  oppress  his  own  people.    
We  should  turn  to  a  background  distinction  in  Machiavelli  between  what  Roger  
Boesche  calls  ‘static’  and  ‘mobilizing’  principalities  to  see  more  clearly  how  an  armed  
and  trained  people  helps  minimize  violent  oppression.24  Static  principalities  cultivate  
elite  bases  of  power,  disarm  the  people,  rely  on  fortresses,  and  cannot  project  power  
abroad.  Mobilizing  principalities  cultivate  popular  bases  of  power,  arm  the  people,  and  
have  a  reliable  mechanism  for  projecting  power.  Neither  static  nor  mobilizing  
principalities  are  free  from  political  violence,  but  Machiavelli  praises  the  latter  for  
repressing  the  elite  and  tapping  the  people  as  a  political  and  military  force.  A  
praiseworthy  prince  will  seize  that  force  to  secure  his  position  as  prince  and  the  
principality  as  a  whole.25  A  praiseworthy  prince  empowers  himself,  in  other  words,  by  
crossing  class  lines  to  empower  the  people.26  
                                                                                                              
24  Roger  Boesche,  Theories  of  Tyranny,  from  Plato  to  Arendt,  (University  Park,  PA:  Pennsylvania  State  
University  Press,  1996),  ch.  4.  
25  Wayne  Rebhorn,  “Machiavelli’s  Prince  in  the  epic  tradition,”  in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Machiavelli,  ed.  
John  Najemy,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2010),  80.  
26  Several  scholars  overlook  this  dynamic:  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  156-­‐‑160,  183;  Harvey  
Mansfield,  Taming  the  Price  1935;  and  Quentin  Skinner,  Foundations  of  Modern  Political  Thought,  25.;  
For  discussions  of  Machiavelli’s  comparison  of  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  to  biblical  David’s  rejection  of  King  Saul’s  
armor,  see  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  21;  and  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  59.  
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Remarkably,  Machiavelli’s  approval  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  and  thus  an  armed  and  
trained  citizenry,  is  unconditioned.  Nowhere  else  in  The  Prince  does  Machiavelli  qualify  
his  support  for  the  citizen-­‐‑militia,  which  cannot  be  said  of  virtually  every  other  claim  
made  in  The  Prince.  Anything  else,  he  suggests,  is  an  unreliable  mechanism  of  violence.  
In  a  world  dominated  by  the  unpredictability  of  Fortuna,  nothing  can  be  more  important  
on  the  field  of  battle  than  reliability.  To  that  end,  chapters  12  and  13  foreshadow  the  
arguments  from  the  Art  of  War  concerning  mercenary  and  auxiliary  arms.  Mercenary  
troops  are  rarely  effective  in  battle  and  are  always  costly  (P  12.ii).  They  drain  the  
treasury  and  do  not  offer  a  substantive  tactical  advantage.  Even  when  they  are  an  
effective  fighting  force,  they  pose  a  threat  to  the  principality  that  employs  them  insofar  
as  they  bear  loyalty  only  to  the  highest  bidder.  (P  12.iii)  Auxiliary  troops,  on  the  other  
hand,  are  typically  effective  in  fighting,  but  pose  an  even  greater  threat  due  to  their  
loyalty  to  a  rival  state,  a  loyalty  that  cannot  even  be  bought.  (P  13.iii)  They  are  capable  
dispensers  of  violence,  but  are  totally  unreliable  in  that  dispensation.27    
In  both  cases,  the  demands  of  the  arms  themselves  trump  the  sovereignty  of  the  
prince,  which  produces  their  unreliability.  The  prince  finds  himself  serving  his  arms  
rather  than  those  arms  serving  him.  With  mercenaries,  the  need  to  pay  them  trumps  the  
political  objectives  of  the  war.  Mercenaries  cater  to  a  logic  of  extraction,  rather  than  
                                                                                                              
27  Machiavelli  even  links  auxiliary  arms  to  the  ‘sins’  responsible  for  Charles  VIII’s  conquest  of  Italy  in  1494.  
(P  12.vi)  
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victory,  which  forces  the  prince  to  chase  money.  In  the  case  of  auxiliaries,  a  prince  has  
placed  his  political  fate  in  the  hands  of  another  power.  He  is  thus  forced  to  chase  the  
favor  of  that  power,  lest  the  auxiliary  arms  be  used  against  him  or  his  people.  In  all  
cases,  without  arms  to  serve  him,  the  prince  and  his  principality  are  at  the  mercy  of  
Fortuna  (P  13.vii).    
As  we  saw  in  chapter  1,  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  by  contrast,  is  part  of  the  principality  
and  loyal  to  it,  which  limits  the  kind  of  uses  a  prince  can  make  of  it.  Mercenary  and  
auxiliary  troops  have  no  such  limitation.  A  salaried  relationship  is  an  external  
relationship,  one  wherein  two  separate  wills  are  bound  by  contract.  The  assumption  
with  respect  to  the  limitation  that  loyalty  puts  on  violence  is  that  members  of  a  political  
body  are  less  likely  to  harm  the  body  with  which  they  identify.  Mercenaries,  as  members  
external  to  the  body  with  which  they  contract,  are  more  likely  to  harm  or  abandon  the  
body  they  are  meant  to  protect  than  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  is.  A  citizen-­‐‑militia  may  respect  the  
prince  as  “one  who  commands,”  but  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  are  marked  by  a  loyalty  to  the  
principality,  rather  than  their  commander.  Again,  as  we  saw  in  chapter  one,  citizen-­‐‑
militias  place  a  populist  limit  on  how  their  commanders  can  and  cannot  use  them.    
The  citizen-­‐‑militia  also  brings  the  prince  and  the  people  closer  together  in  terms  
of  capacities.  This  alignment  makes  sense  from  both  a  political  and  military  perspective.  
Executives  in  both  cases  are  merely  agents  who  help  overcome  the  collective  action  and  
coordination  problems  encountered  by  the  people  at  large.  They  are  organizational  
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tools,  and  thus  must  work  with  the  people  in  order  to  work  for  the  people.  Their  status  as  
tools  is  not  meant  to  diminish  their  importance  or  the  difficulty  of  their  tasks.  Far  from  
it,  there  is  glory  in  being  a  brilliant  prince  or  general  to  be  sure,  but  Machiavelli  does  not  
conceive  of  a  glory  that  comes  at  the  expense  of  popular  liberty.  Rather,  it  animates  
Machiavellian  thinking  on  the  nature  of  prince-­‐‑people  relations.28  In  this  respect,  the  
citizen-­‐‑militia  is  more  than  just  a  group  of  armed  citizens,  it  is  a  group  of  armed  and  
trained  citizens.  The  exercise  of  violence  requires  special  skill  –  and  the  exercise  of  
violence  as  a  group  requires  the  additional  skill  of  cooperation.  These  skills  have  effects  
that  range  beyond  the  exercise  of  violence  alone,  which  is  especially  true  of  learning  to  
act  in  concert.  To  be  trained  in  such  a  manner  is  to  be  empowered.  
Moreover,  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  shifts  relations  of  dependence  in  favor  of  the  
people.  The  prince  comes  to  depend  on  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  as  a  mechanism  of  force.  The  
prince  needs  it  for  defense  of  the  principality.  The  citizens  who  participate  in  it,  on  the  
other  hand,  come  to  depend  less  on  the  prince  insofar  as  Machiavelli’s  citizen-­‐‑militia  is  a  
tool  of  popular  empowerment.  The  prince  gains  by  its  existence,  to  be  sure,  because  the  
prince  gains  by  that  empowerment.  But  to  understand  The  Prince  as  a  text  that  
recommends  princely  power  at  the  expense  of  popular  power  would  be  to  ignore  its  core  
recommendations.  Popular  empowerment  via  participation  in  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  leads  
naturally  to  the  citizen-­‐‑militia’s  capable,  responsive,  and  limited  nature.  What  should  be  
                                                                                                              
28  Pace  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  176.  
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clear  by  now  is  that  part  of  its  limited  nature  is  the  way  in  which  it  limits  the  prince  from  
taking  oppressive  actions.  
2.5 The path of oppression not taken 
Machiavelli’s  condemnation  of  mercenary  soldiers,  coupled  with  his  praise  of  
citizen-­‐‑soldiers,  certainly  would  make  the  latter  seem  compelling  from  the  perspective  
of  a  would-­‐‑be  prince,  but  that  attraction  only  exists  by  virtue  of  Machiavelli’s  ignoring  
another  type  of  military:  the  paramilitary  or  internal  security  apparatus  (hereafter  “client  
militaries”).  Chapters  12-­‐‑14  do  not  discuss  this  manner  of  fighting  force.  Client  militaries  
may  be  loyal  to  their  commanders  and  thus  reliable  as  fighters,  but  that  loyalty  is  not  
patriotic.  Executives  in  non-­‐‑democratic  regimes,  from  petty  warlords  to  party  
secretaries,  have  made  and  continue  to  make  use  of  these  fighting  forces.29    
Machiavelli,  for  his  part,  dismisses  warlordism  as  morally  vacuous  and  
irrelevant  to  most  regimes.  His  primary  engagement  with  these  types  of  regimes  comes  
in  chapter  19,  where  he  bemoans  the  emergence  of  the  Roman  army  as  a  self-­‐‑interested  
entity.  Indeed,  Machiavelli  depicts  a  predatory  military  as  a  scourge  equal  to  the  worst  
sort  of  prince.  A  predatory  military  forces  the  prince’s  hand  in  practices  of  oppression.  
Princes  must  choose  to  alienate  the  people  by  allowing  the  military  to  oppress  them  
because  the  prince  is  powerless  to  resist  the  demands  of  this  armed  body.  In  chapter  19,  
                                                                                                              
29  Indeed  such  relationships  are  so  common  that  Mancur  Olson  and  Robert  Bates,  in  their  respective  
accounts  of  the  emergence  and  stability  of  the  state  assume  this  kind  of  military  apparatus  to  be  the  norm.  
See  Olson,  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development,”  The  American  Political  Science  Review  87,  no.  3  
(September  1993),  567-­‐‑576,  Bates,  When  Things  Fell  Apart,  Chapter  2.  
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Machiavelli  only  cites  one  example  of  someone  successfully  navigating  a  political  order  
in  which  a  client-­‐‑military  has  established  itself:  the  roman  Emperor  Severus.  Even  then,  
Severus  is  an  incomplete  figure  despite  successfully  surviving  a  client  military.  “A  new  
prince  in  a  new  principality…  …should  take  from  Severus  those  parts  which  are  
necessary  to  found  his  state  and  from  Marcus  those  which  are  fitting  and  glorious  to  
conserve  a  state  that  is  already  established  and  firm.”  (P  19.xiv)  Severus’s  political  skill  
must  be  leavened  with  Marcus  Aurelius’s  “love  of  justice.”  Machiavelli  evokes  the  latter  
in  chapter  19  as  Severus’s  counterpoint.  According  to  Machiavelli,  Marcus  was  the  last  
emperor  whose  power  was  based  on  the  authority  of  his  office.  His  virtues  were  not  
suited  to  navigating  the  raw  antagonism  of  a  completely  corrupted  political  order.  
Rather,  they  were  suited  to  maintaining  the  virtue  of  an  order  capable  of  subsuming  
those  antagonisms  within  it.  Upon  his  death,  Rome’s  internal  antagonisms  finally  
overwhelmed  the  last  semblance  of  its  traditional  order,  paving  the  way  for  figures  like  
Severus  to  emerge.  Severus  could  not  have  successfully  operated  in  an  uncorrupted  
Rome.  His  skills  were  specifically  suited  to  navigating  disordered  contexts,  not  well-­‐‑
ordered  and  settled  ones.30  
Nor  should  we  confuse  Severus’s  skill  with  the  fact  that  he  catered  to  a  client-­‐‑
military.  Severus  was  not  a  founder.  He  established  no  new  state.  He  did  not  even  revive  
the  Roman  state.  Instead,  he  allowed  his  soldiers  to  vent  their  appetites  on  the  Roman  
                                                                                                              
30    Nederman,  “Machiavelli  and  moral  character”  360.  
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people.  We  cannot  take  Machiavelli  to  mean  that  his  reader  should  imitate  the  actions  of  
Severus  (i.e.,  the  management  of  a  client-­‐‑military)  in  order  to  succeed  as  a  new  prince  in  
a  new  state.  To  do  so  would  be  to  run  against  the  grain  of  the  popular  humor.  Instead,  
we  should  pay  attention  to  Machiavelli’s  language.  His  reader  should  “take  from  
Severus  those  parts  which  are  necessary  to  found  his  state.”  (Emphasis  mine)  Parts  are  
not  actions.  It  is  far  more  likely  that  Machiavelli  is  referring  to  the  parts  of  his  character  
that  made  him  so  skillful  in  political  and  military  matters.  Such  skillfulness  is  so  
necessary  in  political  innovation  because  of  the  opposition  that  princes  frequently  meet,  
be  it  in  the  form  of  appetitive  elites  or,  as  in  Severus’s  case,  a  rogue  military.    
Finally,  a  more  immediate  issue  bars  consideration  of  warlordism:  Machiavelli  
saw  it  as  no  longer  possible  in  Italy.  “Princes  of  our  times  have  less  of  this  difficulty  of  
satisfying  the  soldiers  by  extraordinary  means  in  their  governments…  …now  it  is  
necessary  for  all  princes  except  the  Turk  and  the  Sultan  to  satisfy  the  people  rather  than  
the  soldiers  because  the  people  can  do  more  than  the  soldiers.”  (P  19.xiii)  As  we  come  to  
learn  in  The  Discourses,  Roman  elites  sought  to  undercut  the  power  of  the  people  by  
corrupting  the  military  in  the  late  republican  era.31  They  turned  the  military  into  an  
increasingly  clientelistic  institution.  In  effect,  Roman  elites  corrupted  Rome’s  citizen  
army  by  infecting  it  with  elite  humors.  Severus  found  himself  under  the  necessity  of  
catering  to  those  humors  because  the  Roman  military  had  become  such  an  influential  
                                                                                                              
31McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  88.  
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institution.  The  people  at  large  were  simply  no  match  for  it.32  In  Machiavelli’s  view,  no  
Italian  military  (or  French  or  German  for  that  matter)  enjoyed  that  much  of  a  power  
imbalance.  No  Italian  prince  could  possibly  find  security  in  a  client  military  –  the  
dangers  posed  by  an  alienated  people  were  simply  too  great.  As  a  result,  Machiavelli  
characterizes  the  militaries  associated  with  warlordism  as  unreliable  instruments  of  
power  and  thus  not  worth  recommending  to  his  reader.  
The  trouble  with  Machiavelli’s  dismissal  of  Severus’s  warlordism  is  that  it  is  
misleading.  It  suggests  that  there  is  no  situation  according  to  which  forces  other  than  
citizen-­‐‑militias  promote  the  general  welfare  of  a  state.33  Machiavelli’s  
mischaracterization  is  based  on  the  implication  that  client  militaries  must  be  predatory  
at  all  times,  but  this  implication  is  wrong.  In  the  presence  of  sufficiently  high  payments  
or  the  expectation  thereof,  security  forces  will  select  long-­‐‑term  income  (e.g.  salaries)  over  
predatory  practices.  Stable  rents  have  the  capacity  to  pacify  ‘specialists  in  violence’  
because  they  represent  the  long-­‐‑run  possibility  of  income-­‐‑maximization.34  They  thus  
cause  the  preferences  of  both  the  members  of  the  security  apparatus  and  members  of  the  
citizenry  at  large  to  converge.  Rather  than  one  preying  upon  the  other,  a  high  
GDP/capita  typically  induces  specialists  in  violence  to  protect  the  productive  capacities  
of  citizens  and  enjoy  a  slice  of  the  economic  pie.  Citizens  obviously  prefer  such  
                                                                                                              
32  Parel,  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  116  and  119.  
33  Mancur  Olson  challenges  this  assumption  when  he  frames  the  problem  of  state  formation  in  terms  of  
‘banditry’,  which  is  no  different  from  petty  warlordism.  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development,”  570.  
34  Bates,  Things  Fell  Apart,  5.  
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arrangements  to  being  victims  of  a  predatory,  client-­‐‑military  and  are  happy  to  engage  in  
productive  activities  in  a  state  of  peace,  rather  than  invest  their  energy  in  hiding  wealth,  
starting  a  rebellion,  or  fleeing  the  country  altogether.    
This  possibility  challenges  Machiavelli’s  claim  in  chapter  13  that  the  citizen-­‐‑
militia  is  the  only  viable  mechanism  of  violence.  The  fact  that  a  security  apparatus  need  
not  be  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  in  order  to  be  protective  of  citizens  of  a  principality  calls  that  
claim  into  question.  Machiavelli’s  reference  to  Agathocles  further  complicates  
Machiavelli’s  picture  given  Agathocles’s  use  of  a  private  security  apparatus  for  
maintaining  power  in  Sicily.  Machiavelli  classifies  Agathocles  as  “criminal”  as  a  result  of  
the  predatory  nature  of  his  rule.  (P  8.ii)  But  that  classification  cannot  overturn  the  
reliability  with  which  he  exercised  power  through  a  military  that  was  not  a  citizen-­‐‑
militia.  Why,  then,  does  Machiavelli  depict  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  as  the  only  reliable  
military  institution  when  he  knows  that  alternatives  exist?    
First,  Machiavelli  would  mount  a  prudential  challenge.  Internal  security  
apparatuses  are  only  stable  instruments  of  rule  when  princes  can  afford  them.  If  a  
warlord  or  prince  can  ‘buy’  sufficient  loyalty  from  these  security  officers,  then  they  have  
acquired  a  stable  instrument  of  rule.  In  this  respect,  such  arms  may  be  domestic  (i.e.,  
made  up  of  citizens  of  the  state),  but  they  are  far  closer  to  mercenary  arms  than  to  a  
citizen-­‐‑militia.  And,  of  course,  Machiavelli  rightly  observes  that  mercenary  arms  force  
their  users  into  a  dependency  on  extractive  practices,  which  are  unstable,  unpredictable,  
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and  thereby  imprudent  means  of  rule.  Moreover,  excessive  extraction  (even  under  the  
guise  of  taxation)  turns  the  people  into  an  enemy  of  the  prince.  Given  the  prince’s  
paucity  of  allies  among  the  elite  –  enmity  is  not  something  he  would  want  to  cultivate  
among  those  who  could  otherwise  be  his  friends.  
Second,  Machiavelli  would  point  out  the  indecency  of  the  patterns  of  extraction  
that  an  internal  security  apparatus  would  require.  Even  at  rates  that  do  not  inspire  
enmity  among  the  people,  taxation  for  the  purposes  of  fielding  an  internal  security  
apparatus  are  tantamount  to  taking  a  citizen’s  patrimony  for  the  purposes  of  oppressing  
him  or  her.  Machiavelli  would  have  us  reject  the  drives  associated  with  these  types  of  
regimes  on  normative  grounds  in  addition  to  prudential  ones.  I  think  we  are  compelled  
to  agree.  While  we  can  reasonably  prefer  a  modus  vivendi  to  anarchy,  we  can  reject  a  
regime  of  oppression  on  normative  grounds  when  Machiavelli  offers  us  an  alternative  
that  empowers  the  people,  rather  than  yoking  them  to  their  own  servitude.  
Third,  citizen-­‐‑militias  are  a  means  by  which  Machiavelli  infuses  principalities  
with  a  heavy  does  of  populism  and  brings  them  closer  to  popular  rule.  Citizen-­‐‑militias  
constrain  the  prince  in  such  a  way  as  to  more  closely  align  the  prince’s  interests  with  
those  of  the  people  at  large.35  A  prince  cannot  ask  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  to  engage  in  certain  
kinds  of  oppression  when  its  members  identify  with  the  state  and  their  fellow  citizens  at  
                                                                                                              
35  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  23;  Pace  Butterfield,  Statecraft  of  Machiavelli,  109;  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  
Machiavelli,  67.  
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large.  Contra  the  suggestions  that  The  Prince’s  recommendations  for  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  
are  part  of  an  elaborate  trap  created  by  Machiavelli,  I  say  that  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  is  not  so  
much  a  trap  as  it  is  a  constraint.36  
2.6 The princely end of the bargain 
The  partnership  between  the  prince  and  the  people  –  as  concretized  in  the  
citizen-­‐‑militia  –  has  the  virtue  of  constraining  the  prince  to  respect  the  norm  of  non-­‐‑
oppression  and  of  creating  a  mechanism  of  violence  that  is  capable  of  projecting  
sufficient  force,  responsive  to  the  public  good,  and  limited  in  its  exercise  of  violence.  
This  partnership  eases  the  problem  of  violent  oppression  in  principalities  because  it  
produces  an  institution  that  can  both  reduce  aggregate  levels  of  violence  and  can  stay  
within  the  boundaries  set  for  it.  If  armed,  trained,  and  organized,  the  people  will  protect  
themselves  from  oppression  and  will  no  longer  desire  to  use  force  once  those  threats  of  
oppression  have  abated.  Fellow  elites  cannot  be  so  reliable  a  partner  for  the  prince  
because  their  appetite  is  to  oppress  the  people  and  the  appetite  for  oppression  can  never  
be  fully  satisfied.  
Constraining  the  appetite  for  oppression  is  also  the  task  of  Machiavelli’s  
“greatest  examples”  of  chapter  6,  who  liberate,  unify,  and  empower  their  respective  
populations  by  founding  states.  On  the  basis  of  chapter  26,  we  can  assume  that  
Machiavelli  hoped  for  the  same  in  Italy.  Yet,  we  ought  to  take  chapter  13  as  the  core  of  
                                                                                                              
36  Dietz,  “Trapping  the  Prince,”  777.  
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the  text,  because  chapter  13  details  for  the  reader  the  necessary  steps  for  the  task  ahead.  
There  is  simply  no  way  around  it.  It  embodies  the  kind  of  work  done  by  the  founders  of  
chapter  6,  satisfies  the  humoral  demands  that  Machiavelli  makes  explicit  in  chapter  9,  
and  decisively  contours  the  ethic  developed  in  the  second  half  of  the  text.37    
Yet  why  send  the  text  to  Lorenzo,  who  so  clearly  had  neither  the  desire,  nor  the  
capability  to  be  an  Italian  Theseus  or  Cyrus,  or  the  next  Romulus?  What  possible  utility  
could  The  Prince  have  in  the  hands  of  a  man  of  such  middling  political  and  moral  worth?  
According  to  the  argument  that  I  have  developed  here,  The  Prince’s  motivational  
strategy  lies  in  the  attractions  that  its  tenets  hold  for  even  self-­‐‑interested  actors  who  have  
none  of  the  public  spiritedness  of  Machiavelli’s  four  founders.  Machiavelli  convincingly  
argues  for  the  prudence  of  a  prince-­‐‑people  alliance  –  specifically  embodied  in  the  
citizen-­‐‑militia  –  in  addition  to  its  moral  value,  thereby  inducing  right  action  even  in  the  
absence  of  the  right  motives.  Moreover,  Machiavelli’s  motivational  strategy  extends  into  
his  institutional  recommendations.  Machiavelli  recognizes  the  need  to  codify  a  public-­‐‑
spirited  response  to  violence  by  creating  institutions  that  guarantee  such  responses,  
rather  than  relying  on  nobles  like  Lorenzo  to  transform  themselves  into  founders  like  
Theseus  and  Romulus.  So  Machiavelli  again  presents  the  public-­‐‑spirited  response  as  the  
                                                                                                              
37  Chapters  15-­‐‑23  cannot  be  properly  understood  without  reference  to  chapter  13.  Not  only  do  they  offer  
competing  answers  to  the  question  of  what  Machiavelli  means  by  one’s  own  arms  (i.e.  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  vs.  
moral  flexibility)  they  interact  such  that  chapter  13  contours  chapters  15-­‐‑23.  A  prince  behaves  differently  in  
the  presence  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  than  he  does  in  the  presence  of  other  mechanisms  of  violence.  See,  for  
example,  Timothy  Lukes,  “Lionizing  Machiavelli,”  American  Political  Science  Review  95,  no.  3  (September  
2001),  571.  
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most  self-­‐‑interested  one.  The  prince  helps  himself,  Machiavelli  suggests,  by  creating  a  
citizen-­‐‑militia  and  thereby  helping  the  people  to  help  themselves.  Machiavelli’s  
redefinition  of  political  virtue  is  first  linked  to  his  founders  of  chapter  6  insofar  as  a  
flexible  moral  nature  is  required  for  the  kind  of  success  they  enjoyed.  But,  as  a  fail-­‐‑safe,  
the  flexible  moral  nature  that  Machiavelli  recommends  is  also  tied  to  the  kind  of  
institutions  that  the  prince  must  create.  Even  a  self-­‐‑interested  prince  will  behave  
differently  when  in  the  company  of  an  armed  people.    
All  that  said,  The  Prince  does  not  recommend  a  relationship  between  the  prince  
and  the  people  that  is  completely  cooperative.  The  prince  must  take  matters  –  especially  
matters  of  violence  –  into  his  own  hands  in  times  of  crises  or  thoroughgoing  corruption.  
The  pursuit  of  non-­‐‑oppression  still  governs  princely  action  in  such  cases  and  so  the  
prince  is  still  made  to  serve  the  ends  of  the  people,  but  he  must  nevertheless  cut  the  




3. Force and Fraud: Between Good Arms and Good 
Laws. 
In  chapter  2,  I  presented  a  reading  of  The  Prince  that  emphasized  the  popular  and  
populist  dimension  of  Machiavelli’s  advice  for  ruling  a  principality  successfully.  He  
recommends  that  the  prince  use  the  people  as  a  mechanism  for  exercising  political  
violence  (via  the  citizen-­‐‑militia)  and  their  desires  as  a  guide  to  the  ends  for  which  he  
ought  to  use  political  violence.  In  Machiavelli’s  view,  these  recommendations  have  the  
effect  of  minimizing  violent  oppression  in  principalities  while  simultaneously  
empowering  the  prince,  the  people,  and  the  principality  itself.  Popular  desires  are  
limited  and  more  reliable  than  those  of  the  great.  The  prince  can  satisfy  the  people’s  
primary  desire  to  be  free  from  oppression.  These  desires  are  consistent  with  a  stable  
political  order.  Moreover,  the  satisfaction  of  it  generates  a  powerful  and  reliable  alliance  
between  the  prince  and  the  people,  which  is  much  more  advantageous  to  both  the  prince  
and  the  people  than  a  prince’s  attempting  to  coax  support  from  rival  elites.  We  have  
seen  Machiavelli  argue  in  The  Prince  and  the  Art  of  War  that  an  armed  people  will  not  
overwhelm  the  political  orders  they  are  meant  to  protect  because  a  praiseworthy  citizen-­‐‑
militia  naturally  lends  itself  to  non-­‐‑oppression.1  Rival  elites  have  the  contrary  impulse,  
making  them  dangerous  to  the  prince  and  the  people  alike.  
                                                                                                              
1  In  the  penultimate  section  of  this  chapter,  I  shall  consider  regimes  that  actually  implicate  the  people  in  
their  own  oppression  as  well  as  the  profoundly  anti-­‐‑Machiavellian  nature  of  those  institutions.    
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While  having  non-­‐‑oppression  as  a  goal  and  enlisting  the  aid  of  the  people  in  
pursuing  that  goal  makes  The  Prince  populist,  we  cannot  say  that  the  text  is  consistently  
or  even  predominantly  democratic.  Many  of  the  political  strategies  that  Machiavelli  
recommends  for  freeing  the  people  from  oppression  do  not  involve  the  people  as  active  
agents,  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  notwithstanding.  To  prevent  oppression,  the  prince  must  
contend  with  the  greatest  sources  of  it:  his  fellow  elites.  To  contend  with  them,  the  
prince  must  fight  fire  with  fire,  so  to  speak,  and  learn  to  use  the  same  tactics  –  force  and  
fraud  –  that  his  fellow  elites  use  to  pursue  their  projects  of  domination.2  The  key  
distinction  between  the  prince’s  use  of  force  and  fraud  and  other  elites’  use  of  force  and  
fraud  is  in  the  purpose  of  that  use:  either  the  oppression  of  the  people  or  their  freedom  
from  oppression  .  Nevertheless  The  Prince  is  undemocratic  because  many  of  its  most  
distinctive  political  recommendations  circumvent  the  demos  even  as  the  text  prioritizes  
their  ends  and  desires.  Of  course,  any  member  of  any  political  class  is  capable  of  using  
force  or  fraud,  but  we  shall  see  that  Machiavelli  has  a  powerful  argument  for  why  the  
prince,  in  particular,  must  be  ready  and  willing  to  do  so.  We  shall  also  see  that  his  
argument  extends  to  the  claim  that  a  praiseworthy  prince  should  engage  in  hypocrisy  by  
outwardly  condemning  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  and  endeavoring  to  minimize  their  
use  by  others  in  the  principality.  If  the  prince  fails  to  secure  a  monopoly  or  near-­‐‑
monopoly  on  force  and  fraud  such  that  they  become  the  norm,  then  he  imperils  the  
                                                                                                              
2  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  37.  
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modus  vivendi  that  he  must  establish  on  behalf  of  the  people.  To  put  the  matter  another  
way,  Machiavelli  answers  the  following  three  questions.  Do  princes  have  special  
privileges  and  duties  in  pursuing  freedom  from  oppression  for  their  subjects?  If  so,  do  
those  special  privileges  and  duties  arise  because  ruling  a  principality  entails  contending  
with  oppression-­‐‑oriented  elites  who  will  to  use  force  and  fraud  without  reservation?  
Must  these  special  privileges  and  duties  remain  veiled  behind  political  appearances,  or  
can  they  be  publically  acknowledged?  He  answers,  “yes”  to  the  first  two  and  
recommends  secrecy  with  the  third.  In  this  chapter,  I  detail  why.    
First,  I  explore  the  tenuous  relationship  between  good  arms  and  good  laws  in  
creating  a  stable  political  order.  A  superficial  reading  of  The  Prince  indicates  a  causal  
relationship  between  good  arms  and  good  laws,  where  good  arms  are  sufficient  for  
causing  good  laws.  According  to  my  reading  of  The  Prince,  however,  Machiavelli  argues  
that  good  arms  are  necessary  for  good  laws,  but  not  sufficient.  So,  in  the  second  section,  
I  elaborate  upon  a  notion  that  I  take  to  be  a  key  element  of  Machiavelli’s  thought:  that  
laws  cannot  be  “good”  when  force  and  fraud  carry  the  day.  To  shed  greater  light  upon  
this  claim,  in  the  third  section  I  detail  Machiavelli’s  recommendation  that  the  prince  
behave  hypocritically  where  force  and  fraud  are  concerned.  In  the  fourth  and  fifth  
sections  I  use  the  example  of  Cesare  Borgia’s  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco  to  show  how  this  
process  works  and  what  Machiavelli  would  mean  by  “cruelty  well-­‐‑used.”  In  the  sixth  
section,  I  take  the  totalitarian  regimes  of  the  20th  and  21st  centuries  as  counterpoints  that  
  93  
demonstrate  what  Machiavelli  means  by  cruelty  badly  used.  These  regimes  are  helpful  
counterpoints  because  they  have  relatively  strong  militaries  and  make  extensive  use  of  
force  and  fraud,  but  spectacularly  fail  to  create  good  laws.  Ultimately,  each  of  these  
sections  contributes  to  a  reading  of  The  Prince  according  to  which  the  prince  secures  the  
non-­‐‑oppression  of  the  people  by  taking  a  series  of  actions  in  which  he  cannot  implicate  
the  people  beyond  their  participation  in  the  citizen-­‐‑militia.  So,  while  I  underscored  the  
popular  politics  of  The  Prince  in  chapter  2,  in  this  chapter  I  take  my  reading  of  The  Prince  
in  the  other  direction.  Without  losing  sight  of  the  populist  nature  of  a  praiseworthy  
prince’s  ends  and  alliance  with  the  people,  we  must  take  note  of  the  tension  that  his  use  
of  force  and  fraud  places  upon  that  alliance.  
I  should  be  careful  to  point  out  that  Machiavelli  does  not  base  his  argument  for  
the  importance  of  princely  force  and  fraud  on  the  presumption  that  the  people  are  
somehow  inferior;  nor  does  he  laud  the  political  elite  as  a  class.  In  fact,  he  would  sooner  
condemn  the  elite  as  selfish,  dangerous,  and  unreliable  than  he  would  impugn  the  
character  and  competence  of  the  people.3  More  to  the  point,  he  regards  political  elites  as  
responsible  for  most  instances  of  violent  oppression,  because  violent  oppression  is  built  
into  their  appetites.4  They  are  his  political  villains,  not  the  people.  And  the  prince  
receives  security  and  glory  in  exchange  for  turning  upon  his  political  class  and  serving  
                                                                                                              
3  John  McCormick,  “Machiavellian  Democracy:  Controlling  Elites  with  Ferocious  Populism,”  American  
Political  Science  Review  95,  no.  2  (June  2001),  300.  
4  Harvey  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  24;  Sheldon  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  180-­‐‑1.  
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the  ends  of  the  people.  Machiavelli  maintains  the  position  that  he  does  because  he  sees  a  
member  of  the  elite  (the  prince)  as  best  suited  and  most  easily  motivated  to  contain  and  
suppress  his  fellows.    
In  holding  a  mirror  to  the  prince  and  –  to  return  to  the  landscape  metaphor  from  
the  dedicatory  preface  –  in  doing  so  from  below,  Machiavelli  shows  the  prince  what  is  
both  behind  and  above  him:  the  mountainous  accomplishments  of  the  past  to  which  he  
might  aspire.5  In  exchange  for  excelling  in  politics  as  Machiavelli  defines  it,  Machiavelli  
promises  deep  reputational  rewards  to  a  successful  prince.  This  argument  is  
fundamentally  an  undemocratic  one.  In  a  principality,  glory  and  status  are  nothing  if  not  
mechanisms  of  differentiation.  Thus,  Machiavelli’s  appeal  to  his  reader  on  the  basis  of  
glory  puts  him  in  further  tension  with  “democratic”  readings  of  The  Prince.  His  appeal  
on  the  basis  of  glory  does  not,  of  course,  trump  the  importance  of  pursuing  popular  
ends.  Rather,  it  yokes  them  together.  The  greatest  glory  accrues  to  those  princes  who  
liberate  their  people  from  oppression.6  Where  the  prince’s  fellow  elites  try  to  satisfy  
themselves  by  oppressing  the  people,  Machiavelli  suggests  that  a  prince  satisfy  himself  
by  ‘dominating’  the  history  books  and  recommends  no  better  way  to  do  that  than  by  
freeing  the  people  from  oppression.  
                                                                                                              
5  We  might  read  the  Life  of  Castruccio  Castracani  in  the  same  way.  As  a  talented  foundling,  Castruccio  very  
much  represents  Machiavelli’s  “new  prince.”  Machiavelli’s  fictionalized  account  of  his  life  puts  the  political  
virtues  that  Machiavelli  values  –  self-­‐‑reliance,  flexibility,  populism,  and  so  on  -­‐‑  on  prominent  display.  
6  For  Eugene  Garver,  glory  also  “prevents  a  reduction  of  politics  to  military  tactics.”  Machiavelli  and  the  
History  of  Prudence,  (Madison:  University  of  Wisconsin  Press,  1987),  90.  
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3.1 Between good arms and good laws 
The  means  by  which  a  prince  does  so  are  neither  ones  of  pure  violence  nor  pure  
politics.  The  pursuit  of  non-­‐‑oppression  cannot  be  separated  from  either  “good  arms”  or  
“good  laws,”  to  borrow  Machiavelli’s  phrases.  Both  good  laws  and  good  arms  are  
necessary  for  preventing  violent  oppression.  On  the  one  hand,  some  arms  are  required  
for  defense  as  long  as  other  states  threaten  peace.7  A  state  that  does  not  have  good  arms  
is  a  state  that  is  subject  to  the  whims  of  Fortuna.  We  also  saw  in  chapter  2  that  good  arms  
are  not  only  powerful;  they  empower  the  right  political  class.  Good  arms  shift  the  center  
of  power  in  any  state  toward  the  people,  creating  a  kind  of  political  necessity  that  deters  
the  elite  from  satisfying  their  oppressive  appetites  on  them.  On  the  other  hand,  laws  are  
good  because  they  define  the  space  of  publically  sanctioned  activity.8  The  virtue  of  laws  
is  that  they  make  up  a  set  of  rules  for  social  engagement  backed  by  the  coercive  capacity  
of  the  state.  Together,  along  with  mores  and  institutions,  good  arms  and  good  laws  
make  up  the  ensemble  of  social  phenomena  which  Machiavelli  might  call  a  “good  
order.”    
                                                                                                              
7  Leo  Strauss  points  out  that  Machiavelli  regards  violent  conquest  as  a  part  of  nature  and  that  reasonable  
political  orders  are  artifices  hammered  out  of  that  nature.  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  57.  
8  Laws  are  just  one  kind  of  social  institution.  According  to  Jack  Knight,  a  social  institution  is  “a  set  of  rules  
that  structure  social  interactions  in  particular  ways.”  (Emphasis  original)  Laws  and  legal  institutions  are  
different,  of  course,  from  norms  and  conventions  because  they  are  enforced  by  the  coercive  power  of  the  
state  while  other  institutions  are  self-­‐‑enforcing.  But  nevertheless,  laws  are  part  of  the  broad  ensemble  of  
social  institutions  that  structure  human  interaction  in  civic,  economic,  and  political  spheres.  Jack  Knight,  
Institutions  and  Social  Conflict.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1992),  2-­‐‑3,  21-­‐‑23.  
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Machiavelli  tells  us  in  chapter  12  that  good  arms  are  citizen-­‐‑militias,  but  
unfortunately  he  gives  few  concrete  examples  of  “good  laws”  in  The  Prince.  Machiavelli  
does  consider  the  different  power  structures  in  different  systems  of  rule  (French  
feudalism  vs.  the  unified  absolutism  of  Turkey  in  Chapter  4)  and  acknowledges  in  
chapter  25  that  some  countries  (France,  Spain,  and  Germany)  “had  been  diked  by  
suitable  virtue”  and  so  had  not  met  the  same  fate  as  the  powers  of  Italy.  So  we  know  
that  some  orders  are  better  than  others,  but  we  do  not  know  which  laws  contribute  to  
those  orders  and  how  they  do  so.  Machiavelli  does  recommend  that  princes  avoid  any  
unnecessary  taxes  and  forbear  from  altering  the  laws  and  customs  of  territories  they  
acquire.  These  examples  are  helpful,  but  only  as  examples  of  principles  of  good  
lawmaking  (and  maintenance)  and  not  as  examples  of  good  laws  themselves.  Based  on  
these  principles  of  good  lawmaking  (and  maintenance),  we  can  reasonably  infer  that  
Machiavelli  would  use  the  norm  of  non-­‐‑oppression  to  differentiate  good  laws  from  bad  
because  excessively  high  taxes  and  rewriting  of  social  practices  might  make  the  people  
feel  oppressed.  But  a  fine-­‐‑grained,  concrete  definition  of  the  term  “good  laws”  is  not  
available  to  us  in  The  Prince.9    
                                                                                                              
9  The  Discourses  on  Livy  are  another  matter.  Machiavelli  discusses  law  extensively  there  and  provides  a  much  
richer  account  of  good,  republican  laws.  Perhaps  this  differential  treatment  of  law  reflects  a  difference  in  the  
regimes  themselves?  If  true,  then  principalities  rely  on  the  skill  and  civic-­‐‑mindedness  of  the  prince  in  order  
to  thrive  while  republics  still  rely  on  the  talents  of  their  people  and  leaders  but  place  a  greater  burden  on  
laws  than  principalities  do.  See  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  179.  
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Machiavelli’s  focus  is  elsewhere.  Non-­‐‑oppression  is  his  goal  and  good  laws  
certainly  have  a  part  to  play  in  meeting  that  goal,  but  Machiavelli  must  first  deal  with  
another  part  of  the  social  order,  one  which  makes  good  laws  possible:  good  arms.  One  of  
the  most  iconic  passages  in  all  of  The  Prince  invokes  both  law  and  arms  as  foundations  
for  the  state.  Machiavelli  writes,  “The  principal  foundations  that  all  states  have,  new  
ones  as  well  as  old  or  mixed,  are  good  laws  and  good  arms.  And  because  there  cannot  be  
good  laws  where  there  are  not  good  arms,  and  where  there  are  good  arms  there  must  be  
good  laws,  I  shall  leave  out  the  reasoning  on  laws  and  shall  speak  of  arms.”  (P  12.i)  At  
first  blush,  Machiavelli  posits  good  laws  and  good  arms  as  discrete  political  phenomena.  
He  mentions  both  the  one  and  the  other  as  political  foundations,  which  makes  sense.  We  
can  easily  imagine  that  the  former  are  an  integral  part  of  any  stable,  codified  order  and  
the  latter  are  the  basis  for  the  enforcement  of  that  order.  Yet,  in  the  very  next  sentence  as  
rendered  above  he  posits  a  causal  relationship  between  good  laws  and  good  arms.  
Machiavelli’s  language  even  goes  as  far  as  to  suggest  that  good  laws  are  epiphenomenal  
to  good  arms.10  In  the  first  clause  of  that  sentence,  Machiavelli  claims  that  good  arms  are  
a  necessary  cause  of  good  laws,  but  in  the  second  clause  Machiavelli  claims  that  good  
arms  are  also  sufficient  causes  of  good  laws.  Most  extant  translations  render  the  second  
clause  of  that  sentence  as  “where  there  are  good  arms  there  must  be  good  laws,”  
                                                                                                              
10  Skinner,  The  Foundations  of  Modern  Political  Thought.  130.  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  58.  
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(emphasis  mine)  but  those  translations  are  not  sensitive  to  the  original  Italian.11  
Machiavelli  uses  the  subjunctive  mood  to  express  the  second  formulation  of  the  relation  
between  good  arms  and  good  laws:  “e  dove  sono  buone  arme  conviene  sieno  buone  
legge.”  “Conviene  sieno,”  which  is  an  archaic  version  of  “conviene  siano”  does  not  
express  a  mechanistic  relationship  between  good  laws  and  good  arms.  At  best,  it  
suggests  a  probabilistic  one:  where  there  are  good  arms,  there  are  likely  to  be  good  laws.  
But  the  Italian  subjunctive  mood  can  also  be  used  to  express  an  opinion  or  judgment,  
especially  if  introduced  by  the  verb  “convenire,”  which  is  used  to  express  agreement.  In  
this  case,  the  second  clause  is  better  translated  as  “where  there  are  good  arms,  I  maintain  
that  it  would  be  better  to  have  good  laws,”  which  is  a  far  cry  from  traditional  translations.    
I  cannot  settle  the  translation  controversy,  but  I  cannot  understate  the  
importance  of  Machiavelli’s  use  of  the  subjunctive  either.  Most  translations  convey  a  
sense  of  determinism  in  translating  “conviene  siano”  as  “must  be”  and  so  effectively  
render  good  laws  as  epiphenomenal  to  good  arms,  but  the  original  Italian  actually  
creates  a  gap  between  the  two.  It  is  “likely”  and/or  “good”  that  good  laws  follow  good  
arms.  This  relationship  is  by  no  means  predetermined.  For  Machiavelli,  good  arms  do  
not  simply  lead  to  good  laws.12  The  former  are  necessary  for  the  latter,  and  so  take  pride  
of  place  in  the  next  three  chapters  (P  12-­‐‑14),  but  human  intervention  determines  whether  
                                                                                                              
11  The  original  Italian  is  “E  perché  non  può  essere  buone  legge  dove  non  sono  buone  arme,  e  dove  sono  
buone  arme  conviene  sieno  buone  legge...”  Mistranslations  of  this  sentence  include  both  Harvey  Mansfield’s  
and  Quentin  Skinner’s  landmark  editions.  
12  Pace  Mansfield,  Taming  the  Prince,  129.  
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good  laws  spring  out  of  good  arms.13  And,  as  Machiavelli  claims,  both  are  the  
foundations  of  states,  so  we  ought  to  be  concerned  with  the  presence  of  both  as  well  as  
the  way  they  relate  to  each  other.  In  any  regime,  but  particularly  in  an  autocracy,  good  
laws  are  impotent  without  coercive  force  to  back  them  up  and  good  arms  become  tools  
of  oppression  if  they  enter  the  space  of  governance  that  ought  to  be  reserved  for  good  
laws.  Good  arms  and  good  laws  must  be  both  separate  and  mutually  supportive.  The  
prince  must  police  that  separation  and  maintain  that  mutual  support,  which  is  why  
Machiavelli  uses  the  subjunctive.    
Why  then  does  Machiavelli  choose  to  “leave  out  the  reasoning  on  laws”  and  
“speak  of  arms  instead”?  (P  12.i)  There  are  three  answers  to  that  question.  First,  in  a  
principality,  Machiavelli  sees  good  arms  as  prior  to  good  laws.  The  prince  must  use  
good  arms  in  order  to  make  good  laws  possible.  The  second  is  that  the  two  (good  laws  
and  arms)  share  a  fairly  intimate  relationship,  as  far  as  Machiavelli  is  concerned.  One  
ought  not  try  to  collapse  one  into  the  other,  but  they  are  not  wholly  distinct,  especially  
insofar  as  they  are  mutually  supportive  once  both  are  brought  into  being.  So  reasoning  
about  one  is  tantamount  to  reasoning  about  the  other.  The  third,  and  perhaps  the  most  
illuminating,  answer  is  that  Machiavelli  does  not  actually  “leave  out  reasoning  on  laws.”  
Though  Machiavelli  never  really  defines  what  he  means  by  “good  laws,”  the  word  
“legge”  does  appear  16  times  in  The  Prince.  Four  of  those  appearances  are  in  chapter  12,  
                                                                                                              
13  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  181.  
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but  almost  as  many  (5)  follow  that  chapter  as  precede  it  (7).  The  law  is  a  thread,  albeit  a  
fuzzy  one,  that  Machiavelli  weaves  throughout  The  Prince.    
3.2 Good arms and the ground of good laws 
Machiavelli  weaves  the  thread  of  law  throughout  The  Prince  because  the  struggle  
to  make  good  laws  possible  is  a  constant  one  in  a  principality.  To  create  a  political  
dynamic  worthy  of  human  life,  the  prince  must  chasten  the  elite  to  the  point  where  they  
are  unsuccessful  in  undermining  a  stable  political  order  and  then  maintain  that  balance  
of  power.14  As  a  result,  The  Prince  is  not  a  discussion  of  how  to  make  good  laws  per  se,  as  
much  as  it  is  a  discussion  of  how  to  make  good  laws  possible  and  then  maintain  that  
possibility  on  an  ongoing  basis.  From  this  perspective,  we  can  see  why  The  Prince  does  
not  teach  its  reader  to  become  a  good  legislator  but  it  does  exhort  its  reader  to  become  a  
founder.15  For  a  founder,  the  most  important  knowledge  is  that  of  how  to  contend  with  
the  elite,  who  are  invested  in  the  possibility  of  oppressing  the  people  and  thus  oppose  
both  good  arms  and  good  laws.16  To  that  end,  The  Prince  teaches  its  reader  how  not  to  
“come  to  ruin  among  so  many  who  are  not  good.”  (P  15.i)  Good  laws  never  recede  
totally  from  view  because  The  Prince  makes  a  set  of  recommendations  aimed  at  creating  
a  dynamic  in  which  greater  lawfulness  is  possible.  And  good  arms  never  recede  from  
                                                                                                              
14  It  is  important  to  differentiate  this  obligation  from  one  in  which  the  political  world  must  be  refashioned  
altogether.  The  prince  cannot  effect  any  radical  transformation.  His  reforms  are  marginal,  rather  than  
architectonic.  See  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  194.  
15  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  53;  Rebhorn,  “Machiavelli’s  Prince  in  the  epic  tradition.”  80.  
16  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  160.  
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view  because  the  creation  of  that  dynamic  depends  on  the  good  use  of  good  arms,  but  
good  arms  do  not  lead  without  fail  to  good  laws.  Good  arms  are  the  means  by  which  the  
people  contribute  to  the  creation  of  good  laws  in  an  autocracy.  But  first  and  foremost  a  
prince  must  know  how  to  clear  the  way  against  elites  who  would  otherwise  oppress  the  
people.  
The  irony,  of  course,  is  that  autocracies  tend  to  be  far  less  lawful  than  
democracies.  While  democracy  and  lawfulness  and  autocracy  and  lawlessness  are  not  
chained  together  at  the  conceptual  level,  that  pairing  does  tend  to  occur.  Observation  of  
that  tendency  should  lead  the  astute  reader  to  ask  whether  my  reading  of  The  Prince  
argues  that  Machiavelli  sees  principalities  as  mere  vehicles  to  republics  if  the  aim  of  a  
praiseworthy  prince  is  the  creation  of  the  possibility  of  greater  lawfulness.  The  thrust  of  
the  last  chapter  would  certainly  suggest  that  I  am  trying  to  republicanize  The  Prince.  And  
my  claim  that  a  praiseworthy  prince  creates  the  possibility  of  greater  lawfulness  would  
do  so  as  well.  But,  as  I  shall  explain  in  chapters  4  and  5,  Machiavelli  is  not  interested  in  
republicanism  per  se.  If  an  exceptionally  virtuous  prince  can  bring  about  the  same  
effects  as  a  republic,  regime-­‐‑type  takes  on  a  secondary  importance  in  principle.  
In  practice,  however,  regime-­‐‑type  does  matter.  First,  the  establishment  of  a  modus  
vivendi  usually  coincides  with  the  monopolization  of  the  legitimate  use  of  violence  in  the  
hands  of  a  single  actor  or  coalition  of  powerbrokers.  We  rarely  see  the  leap  from  anarchy  
to  democracy.  That  said,  there  is  a  strong  correlation  between  democracy  and  the  
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reduction  of  political  violence.  Just  as  the  likelihood  of  dying  a  violent  death  falls  after  
the  transition  from  anarchy  to  autocracy,  the  likelihood  of  dying  a  politically-­‐‑motivated  
death  falls  after  transition  from  autocracy  to  democracy.17  Machiavelli’s  intervention  into  
this  discussion  would  be  to  say  that  there  are  certain  autocratic  activities  that  are  
necessary  precursors  to  that  second,  democratically-­‐‑driven  reduction  in  political  
violence.18  Those  activities  have  to  do  with  constraining  the  elite.  
Consider  the  issue  from  a  different  angle.  In  Violence  and  Social  Orders,  Douglass  
North,  John  Wallis,  and  Barry  Weingast  substitute  the  notion  of  social  orders  for  the  
notion  of  regime-­‐‑type.  Social  orders,  according  to  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast  
encompass  the  broad  ensemble  of  political,  economic,  religious,  and  educational  
activities  that  shape  the  incentives  faced  by  individuals  and  groups  that  have  access  to  
violence.  Under  anarchy,  small  groups  do  form,  but  violence  remains  both  decentralized  
and  privatized.19  The  transition  to  the  “natural  state”  occurs  when  incentives  converge  
on  the  centralization  of  violence  in  the  hands  of  a  single  organization.20  This  
centralization  subverts  the  security  dilemma  that  occurs  when  violence  is  privatized  and  
                                                                                                              
17  Helen  Fein,  “More  Murder  in  the  Middle:  Life-­‐‑Integrity  Violations  and  Democracy  in  the  World,  1987”.  
Human  Rights  Quarterly,  17,  no.  1  (February  1995),  175;  Christian  Davenport,  “State  Repression  and  Political  
Order,”  Annual  Review  of  Political  Science  10,  (June  2007):  8;  Jan  Pierskalla,  “Protest,  Deterrence,  and  
Escalation:  The  Strategic  Calculus  of  Government  Repression,”  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution  54,  no.  1  (2010):  
125  
18  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  197-­‐‑200.    
19  North,  Douglass  C.,  John  Joseph  Wallis,  and  Barry  R.  Weingast.  2009.  Violence  and  Social  Orders:  a  
Conceptual  Framework  for  Interpreting  Recorded  Human  History.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.  P.  51.  
20  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast,  Violence  and  Social  Orders,  18.  
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decentralized.21  In  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast’s  account,  this  centralization  proceeds  by  
giving  privileged  economic  access  to  elite  users  of  violence  in  exchange  for  their  
disarmament.22  This  exchange  effectively  puts  elites  on  an  equal  footing  with  each  other:  
subservient  to  the  state  but  privileged  compared  to  the  people  at  large.  It  also  sets  the  
stage  for  the  morphologically  similar,  generalized  exchange  according  to  which  citizens  
at  large  gain  access  to  certain  economic  activities  in  exchange  for  lawful  behavior.23  The  
crux  of  the  matter  is  the  disarmament  of  the  elite,  however,  without  which  the  security  
dilemma  is  unresolvable  at  every  social  level.  Once  the  state  begins  behaving  as  an  
arbiter  between  elite  actors,  the  people  can  begin  demanding  protection  from  those  
actors  as  well  as  the  same  kind  of  arbitration  of  low-­‐‑level  conflicts.24  
If  initial  disarmament  of  elite-­‐‑level  actors  is  the  crux  of  North,  Wallis,  and  
Weingast’s  account,  then  the  key  question  is  one  of  who  or  what  drives  that  
disarmament.  In  Machiavelli’s  account,  this  is  clearly  the  task  of  the  prince.  And  where  
North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast  point  to  the  role  of  incentives  in  pacifying  political  elites,  
Machiavelli  points  to  the  means  by  which  a  properly  motivated  political  actor  can  
induce  the  proper  behavior  from  his  fellow  elites.  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast  never  
really  unpack  this  process  and  leave  the  emergence  of  the  state  as  a  matter  of  fact.  
                                                                                                              
21  “Throughout  recorded  history,  the  cessation  of  violence  (peace)  is  not  achieved  when  violence  specialists  
put  down  their  arms,  but  rather  peace  occurs  when  the  violent  devise  arrangements  (explicit  or  implicit)  
that  reduce  the  level  of  violence.”  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast,  Violence  and  Social  Orders,  Page  31.  
22  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast,  Violence  and  Social  Orders,  Page  18.  
23  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast,  Violence  and  Social  Orders,  Page.  25.  
24  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast,  Violence  and  Social  Orders  26-­‐‑7.  
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Machiavelli’s  contribution  is  to  chart  a  path  from  anarchy  to  a  stable  distribution  of  
power  and  a  monopoly  on  the  legitimate  use  of  violence.  For  him,  the  matter  is  not  
purely  structural,  as  it  is  for  North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast.  For  Machiavelli,  the  proper  
institutionalization  of  violence  is  also  a  matter  of  the  strategic  interaction  between  the  
prince  and  the  elite.  The  challenge  of  the  situation  is  that  the  terms  of  this  strategic  
interaction  demand  that  the  prince  risk  lawless  behavior  in  order  to  create  the  possibility  
of  a  lawful  dynamic.  
3.3: Force, fraud and the suppression of elite humors 
Machiavelli  brings  this  challenge  into  full  view  after  his  turn  in  chapter  15  to  
discussing  “what  the  modes  of  government  should  be  with  subjects  and  with  friends.”25  
(P  12.i)  Like  the  treatment  of  law  in  the  first  half  of  The  Prince,  Machiavelli  still  discusses  
law  in  the  context  of  combat,  but  unlike  the  first  half  of  The  Prince  Machiavelli  speaks  of  
law  as  a  tool  or  a  means,  rather  than  as  a  feature  of  acquired  territories  with  which  the  
prince  should  not  meddle.  In  chapter  18,  Machiavelli  argues  that  law  is  the  mode  of  
combat  that  is  appropriate  to  human  beings,  while  force  (which  will  apparently  include  
fraud  and  deception)  is  the  mode  of  combat  appropriate  to  beasts,  and  that  a  capable  
prince  must  know  how  to  use  both  modes  of  combat.  (P  18.ii)    
                                                                                                              
25  Chapter  15  begins  what  might  be  called  part  III  of  The  Prince,  part  I  (chapters  1-­‐‑11)  being  his  typology  of  
principalities,  part  II  (12-­‐‑14)  being  his  discussion  of  warfare,  and  part  IV  being  his  treatment  of  the  interplay  
between  fortune  and  virtue.  It  is  also  the  only  chapter  that  does  not  contain  any  historical  examples.  See  Leo  
Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  55-­‐‑59;  See  also  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  163.  
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Of  course,  Machiavelli  only  means  metaphorically  that  force  and  fraud  are  
means  of  combat  appropriate  to  beasts.  All  of  the  means  of  combat  he  discusses  in  
chapter  18  are  for  use  by  human  beings  against  other  human  beings.  The  metaphorical  
distinction  is  helpful,  however,  to  Machiavelli  because  force  and  fraud  are  means  of  
combat  appropriate  to  certain  contexts  and  against  certain  kinds  of  people.  And,  by  the  
time  we  get  to  chapter  18,  Machiavelli  has  told  us  what  those  situations  are.  Politics  is  an  
arena  of  “subjects  and  friends,”  which  is  to  say  that  it  is  an  arena  populated  by  agents  
with  whom  the  prince  must  cultivate  a  livable  relationship.  The  prince’s  relationship  to  
his  enemies  is  defined  by  their  competition.26  It  has  the  peculiar  characteristic  of  a  
relationship  in  which  the  welfare  of  the  one  is  in  conflict  with  the  welfare  of  the  other.  
But  the  prince’s  relationship  to  his  subjects  and  friends  is  defined  by  what  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty  calls  a  “circuit  between  the  self  and  others.”27  The  prince  must  live  with  and  even  
depend  on  his  subjects  and  friends.  Thus,  Machiavelli  cannot  recommend  that  the  prince  
simply  “do  away”  with  the  elite.  He  will  always  require  their  support  to  a  certain  
degree.  But,  those  who  would  lend  him  support  or  offer  political  advice  are  all  self-­‐‑
interestedly  bound  up  in  the  same  political  contest  as  the  prince.  The  result  is  that  they  
cannot  be  trusted  in  the  same  way  that  friends  trust  each  other  in  private.  The  prince  has  
                                                                                                              
26  It  is,  therefore,  not  an  arena  of  hypocrisy.  The  openness  of  the  enmity  reduces  all  relations  to  ones  of  force  
and  coercion.  See  Ruth  Grant,  Hypocrisy  and  Integrity:  Machiavelli,  Rousseau,  and  the  Ethics  of  Politics.  (Chicago:  
University  of  Chicago  Press,  1997),  20.    
27  Maurice  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  “A  Note  on  Machiavelli,”  123.  
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no  ‘true  friends’  in  politics.28  A  prince’s  ‘friends’  are  those  who  are  “wicked  and  do  not  
observe  faith  with  [him].”  (P  18.iii)  What  is  a  prince  to  do?  Machiavelli  suggests  that  the  
prince  respond  in  kind  when  he  tells  his  reader,  “you  also  do  not  have  to  observe  [faith]  
with  them.”  (P  18.iii)  Given  regular  divergences  in  interests,  this  interdependence  
creates  a  need  for  hypocritical  action,  because  people  are  sensitive  to  the  emergence  of  
tit-­‐‑for-­‐‑tat  strategies.  Thus,  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  exists  as  an  uncomfortable  result  of  
our  political  interdependence  and  failure  to  resolve  conflicts  through  open  negotiations.  
It  is  easy  to  recommend  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  in  war.  It  is  a  much  harder  thing  to  
recommend  its  use  with  fellow  citizens,  but  Machiavelli  does  precisely  that.29  
This  claim  is,  in  many  ways,  Machiavelli’s  most  radical  and  radically  
misunderstood.  It  is  the  basis  for  much  of  the  discomfort  that  people  have  with  
Machiavelli.  It  is  also  the  basis  for  his  frequent  application  to  arenas  like  business  and  
even  the  family.30  Those  applications  are  misguided,  however,  and  so  is  a  portion  of  our  
discomfort.  However  radical  Machiavelli’s  claim  regarding  the  priority  of  force  and  
                                                                                                              
28  Grant,  Hypocrisy  and  Integrity,  20.  
29  We  shall  see  in  the  next  section  that  Machiavelli  does  recommend  princely  fraud  against  the  people,  but  it  
is  a  very  different  kind  of  fraud  than  the  one  he  practices  against  the  elite.  
30  See,  for  example,  Suzanne  Evans,  Machiavelli  for  Moms:  Maxims  on  the  Effective  Governance  of  Children,  (New  
York:  Simon  &  Schuster,  2013);  Ian  Demack,  The  Modern  Machiavelli:  the  Seven  Principles  for  of  Power  in  
Business.    (Crows  Nest,  N.S.W.:  Allen  &  Unwin,  2002);  and  Michael  Arthur  Ledeen,  Machiavelli  on  Modern  
Leadership:  Why  Machiavelli’s  Iron  rules  Are  as  Timely  and  Important  Today  as  Five  Centuries  Ago,  (New  York:  
Truman  Talley  Books.  2002)    
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fraud  in  politics,  it  does  not  have  the  same  priority  in  the  home  or  in  business  life.31  We  
have  already  been  told  that  the  prince’s  subjects  (i.e.,  the  people)  do  not  hunger  for  
political  power.32  The  humor  of  the  people  is  for  non-­‐‑oppression,  which  a  well-­‐‑run  state  
can  satisfy.33  But  a  well-­‐‑run  state  cannot  satisfy  the  humor  of  the  elite  because  they  crave  
oppression.34  Indeed,  a  well-­‐‑run  state  is  where  the  appetites  of  the  elite  should  be  most  
frustrated.  Therefore,  it  stands  to  reason  that  when  Machiavelli  brings  up  wolves  by  way  
of  discussing  force  and  fraud  in  chapter  18  he  is  referring  to  the  threat  from  chapter  6  
that  the  elite  pose  to  any  new  modes  and  orders  that  the  prince  creates.  (P  6.iv)  If  these  
orders  are  good,  they  will  frustrate  the  elite  humor  for  oppression  and  will,  in  turn,  
make  enemies  out  of  the  elites.  Thus,  before  a  prince  can  put  good  laws  into  place  –  
which  we  can  assume  are  geared  toward  non-­‐‑oppression  -­‐‑  he  must  know  how  to  
marginalize  those  who  would  actively  undermine  that  project.  
3.4 Force, fraud, and hypocrisy 
When  Machiavelli  divides  the  political  world  into  beasts  (lions,  foxes,  and  
wolves)  and  men  and  political  modes  into  forms  of  combat  (law,  force,  and  fraud),  he  
borrows  a  metaphor  from  Cicero’s  De  Oficiis,  which  was  widely  available  and  highly  
                                                                                                              
31  Nor  is  it  part  of  a  vision  of  Machiavellian  ‘eudiamonia.’  Machiavelli  never  presents  a  vision  of  the  good  
life  a  la  his  Greek  and  Roman  predecessors.  See  Chantal  Mouffe,  The  return  of  the  political.  (London:  Verso,  
1993),  36-­‐‑38;  and  Skinner,  “The  Idea  of  Negative  Liberty”  217-­‐‑19.    
32  A  prince  can,  therefore,  trust  his  people.  Pace  Mansfield,  Taming  the  Prince,  136.  
33  Michael  Gillespie,  Theological  Origins  of  Modernity,  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  2008),  92  
34  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  46.  
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regarded  during  the  renaissance.35  Cicero  writes  that  there  are  two  forms  of  injustice:  
force  and  fraud.  The  “latter  seems  to  belong,  as  it  were,  to  the  fox,  the  former  to  the  lion,  
and  neither  congenial  with  man.”36    He  and  Machiavelli  agree  as  far  as  this  dichotomy  
goes,  but  they  judge  the  justness  of  these  various  modes  radically  differently.  For  Cicero,  
force  and  fraud  are  both  modes  of  injustice,  but  fraud  “is  the  most  detestable”  and  “none  
is  more  heinous  than  that  of  the  men  who,  while  they  practice  fraud  to  the  utmost  of  
their  ability,  do  it  in  such  a  way  that  they  appear  to  be  good  men.”37  We  shall  see  that  it  
is  precisely  this  most  “heinous”  form  of  injustice  (fraud  under  the  appearance  of  
goodness)  that  Machiavelli  recommends  for  princes  in  principalities.  We  shall  also  see  
that  Machiavelli  rejects  the  Ciceronian  assessment  because  the  prince  must  have  tactical  
operating  room  in  order  to  contend  with  the  bestial  nature  of  the  elite.  For  Machiavelli,  
the  injustice  of  allowing  the  elites  to  oppress  the  people  is  far  more  “heinous”  than  the  
injustice  of  fraud  under  the  appearance  of  goodness.  
Of  course,  Machiavelli’s  position  is  several  steps  beyond  the  minimal  response  
one  could  have  to  the  dangers  posed  by  the  elite.  Machiavelli  recommends  the  use  of  
force  and  fraud  against  the  elite,  but  we  can  envision  a  position  in  which  the  prince  
thwarts  the  machinations  of  the  elite  by  mistrusting  them,  rather  than  actively  deceiving  
                                                                                                              
35  For  more  on  the  link  between  the  two,  see,  Marcia  L.  Colish,  “Cicero’s  De  Officiis  and  Machiavelli’s  
Prince,”  Sixteenth  Century  Journal,  IX  (1978):  81-­‐‑93;  and  J.J.  Barlow,  “The  Fox  and  the  Lion:  Machiavelli  
Replies  to  Cicero,”  History  of  Political  Thought  20  (1999):  627-­‐‑645.  
36  De  Oficiis,  I.13.  
37  De  Oficiis,  I.13.  
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them.38  According  to  this  position,  a  prince  would  seek  the  political  support  of  the  elite  
where  necessary,  but  would  never  trust  in  it  in  the  way  he  could  from  a  true  friend.  This  
distrust  would  require  no  deceit  and  no  force;  it  would  never  require  the  injustices  
Cicero  condemns  and  it  would  obviate  much  of  the  problem  of  “dirty  hands,”  to  borrow  
a  phrase  from  Michael  Walzer.39  And  yet,  Machiavelli  would  say  that  the  merely  
cautious  man  would  come  to  ruin  in  politics.  The  prudential  man  goes  beyond  mere  
caution  into  an  offensive  mode  and  must  abandon  distrust  in  favor  of  force  and  fraud,  in  
favor  of  dirty  hands  and  unjust  hypocrisy.  The  prince  must  know  how  to  use  the  lion  to  
“frighten”  wolves  and  he  must  know  how  to  use  the  fox  to  “recognize  snares,”  but  he  
must  also  set  snares  himself.40  As  far  as  Machiavelli  is  concerned,  the  prince  must  go  on  
the  offensive  against  those  who  would  overturn  the  order  he  seeks  to  create.  
The  position  of  the  prince  is  not  unlike  the  one  described  by  theorists  of  
autocratic  institutions  that  develop  in  response  to  threats  to  autocrats  from  both  elite  
and  popular  corners.  We  do  not  expect  autocracies  to  have  democratic  institutions  like  
elections,  parties,  and  legislatures,  but  they  do.41  The  fact  that  some  autocracies  create  
these  institutions  and  that  some  do  not  suggests  that  they  are  not  “costless  window  
                                                                                                              
38  Grant,  Hypocrisy  and  Integrity,  24.  
39  Michael  Walzer,  “Political  Action:  the  Problem  of  Dirty  Hands,”  Philosophy  and  Public  Affairs  2,  no.  2  
(1979):  179.  
40  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  39.  
41  “During  the  post–World  War  II  period,  the  proportion  of  nondemocratic  regimes  with  legislatures  varies  
from  60  to  88  percent.  Legislatures  are  ubiquitous  in  party  dictatorships,  but  less  so  under  military  rule  and  
monarchy.”  Jennifer  Gandhi,  Political  Institutions  under  Dictatorship.  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  
Press.  2008),  xvi.  
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dressing  that  provides  reputational  benefits  on  the  international  stage,”  but  rather  that  
they  are  a  mechanism  by  which  some  autocrats  choose  to  maintain  power  or  gather  
information  on  potential  challengers.42  Such  mechanisms  are  designed  to  compensate  for  
the  shortcomings  of  repressive  tactics.  Every  autocrat  who  uses  repressive  tactics  faces  a  
dilemma  according  to  which  the  use  of  repression  robs  that  autocrat  of  valuable  
information  about  levels  of  support  among  the  people  and  the  likelihood  of  potential  
challenges  from  his  or  her  inner  circle.43  Those  who  expect  to  be  repressed  for  expressing  
dissent  choose  to  mask  their  political  preferences,  rather  than  airing  their  grievances.  
This  dilemma  leads  autocrats  to  choose  strategies  for  maintaining  power  and  
maximizing  wealth  from  a  mix  of  repressive  tactics,  rent-­‐‑creation  through  economic  
intervention,  and  the  domestication  of  opposition.44  The  structure  of  autocracy  
(totalitarian  versus  tin-­‐‑pot  versus  military  junta,  for  example)  is  often  a  function  of  the  
particular  mix  of  strategies  that  the  autocrat  in  question  chooses.  
   Machiavelli’s  recommendations  to  an  autocrat  appear  to  emphasize  repressive  
tactics,  but  a  nuanced  view  of  his  argument  shows  that  he  recognizes  the  broad  contours  
of  the  dictator’s  dilemma.  Machiavelli  recommends  “fear”  (i.e.,  coercive  threats)  as  a  
safer  basis  for  political  fidelity  than  “love”  (i.e.,  distribution  of  rents).  He  writes,  “for  
friendships  acquired  at  a  price  and  not  with  greatness  and  nobility  of  spirit  are  bought,  
                                                                                                              
42  Gandhi,  Political  Institutions  Under  Dictatorship,  xvii.  
43  Ronald  Wintrobe,  The  Political  Economy  of  Dictatorship.  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press.  
1998),  Chapter  2.  
44  Wintrobe,  The  Political  Economy  of  Dictatorship,  15.  
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but  they  are  not  owned  and  when  the  time  comes  they  cannot  be  spent.”  (P  17.iii)  
Friendships  that  are  “acquired  at  a  price”  are  precisely  those  intra-­‐‑elite  alliances  based  
on  rent  creation  that  theorists  of  autocratic  institutions  recognize  as  a  commonly  used  
autocratic  tool.  Machiavelli  eschews  this  tool  because  he  sees  it  as  insufficient  for  
constraining  elite-­‐‑level  appetites:  “For  love  is  held  by  a  chain  of  obligation,  which,  
because  men  are  wicked,  is  broken  at  every  opportunity  for  their  own  utility,  but  fear  is  
held  by  a  dread  of  punishment  that  never  forsakes  you.”  (P  17.iii)  The  particular  
wickedness  of  the  elite  bars  courting  their  loyalty  through  rent-­‐‑creation  only.  
(Apparently  it  bars  winning  them  over  with  his  “greatness  and  nobility  of  spirit”  as  
well).  Love,  in  the  limited  way  that  there  can  be  love  between  a  prince  and  the  elite  with  
whom  he  contends,  must  be  backed-­‐‑up  by  the  prince’s  coercive  threats.  Machiavelli  tells  
his  reader  that  “the  response”  to  the  question  of  being  feared  or  loved  would  be  a  
combination  of  the  two,  where  possible.  But  the  appetites  of  the  elite  make  this  
combination  “difficult”  and  force  the  prince’s  hand  in  using  repressive  tactics.  Of  course,  
repression  feeds  upon  itself,  generating  both  hatred  for  the  regime  and  the  masking  of  
those  feelings  of  hatred  (hence  the  shock  many  dictators  have  evinced  at  finding  out  
precisely  how  hated  they  are).  Thus  Machiavelli  recommends  the  prince  limit  as  much  
as  possible  the  use  of  coercive  force.  “The  prince  should  nonetheless  make  himself  
feared  in  such  a  mode  that  if  he  does  not  acquire  love,  he  escapes  hatred.”  (P  17.iv)  The  
prince  must  respect  the  property  and  persons  of  his  citizens  and  subjects  (note  the  shift  
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in  language  away  from  ‘friends’  (i.e.,  the  elite)  to  citizens  and  subjects  (i.e.,  the  people).  
To  violate  property  rights  or  personal  integrity  would  be  to  trigger  hatred  from  the  
people  and  irrevocably  damage  his  relationship  with  them.  Moreover,  rent-­‐‑creation  for  
the  purposes  of  satisfying  the  elite  may  itself  require  violating  the  people’s  property  
rights,  making  it  a  form  of  oppression.  Far  more  consistent  with  Machiavellian  priorities  
is  the  kind  of  coercive  tactics  he  recommends  against  the  elite.    
Consider  Machiavelli’s  salacious  example  of  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco.  As  
Cesare  Borgia  sought  to  consolidate  a  principality  in  the  region  directly  surrounding  
Rome  (the  “Romagna”),  he  discovered  that  the  local  elite  –  true  to  form  –  “had  been  
readier  to  despoil  their  subjects  than  to  correct  them”  which  led  to  a  “province  that  was  
quite  full  of  robberies,  quarrels,  and  every  other  kind  of  insolence.”  (P  7.iv)  To  quell  the  
internal  violence,  Borgia  endowed  his  lieutenant  de  Orco,  who  had  a  “cruel  and  ready”  
nature,  with  “excessive  authority”  to  bring  the  Romagna  “to  peace  and  unity.”  (P  7.iv)  
Machiavelli  does  not  specify  the  violent  means  by  which  de  Orco  pacified  the  Romagna,  
but  we  can  very  well  imagine  that  de  Orco  spared  little  in  the  way  of  violence  because  
Machiavelli  tells  us  that  de  Orco’s  methods  “had  generated  some  hatred  for  [him].”  (P  
7.iv)  Cesare  Borgia  then  contrived  to  eliminate  de  Orco,  fearing  de  Orco’s  growing  
powerful  in  his  own  right  and  the  hatred  for  de  Orco  being  transferred  to  Borgia  
himself.  I  cannot  understate  the  importance  of  this  contrivance  because  it  illustrates  the  
link  between  Machiavelli’s  recommendations  concerning  minimizing  violent  
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oppression,  the  use  of  hypocrisy,  and  his  treatment  of  princely  authority  as  a  mechanism  
for  creating  the  possibility  of  a  stable  political  order.  I  quote  at  length:  
He  set  up  a  civil  court  in  the  middle  of  the  province,  with  a  most  excellent  
president,  where  each  city  had  its  advocate.  And  because  he  knew  that  past  
rigors  had  generated  some  hatred  for  Remirro,  to  purge  the  spirits  of  that  people  
and  to  gain  them  entirely  to  himself,  he  wished  to  show  that  if  any  cruelty  had  
been  committed,  this  had  not  come  from  him  but  from  the  harsh  nature  of  his  
minister.  And  having  seized  this  opportunity,  he  had  him  placed  [the  day  after  
Christmas]  in  the  piazza  at  Cesena  in  two  pieces,  with  a  piece  of  wood  and  a  
bloody  knife  beside  him.  The  ferocity  of  the  spectacle  left  the  people  at  once  
satisfied  and  stupefied.  (P  7.iv)  
  
Here  we  see  Machiavellian  politics  being  practiced  on  two  levels.  First,  and  of  
greatest  relevance  to  this  chapter,  is  the  elite-­‐‑level  political  action  for  which  Machiavelli  
praises  Borgia.  Borgia  manages  to  eliminate  the  lords  of  the  Romagna,  who  had  allowed  
the  region  to  come  to  such  widespread  violence.  Second,  Borgia  puts  the  necessary  
public  face  on  the  affair.  He  restores  peace  while  also  condemning  the  use  of  excessive  
violence  and  reaffirming  his  position  as  the  highest  governmental  authority  despite  
having  delegated  “excessive  authority”  to  de  Orco.  Had  Borgia  failed  in  one  of  these  
tasks,  the  whole  project  would  have  collapsed.  Had  Borgia  failed  to  eliminate  the  
violence  plaguing  the  Romagna,  he  would  have  fallen  short  of  his  primary  responsibility  
as  a  prince  (i.e.,  the  minimization  of  violent  oppression).  But,  as  Machiavelli  points  out  
in  chapter  20,  one  inconvenience  always  gives  rise  to  another.  (P  20.vi)  The  elimination  
of  the  elite  in  the  Romagna  resulted  in  the  empowerment  and  hatred  of  de  Orco  himself.  
Had  Borgia  not  executed  de  Orco,  de  Orco  might  have  challenged  Borgia’s  position  of  
authority  and  thereby  extended  the  civil  strife  in  the  region.  At  the  very  least,  his  
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continued  presence  in  the  government  would  have  drawn  the  ire  of  the  people.  And,  
had  Borgia  not  executed  de  Orco  in  a  public  and  graphic  way,  he  would  not  have  sent  
any  manner  of  signal  to  the  defenders  of  the  old,  repressive  order.45  Included  in  that  
signal  would  have  been  Borgia’s  successful  claim  on  the  monopoly  on  the  use  of  
violence.  
  Machiavelli’s  praise  of  Borgia’s  use  and  treatment  of  de  Orco  should  not  rest  
easily  with  us,  however.  Borgia  is  responsible  for  de  Orco’s  use  of  violence  in  the  
Romagna.  And  we  rightly  feel  that  someone  should  still  pay  for  using  cruelties  even  if  
that  violence  brought  about  peace.46  Borgia  is  responsible  for  those  cruelties,  yet  he  
publically  shirks  his  responsibility  by  using  a  trial  to  condemn  and  brutally  execute  de  
Orco.  Borgia  uses  both  force  and  fraud  against  de  Orco,  but  that  is  not  what  should  
make  us  uneasy.  It  is  the  force  and  the  fraud  that  he  uses  against  the  people  of  the  
Romagna  that  should  trigger  our  concern.  Borgia  involves  the  people  of  the  Romagna  in  
his  contrivance  to  eliminate  de  Orco.  By  putting  de  Orco  on  public  trial  Borgia  does  not  
keep  his  brutality  “within  the  family,”  so  to  speak.  Rather,  he  uses  the  people  to  
legitimate  his  execution  of  de  Orco  while  simultaneously  deceiving  them  about  who  was  
really  responsible  for  de  Orco’s  cruelties.  If  we  were  comforted  by  Machiavelli’s  
suggestion  that  means  of  combat  appropriate  to  beasts  are  reserved  as  tools  against  the  
                                                                                                              
45  The  publicity  of  Borgia’s  actions  was  essential.  The  question  before  us  is  whether  the  veracity  of  them  was  
as  well.  Either  way,  “for  a  set  of  rules  to  be  an  institution,  knowledge  of  these  rules  must  be  shared  by  the  
members  of  the  relevant  community  or  society.”  Knight,  Institutions  and  Social  Conflict,  2-­‐‑3.    
46  Walzer,  “Political  Action:  the  Problem  of  Dirty  Hands,”  179.  
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elite,  then  some  of  that  comfort  necessarily  disappears  when  we  see  that  Machiavelli  
praises  Borgia  for  a  deception  committed  against  the  people.    
In  chapter  18,  we  saw  that  Machiavelli  recommended  force  and  fraud  as  a  means  
for  fighting  with  the  elite,  whom  he  likens  to  wolves,  but  we  should  not  accept  that  
metaphor  straightforwardly.  If  we  accept  that  Machiavelli  is  right  in  seeing  the  political  
world  as  having  wolves  in  it,  then  we  are  compelled  to  accept  that  we  ought  to  “use  the  
beast”  and  “pick  the  fox  and  the  lion.”  Lions  can  overwhelm  wolves  when  the  wolves  
come  in  force  and  foxes  are  wary  enough  to  recognize  snares.  Such  recommendations,  
despite  the  bestial  metaphor,  are  not  particularly  controversial.  Few  reject  out  of  hand  
the  use  of  defensive  force  and  a  healthy  distrust  of  known  and  likely  rivals  and  enemies.  
Perhaps  most  importantly,  they  exclude  most  people  as  targets  of  force  and  fraud  
because  they  rarely  make  themselves  rivals  and  enemies.  Means  of  combat  “proper  to  
men”  (the  law)  remain  the  recommended  link  between  the  prince  and  the  people.  The  
episode  with  Borgia  and  de  Orco  upsets  that  exclusion.    
There  are  three  ways  that  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco  upsets  Machiavelli’s  
distinction  between  the  ways  of  the  fox  (fraud),  the  lion  (force),  and  men  (law),  despite  
his  claim  that  the  first  two  are  proper  to  interaction  with  wolves  and  that  the  third  is  
appropriate  to  combat  with  other  men.  First,  it  recommends  that  the  prince  take  an  
active  role  in  deceit.  Borgia  uses  his  trial  of  de  Orco  to  deflect  blame  for  de  Orco’s  use  of  
violence  away  from  himself.  The  trial  portrays  de  Orco  as  acting  beyond  his  mandate  
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from  Borgia  and  therefore  responsible  for  his  cruelties.  As  a  result,  the  trial  allowed  
Borgia  to  “purge  the  spirits  of  the  people  and  to  gain  them  entirely  to  himself.”  (P  7.iv)  
This  deception  was  an  active  and  powerful  one.  A  fox  must  not  only  be  able  to  detect  
snares,  he  must  be  able  to  set  them  himself.  This,  as  I  noted  above,  is  a  stronger  position  
than  evincing  distrust  of  one’s  enemies.    
The  second  way  in  which  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco  upsets  the  elite/bestial  vs.  
popular/humane  dichotomy  is  that  it  involves  a  deception  perpetrated  on  the  people  
themselves.  Borgia  uses  the  trial,  bolstered  by  “a  most  excellent  president”  and  a  
representative  from  each  subject  city  of  the  Romagna,  to  cement  the  public  perception  
that  de  Orco  had  acted  alone,  absolving  Borgia  of  responsibility  in  the  eyes  of  the  
people.  Further,  the  trial  depicts  Borgia  as  a  lover  of  justice  dispensed  via  juridical  
process,  rather  than  solely  via  executive  authority.  Borgia  could  have  simply  executed  
de  Orco  on  his  own  authority.  In  fact,  Borgia  does  execute  de  Orco  on  his  own  authority,  
but  he  waits  until  after  the  trial.  Finally,  it  depicts  Borgia  as  cruel  only  to  those  who  are  
excessively  cruel  to  the  people.  By  leaving  de  Orco  “in  the  piazza  at  Cesena  in  two  
pieces,  with  a  piece  of  wood  and  a  bloody  knife  beside  him,”  Borgia  sends  not  only  a  
message  to  the  other  elites,  but  also  to  the  people  that  his  cruelties  are  simultaneously  
spectacular  and  reserved  for  the  excessively  cruel.  Borgia  accomplishes  all  of  this,  of  
course,  in  conspicuous  view  of  the  entire  region,  each  city  of  which  had  sent  its  own  
representative  to  the  trial  thereby  completing  the  fraud.  
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Finally,  and  perhaps  most  profoundly,  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco  blurs  the  
distinction  between  combat  with  force,  combat  with  fraud,  and  combat  with  the  law.  
The  trial  itself  is  a  matter  of  legal  proceeding,  and  so  it  is  a  matter  of  combat  by  law.  But  
the  trial  is  also  a  fraud.  Borgia  uses  the  trial  to  reframe  responsibility  for  the  cruelties  
involved  in  the  pacification  of  the  Romagna.  Cruelties,  of  course,  mean  the  use  of  force  
in  this  case,  thus  making  combat  with  force  the  subject  of  the  trial.  And  we  should  not  
forget  that  much  of  the  trial’s  impact  in  leaving  the  people  “satisfied  and  stupefied”  
comes  from  the  spectacular  form  of  punishment  to  which  Borgia  subjects  de  Orco.  As  a  
result,  we  cannot  say  that  Machiavelli  suggests  a  neat  separation  between  the  humane  
combat  of  the  law  and  the  bestial  combat  of  force  and  fraud.  In  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  
Orco,  all  three  come  together  at  once  in  an  event  implicating  the  people  in  the  power  
struggle  between  Borgia  and  the  elite.47  A  praiseworthy  prince,  it  would  seem,  does  not  
alternate  between  force,  fraud,  and  law  as  much  as  he  mixes  them  to  the  best  of  his  
ability.    
Moreover,  a  praiseworthy  prince  does  not  necessarily  always  reserve  one  form  of  
combat  for  one  political  class  or  another.  In  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco,  we  see  Borgia  
use  the  law  to  condemn  de  Orco  –  a  fellow  member  of  the  political  elite  –  while  
simultaneously  defrauding  the  people  of  the  Romagna.  It  is  merely  on  the  basis  of  
propriety  that  Machiavelli  assigns  force  and  fraud  to  interaction  with  wolves,  whoever  
                                                                                                              
47  Mansfield,  Taming  the  Prince,  141.  
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they  may  be,  and  law  to  interaction  with  men.  There  are  exceptions  to  this  rule,  like  
almost  all  rules  in  political  life.  But,  in  these  exceptions  we  see  an  important  dynamic  of  
political  violence  demonstrated:  the  management  of  the  expectations  surrounding  the  
use  of  violence  are  also  decisive  for  a  stable  political  order.  Generalized  expectations  of  
violence  trigger  conditions  favorable  to  problematic  security  dilemmas,  as  do  
expectations  of  arbitrary  violence  from  a  ruler,  even  if  he  or  she  holds  a  monopoly  on  
violence.  Only  by  acting  hypocritically  in  the  trial  of  de  Orco  could  Borgia  subvert  both  
of  these  expectations  and  thereby  create  a  foundation  for  repeated,  peaceful  interactions  
between  citizens  of  the  Romagna,  which  was  an  essential  step  in  minimizing  oppression  
there.  
3.5 Force, fraud, and the space of appearance 
Can  the  elision  of  the  distinction  between  force,  fraud,  and  law  be  anything  other  
than  Machiavelli  simply  being  Machiavelli?  Contrary  to  the  conventional  wisdom  of  the  
day,  Machiavelli  argues  that  excessive  mercy  is  really  cruelty,  because  peace  needs  
enforcement.48  He  tells  us  that  parsimony  in  government  spending  is  actually  generosity  
(“liberality”)  because  tax-­‐‑based  revenue  comes  at  a  great  cost  to  the  people.  (P  16)  He  
tells  us  that  piety  taken  too  far  can  be  “wretched”,  and  he  tells  us  that  those  who  
                                                                                                              
48  Machiavelli  here  also  flies  in  the  face  of  ancient  political  thought,  as  he  is  the  “first  to  teach  openly  that  
morality  should  be  interpreted  ‘according  to  the  times’”  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  9.  
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“practice  cruelty  well-­‐‑used”  can  “have  some  remedy  with  god  and  with  men.”49  (P  8.iv)  
In  politics,  many  conventionally  understood  virtues  turn  to  vices  when  practiced  
without  an  eye  towards  the  outcomes  they  produce.  Likewise,  some  ends  are  so  great  
that  they  can  justify  the  occasional  violation  of  moral  norms.  Fanatic  adherence  to  
conventional  virtues  blinds  the  adherent  to  the  unconventional  ways  in  which  virtues  
and  vices  play  out  in  politics  and  has  an  uncanny  way  of  turning  virtue  into  vice.  The  
Prince  is  meant  to  illuminate  these  dynamics  for  its  reader  so  that  he  or  she  can  think  in  
terms  of  outcomes.50  To  put  the  matter  a  little  differently,  in  addition  to  teaching  its  
reader  to  know  how  to  avoid  the  apparent  goods  that  create  evil,  it  teaches  its  reader  to  
take  the  very  real  evils  of  politics  and  turn  them  to  the  good.    
Machiavelli’s  praise  of  Borgia’s  use  of  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco  fits  this  
pattern.  There  is  much  evil  in  Borgia’s  use  of  de  Orco,  but  the  episode  is  praiseworthy  
for  Machiavelli  because  Borgia  turns  that  evil  to  the  good.  The  cruelties  that  de  Orco  
exercised  were  actually  kindnesses,  because  he  rid  the  Romagna  of  internal  conflict  and  
widespread  violent  oppression.51  He  brought  the  region  to  “peace  and  unity.”  Why  then  
does  Machiavelli  praise  Borgia’s  fraudulent  transfer  of  blame  to  de  Orco?  Why  was  that  
transfer  valuable  to  the  Romagna  as  a  whole  and  not  just  Borgia  as  its  prince?  First,  
                                                                                                              
49  There  is  a  degree  of  Pelagianism  to  Machiavelli’s  perspective.  Michael  Gillespie,  Theological  Origins  of  
Modernity,  90.  
50  And  perhaps  even  save  him  or  herself  before  god  by  saving  his  or  her  fellow  citizens.  See,  Sebastian  De  
Grazia,  Machiavelli  in  Hell,  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1989),  385.  
51  Parel,  Machiavellian  Cosmos,  117.  
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Machiavelli  notes  that  the  trial  consolidated  political  authority  in  the  Romagna.  Where  
violence  is  likely  to  accompany  political  competition,  the  consolidation  of  political  
authority  becomes,  in  a  sense,  an  act  of  political  fidelity  to  the  region  that  would  have  
suffered  violence  due  to  fractured  authority.  Furthermore,  it  allowed  the  people,  who  
had  developed  a  hatred  for  Borgia’s  minister  to  vent  that  hatred  safely.  Again,  where  
violence  is  likely  to  accompany  hatred,  misdirection  becomes  a  helpful  tool  for  keeping  
the  peace.  Finally,  there  is  a  deeper,  more  important  move  embedded  in  Borgia’s  fraud.  
His  predecessors  in  the  Romagna  had  given  the  people  “matter  for  disunion,  not  union”  
and  were  “readier  to  despoil  their  subjects  than  to  correct  them.”  (P  7.iv)  The  result  was  
a  widespread  violence,  both  individual  and  factional.  Predatory  rule  had  not  only  
inured  the  people  of  the  Romagna  to  violence,  it  had  encouraged  it  within  them.  The  
trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco  needed  to  change  that  element  of  the  political  dynamic  in  the  
Romagna,  too.    
As  Avner  Grief  notes,  institutional  frameworks  only  structure  political  behavior  
when  people  are  properly  disposed  to  follow  them.52  In  game  theoretic  terms,  this  
involves  establishing  “equilibria  in  which  each  decision  maker  correctly  anticipates  the  
behavior  of  others  and  finds  it  optimal  to  take  the  action  expected  of  him.”53  Expectation  
about  the  behavior  of  others  matters  a  great  deal,  even  to  the  point  where  it  determines  
                                                                                                              
52  Avner  Greif,  Institutions  and  the  Path  to  the  Modern  Economy:  Lessons  From  Medieval  Trade.  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  2006),  8.  
53  Greif,  Institutions  and  the  Path  to  the  Modern  Economy,  9.  
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which  of  the  multiple  equilibria  will  be  the  result  of  a  given  set  of  conditions.  More  
importantly,  self-­‐‑reinforcing  institutions  exist  when  “each  individual,  responding  to  the  
institutional  elements  implied  by  others’  behavior  and  expected  behavior,  behaves  in  a  
manner  that  contributes  to  enabling,  guiding,  and  motivating  others  to  behave  in  the  
manner  that  led  to  the  institutional  elements  that  generated  the  individual’s  behavior  to  
begin  with.”54  Just  as  some  will  be  tempted  to  break  the  speed  limit  if  they  expect  that  
others  will  do  so  as  well,  formal  rules  about  violence  cannot  effectively  solve  a  security  
dilemma  if  the  beliefs  and  expectations  that  form  the  basis  of  the  security  dilemma  
remain  in  place.  We  can  read  the  Romagna  episode  in  line  with  the  recognition  that  the  
success  of  formal  institutional  rules  relies  upon  existing,  informal  expectations.  The  trial  
of  Remirro  de  Orco  is  praiseworthy  for  Machiavelli  because  it  attempts  to  shift  both.  
Perhaps  more  than  taking  note  of  Borgia’s  cunning  per  se,  Machiavelli’s  reader  should  
take  note  of  the  way  that  Borgia  uses  his  cunning  to  signal  that  the  state  had  
monopolized  the  legitimate  use  of  violence  and  had  introduced  a  reliable,  if  severe  
system  of  punishment.  These  two  conditions  are  far  more  conducive  to  peace  and  non-­‐‑
oppression  than  an  environment  of  vendettas  and  blood  feuds.    
To  generate  that  signal  Borgia  needed  to  know  how  to  manipulate  political  
appearances.  In  principalities,  the  prince  occupies  the  center  space  of  appearance.55  As  
                                                                                                              
54  Greif,  Institutions  and  the  Path  to  the  Modern  Economy,  14-­‐‑15.  
55  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  17,  29.  
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the  focus  of  attention,  the  prince  must  know  how  he  appears  to  others  in  order  to  avoid  
the  people’s  hatred  and  contempt,  which  would  destabilize  the  regime.  Machiavelli  has  
this  fact  of  political  life  in  mind  when  he  writes  that  a  praiseworthy  prince  should  
“appear  all  mercy,  all  faith,  all  honesty,  all  humanity,  all  religion.”  (P  18.v)  To  appear  the  
opposite  of  merciful,  faithful,  honest,  humane,  and  religious  is  the  Machiavellian  
equivalent  of  stepping  upon  the  third  rail.  To  give  up  those  appearances  is  to  give  up  a  
significant  degree  of  freedom.  But  strategic  potency  is  not  the  only  consideration  for  a  
prince  publically  promoting  conventional  virtues.  A  people  that  no  longer  value  mercy,  
faithfulness,  honesty,  humanity,  religiosity,  and  (per  the  trial)  lawfulness,  also  constrain  
the  prince’s  ability  to  act  on  their  behalf.  Machiavelli  writes,  “for  when  that  community  
of  which  you  judge  you  have  need  to  maintain  yourself  is  corrupt,  whether  they  are  the  
people  or  the  soldiers  or  the  great,  you  must  follow  their  humor  to  satisfy  them,  and  then  
good  deeds  are  your  enemy.”  (P  19.vi;  Emphasis  mine)  As  the  central  political  figure  in  the  
state,  the  prince  has  the  power  to  promote  certain  behavioral  norms  over  others  just  by  
outwardly  demonstrating  those  norms.  Whether  we  presume  that  the  prince  can  redeem  
a  corrupted  people  or  he  can  merely  shift  the  expectations  of  a  people  accustomed  to  
violence,  a  prince  needs  to  publically  promote  mercy,  liberality,  faithfulness,  and  all  of  
the  related  virtues  because  doing  so  helps  him  keep  the  peace.  So  outward  displays  of  
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virtue  do  not  merely  help  the  prince  avoid  an  exogenously  driven  pitfall,  they  also  help  
him  shape  the  very  social  landscape  of  the  principality.56  
We  can  understand  Borgia’s  use  of  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco  as  a  reflection  of  
this  complicated  dynamic  between  prince  and  people.57  If  the  people  of  the  Romagna  
had  somehow  managed  to  remain  peaceful,  despite  the  corrupting  rule  they  had  
experienced  under  the  lords  of  the  Romagna,  then  Borgia’s  deceit  was  necessary  to  both  
affirm  that  virtue  and  avoid  the  hatred  of  the  people  of  the  Romagna.  If  the  elite  had  
corrupted  the  people  of  the  Romagna  as  Machiavelli  suggests,  then  Borgia’s  deceit  was  
necessary  to  signal  a  change  in  behavioral  norms.  And,  if  the  latter  was  the  case,  the  
spectacular  nature  of  de  Orco’s  execution,  which  left  the  people  “at  once  satisfied  and  
stupefied”,  was  necessary  to  signal  Borgia’s  resolution  in  enforcing  that  change.    
In  any  case,  Borgia’s  hypocrisy  was  not  just  an  example  of  a  shrewd  political  
mind  at  work;  it  was  an  example  of  a  politician  turning  a  necessary  evil  to  the  good.  To  
put  the  matter  another  way,  Borgia’s  hypocrisy  was  an  example  of  one  of  the  ways  in  
which  a  prince  translates  the  use  of  force  (de  Orco)  into  lawful  institutions  like  trials.  
From  this  standpoint,  we  can  better  see  why  Machiavelli  used  the  subjunctive  in  talking  
about  the  relationship  between  good  arms  and  good  laws.  First,  the  one  does  not  always  
follow  the  other.  Second,  the  latter  have  to  supersede  the  former  as  the  institutions  that  
                                                                                                              
56  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  77  
57  Pace  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  175.  
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structure  social  life.  Had  Borgia  pursued  good  arms  only,  he  would  have  left  de  Orco  -­‐‑  
who  was  an  exemplary  user  of  force  –  as  the  governor  of  the  Romagna.  Minimizing  
oppression,  however,  requires  paying  attention  to  the  appearance  of  all  acts  of  violence  
because  those  appearances  affect  the  beliefs  and  expectations  that  people  have  with  
respect  to  the  use  of  violence.  Formal  rules  (like  laws)  surrounding  the  use  of  violence  
are  only  effective  when  beliefs  and  expectations  conform  to  those  rules.  The  prince’s  
position  at  the  center  of  the  political  stage  makes  him  a  crucial  player  in  the  
development  and  management  of  those  beliefs  and  expectations.58  Thus,  a  prince  must  
appear  conventionally  virtuous  not  only  in  order  to  avoid  the  hatred  and  contempt  of  a  
virtuous  people,  he  must  also  appear  conventionally  virtuous  in  order  to  uphold  the  
expectation  of  virtuous  behavior  even  among  a  corrupt  people.  While  this  problem  is  not  
limited  to  the  use  of  force  and  fraud  (see,  for  example,  Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  
liberality  and  parsimony),  it  is  particularly  important  in  those  cases.  First,  it  drives  
Machiavelli’s  inversion  of  the  conventional  notions  of  cruelty  and  mercy.  A  little  of  the  
former,  if  it  establishes  a  modus  vivendi,  leads  to  a  lot  of  the  latter.  Second,  and  perhaps  
more  importantly,  deceit  about  violence  is  worthwhile  if  it  leads  to  expectations  about  
violence  like  a  state  monopoly  on  it  and  punishment  through  trials  and  tribunals.  A  shift  
in  those  expectations  helps  to  solidify  conditions  that  are  vital  to  minimizing  violent  
oppression.  
                                                                                                              
58  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  67;  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  178-­‐‑179.  
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The  prince  can  affect  the  nature  of  both  formal  rules  and  the  way  in  which  
people  engage  with  those  rules  by  managing  the  appearance  of  his  public  actions.  The  
management  of  political  appearance,  however,  is  not  the  same  as  actually  possessing  the  
virtues  that  that  management  is  designed  to  promote.  In  fact,  Machiavelli  warns  his  
reader  against  following  conventional  codes  of  conduct  too  closely.  “By  appearing  to  
have  them,  they  are  useful,  as  it  is  to  appear  merciful,  faithful,  humane,  honest,  and  
religious,  and  to  be  so,  but  to  remain  with  a  spirit  built  so  that  if  you  need  not  to  be  those  
things,  you  are  able  to  know  how  to  change  to  the  contrary.”  (P  18.v,  emphasis  mine)  
The  appearance  of  mercy,  faithfulness,  humanity  and  the  other  virtues  are  always  
useful.  Likewise,  actually  being  merciful,  faithful,  humane  and  so  on  is  also  always  useful  
provided  one  knows  how  to  be  cruel,  deceitful,  and  bestial  when  the  wolves  are  at  the  
door.59  When  the  wolves  are  not  at  the  door  and  when  orders  are  not  corrupt,  a  prince  
would  do  well  to  follow  the  conventional  advice  of  the  humanists  of  Machiavelli’s  day  
and  sincerely  exercise  the  conventional  virtues  Machiavelli  lists  above.  Virtues,  for  
Machiavelli,  are  tools  that  one  should  use  in  the  service  of  non-­‐‑oppression  and  he  does  
not  suggest  that  their  hypocritical  exercise  is  always  necessary  to  further  those  causes.60  
                                                                                                              
59  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  82.  
60  Pace  Grant,  Hypocrisy  and  Integrity,  29.  
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The  appropriate  mode  of  proceeding  is  entirely  dependent  upon  the  particulars  of  the  
situation.61    
The  prince  is  something  like  the  weight-­‐‑bearing  cables  of  a  catenary  bridge,  
where  excessive  rigidity  results  in  the  collapse  of  the  entire  structure.  Thus,  with  respect  
to  conventional  virtues,  Machiavelli  advises:  “by  having  them  and  always  observing  them,  
they  are  harmful.”  (P  18.v,  emphasis  mine)  The  language  that  Machiavelli  uses  here  is  
not  all  that  different  from  the  language  the  he  used  in  talking  about  different  kinds  of  
militaries.  A  rigid  dedication  to  conventional  virtues  is  analogous  to  using  mercenary  
soldiers.62  A  prince  who  cannot  deviate  from  socially  prescribed  norms  restricts  himself  
in  the  same  way  that  a  prince  who  engages  mercenary  soldiers  restricts  himself.63  In  both  
cases,  the  tools  (be  they  mercenaries  or  virtues)  dictate  the  actions  of  the  prince.64  
Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  the  political  world  is  that  it  is  sufficiently  unpredictable  and  
that  certain  possibilities  are  sufficiently  dangerous  that  to  tie  one’s  hand  in  any  way  is  to  
risk  disaster.65  Nevertheless,  to  return  to  the  bridge  metaphor,  one  does  not  want  too  
much  flexibility  in  the  deck  of  a  catenary  bridge.  Where  the  deck  is  insufficiently  rigid,  
                                                                                                              
61  “Prudence”  is  the  virtue  of  knowing  when  to  use  which  mode  of  proceeding  is  best  suited  to  which  
situation  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  Virtue,  39-­‐‑44.  
62  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  162,  177.  
63  He  also  signals  his  probable  behavior  to  his  enemies,  which  would  put  him  at  a  strategic  disadvantage.  
Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision  202.  In  a  similar  vein,  Grant  points  out  that  Machiavellian  hypocrisy  ensures  that  
the  prince  will  “be  the  manipulator  and  not  the  manipulated  by  acquiring  enough  power  to  secure  his  
autonomy  –  to  rely  on  his  “own  arms”.  Grant,  Hypocrisy  and  Integrity,  13.  See  also  Garver,  Machiavelli  and  the  
History  of  Prudence,  87.  
64  To  this  we  should  add  flexibility  in  oratory.  Cox,  “Rhetoric  and  Ethics  in  Machiavelli,”  183.  
65  Cox,  “Rhetoric  and  Ethics  in  Machiavelli,”  182.  
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the  structure  collapses.  That  is  why  Machiavelli  yokes  flexible  engagement  with  virtues  
on  the  part  of  the  prince  to  the  pursuit  of  non-­‐‑oppression.  
3.6 Bad arms and bad laws: fascism, Marxism, and 
fundamentalism 
At  this  point,  Machiavelli’s  case  for  autocracies  might  seem  to  echo  the  cases  that  
the  totalitarian  regimes  of  the  20th  and  21st  centuries  would  make  for  themselves,  but  it  
would  be  a  mistake  to  see  Machiavelli  as  a  defender  of  these  regimes.  Indeed,  he  would  
be  one  of  their  harshest  critics.66  These  regimes  would  all  argue  that  any  cruelties  they  
committed  were  being  turned  to  the  good  because  they  understood  their  radical  
transformation  of  society  in  terms  of  general  welfare.  They  were  also  willing  to  use  both  
force  and  fraud  to  effect  that  transformation.  Max  Weber  calls  this  attitude  “the  ethic  of  
ultimate  ends.”67  This  ethic  sees  all  means  as  justified  by  a  single  end,  which  is  usually  a  
comprehensive  transformation  of  social  life.  It  is  also  profoundly  anti-­‐‑Machiavellian.  
Machiavelli  would  oppose  such  political  programs  on  three  counts.  First,  any  
cruelties  they  commit  are  not  “done  at  a  stroke,  out  of  necessity  to  secure  [the  regime].”  
(P  8.v)  As  top-­‐‑down,  accelerated  social  transformation  fails  to  take  root,  regimes  that  are  
committed  to  such  transformations  turn  increasingly  to  the  use  of  force  and  fraud.  So  
their  cruelties  “rather  grow  with  time  than  are  eliminated.”  (P  8.v)  If  their  ultimate  end  
                                                                                                              
66  Mansfield,  Taming  the  Prince,  149.  
67  Max  Weber,  “Politics  as  a  Vocation”  in  Max  Weber’s  complete  Writings  on  Academic  and  Political  Vocations.  
Ed.  John  Dreijmanis,  Trans.  John  Wells.  (New  York:  Algora  Publishing)  198.  
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is  ill-­‐‑suited  to  a  life  well-­‐‑led,  then  their  cruelties  cannot  be  done  at  a  stroke.  Those  
cruelties  continue  as  long  as  the  regime  is  committed  to  radical  transformation  because  
the  radically  new  society  never  takes  root.  The  sin  they  end  up  committing  is  precisely  
the  opposite  of  that  of  the  Florentines  in  Pistoia,  who  were  guilty  of  “cruel  pity”  in  
failing  to  intervene  against  the  violence  there.  The  sins  of  totalitarian  regimes,  by  
contrast,  are  acts  of  “pious  cruelty,”  which  entail  the  use  of  excessive  violence  in  the  
service  of  some  abstract  principle  or  belief.  (P  21.i)  Ferdinand  of  Aragon  committed  an  
act  of  pious  cruelty  in  1501-­‐‑2  when  he  expelled  the  Jews  and  Muslims  who  previously  
had  been  forcibly  converted  to  Christianity  from  Spain.68  (P  21.i)  Machiavelli  says  of  the  
expulsion  of  the  Marranos  that  there  could  not  be  “an  example  more  wretched  and  rarer  
than  this.”  (P  21.i)  Ferdinand’s  was  an  act  of  partial  religious  reconstruction  of  Spain.  If  it  
received  such  hyperbolic  condemnation,  then  we  can  only  assume  that  pious  cruelties  
like  the  Holocaust,  or  Pol  Pot’s  genocide  in  Cambodia  would  receive  stronger  
condemnations  from  Machiavelli.69  
Similarly,  Machiavelli  would  condemn  such  regimes  for  their  use  of  propaganda.  
Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  the  use  of  fraud  frequently  evokes  comparisons  to  the  
propaganda  machines  of  such  regimes  –  especially  in  the  case  of  de  Orco’s  show  trial.  
The  superficial  reading  of  Machiavelli  that  places  him  within  the  confines  of  an  Orwell  
                                                                                                              
68  Mansfield,  Taming  the  Prince,  125.  
69  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  200.  
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novel  misses  his  judgment  of  the  people  at  large.  In  precisely  the  same  chapter  that  he  
recommends  fraud  as  a  practice  of  rule  (chapter  18),  he  observes  that  the  people  are  
“taken  in  by  the  appearance  and  outcome  of  a  thing.”  (P  18.vi;  emphasis  mine)  And  more  
importantly,  “in  the  actions  of  all  men,  and  especially  of  princes,  where  there  is  no  court  
to  appeal  to,  one  looks  to  the  end.”  (P  18.vi)  These  passages,  I  suppose,  are  the  basis  for  
the  perception  that  Machiavelli  argues  that  the  ‘ends  justify  the  means.’  He  certainly  
comes  close  to  arguing  that  point,  but  reducing  these  claims  to  simple  consequentialism  
obscures  what  he  is  asserting  about  the  people.70    
The  people,  who  are  the  ultimate  source  of  political  ends  (whether  they  justify  
their  means  or  not),  are  “taken”  by  appearances  and  outcomes.  These  elements  of  a  
political  process,  rather  than  means  per  se,  move  the  people.  The  “what”  and  “why”  of  a  
policy  trumps  the  “how.”  But  we  may  rightly  ask  what  the  people  do  when  political  
appearances  contrast  with  political  outcomes.  In  such  instances,  Machiavelli  tells  us  that  
the  people  turn  to  outcomes  to  make  a  judgment.  (P  18.vi)  In  part,  this  is  because  the  
people  can  be  deceived  about  the  means  of  a  project.  And  in  part  this  is  because  the  part  
of  a  project  about  which  the  people  cannot  be  deceived  –  the  outcome  –  trumps  all  else  in  
their  judgment.  If  Machiavelli  is  right,  then  the  totalitarian  regimes  that  rely  upon  
                                                                                                              
70  Pace  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  352.  
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propaganda  to  maintain  rule  only  manage  to  deceive  themselves.71  The  people  that  they  
oppress  know  that  they  are  being  oppressed,  rather  than  liberated,  even  if  they  cannot  act  
to  liberate  themselves.  At  best,  such  regimes  can  control  distribution  of  information  to  
the  extent  that  dissident  citizens  cannot  share  their  judgments  with  each  other  and  
thereby  unite  in  opposition.  Indeed,  such  practices  are  common  among  oppressive  
regimes  and  their  downfalls  are  frequently  heralded  by  the  sudden  public  revelation  of  
widespread  dissent  and  dissatisfaction.72  The  periodic  uprisings  within  the  Soviet  Union  
and  its  abrupt  fall  are  certainly  illustrative  of  this  phenomenon.  They  also  reveal  the  
second  way  in  which  totalitarian  regimes  cannot  stand  up  to  Machiavellian  scrutiny:  
they  try  to  use  fraud  to  mask  their  failure  to  satisfy  the  popular  humor.  In  doing  so,  they  
miss  the  forest  for  the  trees.  Suspect  means  can  be  hidden  through  fraud.  They  can  also  
be  redeemed  by  positive  outcomes.  But  negative  outcomes  can  neither  be  hidden  nor  
redeemed.    
Totalitarian  regimes  do  not  stop  at  deception,  however,  and  even  attempt  to  
make  the  people  a  party  to  their  own  oppression.  This  behavior  is  the  third  count  in  the  
Machiavellian  case  against  totalitarian  regimes.  I  argued  in  chapter  2  that  Machiavelli  
praises  principalities  that  enlist  the  people  into  the  citizen-­‐‑militia.  No  ruler  rules  without  
                                                                                                              
71  “Where  the  actors  were  all  intent  on  creating  false  worlds,  success  depended  not  only  on  the  ability  to  
distinguish  the  true  world  from  the  false,  but  also  in  avoiding  the  trap  of  one’s  own  deceptions.”  Wolin,  
Politics  and  Vision,  191.  
72  Lohmann,  Susanne,  “The  Dynamics  of  Informational  Cascades:  The  Monday  Demonstrations  in  Leipzig,  
East  Germany,  1989-­‐‑91,”  World  Politics  47,  no.  1  (1994):  42-­‐‑101.  
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the  cooperation  of  some  group  of  assistants  –  whether  they  are  members  of  the  economic  
elite,  an  internal  security  apparatus,  the  autocrat’s  political  party,  or  run-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑mill  
citizens.  Machiavelli  favors  this  last  alliance  between  the  prince  and  the  people  at  large.  
Specifically,  he  favors  an  alliance  that  arms  and  enlists  the  people  in  defense  of  the  state  
from  enemies  abroad  and  from  the  elite  at  home.  Totalitarian  regimes  do  precisely  the  
opposite.  They  enlist  individual  citizens  in  their  own  oppression.  In  the  German  
Democratic  Republic,  for  example,  628,000  different  citizens  collaborated  with  the  
Ministry  for  State  Security  with  as  many  as  200,000  informing  for  the  “Stasi”  at  any  
given  time.73  From  a  Machiavellian  perspective,  the  Stasi  were  as  blameworthy  as  a  well-­‐‑
functioning  citizen-­‐‑militia  would  be  praiseworthy.  By  turning  citizens  against  each  
other,  institutions  like  the  Stasi  create  a  perverse  and  disempowering  atomization  of  
social  networks.  
Totalitarian  regimes  multiply  cruelties  over  time,  try  to  use  propaganda  to  
deceive  the  people  about  the  outcomes  of  their  projects,  and  coerce  individual  citizens  
into  repressing  each  other.  Each  of  these  three  behaviors  violates  significant  strategic  
and  normative  Machiavellian  tenets.  These  regimes  are  both  wrong  and  imprudent.  
They  ignore  the  people  both  as  a  normative  touchstone  and  as  a  strategic  partner  for  
                                                                                                              
73  Helmut  Müller-­‐‑Enbergs:  Die  inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiter.  In:  BStU:  Anatomie  der  Staatssicherheit  –  Geschichte,  
Struktur,  Methoden,  Berlin  (2008),  35–38  
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minimizing  oppression.  It  should  be  clear  that  these  regimes  are  not  praiseworthy  
despite  Machiavelli’s  recommendation  for  practicing  hypocrisy  in  politics.  
3.7 Beyond good arms and good laws: from principalities to 
republics 
If  we  can  commit  Machiavelli  to  any  normative  position,  it  is  that  the  ends  of  the  
people  are  more  decent  than  those  of  the  elite.  Machiavelli  repeats  this  statement  
throughout  his  oeuvre  and  he  never  contradicts  it.  It  defines  the  appropriate  aims  for  
princely  action.  Chapter  2  delineated  those  aims,  and  described  Machiavelli’s  construal  
of  popular  participation  in  political  violence  as  necessary  for  achieving  those  populist  
ends.  This  chapter  argues,  however,  that  his  view  of  popular  and  elite  humors  gives  rise  
to  his  paradoxical  view  of  the  establishment  of  law,  his  recommendation  for  hypocrisy  
and  the  political  use  of  deception  on  the  part  of  the  prince,  his  contradiction  of  
conventional  humanist  ethics,  and  what  would  be  his  condemnation  of  totalitarian  
regimes  were  he  alive  to  see  them.  Machiavelli’s  view  of  political  humors  gives  rise  to  
these  recommendations  because  the  humor  of  the  elite  requires  the  intervention  of  the  
prince  on  behalf  of  the  people.  We  saw  in  chapters  1  and  2  that  when  Machiavelli  talks  
about  good  arms,  he  is  talking  about  a  citizen-­‐‑militia.  Citizen-­‐‑militias  do  not  create  
themselves.  They  require  commanders  and  organizers.  This  command  and  organization  
is  the  task  of  the  prince.  But  the  prince  is  not  just  a  military  commander.  His  role  is  
political  because  he  cannot  cease  his  duties  with  military  action.  He  must  create  a  space  
for  good  laws  as  well.  If  we  take  Machiavelli’s  understanding  of  the  political  humors  to  
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be  correct,  then  creating  a  space  for  good  laws  requires  the  artful  use  of  force  against  the  
elite.  Here,  we  must  take  Machiavelli’s  promotion  of  hypocrisy  and  deception  seriously.  
The  prince  must  become  fearsome  to  the  elite  without  becoming  hateful  to  the  people.  
Maintaining  that  balance  requires  the  artful  management  of  not  just  political  facts,  but  
also  political  perceptions  (which  are  often  the  same).  In  the  trial  of  Remirro  de  Orco,  for  
example,  Borgia  needed  to  create  a  perception  of  lawfulness  out  of  the  raw  force  used  by  
de  Orco.  Borgia  needed  to  bring  lawfulness  out  of  what  is  inherently  lawless.  
Minimizing  violent  oppression  requires  drawing  goodness  out  of  participation  in  a  
world  of  evil  and  kindness  out  of  participation  in  a  world  of  cruelty.  
The  Machiavellian  paradox  lies  in  the  fact  that  acting  against  the  elite  requires  
the  use  of  cruelty,  but  the  use  of  cruelty  cannot  become  the  public  norm.  A  people  that  
goes  in  for  the  regular  use  of  violence  becomes  an  enemy  of  good  deeds.  And  a  prince  
that  goes  in  for  excessive  violence  in  a  public  way  becomes  hateful  to  the  people.  Thus  
Machiavelli  restricts  the  use  of  cruelty  to  the  prince  and  exhorts  the  prince  to  mask  the  
use  of  those  cruelties.  In  this  sense,  The  Prince’s  undemocratic  moments  and  hypocrisy  
are  bound  together  in  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  virtue  and  vice.  They  also  extend  to  his  
more  particular  notion  of  virtú.  A  prince  that  does  not  tie  his  own  hands  in  terms  of  
behavioral  norms  is  able  to  maintain  greater  independence  in  action.  He  does  not  rely  on  
circumstances  catering  to  particular  virtues.  He  is  free  to  adjust  to  circumstances,  which  
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he  cannot  control.  His  autonomy  lies  in  having  a  character  disposed  to  match  his  mode  
of  proceeding  to  the  given  situation.  
Likewise,  the  needs  of  the  people  to  not  be  oppressed  trump  all  other  political  
injunctions.  There  is  great  importance  in  being  honest,  merciful,  generous,  and  lawful,  
but  that  importance  is  not  so  great  that  it  bars  deceit  and  violence  where  they  are  
necessary  to  protect  the  people  from  the  elite  or  foreign  invasion.  In  the  context  of  
political  morality,  Machiavellian  virtú  lies  in  this  independence  from  abstract  codes  of  
conduct,  just  as  a  prince  having  his  “own  arms”  lies  in  independence  from  mercenary  
and  auxiliary  arms.  But  just  as  a  prince’s  “own  arms”  are  actually  the  people  in  the  form  
of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  a  prince’s  moral  independence  also  requires  the  popular  perception  
of  him  as  conventionally  moral.  The  prince  must  appear  to  be  conventionally  moral  both  
for  his  sake  as  a  holder  of  power  and  for  the  sake  of  the  principality  as  a  whole.  To  
appear  otherwise  is  to  risk  the  possibility  of  contempt  and  hate  –  thus  destabilizing  his  
power  –  or  to  risk  the  corruption  of  the  people  –  thus  corrupting  the  principality’s  
source  of  strength  and  cultivating  hatred  for  good  deeds.  The  needs  of  the  people  both  
demand  and  justify  the  prince’s  immoralism  and  hypocrisy.  By  extension,  they  justify  
the  elitism  of  the  prince.  The  prince,  and  only  the  prince,  can  go  in  for  that  immoralism  
and  hypocrisy.    
The  challenge  for  Machiavelli  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  skill  to  be  a  prince  is  rare  
and  that  the  language  of  populism  is  easily  turned  to  the  oppression  of  the  people,  as  
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has  been  the  case  with  most  totalitarian  regimes.  The  failures  of  these  regimes  do  not  
indict  what  Machiavelli  considers  to  be  praiseworthy  principalities  because  the  two  are  
inconsistent  with  each  other.  The  former  expand  the  use  of  cruelty  over  time,  whereas  
the  latter  reduces  it.  The  former  try  to  deceive  the  people  about  the  outcomes  of  their  
policies,  which  is  impossible.  And  the  former  try  to  remake  society  as  a  whole  –  an  act  of  
pious  cruelty  –  whereas  the  latter  minimize  social  interventions.  Nevertheless,  the  
tendency  of  totalitarian  regimes  to  emerge  (as  well  as  run  of  the  mill  tin-­‐‑pot  autocrats)  
indicates  something  about  the  tendency  of  autocratic  power  to  autonomize  itself.  In  
Machiavelli’s  praiseworthy  principalities,  the  prince  has  incredible  power  and  the  only  
checks  on  that  power  are  Machiavelli’s  exhortation  that  the  prince  act  towards  populist  
ends,  use  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  as  his  arms,  and  avoid  the  hatred  of  the  people.      
These  checks  on  power  are  weak  at  best  and  both  glory  and  self-­‐‑interest  often  are  
not  sufficient  motivation  for  virtuous  princely  behavior,  which  underscores  the  need  for  
an  alternative  political  form.  That  alternative  political  form  is  the  republic,  which  
Machiavelli  treats  at  length  in  the  Discourses  on  Livy  and  to  which  I  now  turn  for  the  next  
two  chapters.  What  is  remarkable  about  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  republics  is  that  they  
also  demonstrate  an  agonistic  and  symbiotic  relationship  between  political  classes.  The  
terms  of  that  partnership  are  different,  to  be  sure,  but  the  way  in  which  they  aim  to  
minimize  violent  oppression  demonstrate  that  they  have  more  in  common  with  
principalities  than  advocates  of  republics  would  like  to  admit.  I  turn  now  to  
  136  
Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  popular  political  participation  in  republics  in  chapter  4.  In  
chapter  5,  I  discuss  the  role  of  republican  elites.
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Chapter 4: Good Laws and Good Arms: Rome’s 
Structured citizen participation  
Violent  oppression  is  a  problem  for  every  state.  However,  not  every  state  must  
respond  in  the  same  way  to  that  problem.  For  Machiavelli,  the  set  of  actions  suitable  to  
principalities  differs  from  the  set  of  actions  suitable  to  republics.1  In  The  Discourses  on  
Livy  (hereafter  “the  Discourses”)  he  outlines  the  steps  republics  must  take  to  empower  
their  citizens  to  secure  themselves  from  oppression.2  If  we  take  his  description  of  Rome  
to  be  a  model  for  republics,  then  republics  must  recruit  the  people  for  external  defense  as  
well  as  participation  in  institutions  beyond  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  that  serve  as  internal  
checks  against  oppression.  Machiavelli  praises  Rome  for  using  her  people  at  large  to  
satisfy  her  needs  for  external  defense  and  the  placement  of  internal  checks  on  the  
oppressive  practices  of  her  elites.  Remarkably,  Rome’s  primary  mechanism  for  checking  
her  elites  –  the  plebeian  tribunes  (tribuni  plebis)  –  was  created  in  exchange  for  the  
people’s  willingness  to  serve  in  the  army  and  maintained  its  authority  because  the  
people  threatened  to  use  their  power  to  do  violence  should  their  tribunes  be  hindered.  
These  two  crucial  mechanisms  for  preventing  violent  oppression  had  the  same  popular  
root.  The  arrangement  Machiavelli  holds  out  as  a  model  in  the  Discourses  contrasts  with  
the  model  he  holds  out  in  the  Prince,  in  which  the  prince  must  recruit  the  people  into  the  
citizen-­‐‑militia  to  both  fill  its  ranks  and  limit  its  uses,  but  take  it  upon  himself  to  act  as  a  
                                                                                                              
1  Sheldon  Wolin.  Politics  and  Vision,  205.  
2  Chantal  Mouffe,  The  Return  of  the  Political  (London:  Verso,  1993),  44.  
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check  against  the  oppressive  drives  of  his  fellow  elites.  If  the  Rome  that  Machiavelli  
describes  can  be  taken  for  a  model  of  republics  in  general,  then  well-­‐‑functioning  
republics  not  only  channel  legitimacy  and  preferences  upward,  they  use  the  people  to  
check  the  corrupting  ambition  of  the  elite  as  well.3  Machiavelli’s  analysis  of  republican  
rule  thus  compels  us  to  think  differently  about  what  ought  to  be  the  hallmarks  of  
democracies  today.  They  ought  not  be  only  things  like  voting,  standing  for  office,  and  
popular  deliberation  over  policy,  but  also  include  agonistic  challenges  to  political  elites.  
The  Roman  approach,  however,  had  its  limitations  and  republics  can  learn  from  
those  limitations.  The  stability  of  the  Roman  republic  depended  on  the  ongoing  use  of  
the  tribunes  in  addition  to  the  ongoing  effectiveness  of  the  military  to  stave  off  corrupting  
influences.  While  the  tribunate  was  central  to  keeping  Roman  elites  in  check,  it  was  the  
corruption  of  the  military,  according  to  Machiavelli,  that  removed  the  final  barrier  
between  the  corrupting  ambitions  of  the  Roman  elites  and  the  end  of  the  Roman  
republic.  The  democracies  of  today  that  would  exercise  their  military  power  abroad  
must  pay  attention  to  Machiavelli’s  analysis  of  Rome’s  failure  to  check  potential  sources  
of  oppression  as  her  empire  grew.  
                                                                                                              
3  In  a  sense,  the  Rome  that  Machiavelli  describes  challenges  the  traditional  interpretations  of  Weber’s  dictum  
that  the  “state  is  a  human  community  that  (successfully)  claims  the  monopoly  of  the  legitimate  use  of  physical  
force  within  a  given  territory.  “Politics  as  a  Vocation.”  31.  If  both  Machiavelli  and  Weber  are  right,  then  the  
people  are  the  state  in  a  democracy  because  the  only  the  people  can  successfully  claim  a  monopoly  of  the  
legitimate  use  of  physical  force  within  the  given  territory  of  the  state.    
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In  this  chapter,  I  proceed  as  follows:  First,  I  discuss  the  relationship  between  
class  antagonism  and  Rome’s  capacity  for  military  expansion.4  It  would  be  easy  to  
presume  that  those  states  that  best  prevent  violent  oppression  are  those  states  that  
eschew  combative  forms  of  politics  in  favor  of  highly  collaborative  ones.  Machiavelli  
would  reject  that  claim  and  instead  point  to  the  harnessing  of  contentious  politics  as  the  
best  avenue  available  to  a  democracy  for  empowering  both  the  state  and  its  citizens.  
Nevertheless,  it  would  be  an  overstatement  to  say  that  Rome  deliberately  accentuated  
internal  political  conflicts  in  order  to  do  so.  In  fact,  the  Rome  that  Machiavelli  describes  
sought  ways  to  alleviate  the  destructive  elements  of  the  conflict  between  the  elites  and  
the  people  without  eliminating  that  conflict  entirely.  Machiavelli  claims  that  Rome’s  
expansionary  projects  were  a  means  by  which  Rome  managed  the  most  destructive  
energies  of  its  internal  conflicts,  even  as  that  expansion  was  fuelled  by  those  energies.5  
The  Rome  Machiavelli  describes  thereby  addressed  two  of  the  most  important  
requirements  for  preventing  violent  oppression  within  her  territory:  external  defense  
and  internal  stability.    
                                                                                                              
4  Having  already  discussed  what  a  well-­‐‑functioning  citizen-­‐‑army  looks  like  in  chapters  1  and  2,  I  forgo  
adding  at  length  to  that  discussion  in  this  chapter.  As  a  result,  the  primary  focus  of  this  chapter  is  the  
manner  in  which  Rome  placed  checks  on  the  ambitions  of  her  elites  and  the  way  in  which  those  checks  
related  to  her  citizen-­‐‑militia.  I  do,  however,  take  up  the  question  of  the  corruption  of  the  Roman  military  in  
section  4  of  this  chapter.  
5  Sallust’s  influential  Bellum  Catalinae  makes  the  case  that  popular  domestic  politics  and  expansionism  are  
intertwined.  For  more  on  the  influence  of  Sallust  on  Machiavelli,  see  Quentin  Skinner,  “Machiavelli’s  
Discoursi  and  the  Pre-­‐‑Humanist  origins  of  Republican  Ideas”  in  Machiavelli  and  Republicanism,  edited  by  
Gisela  Bock,  Quentin  Skinner  and  Maurizio  Viroli  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1990)  and  Ben  Fontana,  “Sallust  and  
the  Politics  of  Machiavelli,”  History  of  Political  Thought  24  (2003).  
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In  the  second  section  of  this  chapter,  I  argue  that  while  Machiavelli  admired  
Rome’s  ability  to  expand  and  thereby  alleviate  concerns  over  ambitious  elites  at  home,  
he  really  sees  Rome’s  particular  brand  of  internal  politics  as  her  most  exemplary  feature.  
To  put  the  matter  another  way,  Machiavelli’s  primary  admiration  was  of  Rome’s  ability  
to  productively  manage  contentious  politics.  Rome’s  capacity  to  expand  was  a  valuable  
by-­‐‑product  of  that  management,  but  was  not  the  primary  basis  of  Machiavelli’s  praise  
for  her  politics.6  Given  that  Rome’s  conquest  per  se  is  not  Machiavelli’s  measure  of  
Rome’s  virtues,  I  turn  in  this  section  to  the  modes  of  contentious  politics  that  
Machiavelli  saw  as  so  necessary  to  Rome’s  flourishing.7  To  that  end,  it  presents  
Machiavelli’s  judgment  of  the  way  in  which  Rome  used  her  people  to  check  the  
ambitions  of  her  elites.8  Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  popular  judgment  of  political  elites  
relates  directly  to  the  problem  of  violent  oppression  because  Machiavelli  praises  the  
people’s  capacity  for  effectively  directing  the  coercive  and  punitive  powers  of  the  state.    
In  the  third  section  of  this  chapter,  I  turn  to  Rome’s  key  institution  for  checking  
the  ambitions  of  her  elites:  the  plebian  tribunes.  Popular  judgment  and  political  violence  
were  unified  in  this  institution.  The  authority  of  the  plebian  tribunes  was  not  only  
                                                                                                              
6  Pace  Mark  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  5.  
7  This  chapter  focuses  on  Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  the  role  played  by  the  people  in  those  modes  of  
politics  while  the  next  chapter  showcases  Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  elite-­‐‑level  politics  in  Rome.  
8  According  to  Vickie  Sullivan,  there  is  also  a  religious  dimension  to  Rome’s  struggle  against  the  ambition  of  
her  elites.  Rome’s  elites  were  able  to  coopt  the  effects  of  Roman  religious  culture  to  satisfy  their  ambitions.  
According  to  her  reading,  this  political  maneuver  not  only  resulted  in  the  downfall  of  the  Roman  republic,  it  
also  produced  Christianity  as  it  existed  in  Machiavelli’s  day:  “Christian  Rome  emerged  from  ancient  Rome  
in  [Machiavelli’s]  view  because  it  was  ill  equipped  to  thwart  the  designs  of  its  ambitious  men  who  strained  
for  tyranny.”  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  6.  
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grounded  in  the  popular  capacity  to  use  violence,  it  also  leveraged  that  capacity  to  
guarantee  the  force  of  popular  judgment  in  the  policing  of  Roman  elites.  In  Machiavelli’s  
view,  the  plebian  tribunes  played  a  major  role  in  checking  corruption  in  Rome  and  
limiting  the  attempts  of  Roman  elites  to  satisfy  their  ambitions  for  greater  power,  
wealth,  and  ultimately  the  capacity  to  oppress  the  people.  
  Nevertheless,  the  plebian  tribunes  could  not  completely  thwart  those  ambitions.  
So,  in  section  4,  I  outline  the  limit  of  tribucan  power  in  checking  Roman  elites,  the  way  
in  which  Roman  elites  circumvented  checks  on  their  ambition,  and  highlight  
Machiavelli’s  diagnosis  of  the  ultimate  downfall  of  the  Roman  republic:  the  corruption  
of  her  military.  While  the  plebian  tribunes  played  a  significant  role  in  preventing  violent  
oppression  by  institutionalizing  the  people’s  capacity  to  do  violence  to  the  elites  and  
thereby  placing  a  check  on  the  ambitions  of  Roman  elites,  Rome’s  internal  conflicts  
finally  overwhelmed  her  political  order  when  the  clientelistic  linkages  that  formed  
between  its  commanders  and  rank-­‐‑and-­‐‑file  soldiers  corrupted  the  military.  Machiavelli’s  
analysis  of  Rome’s  growth  and  decay  once  again  reveals  the  importance  of  properly  
institutionalizing  mechanisms  of  violence  with  an  eye  toward  preventing  violent  
oppression  because  those  mechanisms  are  the  final  bulwark  between  a  modus  vivendi  
and  civil  war.  Institutions  like  the  plebian  tribunes  are  necessary  for  checking  the  
ambitions  of  political  elites,  but  properly  institutionalizing  mechanisms  of  violence  are  
necessary  for  keeping  those  elites  disarmed,  should  their  ambitions  go  unchecked.  
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4.1 Agonism at home and conflict abroad 
There  is  a  general  intuition  that  societies  divided  along  economic,  ethnic,  or  
religious  lines  should  and  can  adopt  constitutional  orders  that  ameliorate  those  
divisions.9  Machiavelli  rejects  this  intuition.  To  reject  internal  antagonisms  would  be  to  
radically  misunderstand  the  nature  of  politics.10  In  the  Discourses,  Machiavelli  presents  a  
Rome  that  drew  strength  and  virtue  from  her  internal  divisions.11  In  the  opening  
passages  of  that  text,  Machiavelli  tells  his  reader  that  it  is  precisely  Rome’s  class-­‐‑
antagonism  that  led  to  many  of  the  virtues  of  the  Roman  state.12  Roman  virtue,  he  
claims,  flows  from  Roman  education,  Roman  education  from  Roman  law  and,  Roman  
law  from  the  “tumults”  arising  between  Roman  classes.  (D  I.4.i)  To  eliminate  one  side  or  
the  other  of  this  agonistic  relationship  would  be  to  cut  off  good  Roman  virtue,  
education,  and  law  at  their  source,  and  thereby  cut-­‐‑off  all  of  the  positive  results  of  those  
laws.  
Machiavelli  saw  Rome  as  a  special,  imperial  kind  of  republic,  which  brought  
with  it  advantages  and  disadvantages.  In  book  1  of  The  Discourses,  Machiavelli  
                                                                                                              
9  Lijphart,  Arend,  1977,  Democracy  in  Plural  Societies:  A  Comparative  Exploration,  Yale  University  Press,  New  
Haven.  Hume,  David,  “Idea  of  a  Perfect  Commonwealth,”  in  Essays  moral,  political  and  literary,  Eds.  T.H.  
Green  and  T.H.  Grose.  London:  Longmans,  Green,  1882;  R.  E.  Goodin,  ‘Cross-­‐‑cutting  cleavages  and  social  
conflict’,  British  Journal  of  Political  Science,  5  (1975),  516-­‐‑9;  Goodin,  Robert,  “Designing  constitutions:  the  
political  constitution  of  a  mixed  commonwealth,”  Political  Studies,  44  (1996):  640.  Donald  Horowitz,  A  
Democratic  South  Africa?:  Constitutional  Engineering  in  a  Divided  Society  (Berkeley,  University  of  California  
Press,  1991),  ch.  5.  
10  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  “A  note  on  Machiavelli,”  123.  
11  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  26.  
12  Patrick  Coby  takes  Machiavelli’s  case  for  liberty  to  be  the  contributions  it  makes  to  the  growth  of  a  
republic.  Machiavelli’s  Romans,  255.  
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distinguishes  imperial  republics  such  as  the  Roman  republic  from  ‘quiet’  states  such  as  
Sparta  and  Venice,  which  were  governed  by  narrow,  aristocratic  swaths  of  their  
populations,  even  though  they  shared  the  name  of  “republic.”  (D  I.6.i-­‐‑iv)  They  did  not  
share  Rome’s  imperial  nature,  lacking  the  open  borders  and  requisite  population  in  
Sparta’s  case  and  lacking  the  required  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  in  Venice’s  case.13  The  Spartan  and  
Venetian  republics  remained  “quiet”  and  aristocratic  because,  in  Machiavelli’s  view,  the  
bulk  of  their  population  remained  relatively  impotent  in  comparison  to  the  elites  of  
those  regimes.  (D  I.6.i)  They  did  not  “tolerate”  the  “tumults”  of  Rome,  which  were  
linked  to  the  latter’s  “employ[ment]  of  the  plebs  in  war.”  (D  I.6.iii)  Machiavelli  regards  
such  arrangements  as  desirable  in  their  own  way,  but  lacking  in  imperial  potential.  “If  
the  thing  could  be  held  balanced  in  this  mode,”  he  writes  “it  would  be  the  true  political  
way  of  life  and  the  true  quiet  of  a  city.”14  (D  I.6.iv)  Nevertheless,  Machiavelli  
circumscribes  the  possibilities  for  regimes  that  pursue  “the  true  quiet  of  the  city.”  He  
regards  their  martial  limitations  as  irredeemable  shortcomings.  However  attractive  
Venetian  or  Spartan  quietude  might  seem  in  the  abstract,  Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  the  
                                                                                                              
13  Thought  not  all  republics  share  Rome’s  imperialism,  Machiavelli  does  regard  republics  as  naturally  more  
powerful  and  thus  greater  threats  than  principalities.  See,  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  52-­‐‑3;  and  Mikael  
Hörnqvist.  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  Chapter  4.  
14  While  Machiavelli  does  not  specify  here  what  he  means  by  the  “true  political  way  of  life,”  we  can  easily  
imagine  several  benefits  to  Spartan  or  Venetian  quietude.  In  the  Spartan  case,  it  meant  a  rarely  seen  
continuity  of  tradition.  The  ‘Spartan’  way  of  life  –  for  all  of  its  admirable  and  detestable  qualities  –  
maintained  an  enviable  kind  of  cultural  integrity.  In  the  Venetian  case,  it  better  afforded  its  citizens  time  for  
all  of  the  contemplative  pursuits  held  dear  by  the  ancients  and  all  of  the  commercial  pursuits  held  dear  by  
us  moderns.  And  in  a  contemporary,  consolidated  democracy,  it  would  mean  that  a  greater  percentage  of  
public  funds  could  be  directed  towards  education,  healthcare,  and  social  welfare.    
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interstate  system  speaks  to  the  necessity  of  Roman  militarism.15  Machiavelli  thinks  that  
states  that  do  not  defend  themselves  are  at  risk  of  being  conquered  by  neighboring  
states.16  Geography  and  careful  foreign  policy  can  mitigate  that  risk,  but  the  inherent  
chaos  of  the  international  system  makes  foreign  aggression  inevitable  on  a  long  enough  
timeline.  For  this  reason  alone,  states  require  some  defensive  capacity,  whether  they  rely  
on  their  own  arms  (per  Machiavelli’s  suggestion),  mercenary  arms  (as  Florence  did  in  
Machiavelli’s  day),  or  the  arms  of  others  (like  the  client  states  of  the  U.S.A.  and  the  
U.S.S.R.  during  the  Cold  War).  Machiavelli,  however,  redefines  self-­‐‑defense  as  
expansion  or  “acquisition.”17  Sparta  and  Venice  could  not,  in  Machiavelli’s  view,  engage  
in  the  defensive  expansion  that  Machiavelli  thought  the  “necessity”  of  the  international  
system  demanded.    
Sparta  and  Venice  were  not  properly  “ordered”  to  be  capable  of  expansions.  (D  
I.6.iv)  This  shortcoming  turned  out  to  be  damning  for  them,  as  it  would  be  for  any  state  
“ordered”  as  they  were:  “so  when  a  republic  that  has  been  ordered  so  as  to  be  capable  of  
maintaining  itself  does  not  expand,  and  necessity  leads  it  to  expand,  this  would  come  to  
take  away  its  foundations  and  make  it  come  to  ruin  sooner.”  (D  I.6.iv)  Sparta  and  Venice  
had  tried  to  expand  their  dominion  while  in  a  position  of  regional  leadership,  but  were  
unable  to  maintain  their  acquisitions.  (FH  I.29)  Machiavelli  seems  to  suggest  that  the  
                                                                                                              
15  Maurice  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  “A  note  on  Machiavelli,”  131.  
16  See  also  D  II.19.  
17  “But  since  all  things  are  in  motion  and  cannot  stay  steady,  they  must  either  rise  and  fall:  and  many  things  
that  reason  does  not  bring  to  you,  necessity  brings  you.”  (D  1.6.iv)  
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vicissitudes  of  power  politics  had  a  damning  impact  on  Spartan  and  Venetian  political  
institutions.  While  Machiavelli  does  not  specify  how  Spartan  and  Venetian  military  
reversals  made  them  “come  to  ruin  sooner,”  he  insists,  “expansion  is  poison  for  such  
republics.”18  (D  I.6.iv)  Presumably  his  first-­‐‑hand  experience  of  the  Florentine  defeat  at  
Prato  guides  this  unspecified  connection.  Florence  –  a  poorly  ordered  regime  –  not  only  
suffered  a  catastrophic  military  defeat  when  Spanish  forces  overwhelmed  its  militia  in  
1512,  it  also  suffered  the  collapse  of  the  Soderini  regime  and  the  restoration  of  Medici  
rule.19  Machiavelli  frequently  observes  a  correspondence  between  military  defeat  and  
the  onset  of  political  crises.20  Given  this  relationship,  Machiavelli  may  not  need  to  
chronicle  the  specific  collapses  suffered  by  Sparta  and  Venice  at  home  as  a  result  of  
defeats  abroad.  Machiavelli  needs  merely  to  signal  that  Sparta  and  Venice,  though  well  
positioned  to  defend  narrow  swathes  of  territories,  begged  for  political  crises  when  they  
attempted  to  expand.    
                                                                                                              
18  In  Discourses  II.19.ii  Machiavelli  elaborates  on  the  matter  a  little:  “in  a  thousand  modes  and  from  many  
causes  [are  such]  acquisitions  harmful”  because  they  involve  “acquir[ing]  empire  without  forces,  and  
whoever  acquires  empire  without  forces  will  be  ruined.”  While  this  elaboration  does  not  specify  the  
mechanisms  by  which  the  loss  of  empires  “acquired  without  forces”  ultimately  ruin  a  republic,  it  does  
deepen  Machiavelli’s  critique  of  relying  on  foreign  and  mercenary  arms.  Machiavelli  goes  on  in  this  chapter  
to  detail  some  of  the  ways  in  which  conquest  can  corrupt  rank-­‐‑and-­‐‑file  soldiers,  commanders,  and  militaries  
as  a  whole.  I  consider  these  issues  in  greater  detail  in  section  4  of  this  chapter.  
19  For  an  alternate  view,  see  J.G.A.  Pocock,  who  writes  that  “Florence  is  not  a  principal  object  of  reference”  in  
the  Discourses.  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  187.  
20  In  addition  to  Sparta  and  Venice,  Machiavelli  mentions  the  Roman  defeat  at  Cannae  and  the  Athenian  loss  
in  the  Peloponnesian  War  as  generating  political  catastrophes.  This  link  between  expansionism  and  political  
stability  contradicts  Pocock’s  reading  of  Machiavelli  as  deciding  “military  dynamism  was  to  be  preferred  
before  the  search  for  stability.”  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  218.  
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Elsewhere  in  the  Discourses,  Machiavelli  underscores  his  notion  of  a  
correspondence  between  stable  political  institutions  at  home  and  expansion  abroad.21  In  
I.6  Machiavelli  argues  that  the  body  politic  decays  in  the  absence  of  the  right  kind  of  
internal  conflict.22  He  writes  “If  heaven  were  so  kind  that  it  did  not  have  to  make  war,  
from  that  would  arise  the  idleness  to  make  it  either  effeminate  or  divided;  these  two  
things  together,  or  each  by  itself  would  be  the  cause  of  its  ruin.”  (D  I.6.iv)  So  even  
without  the  threat  of  invasion,  states  like  Sparta  and  Venice  face  the  danger  of  political  
corruption,  despite  the  advantages  of  their  “quietude.”  As  a  Florentine,  Machiavelli  was  
well  steeped  in  the  difficulties  of  partisan  faction  and  political  impotence.  In  the  13th  and  
14th  centuries,  divisions  between  the  Guelphs  and  the  Ghibellines  in  Florence  were  
among  the  most  pronounced  on  the  Italian  peninsula.  Following  the  Guelph  victories  at  
Campaldino  and  Caprona,  the  Florentine  Guelphs  split  into  the  ‘Black’  (pro-­‐‑papal)  and  
‘White’  (anti-­‐‑papal)  factions,  mirroring  the  original  Guelph-­‐‑Ghibelline  split.23  The  
interplay  between  these  two  sides  of  Florentine  politics  fuelled  practices  of  extra-­‐‑
institutional  and  extra-­‐‑legal  power  grabs.  Coups,  revolts,  and  assassinations,  as  well  as  
ballot-­‐‑stuffing  and  bribery  were  common  and  significant.  Florentine  factionalism  led  to  
a  particularly  violent  brand  of  domestic  politics  and  a  particularly  impotent  brand  of  
                                                                                                              
21  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  65.  
22  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  89.  
23  John  Najemy,  “A  History  of  Florence,”  89.  
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foreign  policy.  Divided  at  home,  Florence  could  not  project  power  abroad.24  In  this  
respect,  Florence  was  an  avatar  of  the  Italy  to  which  Machiavelli  refers  in  Chapter  26  of  
The  Prince:  “without  a  head,  without  order,  beaten,  despoiled,  torn,  pillaged,  and  having  
endured  ruin  of  every  sort.”    
Florence  failed  to  redirect  or  suppress  the  political  ambitions  of  her  elites.  In  
Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  the  human  psyche,  few  impulses  are  as  strong  or  as  
destructive  as  ambition.  The  word  “ambition”  appears  in  47  chapters  in  The  Discourses  
and  never  once  as  a  benign  force  (though  often  enough  as  a  force  that  has  productive  
potential).  Most  frequently,  Machiavelli  describes  it  as  a  characteristic  of  “the  great”  and  
something  that  must  be  “beaten  down  in  a  city  by  various  ways  and  various  modes”  
because  of  its  political  malignity.  (D  I.37.iii)  Ambition  can  often  tempt  those  who  have  it  
to  pursue  their  own  interests  at  the  expense  of  the  public  good.  (D  I.2.iii)  Machiavelli  
even  goes  as  far  as  to  say  that  the  ambitious  are  also  often  blinded  to  the  dangers  of  their  
actions  even  where  they  do  not  consciously  favor  themselves  over  the  public  good.  (D  
DL)  In  Florence,  the  ambition  of  the  great  led  to  a  struggle  over  control  over  Florence  
herself.25  Whatever  political  talents  Florentines  possessed,  they  most  often  directed  their  
energies  at  developing  creative  ways  of  acquiring  power  over  Florence  rather  than  
augmenting  Florence’s  power.    
                                                                                                              
24  For  an  extended  discussion  of  the  weakness  of  Florentine  foreign  policy,  see  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  
Empire.  97-­‐‑102.  
25  Najemy,  A  History  of  Florence,  63-­‐‑88.  
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Roman  expansionism  offers  a  way  of  treating  these  symptoms  of  ambition  by  
lashing  it  to  productive  use.26  In  the  absence  of  an  imperial  project,  Florentine  elites  had  
only  each  other  as  antagonists.  Rome  pursued  the  opposite  course.  It  exported  the  
products  of  its  ambitions.27  Acquiring  power  in  Rome  was  tied  to  the  augmentation  of  
Rome’s  power.  Rome’s  key  practice  was  opening  the  space  for  participation  in  that  effort  
to  as  many  of  her  citizens  as  possible.  Machiavelli  tells  us  that  Rome  was  so  successful  
because  “the  whole  city—both  the  nobles  and  the  ignoble—was  put  to  work  in  war,  so  
many  virtuous  men  emerged  in  every  age,  decorated  from  various  victories,  that  the  
people  did  not  have  cause  to  fear  any  one  of  them,  since  they  were  very  many  and  
guarded  one  another.”  (D  1.30.ii)  Success  abroad  led  to  a  degree  of  power  at  home.  But  
even  would-­‐‑be  tyrants  who  had  acquired  a  degree  of  power  at  home  were  deterred  from  
undermining  the  Roman  republic  because  equally  empowered  rivals  could  hinder  the  
activity  of  the  most  ambitious  among  them.  Roman  expansionism  thus  offered  an  outlet  
for  the  ambitions  of  its  citizens  while  simultaneously  raising  the  cost  of  engaging  in  the  
kind  of  “extraordinary”  political  maneuvers  that  fomented  the  internal  division  and  
factionalism  of  places  like  Florence.28    
                                                                                                              
26  Pocock  observes  that,  for  Machiavelli,  “Rome  is,  as  it  were,  the  “new  prince”  among  republics,  and  
Machiavelli  would  rather  study  the  new  prince  than  the  hereditary  ruler:  the  short  view  is  more  interesting  
than  the  long,  and  life  in  it  more  glorious.”  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  198.  If  Pocock  is  right  about  Rome  
corresponding  to  the  new  prince,  then  there  is  an  additional  reason  for  Machiavelli’s  elevation  of  it  above  
Sparta  and  Venice.  It  is  the  regime  most  worth  studying  because  it  is  the  regime  of  the  greatest  virtue.    
27  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  89.  
28  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  41.  
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Rome  thereby  satisfied  important  requirements  for  preventing  violent  
oppression  inherent  to  the  central  political  problem  of  violence.  By  channeling  the  
ambitions  of  her  elites  outward,  Rome  empowered  herself  in  a  way  that  obviated  threats  
from  abroad.  By  generating  a  dynamic  in  which  elites  would  “guard”  one  another,  
Rome  discouraged  those  elites  from  pursuing  the  kinds  of  activities  that  would  give  the  
people  “cause  to  fear  any  one  of  them.”  (D  1.30.ii)  It  would  be  misleading,  however,  to  
say  that  these  practices  were  Rome’s  strongest  bulwark  against  violent  oppression.  
Popular  participation  was  similarly  necessary  for  her  external  defense  and  internal  
checking  of  elite  ambition.  It  is  to  these  elements  of  the  Roman  political  order  that  I  now  
turn  –  partly  because  no  picture  of  the  Rome  that  Machiavelli  describes  would  be  
complete  without  them,  but  also  because  they  represent  for  Machiavelli  an  object  of  
greater  admiration  than  Rome’s  empire  itself.  
4.2 Political violence in the piazza and palazzo 
If  Machiavelli  is  right  that  the  only  solution  to  the  kind  of  internal  strife  that  
plagued  Florence  is  an  expansionary  one,  then  the  members  of  every  state  are  forced  to  
choose  between  two  deeply  unattractive  positions.  On  the  one  hand,  they  can  eschew  
expansion,  acquisition,  and  the  agonistic  politics  that  expansion  and  acquisition  require.  
This  position  absolves  them  of  the  sins  of  imperialism,  but  it  also  leaves  the  security  of  
the  state  to  forces  beyond  its  control.  On  the  other  hand,  they  can  pursue  a  policy  of  
expansion  as  a  means  of  survival.  To  justify  this  position,  they  might  turn  to  the  realist  
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view  of  the  interstate  system  according  to  which  zero-­‐‑sum  interactions  dominate  
interstate  relations  and  the  anarchic  nature  of  the  interstate  system  guarantees  the  use  of  
force  and  the  threat  thereof  to  resolve  conflicts.29  They  might  further  justify  this  choice  
by  picking  up  Machiavelli’s  claim  that  expansionary  projects  also  ameliorate  civic  strife  
and  are  necessary  for  the  ongoing  health  of  the  state.  Indeed,  much  of  Machiavelli’s  
argument  in  the  opening  chapters  of  the  Discourses  characterizes  this  second,  
“Imperialism-­‐‑as-­‐‑survival”  position  as  both  prudent  and  justified.30  
That  said,  the  “Imperialism-­‐‑as-­‐‑survival”  position  distorts  Machiavelli’s  appraisal  
of  Roman  expansion  and  his  admiration  thereof.  There  is  more  to  Machiavelli’s  story  
than  what  Mark  Hulliung  calls  “that  singularly  expansionary,  singularly  successful  
Roman  republic.”31  If  the  survival  of  a  continuous,  stable  constitutional  order  were  
Machiavelli’s  only  interest,  then  Machiavelli  would  have  elevated  the  Spartan  regime  
over  the  Roman  ones  (the  monarchy,  republic,  and  empire,  respectively)  given  that  the  
former’s  lifetime  exceeded  each  of  the  latters’  by  hundreds  of  years.  Similarly,  if  he  had  
taken  conquest  per  se  as  the  measure  of  a  secure  state,  then  Machiavelli  would  have  
praised  the  late  Roman  republic  over  that  of  the  3rd  century  BCE  and  even,  perhaps,  the  
                                                                                                              
29  See  John  Mearshimer,  “The  False  Promise  of  International  Institutions.”  International  Security  19,  no.3  
(1994):  5–49.  For  a  related  view,  see,  Kenneth  Waltz,  Theory  of  International  Politics.  (Reading,  MA:  Addison-­‐‑
Wesley.  1979).  
30  Moreover,  most  Florentines  would  have  seen  imperialism  as  compatible  with  republicanism  insofar  as  
republicanism  entailed  a  legal  relationship  of  domination  and  submission  between  those  who  ruled  and  
those  were  ruled  in  turn.  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  41.  
31  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  5.  
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early  imperial  era  over  that  of  the  late  Roman  republic.  Instead,  Machiavelli  sees  the  late  
republican  and  early  imperial  eras  as  fundamentally  corrupt.  32  Rome  the  ‘world-­‐‑
conqueror’  does  not  capture  Machiavelli’s  imagination.33  If  anything,  he  sees  the  
conquests  of  the  late  Roman  republic  as  merely  cashing  in  on  the  virtue  of  the  early  
Roman  republic.34  The  Roman  Empire  was  a  by-­‐‑product  of  Roman  virtue,  not  the  
measure  of  it.  It  is  the  politics  of  Rome  up  to  the  time  of  the  Gracchi  that  attracted  
Machiavelli.  That  political  order  was  able  to  utilize  the  strengths  of  her  elites  and  people  
alike  in  a  way  that  made  her  more  praiseworthy,  on  Machiavelli’s  view,  than  any  other  
state  with  which  he  was  familiar.  Given  the  necessities  of  political  life,  the  Roman  
politics  up  to  the  time  of  the  Gracchi  represented  for  Machiavelli  the  best  of  all  possible  
political  worlds.  
Machiavelli  praises  that  Rome  over  Sparta  and  Venice  because  she  “tolerate[d]  
the  enmities  that  arise  between  the  people  and  the  Senate,  taking  them  as  an  
inconvenience  necessary  to  arrive  at  Roman  greatness.”  (D  I.6.iv)  The  competition  
between  the  people  and  the  elite  in  Rome  could  have  been  rendered  latent  as  it  was  in  
Sparta  and  Venice  by  excluding  the  people  from  key  political  spaces.  But,  for  
                                                                                                              
32  This  fact  leads  me  to  doubt  Patrick  Coby’s  claim  that  Machiavelli  valued  Roman  spiritedness  to  the  point  
where  empire  and  expansion  trumped  love  of  liberty,  even  though  that  spiritedness  fuelled  all  three.  Coby,  
Machiavelli’s  Romans,  263-­‐‑266.  
33  Leo  Strauss  points  out  that  Machiavelli’s  dream  of  Italian  unity  and  independence  may  have  shaped  the  
Discourses.  For  Machiavelli,  he  notes,  “Rome  reached  her  ultimate  greatness  when  she  ruled  (most  of)  Italy  
and  had  not  yet  embarked  on  foreign  conquests.  Hence  the  full  title  of  the  Discourses  draws  our  attention  to  
a  united  and  fee  Italy,  freed  and  united  by  a  hegemonial  republic,  be  it  Rome  or  Florence,  and  not  by  a  
prince.”  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  89.  
34  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  5.  
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Machiavelli,  it  is  better  to  tolerate  active  conflict  between  the  people  and  the  elite  by  
forcing  both  classes  to  occupy  key  political  spaces  jointly.35  The  joint  occupation  of  key  
political  spaces  resulted,  according  to  Machiavelli’s  interpretation,  in  Roman  greatness.  
It  produced  her  ability  to  project  strength  abroad  and  cultivate  virtue  at  home.36  Abroad,  
Rome  effected  this  joint  occupation  by  having  a  large-­‐‑citizen  army  as  the  popular  
element  and  a  complex  system  for  the  selection  of  commands  as  the  elite  element.  At  
home,  given  Rome’s  commitment  to  its  citizen  army,  the  people  had  a  de  facto  veto  
against  the  Senate  and  Rome’s  elite  magistracies,  which  the  people  parlayed  into  de  jure  
veto  power  via  the  tribunate.  The  plebian  tribunes  shifted  the  institutional  balance  of  
power  away  from  the  senate  and  magistracies  such  that  the  elites  of  Rome  and  the  
people  of  Rome  were  forced,  albeit  agonistically,  to  cooperate.  At  the  same  time,  Rome’s  
commitment  to  popular  judgment  in  judicial  proceedings  had  the  salutary  effect  of  
checking  the  ambitions  of  Roman  elites.  An  appreciation  for  these  elements  of  the  
Roman  political  order  is  at  the  core  of  Machiavelli’s  admiration  for  it.37  
There  are  two  levels  to  Machiavelli’s  admiration  for  popular  participation  in  
Roman  politics.  The  first  level  makes  him  consistent  with  Aristotle,  Livy,  and  Polybius,  
                                                                                                              
35  For  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  this  principle  is  at  the  core  of  Machiavelli’s  republicanism:  “Machiavelli  was  a  
republican  because  he  had  found  a  principle  of  communion.  By  putting  conflict  and  struggle  at  the  origins  of  
social  power,  he  did  not  mean  to  say  that  agreement  was  impossible;  he  meant  to  underline  the  condition  for  
a  power  which  does  not  mystify,  that  is,  participation  in  a  common  situation.”  (Emphasis  mine)  “A  Note  on  
Machiavelli,  126.  See  also  Leo  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  95,  103;  Hannah  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  
87.  
36  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  51.  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  81.  
37  John  P.  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  65.  
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all  of  whom  influenced  Renaissance  political  thought  in  deep  ways.38  In  chapter  2  of  
book  1,  Machiavelli  imports  Polybius’s  description  of  a  regime  cycle  in  which  virtuous  
principalities  become  corrupted  and  give  way  to  virtuous  aristocracies.  These  
aristocracies  in  turn  get  corrupted  and  give  way  to  virtuous  republics,  who  then  fail  in  
turn  and  become  –  via  some  talented  demagogue  –  a  principality  once  again.  (D  I.2.iii)  
The  thinking  here  is  that  any  unmixed  form  of  rule  (of  the  one,  the  few,  or  the  many)  has  
an  inherent  instability.  The  empowered  class  always  eventually  oversteps  its  mandate  to  
rule  if  it  rules  alone  and  then  begins  ruling  in  its  own  interest.  Mixed  regimes  are  
designed  to  empower  each  part  so  that  the  interests  of  each  are  tended.  They  are  also  
designed  to  capture  the  perceived  virtues  of  each  part:  the  decisiveness  and  consistency  
of  the  one,  the  deliberation  and  prudence  of  the  few,  and  the  passion  and  authenticity  of  
the  many.  Machiavelli  takes  a  somewhat  different  view  of  those  talents  from  the  
traditional  advocates  of  mixed  regimes,  but  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  Machiavelli  
supports  a  mixed  regime  because  the  pooling  of  interests  and  talents  from  various  
classes  has  a  stabilizing  and  empowering  effect  on  the  regime  as  a  whole.39  
The  second  level  of  Machiavelli’s  support  for  a  mixed  regime  will  sound  familiar  
to  readers  of  The  Federalist  Papers.  Federalist  #51  reads:  
                                                                                                              
38  Coby,  Machiavelli’s  Romans,  253.  For  Maurizio,  Machiavelli’s  espousal  of  an  aggressive  foreign  policy  is  the  
result  of  Machiavelli’s  wanting  to  put  an  Aristotelian  vision  of  political  life  into  practice  in  the  context  of  the  
power-­‐‑politics  that  Machiavelli  saw  as  characteristic  of  inter  and  intra-­‐‑state  relations.  See  “Machiavelli  and  
the  Republican  Idea  of  Politics.”  in  Machiavelli  and  Republicanism,  eds.  Gisela  Bock,  Quentin  Skinner  and  
Maurizio  Viroli  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1990).  
39  Hannah  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  85.  
  154  
Ambition  must  be  made  to  counteract  ambition…  …you  must  first  enable  the  
government  to  control  the  governed;  and  in  the  next  place  oblige  it  to  control  
itself.  A  dependence  on  the  people  is,  no  doubt  the  primary  control  on  the  
government;  but  experience  has  taught  mankind  the  necessity  of  auxiliary  
precautions.40  
  
Like  Machiavelli,  Madison  observes  that  dependence  on  the  people  is  a  valuable  check  
on  government  abuse,  but  a  republic  must  rely  on  additional,  internal  limits  on  power.  
Madison  is  here  espousing  a  constitutional  arrangement  whereby  powers  are  divided  
along  branches  of  government  and  members  of  each  branch  develop  an  interest  in  
“defending  their  turf,”  so  to  speak.  If  successful,  no  single  branch  could  overuse  its  
given  power.  In  I.2,  Machiavelli  takes  a  similar  view:    
So  those  who  prudently  order  laws…  …choose  one  that  shares  in  all  [classes],  
judging  it  firmer  and  more  stable;  for  the  one  guards  the  other,  since  in  one  and  
the  same  city  there  are  the  principality,  the  aristocrats,  and  the  popular  
government.”  (D  1.2.v)  
  
Machiavelli’s  divisions  occur  along  class  lines,  rather  than  according  to  the  powers  
themselves,  but  this  difference  does  not  overshadow  the  most  important  similarity  
between  the  two  positions.  Ambitious  Romans  checked  ambitious  Romans.  They  kept  
themselves  “so  upright”  out  of  such  a  deep  fear  of  appearing  ambitious  “that  when  one  
came  to  the  dictatorship  he  carried  away  from  it  the  greater  glory  the  sooner  he  laid  it  
down.”  (D  I.31.ii,  emphasis  mine)  Roman  political  order,  as  Machiavelli  describes  it,  so  
strongly  discouraged  abuses  of  power  that  turning  one’s  ambitions  to  virtuous  behavior  
                                                                                                              
40  Alexander  Hamilton,  James  Madison,  John  Jay,  The  Federalist  papers,  ed.  Clinton  Rossiter,  (New  York,  N.Y.:  
Signet  Classic,  2003),  319.  
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became  the  default  strategy  of  rational  roman  politicians.  Herein  lies  Rome’s  deepest  
attraction  for  one  accustomed  to  Florentine  politics,  where  unchecked  ambition  led  to  
the  destruction  of  civil  order.    
     The  key  practice  that  created  this  strategic  landscape  was  Rome’s  use  of  the  
people  to  govern  the  distribution  of  punishments  for  accidental  misuses  and  deliberate  
abuses  of  power  alike.  “To  those  who  are  posted  in  a  city  as  a  guard  of  freedom,”  
Machiavelli  writes,  “one  cannot  give  a  more  useful  and  necessary  authority  than  that  of  
being  able  to  accuse  citizens  to  the  people,  or  to  some  magistrate  or  council.”  (D  I.7.i)  
The  commonplace  critique  of  punishment  meted  out  by  the  people  is  that  the  people  
tend  to  adopt  a  ‘mob-­‐‑mentality’  and  will  use  force  in  an  undirected  and  uninformed  
manner.  41  Machiavelli  even  attributes  this  view  to  Livy.  (D  I.58.i)  However,  Machiavelli  
does  not  subscribe  to  it  so  long  as  the  right  set  of  laws  and  institutions  govern  the  
punishment  meted  out  by  the  people.42    
   In  defense  of  this  characterization  of  popular  judgment,  Machiavelli  brings  up  
the  example  of  class-­‐‑conflict  in  Capua.43  Just  after  the  Roman  defeat  at  Cannae  during  
the  Second  Punic  War,  the  Capuan  people  and  senate  found  themselves  deeply  divided.  
The  city’s  chief  magistrate,  Pacuvius  Calanus,  feared  that  the  division  of  the  people  and  
                                                                                                              
41  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  68-­‐‑72.  Leo  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  127.  
42  In  instances  where  no  such  mechanisms  exist  the  resulting  “calumnies”  are  as  bad  for  the  health  of  the  
regime  as  public  accusations  are  salutary.  (D  I.7-­‐‑8)  
43  Mansfield  comes  to  the  opposite  conclusion.  He  takes  Machiavelli’s  discussion  here  to  be  an  “invitation  on  
how  to  deceive  the  plebs,  elaborated  with  instructions  on  how  to  do  so.”  Machiavelli’s  New  Modes  and  Orders,  
(Chicago:  Univ.  of  Chicago  Press,  2001)  143.  
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the  senate  would  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  the  senate  and  capitulation  to  Hannibal’s  
forces.44  To  reconcile  the  people  and  the  senate,  Pacuvius  engineered  a  political  trial  of  
sorts.  For  each  senator  that  the  people  wished  to  depose  and  execute,  Pacuvius  asked  the  
people  to  nominate  a  replacement  from  among  their  ranks.  Machiavelli  reports  that  each  
pairwise  comparison  failed  to  yield  an  exchange  that  the  people  would  find  favorable.  
The  people  of  Capua  had  been  angry  enough  with  its  senate  to  desire  rash  action,  but  
when  Pacuvius  put  the  people  into  a  deliberative  mode  they  reconciled  themselves  with  
the  senate.      
     For  Machiavelli,  the  people  are  effective  judges  of  the  elite  provided  that  their  
judgment  is  properly  structured.45  They  do  not  rush  headlong  into  mob-­‐‑like  modes  of  
proceeding  if  constrained  to  consider  the  matter  at  hand  from  the  proper  angle.46  The  
Capuan  example  demonstrates  the  mechanism  that  Machiavelli  thinks  is  at  work  in  
making  this  so.  He  brings  up  the  Capuan  example  in  a  chapter  entitled  “However  
Deceived  in  Generalities,  Men  Are  Not  Deceived  in  Particulars.”  (D  I.47.T)  What  he  
means  by  deception  in  generality  and  deception  in  particulars  maps  very  neatly  onto  a  
proverb  that  he  quotes  near  the  end  of  that  chapter:  The  people  “have  one  mind  in  the  
piazza  and  another  in  the  palazzo.”  (D  I.47.iii)  Political  problems  –  and  the  means  for  
                                                                                                              
44  Livy  has  him  as  Pacuvius  Calavus.  
45  Patrick  Coby  points  out  four  additional  “qualities  exhibited  by  the  people  that  earn  it  this  place  of  honor  
in  Machiavelli’s  political  thought:  gratitude,  constancy,  prudence,  and  trustworthiness.”  Machiavelli’s  
Romans,  254.  
46  Hannah  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  87.  
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addressing  them  –  appear  differently  when  one  occupies  the  “palazzo”  (i.e.,  rules)  or  the  
“piazza”  (i.e.,  is  a  subject  of  rule).  Where  people  might  take  one  view  of  a  particular  
issue  from  the  piazza  while  thinking  about  it  in  general  terms,  entering  the  palazzo  to  
make  and  execute  a  decision  changes  that  view.  Machiavelli  writes,  
Considering  all  that  has  been  discoursed  above,  one  sees  how,  seeing  that  a  
generality  deceives  them,  one  can  soon  open  the  eyes  of  the  peoples  by  finding  a  
mode  by  which  they  have  to  descend  to  particulars,  as  did  Pacuvius  in  Capua  
and  the  Senate  in  Rome.  (D  I.47.iii)  
  
Pacuvius  asked  the  people,  in  effect,  to  figuratively  “enter  the  palazzo”  when  he  asked  
them  to  replace  each  senator  with  one  of  their  own.  Forced  into  the  proper  mindset,  the  
people  saw  the  challenges  faced  by  and  the  behaviors  of  the  senate  from  a  different  
angle.  For  Machiavelli,  the  perceived  topography  of  any  given  problem  changes  based  
on  one’s  position  in  the  political  landscape.  In  some  ways,  this  idea  echoes  the  spatial  
metaphor  Machiavelli  uses  in  the  dedicatory  preface  of  The  Prince,  wherein  he  claims  
that  the  prince  needs  the  perspective  of  the  people  (who  are  ‘down  low’)  to  properly  
understand  the  nature  of  princes  (who  are  ‘up  high’)  and  vice  versa.  The  same  problem  
bedevils  republics.  Where  the  people  are  in  a  position  to  confront  political  problems  as  
decision-­‐‑makers,  and  not  just  subjects,  confrontation  with  the  particulars  of  the  matter  
aids  and  improves  their  judgment.47  In  the  Capuan  episode,  the  people  reject  the  use  of  
violent  measures  when  asked  to  deliberate  on  their  occupation  of  the  ‘palazzo.’  
                                                                                                              
47  Hannah  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  88.  
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   The  trick  for  a  republic  is  structuring  political  participation  –  as  a  matter  of  
political  order  –  in  such  a  way  as  to  force  the  people  to  descend  to  particulars.48  In  taking  
up  the  question  of  the  relative  political  decision-­‐‑making  capacities  of  the  people  and  of  
princes,  Machiavelli  uses  fairly  harsh  language  in  describing  the  conditions  for  virtuous  
decision-­‐‑making  by  the  people.  He  writes,  “if,  thus,  one  is  reasoning  about  a  prince  
obligated  to  the  laws  and  about  a  people  fettered  by  them,  more  virtue  will  always  be  
seen  in  the  people  than  in  the  prince.”  (D  I.58.vi)  Machiavelli  describes  laws  in  this  
context  as  fetters  (and  later  as  shackles).  When  subject  to  these  fetters  and  shackles,  the  
people  exhibits  greater  virtue  than  a  prince  similarly  constrained.49  And  when  
unshackled  and  unfettered,  a  people  makes  fewer  errors  and  is  more  easily  disabused  of  
those  errors  than  a  tyrant.  When  degrees  of  legal  constraint  are  held  constant  across  
cases,  democratic  decision-­‐‑making  has  the  edge  in  Machiavelli’s  eyes.  
   Democratic  regimes  that  would  minimize  violent  oppression  must  devise  a  set  of  
institutional  constraints  (shackles  and  fetters)  that  recruits  the  judgment  of  the  people  in  
checking  the  elite’s  ambitions  that  otherwise  would  lead  to  projects  of  oppression.  
Machiavelli  sees  the  people,  coupled  with  the  proper  institutional  constraints,  as  the  best  
“guard  of  freedom,”  They  do  not  share  the  elite  humor  for  oppression  and  so  will  check  
oppressive  practices,  but  –  as  demonstrated  by  the  Capuan  episode  –  they  do  not  
                                                                                                              
48  For  an  extended  discussion  of  these  structures,  see  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy.  Chs.  3-­‐‑5.  
49  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  205.  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  33.  
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exercise  violence  with  the  mob  mentality  ascribed  to  them  by  their  most  strident  critics.  
The  people,  in  Machiavelli’s  view,  are  harsh  judges  by  virtue  of  their  desire  for  non-­‐‑
oppression  and  can  become  fair-­‐‑minded  by  virtue  of  the  right  set  of  institutional  
constraints.  
4.3 The tribunes as a check on elite ambition 
     Rome  institutionalized  popular  engagement  through  a  variety  of  practices,  but  
the  tribunate  stands  out  as  the  most  important  “shackle”  of  the  people  for  the  purposes  
of  this  discussion.  Machiavelli  follows  both  Livy  and  Polybius  in  observing  that  the  
plebian  tribunes  represented  the  popular  element  of  Roman  political  order.50  The  latter  
regards  the  tribunes  as  especially  important  both  as  a  check  on  the  constitution’s  
monarchical  (i.e.,  consular)  and  aristocratic  (i.e.,  senatorial)  tendencies  as  well  as  part  of  
the  mixed  nature  of  Rome’s  constitution.51  Indeed,  all  three  thinkers  see  the  Roman  
constitution  as  only  reaching  full  maturity  after  the  creation  of  the  plebian  tribunes  in  
494  BCE.  While  some  of  the  institutions  that  preceded  its  creation  –  like  the  Consuls  and  
the  Roman  army  –  were  obviously  aimed  at  minimizing  violent  oppression,  the  plebian  
tribunes  might  have  the  deepest  relationship  to  it  insofar  as  they  both  empowered  the  
                                                                                                              
50  D  I.3.iii;  Livy,  The  History  of  Rome,  Books  1-­‐‑5,  trans.  Valerie  M.  Warrior,  (Indianapolis,  IN:  Hackett  Pub.  
2006),  123;  Polybius,  The  Histories.  Trans.  W.  R.  Paton,  (New  York:  G.P.  Putnam’s  Sons,  1922)  Book  VI,  
chapter  5.  
51  Pocock  dissents,  claiming,  “the  decisive  step  was  taken  early  and  accounts  for  the  establishment  of  the  
consulate  at  the  expulsion  of  the  kings.”  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  195.  
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people  to  check  the  ambitions  of  the  elites  and  reflected  the  popular  authority  to  use  
violence.  
   The  plebian  tribunes  were  created  when,  in  the  early  years  of  the  Roman  
republic,  Rome  failed  to  make  citizen  participation  in  the  army  feasible  despite  its  heavy  
reliance  on  citizen  participation.  Citizens  conscripted  for  war  would  often  fall  into  debt  
as  a  result  of  their  participation  in  a  given  campaign.  To  protest  this  usage  in  war,  the  
plebs  stopped  obeying  sentences  against  them  in  civil  court,  discontinued  participation  
in  military  action,  closed  shops,  and  “seceded”  to  the  Mons  Sacer  three  miles  outside  the  
city.  
   The  compromise  that  ended  the  secession  –  the  creation  of  the  plebian  tribunes  –  
was  born  of  the  recognition  of  the  authority  of  the  Roman  people  to  use  violence  against  
political  elites.  Each  tribune  was  considered  “sacrosanct.”52  That  sacrosanctity  was  
enforced  by  the  plebian  oath  to  kill  any  person  who  interfered  with  the  work  of  the  
tribunes.53  Backed  by  the  plebeian  oath  to  enforce  his  sacrosanctity,  a  tribune  could  
interrupt  the  creation  of  a  law  in  the  senate  or  the  implementation  of  a  law  by  a  
magistrate  by  physically  interfering  with  those  proceedings.  Via  the  practice  of  
“intercessio,”  the  tribune  literally  interposed  his  person  in  the  senate  or  elsewhere  to  
generate  the  legal  equivalent  of  a  veto  against  the  exercise  of  state  power.54  The  tribunes  
                                                                                                              
52  Andrew  Lintott,  The  Constitution  of  the  Roman  Republic.  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press.  1999),  121.  
53  Lintott,  The  Constitution  of  the  Roman  Republic,  121.  
54  Lintott,  The  Constitution  of  the  Roman  Republic,  123.  
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could  not,  however,  use  this  practice  once  a  law  had  already  been  enacted,  at  which  
point  it  had  taken  on  the  authority  of  the  Roman  people.  As  the  representatives  of  the  
people,  the  tribunes  could  not  contradict  popular  authority.  The  only  instances  of  appeal  
that  fell  within  the  ambit  of  the  tribunes  were  those  of  “auxilium,”  wherein  a  tribune  
could  challenge  a  magistrate’s  finding  against  a  plebian  in  court  (including  capital  
cases).55  Again,  the  principal  mechanism  of  the  tribunes  action  was  the  (threat  of)  
interposing  his  body  between  the  bearer  of  state  power  and  the  plebian  subject  of  that  
power  while  enjoying  the  protection  of  the  plebian  oath  to  kill  anyone  interfering  with  
the  tribune  in  his  work  as  advocate  for  the  plebs.  The  threat  of  violence  that  guaranteed  
the  power  of  the  tribunes  was  thus  limited  in  its  scope.  Nevertheless,  the  threat  of  
violence  against  those  who  interfered  with  the  tribunes  was  sufficient  to  empower  them  
to  policing  the  patricians  –  and  the  state  as  a  whole  –  on  behalf  of  the  plebs.    
   For  Machiavelli,  the  value  of  the  plebian  tribunes  was  the  check  they  placed  on  
the  ambition  of  Roman  elites  while  simultaneously  empowering  and  organizing  the  
Roman  plebs.  In  I.3,  Machiavelli  observes  that  the  tribunes  took  the  place  of  the  Tarquins  
as  the  institutional  threat  against  elites  whose  ambitions  would  inevitably  lead  to  
projects  of  oppression.  Under  the  Tarquins,  elites  were  afraid  to  act  with  impunity  for  
fear  of  retribution  from  above.  The  de  facto  “necessity”  (as  Machiavelli  calls  it)  that  
                                                                                                              
55  Lintott,  The  Constitution  of  the  Roman  Republic,  125.  
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Roman  elites  faced  under  the  Tarquins  was  eventually  institutionalized  with  the  
creation  of  the  tribunes,  who  instilled  fear  in  the  Roman  elites  from  below.56  
     Simultaneously,  the  tribunes  gave  the  people  a  “head,”  thereby  solving  the  
collective  action  problems  that  plague  large  bodies  of  individuals.57  In  a  chapter  entitled  
“The  Plebs  Together  Is  Mighty,  by  Itself  Weak,”  Machiavelli  argues  that  a  “multitude  so  
excited,  wishing  to  escape  certain  dangers,  has  at  once  to  make  from  itself  a  head  to  
correct  it,  to  hold  it  united,  to  think  about  its  defense,  as  did  the  Roman  plebs  when  it…  
…made  twenty  tribunes.”  58  (I.57.i)  In  political  contests,  powerful  individuals  and  small,  
well-­‐‑organized  groups  have  an  advantage  vis.  large  groups  that  suffer  from  problems  of  
internal  cohesion.  Machiavelli  advises  his  reader  that  “by  using  a  little  industry,  [a  
powerful  individual]  will  be  able  to  disunite  the  very  many  and  to  weaken  the  body  that  
was  mighty.”  59  (D  III.11.i  )  A  large  group,  motivated  by  a  shared  passion  or  desire,  has  
but  a  short  time  to  act  before  the  free-­‐‑rider  problem  begins  to  cripple  it.  Machiavelli  
                                                                                                              
56  For  a  discussion  on  the  role  of  “terror”  in  the  founding  of  a  state  see  Leo  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  
167.  
57  Mancur  Olson,  The  logic  of  Collective  Action:  Public  Goods  and  the  Theory  of  Groups.  Cambridge,  Mass:  
Harvard  University  Press.  
58  To  adopt  a  way  of  talking  about  the  matter  from  The  Prince,  one  could  say  that  the  tribunes  functioned  as  
the  people’s  (civically  elected)  princes.  Likewise,  an  analogy  might  be  borrowed  from  the  Art  of  War  insofar  
as  the  tribunes  functioned  as  the  equivalent  of  commanders  in  an  army.  Armies,  Machiavelli  tells  us  in  III.13  
of  The  Discourses,  exhibit  a  symbiotic  relationship  between  commanders  and  rank-­‐‑and-­‐‑file  soldiers.  The  one  
without  the  other  should  not  ultimately  be  feared  by  its  adversaries.  Virtuous  commanders  can  train  
virtuous  soldiers,  and  virtuous  soldiers  can  locate  and  elect  virtuous  commanders  (though  they  cannot  
create  them),  but  the  window  for  the  former  remains  open  much  longer  than  the  latter.  “Nonetheless”  
Machiavelli  observes,  “a  good  army  without  a  good  head  usually  becomes  insolent  and  dangerous,  as  the  
army  of  Macedon  became  after  the  death  of  Alexander.”  (D  III.13.iii)  
59  It’s  worth  noting  that  Machiavelli  brings  this  principle  up  in  the  context  of  discussing  the  Roman  elites’  
successful  effort  to  disunite  the  college  of  the  tribunes  itself.  
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explains  the  psychology  of  the  matter  when  he  observes,  “when  the  spirits  of  men  are  
cooled  a  little  and  each  sees  he  has  to  return  to  his  home,  they  begin  to  doubt  themselves  
and  to  think  of  their  safety.”  (D  1.57.i)  The  only  way  to  overcome  this  problem  is  to  
create  an  institution  that  is  a  de  jure  distillation  of  the  de  facto  power  of  the  people  on  
the  one  hand,  and  is  capable  of  keeping  the  people  united  and  engaged  on  the  other.60  
The  plebian  tribunes  had  both  features.  The  tribunes  institutionalized  the  outrage  felt  by  
the  plebians  during  the  First  Secession  to  the  Mons  Sacer.  The  threat  of  violence  from  
below,  entrenched  in  the  plebian  oath  to  enforce  the  sacrosanctity  of  the  tribunes,  
created  an  ongoing  means  by  which  the  Roman  people  could  subvert  the  policies  of  
Roman  elites  through  their  tribucan  representatives.61      
   The  tribunes’  equally  important  means  of  checking  Roman  elites,  however,  lay  in  
their  capacity  to  bring  public  accusations  against  prominent  Roman  citizens.  In  I.7  of  The  
Discourses,  Machiavelli  writes,  “to  those  who  are  posted  in  a  city  as  guard  of  its  freedom  
one  cannot  give  a  more  useful  and  necessary  authority  than  that  of  being  able  to  accuse  
citizens  to  the  people,  or  some  magistrate  or  council,  when  they  sin  against  the  free  
state.”  (D  I.7.i)  This  mode  of  public  accusation  had,  according  to  Machiavelli,  the  dual  
effect  of  deterring  or  weeding  out  most  corrupt  politicians  while  also  channeling  the  
                                                                                                              
60  Hannah  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  81.  
61  Hannah  Pitkin  points  out  that  citizen  “virtú  emanates  from  below”  in  Machiavelli’s  vision  of  a  well-­‐‑
functioning  republic.  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  82.  
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ambitions  of  the  people  into  a  politically  productive  and  legally  endorsed  practice.62  The  
choice  between  checking  corrupt  nobles  through  “extraordinary”  modes  (i.e.,  
conspiracies,  assassinations,  mobs)  and  “ordinary”  ones  (i.e.,  trials)  is  easy  for  
Machiavelli  to  make.  The  latter  is  preferable  because  “the  execution  is  done  without  
private  forces  and  without  foreign  forces,  which  are  the  ones  that  ruin  a  free  way  of  life;  but  
it  is  done  with  public  forces  and  orders,  which  have  their  particular  limits  and  do  not  lead  
beyond  to  something  that  may  ruin  the  republic.”  (D  I.7.i,  emphasis  mine)  Public  accusations  
channel  the  threat  of  violence  from  below  in  a  way  that  does  not  destabilize  the  regime  
as  a  whole  because  they  do  not  trigger  the  use  of  private  or  foreign  arms  or  any  other  
“extraordinary”  modes.63  Machiavelli  condemns  private  or  foreign  arms  because  they  
“ruin  a  free  way  of  life,”  which  –  he  reveals  in  his  praise  of  “public  forces  and  orders”  –  
means  having  no  “particular  limits.”  Minimizing  violent  oppression  relies  upon  uses  of  
violence  that  have  such  limits.  Machiavelli  associates  these  limits  with  public  forces  and  
orders  –  at  least  as  they  were  institutionalized  in  Rome.  If  Machiavelli’s  view  of  tribucan  
power  is  accurate,  then  the  power  of  that  institution  to  accuse  elites  helped  to  minimize  
projects  of  oppression  without  becoming  a  source  of  oppression  itself.  
   An  episode  where  the  absence  of  popular  judgment  through  tribucan  policing  
led  to  crisis  in  the  Roman  republic  confirms  the  importance  of  this  part  of  the  Roman  
                                                                                                              
62  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  67.  
63  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  117.  
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political  order.  In  452  BCE,  ten  Roman  citizens,  led  by  Appius  Claudius  Crassus  were  
appointed  to  undertake  a  project  of  Roman  legal  reform  and  codification.  Notably,  all  
other  Roman  magistracies  were  suspended  while  the  decemvirate  worked,  giving  these  
citizens  the  power  of  administering  legal  judgment  and  punishment  up  to  and  including  
capital  sentences.  Neither  the  Senate  nor  the  tribunes  could  interfere.  The  members  of  
the  decemvirate  were  supposed  to  assume  office  in  451  BCE  and  serve  for  that  year  
alone.  When  their  term  of  service  ended,  the  decemviri  did  deliver  their  proposed  legal  
reforms  to  the  Comitia  Centuriata  –  one  of  Rome’s  three  voting  assemblies  –  but  also  
requested  and  received  an  extension  of  their  office  for  another  year  to  add  to  the  existing  
legal  reforms.  Machiavelli  condemns  this  reauthorization  because  it  resulted  in  the  
transformation  of  the  Decemvirate  in  to  a  tyrannical  body.  He  writes,  “finding  
themselves  alone,  without  consuls,  without  tribunes,  without  appeal  to  the  people,  and  
because  of  this  not  having  anyone  to  observe  them,  they  were  able  to  become  insolent  in  
the  second  year,  moved  by  the  ambition  of  Appius.”  (I.35.i,  emphasis  mine)  Like  those  
who  were  appointed  dictator  in  Rome  from  time  to  time,  the  decemviri  were  granted  
broad  powers.  Unlike  the  dictatorship,  however,  the  decemvirate  worked  in  the  absence  
of  the  tribunes  that  served  as  institutional  checks  on  politicians.64  With  the  exception  of  
the  tribunes,  dictators  assumed  authority  over  other  Roman  magistracies;  the  
                                                                                                              
64  For  an  extended  discussion  of  the  matter,  see  Harvey  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  New  Modes  and  Orders,  117-­‐‑
118.  
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decemvirate  suspended  those  magistracies  altogether.  For  Machiavelli,  this  institutional  
change  led  to  a  change  in  the  behavior  of  the  decemviri  with  respect  to  those  who  served  
as  dictators.  While  Machiavelli  praises  the  dictatorship  in  I.34,  he  describes  the  
decemvirate  as  “that  magistracy  [which]  came  to  be  altogether  prince  of  Rome.”  (D  
I.40.ii)  The  abuses  of  the  decemviri  –  Appius  in  particular  –  led  in  turn  to  the  second  
secession  of  the  plebs  to  the  Mons  Sacer,  the  ending  of  which  required  the  codification  of  
the  decemvirate’s  legal  reforms,  the  abolition  of  the  decemvirate  itself,  and  the  
reestablishment  of  the  tribunes.  
   The  absence  of  tribucan  policing  led  to  the  abuses  of  the  Decemvirate.  As  such,  
Machiavelli  uses  it  to  illustrate  his  claim  that    
The  power  of  the  tribunes  of  the  plebs  in  the  city  of  Rome  was  great,  and  it  was  
necessary,  as  has  been  discoursed  of  by  us  many  times,  because  otherwise  one  
would  not  have  been  able  to  place  a  check  on  the  ambition  of  the  nobility,  which  would  
have  corrupted  that  republic  a  long  time  before  it  corrupted  itself.  (D  III.11.i,  emphasis  
mine)  
  
The  tribunes  were  adept  at  frustrating  the  ambitions  of  the  nobles.  Their  intercessional  
powers  were  a  direct,  institutional  check  on  laws  that  would  be  harmful  to  the  Roman  
republic  in  general  and  the  plebeians  in  particular.  Their  use  of  the  people  as  judges  of  
the  behavior  of  Roman  elites  resulted  in  a  process  by  which  the  people  identified  and  
removed  corrupt  and  oppressive  figures  from  office.  They  were  a  vital  means  by  which  
Rome  prevented  violent  oppression  of  her  citizens.  That  treatment  required  a  popular  
check  on  elite  ambitions.  The  tribunes  provided  that  check  by  being  the  “shackle”  that  
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focused  and  concentrated  both  popular  judgment  and  the  threat  of  violence  into  a  
bulkhead  against  elite  oppression.  
4.4 Popular punishment and Rome’s decline  
   If  Machiavelli  is  right  that  the  plebian  tribunes  were  effective  in  checking  the  
ambitions  of  the  elites,  then  Machiavelli  must  somehow  account  for  the  eventual  decline  
of  the  Roman  republic  into  civil  war.    After  all,  Appius’s  failed  bid  to  become  a  tyrant  in  
Rome  underscores  the  utility  of  tribucan  policing  while  also  revealing  the  regime’s  
robustness  even  in  the  absence  of  institutional  checks  on  elite  ambition  such  as  the  
plebian  tribunes.  In  fact,  Machiavelli  marks  the  episode  as  one  of  renewal.  He  claims  
that  the  transgressions  and  “excessive  and  notable”  punishment  of  the  decemviri  had  
the  same  effect  in  counteracting  the  “ambition  and  the  insolence  of  men”  as  “the  orders  
that  drew  the  Roman  republic  back  towards  its  beginning  [such  as]  the  tribune  of  the  
plebs  [and  the]  censors.”65  (D  III.1.iii)  The  Second  Secession  of  the  plebs  was  a  political  
crisis  to  be  sure,  but  its  result  was  to  strengthen  Rome’s  popular  institutions,  not  weaken  
them.  In  fact,  Machiavelli  sees  the  episode  as  just  one  example  in  a  long  line  of  virtuous  
crisis  management.66  To  protect  his  account  of  the  plebian  tribunes,  Machiavelli’s  
explanation  of  the  republic’s  decline  must  account  for  the  fact  that  a  change  to  some  other  
                                                                                                              
65  This  renewal  required  the  virtue  of  a  citizen  who  rushes  spiritedly  to  execute  them  against  the  power  of  
those  who  transgress  them.  Chapter  5  addresses  this  type  of  citizen.  
66  “From  the  Tarquins  to  the  Gracchi,  which  was  more  than  three  hundred  years,”  Machiavelli  writes,  “the  
tumults  of  Rome  rarely  engendered  exile  and  very  rarely  blood.”  D  I.4.i  16  also  see  D  III.1.iii.  
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part  of  the  Roman  political  order  impaired  Rome’s  ability  to  manage  political  crises  
virtuously.    
   Moreover,  that  explanation  must  account  for  the  fact  that  Rome  lost  its  capacity  
to  turn  political  crises  into  episodes  of  renewal.67  Machiavelli  tells  us  that  once  a  state  is  
sufficiently  corrupt,  an  episode  that  would  otherwise  result  in  renewal  poses  a  risk  to  the  
state  itself  because  “so  many  delinquents  join  together  that  they  can  no  longer  be  
punished  without  danger.”  (D  III.1.iii)  He  makes  this  observation  on  the  heels  of  
claiming  that  institutions  such  as  the  plebian  tribunes  and  episodes  such  as  the  Second  
Succession  are  necessary  for  checking  the  ambition  of  the  elites.  According  to  this  logic,  
the  fatal  corruption  of  a  republic  is  the  result  of  failures  to  regularly  and  frequently  
check  the  ambitions  of  the  elite.  The  crisis  generated  by  the  absence  of  the  tribunes  
during  the  period  of  the  Decemvirate  resulted  in  renewal  rather  than  danger  to  the  
Roman  republic  because  Rome  had  not  yet  undergone  the  kind  of  corruption  that  is  the  
natural  consequence  of  unchecked  ambition.68  But,  Machiavelli  tells  his  reader  elsewhere  
that,  by  the  time  of  the  Gracchi,  Rome  had  become  so  corrupt  that  it  would  have  been  
better  to  “temporize”  in  the  face  of  the  crisis  engendered  by  the  revival  of  the  agrarian  
law  than  to  tackle  the  corruption  head-­‐‑on.  (D  1.37.iii)  
                                                                                                              
67  For  an  extended  discussion  of  the  role  of  corruption  in  enervating  Rome’s  ability  to  handle  a  crisis,  see  
Vickie  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  83-­‐‑101.    
68  For  a  general  discussion  of  Machiavelli’s  notion  of  corruption,  see  Pocock’s  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  209.    
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   Rome’s  eventual  decline  came  about  -­‐‑  in  Machiavelli’s  assessment  –  when  
conflicts  over  inequality  of  wealth  led  to  extra-­‐‑legal  attempts  at  exercising  power  and  
when  Rome  began  to  “prolong  [military]  commands.”69  In  this  respect,  the  death  of  the  
Roman  republic  lay  in  the  corruption  of  its  military.70  Roman  political  practices  were  
sufficient  for  checking  the  ambition  of  the  nobles  at  home,  but  were  insufficient  for  
checking  them  in  the  more  distant  provinces  of  the  empire.  The  attenuation  of  elite  
constraints  proceeded  along  two  tracks.71  First,  the  growth  of  the  empire  created  a  
loophole  in  Rome’s  Agrarian  Law.  The  Agrarian  Law  originally  limited  individual  
landholding  and  required  equal  distribution  of  imperially  acquired  lands  among  citizens  
of  Rome.  Provincial  landholdings,  however,  “being  distant  from  the  eyes  of  the  plebs  
and  in  places  where  it  was  not  easy  to  cultivate  them  came  to  be  less  desired  by  them.”  
(D  I.37.ii)  Nor  did  tribucan  authority  extend  beyond  Rome  itself.  With  elites  using  the  
provinces  as  springboards  to  greater  power,  the  revival  of  the  Agrarian  Law  by  the  
Gracchi  “found  the  power  of  its  adversaries  redoubled,  and  because  of  this  it  inflamed  
so  much  hatred  between  the  plebs  and  the  Senate  that  they  came  to  arms  and  to  
bloodshed,  beyond  every  civil  mode  and  custom.”  (D  I.37.ii,  Emphasis  Mine)  The  
extraordinary  violence  of  this  episode  of  class  conflict  began  with  Tiberius  Gracchus’s  
violation  of  the  sacrosanctity  of  his  fellow  tribune  Marcus  Octavius,  who  had  been  
                                                                                                              
69  For  an  extended  discussion  of  the  roles  played  by  the  desire  for  property  and  honor,  the  effect  of  Roman  
religion,  and  the  Gracchi’s  own  political  innovations,  see  Vickie  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  69-­‐‑80.  
70  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  149.  
71  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy.  88.  
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persuaded  by  the  Senate  to  veto  Tiberius’s  proposal  of  the  Lex  Sempronia  Agraria  to  the  
Popular  Assembly  (Concilium  Plebis).  The  violence  continued  through  Tiberius’s  
murder  by  several  Senators  and  their  partisans.  According  to  Machiavelli,  that  violence  
finally  culminated  in  the  civil  war  between  Marius  and  Sulla  nearly  50  years  later.  The  
attempt  to  revive  the  Agrarian  law  was  thus  the  beginning  of  the  end,  so  to  speak.  It  also  
explains  half  of  the  puzzle  of  what  led  to  the  collapse  of  the  Roman  republic.    
   The  other  half  of  the  puzzle  links  the  crisis  caused  by  the  Gracchi  and  the  civil  
wars  that  ultimately  ended  the  republican  era.  That  half  of  the  puzzle  was  the  
transformation  of  the  Roman  military  into  a  clientelistic  body.  As  Rome’s  empire  grew,  
the  Senate  began  extending  the  length  of  time  for  which  a  given  commander  would  
remain  with  his  army.  A  seemingly  convenient  policy,    
That  thing  produced  two  inconveniences:  one,  that  a  lesser  number  of  men  were  
practiced  in  commands,  and  because  of  this  they  came  to  restrict  reputation  to  a  
few;  the  other,  that  when  a  citizen  remained  commander  of  an  army  for  a  very  
long  time,  he  would  win  it  over  to  himself  and  make  it  partisan  to  him.  Because  
of  this  Sulla  and  Marius  could  find  soldiers  who  would  follow  them  against  the  
public  good;  because  of  this,  Caesar  could  seize  the  fatherland.  (D  III.24)  
  
Here,  the  growth  in  Rome’s  power  and  her  corruption  are  intimately  intertwined.72  We  
know  from  The  Prince  and  Art  of  War  how  dangerous  it  is  for  an  army  to  develop  a  
corporate  identity,  whether  those  linkages  are  mercenary  or  clientelist.  The  civil  wars  
that  brought  Rome’s  republican  era  to  an  end  illustrate  that  danger  by  showing  that  
links  between  soldier  and  commander  facilitate  civil  war  when  they  trump  those  between  
                                                                                                              
72  Pace  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  59.  
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citizen  and  commonwealth.  According  to  Machiavelli,  the  extensions  of  military  
commands,  which  surely  aided  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  empire  during  the  late  
republican  era,  led  to  the  formation  of  those  linkages,  and  thus  the  downfall  of  the  
Roman  republic  itself.  
   It  is  worth  noting  that  Machiavelli  does  not  point  to  the  Marian  Reforms  as  
contributing  to  the  formation  of  clientelistic  linkages  in  the  Roman  military.  These  
reforms  lowered  the  property  requirement  for  entering  the  military  and  thereby  opened  
it  to  Romans  most  likely  to  depend  on  the  spoils  of  war  for  their  sustenance.  This  
reconfiguration  of  the  Roman  military  swelled  its  ranks  and  created  new  possibilities  for  
conquest  and  a  rank  and  file  that  was  more  loyal  to  its  commander,  who  delivered  
spoils,  than  the  state,  which  demanded  sacrifice.  Whether  intentionally  or  by  oversight,  
Machiavelli  ignores  the  importance  of  the  Marian  Reforms  and  holds  the  Senate’s  policy  
of  extending  commands  responsible  for  creating  clientelistic  linkages  in  the  military.73  In  
so  doing,  he  absolves  the  Roman  people  at  large  of  responsibility  for  enabling  Marius  
and  Sulla  to  “find  soldiers  who  would  follow  them  against  the  public  good,”  and  
instead  condemns  a  patrician  policy  of  extending  commands  for  creating  partisan  
armies.  
                                                                                                              
73  This  oversight  is  particularly  odd,  given  Machiavelli’s  focus  in  the  Discourses  on  the  people,  as  Leo  Strauss  
puts  it,  as  “the  maintainer  of  established  modes  and  orders,  or  as  the  repository  of  morality  and  religion.”  
Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  133.  On  the  issue  of  the  oversight,  see  also  Vickie  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  
177.  
  172  
   Similarly  it  is  worth  noting  that  Machiavelli  blames  the  conflict  over  the  Agrarian  
Law  on  the  imprudence  of  the  Gracchi,  though  he  provides  ample  evidence  on  which  
one  could  indict  the  people.  Popular  indifference  to  lands  far  from  Rome  helped  create  
the  vacuum  that  elite  acquisition  filled.  (D  I.37.i)  Then,  wanting  to  share  in  “honors  and  
possessions”  with  the  elite,  the  plebs  reversed  their  position  on  these  provincial  holdings  
when  pushed  to  do  so  by  the  Gracchi.74  
The  republican  era  came  to  an  end  in  Rome  because  class-­‐‑based  factions  took  up  
private  arms  in  an  attempt  to  settle  the  disputes  between  them.75  The  failure  to  enforce  
the  Agrarian  Law  was  the  opening  that  allowed  Rome’s  classes  to  break  their  
institutional  constraints  (such  as  the  Tribunes  and  the  Senate)  and  resolve  their  conflicts  
by  force  of  arms,  rather  than  by  the  tumults  that  Machiavelli  praises.  As  a  result,  the  
Gracchi’s  attempt  to  revive  the  Agrarian  Law  was  the  beginning  of  a  decades-­‐‑long  cycle  
of  “extraordinary”  uses  of  violence.  Those  extraordinary  uses  of  violence  brought  an  end  
to  the  republican  era  because  the  Roman  military  became  a  source  of  private  arms.  In  
this  respect,  changes  to  the  way  that  Rome  addressed  the  core  political  problems  of  
violence  were  the  final  cause  of  death  for  the  Roman  republic.  Rome  thrived  while  her  
forces  were  “public”  and  died  when  they  became  “private.”  Recall  Machiavelli’s  
description  of  praiseworthy  punishment  in  book  I:  
                                                                                                              
74  For  more  on  the  role  of  the  people’s  ambition  in  the  crisis  ensuing  from  the  revival  of  the  Agrarian  Law,  
see  Vickie  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes;  Harvey  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  New  Modes  and  Orders,  122.  
75  J.G.A.  Pocock  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  211;  Vickie  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  74.  
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For  the  execution  is  done  without  private  forces  and  without  foreign  forces,  
which  are  the  ones  that  ruin  a  free  way  of  life;  but  it  is  done  with  public  forces  
and  orders,  which  have  their  particular  limits  and  do  not  lead  beyond  to  something  that  
may  ruin  the  republic.  (D  I.7.ii,  emphasis  mine)  
  
The  armies  of  the  late  republican  era  had  become  private  forces  and  thereby  ruined  the  
free  way  of  life  and  the  republic  in  Rome.  The  death  of  the  Roman  republic  coincided  
with  the  rebirth  of  the  army  as  a  private  force.  
   How,  then,  can  a  democracy,  or  any  type  of  regime,  keep  its  forces  public,  rather  
than  private?  Though  Machiavelli  does  not  make  this  suggestion,  his  analysis  of  Roman  
politics  offers  a  promising  way  of  thinking  about  the  problem.  Machiavelli  was  an  
advocate  of  popular  participation  in  political  decision-­‐‑making,  provided  that  
participation  was  properly  structured  (i.e.,  shackled).  The  same  goes  for  popular  
participation  in  institutions  of  violence.  His  proposal  for  the  citizen-­‐‑militia  in  The  Prince  
and  the  Art  of  War  held  out  popular  participation  in  the  principality’s  chief  mechanism  
of  violence  as  a  constraint  in  its  own  right,  but  that  constraint  was  meant  to  shackle  the  
prince.  In  republics,  popular  participation  in  a  given  mechanism  of  violence  is  not  
enough  to  ensure  that  the  guardians  are  themselves  guarded.  While  Rome  excelled  at  
structuring  popular  political  participation  through  the  tribunes,  she  eventually  failed  to  
properly  structure  participation  in  the  military.  By  extending  the  length  of  military  
commands,  Rome  allowed  her  citizen  soldiers  to  come  under  the  sway  of  their  
commanders’  ambitions  in  addition  to  the  demands  of  the  given  campaign.  If  
Machiavelli’s  depiction  of  the  fall  of  the  Roman  republic  is  accurate,  then  rank-­‐‑and-­‐‑file  
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service  in  the  military  is  not  all  that  different  from  citizen  participation  in  other  political  
institutions.76  When  properly  structured,  such  participation  can  help  republics  thrive.  
When  poorly  structured,  it  can  lead  to  their  collapse.77  
4.5 Good arms, good laws, and citizen participation 
     For  Machiavelli,  every  state  must  respond  to  two  great  sources  of  oppression:  
invasion  from  other  states  and  oppression  by  elites  within  the  state.  Machiavelli  took  
Rome  to  be  the  best  example  of  all  known  states  because  she  responded  to  both  sources  
so  admirably.  Rome  exported  the  ambitions  of  her  elites  in  her  expansionary  projects,  
thereby  sidestepping  the  factionalism  of  Florence  and  securing  her  own  place  in  a  
chaotic  interstate  system.  Rome  also  provided  him  with  a  specifically  mixed  model  for  
minimizing  violent  oppression,  in  which  citizens  were  recruited  to  check  the  ambitions  
of  elites  in  addition  to  serving  in  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  –  a  policy  that  he  recommends  for  
autocracies  as  well.  This  chapter  showcased  Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  the  Roman  
tribunate  because  it  highlights  both  the  strengths  and  the  limitation  of  the  people  in  
checking  the  ambitions  of  the  elite.  The  people,  when  under  the  right  institutional  
                                                                                                              
76  Pocock  goes  as  far  to  depict  military  service  as  a  school  for  citizenship:  “It  may  be  through  military  
discipline  that  one  learns  to  be  a  citizen  and  to  display  civic  virtue.”  The  Machiavellian  Moment  200;  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty  offers  a  sympathetic  interpretation  when  he  writes  that  “The  trap  of  collective  life  springs  both  
directions:  liberal  regimes  are  always  a  little  less  so  than  is  believed,  others  are  a  little  more  so.”  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty  Reader,  125.  Also  see  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  212.  
77  Vickie  Sullivan  reads  a  different  takeaway  in  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  the  downfall  of  the  republic:  “the  
Republic’s  constitution  should  have  had  mechanisms  for  preventing  such  extraordinary  appeals  [as  those  
made  by  the  Gracchi].  Caesar  should  not  have  been  allowed  the  firm  foothold  he  attained.”  Machiavelli’s  
Three  Rome’s  80.  
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constraints,  are  particularly  adept  making  the  right  decision  about  elite  ambition.  But  an  
institution  like  the  tribunate  can  only  check  the  ambition  of  the  elites  where  authorized  
to  do  so,  which  amounted  to  a  serious  limitation  in  the  Roman  case.  Unchecked  when  
abroad,  Roman  elites  forged  clientelistic  linkages  with  the  soldiers  in  their  charge.  This  
corrupted  military  spelled  the  end  of  the  Roman  republic.  For  today’s  democracies,  it  is  
not  enough  to  simply  hold  elections  and  have  representatives  to  fend  off  collapsing  into  
autocracies  or  failed  states  altogether;  they  must  take  note  of  the  dangers  posed  by  
poorly  structured  militaries  as  well  as  the  virtues  of  virtuously  structured  ones.
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5. Infinite Princes – Elites and Political Violence in the 
Discourses 
The  motivating  question  of  chapter  3  was,  “does  Machiavelli  think  that  the  need  
to  prevent  violent  oppression  gives  rise  to  special  privileges  and  or  special  duties  for  
princes  in  principalities?”  In  that  chapter,  I  argued  that,  yes,  he  does.  In  The  Prince,  
Machiavelli  recommends  special  privileges  for  princes  and  does  so  because  princes  are  
better  positioned  within  a  principality  to  constrain  oppression-­‐‑oriented  elites  as  a  result.  
In  this  chapter,  I  ask  if  Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  republics  in  the  Discourses  shares  this  
conclusion  with  respect  to  their  own  political  leaders.  At  first  glance,  it  should  not.  How  
could  a  republic  share  this  characteristic  of  principalities  when  it  –  strictly  speaking  –  
has  no  prince?  To  speak  of  a  prince  of  a  republic  seems  paradoxical,  but  Machiavelli  
does  precisely  that  when  he  writes,  “through  the  mode  of  electing  [a  republic]  has…  
…infinite  most  virtuous  princes  who  are  in  succession  to  one  another.  This  virtuous  
succession  will  always  exist  in  every  well-­‐‑ordered  republic.”  (D  I.20.i)  If  a  “virtuous  
succession”  of  “infinite  most  virtuous  princes”  exists  in  “every  well-­‐‑ordered  republic,”  
then  there  must  be  some  use  for  “princes”  in  a  republic.1  The  question  before  us  
concerns  the  nature  of  that  use  in  relation  to  the  prevention  of  violent  oppression  in  a  
                                                                                                              
  1  With  respect  to  the  role  played  by  elites  in  republics,  Patrick  Coby  writes  “extrapolating  from  the  Roman  
experience,  one  sees  that  politics,  Machiavelli-­‐‑style,  depends  heavily  on  heroic  individuals,  princes,  who  
arguably  are  more  important  to  its  success  than  the  well-­‐‑crafted  institutions  of  a  mixed  regime.”  
Machiavelli’s  Romans,  15.  For  Coby’s  extended  discussion,  see  Chapter  6.  See  also  J.G.A.  Pocock,  The  
Machiavellian  Moment,  212;  Mark  Hulliung  Citizen  Machiavelli,  73;  Vickie  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  
161.  
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republic.  So,  turning  away  from  the  last  chapter’s  focus  on  popular  participation,  in  this  
chapter  I  turn  to  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  elite-­‐‑level  participation  in  addressing  the  
same  question.  
   The  Discourses  features  a  diverse  cast  of  political  elites,  the  members  of  which  
earn  Machiavelli’s  praise  for  myriad  political  actions.  They  are  founders  of  states  and  
religions,  commanders  of  armies,  political  officeholders  and  more.  In  these  various  roles,  
they  are  more  or  less  closely  involved  with  actual  mechanisms  of  violence  and  the  actual  
creation  and  maintenance  of  political  institutions.  In  order  to  evaluate  these  various  
roles,  in  section  1,  I  parse  the  relationship  between  good  laws  and  good  arms  in  the  
Discourses  and  try  to  specify  Machiavelli’s  definition  of  the  former.  That  relationship  is  
one  of  a  two-­‐‑way  street,  in  which  good  laws  can  cause  good  arms  and  vice  versa.  So  
preventing  violent  oppression  requires  both  good  laws  and  good  arms,  and  thus  
knowledge  of  how  elites  can  bring  these  into  being.    
In  section  2,  I  turn  to  Machiavelli’s  use  of  praise  and  blame  as  mechanisms  for  
prompting  his  contemporaries  to  imitate  ancient  political  practices.  Because  Machiavelli  
uses  praise  and  blame  to  induce  that  imitation,  section  2  analyzes  the  Roman  example  
Machiavelli  praises  most  highly  in  the  Discourses,  Numa  Pompilius,  with  respect  to  the  
political  effect  he  had  upon  violent  oppression  in  Rome.  Thinking  about  Machiavelli’s  
treatment  of  Numa  and  his  religious  innovations  in  these  terms  explains  various  puzzles  
in  the  Discourses,  including  Machiavelli’s  elevation  of  Numa  above  Romulus  as  a  
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founder  of  Rome,  as  well  as  Machiavelli’s  focus  on  Roman  religion  at  the  expense  of  
Christianity.  Of  course,  Machiavelli  does  not  ignore  Romulus’s  role  in  founding  Rome.  
In  Section  3,  I  detail  the  way  in  which  Machiavelli  rehabilitates  Romulus  as  an  exemplar  
for  republican  elites.  Despite  the  murder  of  his  brother,  Remus,  Machiavelli  holds  
Romulus  out  as  a  worthy  exemplar  because  his  use  of  violence  empowers,  rather  than  
undermines  core  Roman  institutions.  This  effect  obviates  concerns  over  the  destabilizing  
effects  of  violence.  In  section  4,  I  present  the  third  member  of  Rome’s  trinity  of  founders:  
Brutus.  Brutus  is  an  exemplary  figure  where  the  minimization  of  violent  oppression  is  
concerned  because  he  establishes  a  tradition  of  frustrating  elite  humors.  Romulus  
subjected  the  use  of  violence  to  law  and  Numa  subjected  it  to  religion,  but  it  is  Brutus  
who  sets  an  example  of  policing  the  corruption  of  these  orders  while  simultaneously  
protecting  the  people  from  the  elites  who  would  use  violence  to  oppress  them.  
While  Numa,  Romulus,  and  Brutus  are  each  exemplars  of  elite-­‐‑level  action  for  
founding  and  renewing  regimes,  they  do  not  exhaust  the  universe  of  models  that  are  
necessary  for  understanding  how  elites  can  address  problems  of  political  violence  in  
republics.  In  particular,  good  generals,  good  “dictators,”  and  good  opinion  leaders  can  
also  do  much  to  address  problems  of  political  violence,  though  their  individual  tasks  
(winning  wars,  resolving  crises,  and  influencing  decisions)  may  be  different.  In  section  5,  
I  parse  the  function  of  these  various  roles  in  Rome.  Finally,  because  Machiavelli  uses  
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praise  and  blame  as  his  primary  lever  of  motivation  for  elites  in  republics,  in  section  6,  I  
explain  how  Machiavelli  thinks  such  regimes  ought  to  award  glory  for  public  service.  
5.1 Good Arms, Good Laws, and Good Causes.  
In  the  Discourses,  Machiavelli  describes  the  relationship  between  arms  and  laws  
in  three  different  ways.  Once  one  makes  sense  of  these  descriptions,  it  is  possible  to  see  
how  they  inform  the  privileges  and  duties  of  political  elites  in  republics.  The  first  
reference  to  this  relationship  is  as  a  measure  for  orders,  of  which  laws  are  a  part.  
Machiavelli  writes,  “I  cannot  deny  that  fortune  and  the  military  were  causes  of  the  
Roman  Empire;  but  it  quite  appears  to  me  that  [critics  of  Roman  politics]  are  not  aware  
that  where  the  military  is  good,  there  must  be  good  order;  and  too,  it  rarely  occurs  that  
good  fortune  will  not  be  there.”  (D  I.4.i)  Machiavelli’s  claim  here  is  that  one  can  know  
that  Rome’s  orders  were  good  despite  the  apparent  chaos  of  the  class-­‐‑conflict  there  
because  Rome  enjoyed  such  military  success.  Rome’s  military  strength  and  strength  of  
her  orders  were  testaments  to  each  other.  Indeed,  Rome’s  military  success  is  the  reason  
that  Machiavelli  elevates  Rome’s  political  order  over  Sparta’s  and  Athens’s  as  an  object  
of  study.  (D  I.6.i-­‐‑ii)  This  heuristic  device  tells  the  reader  that  both  Rome’s  arms  and  laws  
were  good,  but  does  not  tell  the  reader  which  was  the  cause  of  the  other.    
Near  the  end  of  book  III,  Machiavelli  seems  to  settle  the  matter  by  repeating  his  
claim  from  The  Prince  that  good  arms  are  –  at  the  very  least  –  necessary  for  good  laws.  
He  writes,  “although  it  was  said  another  time  that  the  foundation  of  all  states  is  a  good  
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[militia],  and  where  this  does  not  exist  there  can  be  neither  good  laws  nor  any  other  
good  thing,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  superfluous  to  repeat  it.”2  (D  III.31.iv)  The  lesson  
that  the  right  kind  of  mechanism  of  violence  must  back  laws  is  so  important  to  
Machiavelli  that  he  self-­‐‑consciously  chooses  to  repeat  it  to  the  reader  or  at  least  make  the  
reader  aware  that  he  has  made  the  claim  elsewhere.  (P  12.i)  Machiavelli  then  takes  the  
opportunity  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  only  good  kind  of  militia  is  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  
because  “one  sees  that  the  military  cannot  be  good  unless  it  can  be  trained,  and  that  it  
cannot  be  trained  unless  it  is  composed  of  your  subjects.”  (D  III.31.iv)  Because  command  
over  training  implies  command  in  general,  Machiavelli  must  mean  that  good  
mechanisms  of  violence  are  those  that  the  regimes  they  are  meant  to  serve  can  command  
them  when  necessary.  This  meaning  could  imply  that  a  mechanism  of  violence  that  
usurps  sovereignty  is  incompatible  with  good  laws  to  the  extent  that  sovereignty  is  a  
characteristic  of  good  laws.  This  conclusion  does  not  lead  definitively,  however,  to  the  
idea  that  good  arms  are  the  generative  cause  of  good  laws,  only  that  “neither  good  laws  
nor  any  other  good  thing”  can  exist  without  a  citizen-­‐‑militia.  To  put  the  matter  another  
way,  we  ought  to  construe  this  relationship  as  a  causal  one,  but  a  passive  cause  at  best.  
A  review  of  other  references  to  law  in  the  Discourses,  shows  Machiavelli  
characterizing  law  as  a  causal  factor  for  a  variety  of  important  political  outcomes.  Laws  
                                                                                                              
2  The  Mansfield-­‐‑Tarcov  translation  I  have  been  using  has  “military”  rather  than  “militia,”  but  the  original  
Italian  is  “milizia,”  which  clearly  translates  to  “militia.”  
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can  function  as  a  “necessity”  which  constrains  citizens  to  become  better  soldiers.  (D  
I.1.vi)  Laws  can  teach  citizens  about  justice  and  enforce  the  proper  feelings  of  political  
gratitude.  (D1.2.ii)  While  “hunger”  makes  people  “industrious,”  law  makes  them  
“good.”  (D1.3.ii)  One  can  make  laws  that  “favor”  freedom  and  laws  that  prevent  rich  
citizens  from  acquiring  partisans.  (D  I.4.i  and  D  I.34.ii,  respectively)  Laws  can  “shackle”  
and  “regulate”  the  behaviors  of  the  people  and  princes  alike.  (D  I.58.ii-­‐‑iv)  Properly  
designed  laws  can  also  lead  states  “back  to  the  mark”  as  part  of  periodic  institutional  
renewal.  (D  III.1.ii)  Laws  cannot  produce  desirable  outcomes,  however,  where  a  state  
has  become  thoroughly  corrupt.  (D  I.18.ii)  If  the  “order  of  the  state”  does  not  change  to  
adjust  for  the  corruption  in  citizens’  “customs,”  then  laws,  which  “have  need  of  good  
customs  so  as  to  be  observed,”  are  rendered  useless  at  best  and  destructive  at  worst.3  (D  
I.18.ii)  This  brief  catalogue  of  some  of  the  references  to  law  in  the  Discourses  indicates  
that  good  laws,  rather  than  merely  being  epiphenomenal  to  good  arms,  are  in  fact  causal  
factors  in  their  own  right.  While  Machiavelli  never  explicitly  defines  the  term,  it  is  clear  
across  his  references  to  good  laws  that  they  create  virtue-­‐‑generating  necessity  in  those  
who  obey  them.  They  are  artificial  constraints  on  that  produce  desirable  political  
outcomes  such  as  martial  readiness,  minimal  economic  inequality,  and  regular  
institutional  renewal.  Like  all  artificial  social  constraints,  however,  they  cannot  have  the  
                                                                                                              
3  Machiavelli  defines  the  order  of  the  state  in  Rome  as  “the  authority  of  the  people,  of  the  senate,  of  the  
tribunes,  of  the  consuls;  the  mode  of  soliciting  and  creating  magistracies;  and  the  mode  of  making  the  laws.”  
(I.18.ii)  
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full  and  desired  effect  if  the  people  subject  to  them  do  not  also  internalize  the  norms  
they  reflect.  This  limitation  on  law  explains  Machiavelli’s  emphasis  on  maintaining  
customs  consistent  with  those  laws  as  part  of  the  “order  of  the  state.”  With  respect  to  the  
question  at  hand,  it  is  clear  that  good  laws,  as  Machiavelli  understands  them,  produce  
the  necessary  components  for  good  arms  by  constraining  citizens  to  become  better  
soldiers.  Moreover,  by  precluding  the  acquisition  of  partisans,  good  laws  preclude  civil  
war.  (D  III.22.iv  and  D  III.28)  Perhaps  most  importantly,  by  generating  institutional  
renewal,  good  laws  reinvigorate  the  regime  as  a  whole,  arms  included.  (D  III.1.ii-­‐‑iii)  
Ultimately,  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  the  relationship  between  good  laws  and  
good  arms  in  the  Discourses  is  a  two-­‐‑way  street.  There  are  causal  pathways  leading  from  
good  arms  to  good  laws  as  well  as  causal  pathways  leading  from  good  laws  to  good  
arms.4  Part  of  this  complication  results  from  there  being  different  kinds  of  political  
causality.  Some  political  things  (such  as  arms  or  laws)  may  come  into  being  for  different  
reasons  than  the  reasons  they  stay  in  being.  For  example,  Machiavelli  argues  in  the  
opening  chapter  of  book  I  that  good  laws  are  made  by  founders,  but  clarifies  the  point  
later  that  while  princes  “are  superior  to  peoples  in  ordering  laws,  forming  civil  lives,  
and  ordering  new  statutes  and  orders,  peoples  are  so  much  superior  in  maintaining  
                                                                                                              
4  Michael  Mallet  is  right  that  “Good  laws  needed  to  precede  good  arms  in  the  sense  that  he  intended  them;  
the  ideal  military  solutions  would  only  emerge  in  a  settled  state  with  just  and  equitable  institutions,  a  state  
which  might  expect  to  attract  the  sort  of  patriotism  which  Machiavelli  was  seeking.”  But,  because  
Machiavelli’s  fundamental  tenets  include  a  mutual  causality  between  arms  and  law,  Mallet  is  wrong  to  say  
that  “perhaps  the  conclusions  that  we  can  draw  is  that  Machiavelli’s  basic  concepts  were  mistaken.”  Michael  
Mallett,  “The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Warfare,”  179.    
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things  ordered  that  without  doubt  they  attain  the  glory  of  those  who  order  them.”  (D  I.58.iii,  
emphasis  mine)  Machiavelli  so  often  uses  glory  as  a  measure  for  praiseworthy  action  
that  we  have  to  take  his  language  here  as  one  of  equal  valuation  of  these  different  kinds  
of  causes  of  law.  Likewise,  we  learn  in  book  III  that  “good  captains”  can  be  the  cause  of  
“good  arms”  insofar  as  they  can  “instruct  their  army  and  make  it  good.”  (D  III.14.iii)  But  
if  good  captains  can  be  the  cause  of  good  arms  by  bringing  armies  into  being,  so  too  can  
laws  “impos[e]  a  necessity  to  exercise  on  those  who  had  to  be  soldiers,  so  that  through  
such  an  order  they  became  better  soldiers.”  (D  I.1.iv)  Without  such  ongoing  necessity,  
“very  agreeable  and  very  fertile  countries  [are]  apt  to  produce  men  who  are  idle  and  
unfit  for  any  virtuous  exercise.”  (D  I.1.iv)  Captains  may  be  capable  of  bringing  good  
arms  into  being,  but  laws  are  much  more  reliable  at  maintaining  them.5  From  this  
perspective,  laws  deserve  credit  as  a  “cause”  of  good  arms  because  they  maintain  arms  
as  such,  especially  given  Machiavelli’s  argument  that  the  maintenance  of  a  thing  can  be  
just  as  glorious  as  the  creation  of  it.  Moreover,  keeping  the  creation  of  the  tribunate  in  
mind,  it  is  possible  to  see  how  “good  arms”  create  good  laws.  It  was  the  need  for  plebian  
enrollments  in  the  military  and  ongoing  popular  authority  to  do  violence  that  gave  the  
tribunate  the  power  it  had  to  prevent  the  oppression  of  the  plebs.  These  various  causal  
interactions  mean  that  at  different  times  good  arms  are  the  cause  of  good  laws,  good  
                                                                                                              
5  Partly  because  the  right  set  of  laws,  according  to  Machiavelli,  can  produce  a  succession  of  “virtuous  
princes,”  upon  whose  shoulders  it  would  fall  to  command  the  armies  of  the  republic.  (I.20)    
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laws  are  the  cause  of  good  arms,  they  are  mutually  causal,  or  they  both  come  into  being  
as  a  result  of  a  virtuous  founder.6  
   If  the  Discourses  is  consistent  about  one  facet  of  politics  in  republics,  it  is  that  
elites  in  those  regimes  must  know  when  and  how  to  bring  good  arms  and  good  laws  
into  being,  to  use  one  side  of  the  dyad  as  leverage  to  create  or  maintain  the  other,  and  to  
get  out  of  the  way  entirely  where  appropriate.7  As  a  result,  the  grand  arc  of  elite-­‐‑level  
politics  in  the  Discourses  is  one  of  extra-­‐‑legal  (by  virtue  of  being  pre-­‐‑institutional)  elite  
political  action  resulting  in  elites  being  constrained  by  the  institutions  that  they  then  
create  and  maintain  with  the  help  of  the  people.8  In  this  regard,  the  Discourses  mirrors  
the  grand  arc  of  the  Prince  insofar  as  the  former  uses  the  prince  to  create  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  
which  in  turn  constrains  him.  Likewise,  the  kinds  of  institutions  that  Machiavelli  praises  
in  the  Discourses  empower  the  republic  as  a  whole  but,  ought  to  be  particularly  attractive  
to  members  of  the  elite  because  they  provide  a  platform  for  the  pursuit  of  glory,  which  
partially  and  safely  satisfies  the  elite  drive  for  oppression.  So  just  as  the  Prince  exhorts  
the  princes  who  read  it  to  strike  a  bargain  with  the  people  to  repress  the  petty  lords  who  
would  otherwise  vent  their  appetites  on  the  people  within  their  territories,  the  Discourses  
                                                                                                              
6  Even  in  the  Prince,  we  learn  of  Borgia’s  use  of  violence  in  the  Romagna  to  shift  behavioral  expectations  
back  towards  lawfulness  –  and  thus  how  “cruelty  well-­‐‑used”  can  make  good  laws  possible.  But,  we  also  
learned  in  the  Prince  that  the  creation  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  (i.e.  “good  arms”)  can  liberate  a  principality  from  
the  vicissitudes  of  relying  on  auxiliary  or  mercenary  arms.  While  that  kind  of  political  autonomy  is  not  
“good  law”  per  se,  it  is  consistent  with  the  idea  of  what  good  law  should  effect,  and  thus  illustrative  of  the  
complicated  causal  relationship  at  play.    
7  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  151.  
8  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  156-­‐‑161.  
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devises  a  set  of  institutions  for  a  republic  to  reward  its  leading  citizens  for  their  public  
service,  thereby  directing  them  away  from  oppressing  their  fellow  citizens  and  toward  
virtuous  political  action.  
5.2 Glory, gods, and gore 
In  the  political  world  Machiavelli  describes,  the  greatest  public  servants  deserve  
the  greatest  praise.  In  chapter  3,  I  argued  that  Machiavelli  makes  the  case  in  The  Prince  
that  the  prince’s  rewards  for  popular  service  are  glory  on  the  one  hand  and  the  retention  
of  power  on  the  other.  What  one  can  easily  overlook  is  the  fact  that  Machiavelli  uses  
glory  and  retention  of  power  to  stimulate  public  service,  which  is  the  foundational  good  
of  his  politics.  The  same  is  true  of  the  Discourses.  Catering  to  popular  desires  is  the  
dominant  end  of  politics,  but  in  the  Discourses,  Machiavelli  just  uses  glory  to  induce  that  
service  among  elites.  Republican  elites  are  powerful  and  secure  when  the  republic  is  
powerful  and  secure,  but  that  power  and  security  are  not  private  goods.  Individual  
republican  elites  share  in  the  power  and  security  of  a  powerful  and  secure  republic  by  
virtue  of  their  citizenship,  but  their  positions  as  elites  within  the  republic  are  never  
secure;  their  power  is  borrowed,  never  owned.  Their  only  individual  goods  are  the  glory  
and  honor  they  earn  through  virtuous  action.      
Machiavelli’s  assessment  of  the  human  psyche  includes  a  deep  appreciation  for  
the  motivational  power  of  praise  and  blame.  In  prefacing  the  text,  he  confesses  that  the  
greater  “read[iness]  of  men  to  blame  than  to  praise  the  actions  of  others”  makes  his  
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undertaking  the  Discourses  “no  less  dangerous”  than  the  search  for  “unknown  waters  
and  lands.”  (D  I.PR.i)  His  intention  is  not  to  counteract  the  human  impulse  to  offer  
praise  and  to  offer  blame,  but  rather  to  offer  praise  and  blame  in  the  right  measure  to  the  
right  objects  of  consideration.  Our  habits  of  offering  praise  and  blame  and  responding  to  
the  praise  and  blame  of  others  can  be  a  reliable  foundation  for  politics,  if  we  praise  and  
blame  the  right  things.  Often,  however,  we  tend  to  err  in  the  objects  and  measure  of  our  
praise  and  blame.  Machiavelli  argues,  “men  always  praise  ancient  times  –  but  not  
always  reasonably.”  (D  II.PR.i)  The  tendency  of  human  reach  to  exceed  human  grasp  
leads  to  discontent  with  the  status  quo,  which  “makes  them  blame  the  present  times,  
praise  the  past,  and  desire  the  future,  even  if  they  are  not  moved  to  do  this  by  any  
reasonable  cause.”  (D  II.PR.iii)  Machiavelli  sees  this  tendency  to  praise  unreasonably  as  
leading  to  the  admiration  of  the  ancients,  rather  than  imitation  of  them.9  “Indeed,”  he  
writes,  ancient  action  is  “so  much  shunned  by  everyone  in  every  least  thing  that  no  sign  
of  that  ancient  virtue  remains  with  us.”  (D  I.PR.ii)  To  counteract  the  loss  of  ancient  
virtue,  Machiavelli  takes  upon  himself  “the  duty  of  a  good  man…  …[which  is]  to  teach  
others  that  the  good  that  you  could  not  work  because  of  the  malignity  of  the  times  and  
fortune,  so  that  when  many  are  capable  of  it,  someone  of  them  more  loved  by  heaven  
may  be  able  to  work  it.”  (D  II.PR.iii)  “The  good”  that  Machiavelli  teaches  is  both  new  
                                                                                                              
9  For  a  discussion  of  the  different  “sense”  metaphors  Machiavelli  uses  in  counseling  proper  appreciation  of  
the  ancients,  see  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  110.  
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and  old.10  Machiavelli  “labors”  to  “find  new  modes  and  orders,”  but  these  new  modes  
and  orders  are  inspired  by  “the  most  virtuous  works  the  histories  show  us.”  (D1.pr.i-­‐‑ii)  
Upon  reflection,  this  strategy  of  fashioning  the  new  out  of  the  old  is  a  shrewd  one  
because  it  mirrors  the  transformation  Machiavelli  wishes  to  bring  about  in  his  day.  
Machiavelli’s  contemporaries  already  admire  the  political  acts  of  the  ancients,  but  
Machiavelli’s  goal  is  to  transform  that  existing  admiration  into  something  that  does  not  
currently  exist,  namely  the  creation  of  new  orders  via  imitation  of  the  politics  of  the  
ancients.11  Machiavelli  wants  the  elites  of  his  day  (the  young,  spirited,  and  
impressionable  ones  in  particular  (D  II.PR.iii))  to  imitate  the  best  parts  of  ancient  politics  
with  the  same  vigor  and  passion  that  they  imitate  ancient  art  and  medicine.12  (D  I.PR.ii)    
To  do  so,  Machiavelli  writes  on  “whatever  [he]  shall  judge  necessary…  …so  that  
those  who  read  these  statements  of  [his]  can  more  easily  draw  from  them  that  utility  for  
which  one  should  seek  knowledge  from  histories.”13  (D  I.PR.ii)  Like  The  Prince,  
Machiavelli  wrote  the  Discourses  according  to  a  political  agenda  and  offer  a  view  of  the  
political  world  commensurate  with  that  agenda.14  And  because  Machiavelli  understands  
praise  and  blame  to  be  motivational  levers  when  it  comes  to  human  behavior,  it  stands  
                                                                                                              
10  Benner  points  out  that  all  political  “imitators”  deploy  a  blend  of  new  and  old.  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  109;  See  
also  Leo  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  85  -­‐‑86,  116,  167.  
11  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  133.  
12  For  a  comparison  of  Machiavelli’s  task  to  those  of  Agis  the  Spartan  and  Jesus  Christ,  see  Strauss  Thoughts  
on  Machiavelli,  173.  
13  Part  of  this  task  involves  painting  an  overly  rosy  view  of  the  ruling  elite  in  Rome.  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  
Machiavelli,  134.  
14  Nor  does  Machiavelli  think  of  himself  as  the  first  to  do  this.  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  112.  
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to  reason  that  the  way  he  praises  and  blames  ancient  political  actors  reflects  the  political  
behaviors  he  wishes  to  inspire  in  others.15  
This  line  of  thinking  makes  Machiavelli’s  opening  to  DI.10  so  intriguing.  He  
writes,    
“Among  all  men  praised,  the  most  praised  are  those  who  have  been  
heads  and  orderers  of  religions.  Next,  then  are  those  who  have  founded  
either  republics  or  kingdoms.  After  them  are  celebrated  those  who,  
placed  over  armies,  have  expanded  either  their  kingdom  or  that  of  the  
fatherland.  To  these  literary  men  are  added;  and  because  these  are  of  
many  types,  they  are  each  celebrated  according  to  his  rank.  To  any  other  
man,  the  number  of  which  is  infinite,  some  share  of  praise  is  attributed  
that  his  art  or  occupation  brings  him.”  (D  I.10.i)  
  
Contrast  this  hierarchy  with  his  characterization  of  the  four  founders  in  The  
Prince  (Romulus,  Theseus,  Cyrus,  and  Moses)  in  chapter  6.  In  that  chapter,  he  dedicates  
himself  exclusively  to  a  discussion  of  the  3  secular  founders,  writing,  “one  should  not  
reason  about  Moses,  as  he  was  a  mere  executor  of  things  that  had  been  ordered  for  him  
by  god.”  (P.6.ii)  Moreover,  Machiavelli  holds  Moses  out  not  as  a  figure  for  imitation,  but  
rather  as  a  figure  who  “should  be  admired  if  only  for  that  grace  which  made  him  
deserving  of  speaking  with  god.”  (P.6.ii,  emphasis  mine)    
   In  the  Discourses,  however,  it  is  a  religious  figure  who  most  fundamentally  
shaped  patterns  of  violence  to  prevent  violent  oppression.  Machiavelli  regarded  Rome  
as  a  city  of  multiple  founders  and  orderers.  In  DI.1.v,  Machiavelli  offers  the  case  to  be  
                                                                                                              
15  Machiavelli  writes  of  one  contemplating  the  ancients,  “without  doubt,  if  he  is  born  of  man,  he  will  be  
terrified  away  from  every  imitation  of  wicked  times  and  will  be  inflamed  with  an  immense  desire  to  follow  
the  good.”  (D  I.10.vi)  
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made  for  Aeneas,  Romulus,  Numa  Pompilius,  “and  others”  in  each  having  a  hand  in  
founding  Rome.  But  who  was  the  founder?  In  DI.11.ii,  Machiavelli  settles  the  matter  of  
their  relative  influences  by  writing,    
If  one  had  to  dispute  over  which  prince  Rome  was  more  obligated  to,  
Romulus  or  Numa,  I  believe  rather  that  Numa  would  obtain  the  first  
rank,  for  where  there  is  religion,  arms  can  be  easily  introduced,  and  
where  there  are  arms  and  not  religion,  the  latter  can  be  introduced  only  
with  difficulty.  (I.11.ii)  
  
Numa  surpasses  Romulus  as  a  founder  of  Rome  because  his  religious  
innovations  “served  to  command  armies,  to  animate  the  plebs,  to  keep  men  good,  [and]  
to  bring  shame  to  the  wicked.”  (D  I.11.ii)  Romulus’s  reign  gave  Rome  its  “birth  and  
education”  but  those  things  that  were  “omitted  by  him  were  [ordered]  by  Numa.”  (D  
I.11.i)  These  “omitted”  things,  it  turns  out  were  cultural  practices  necessary  to  “reduce  
[the  Roman  people]  to  civil  obedience.”  (D  I.11.i)  As  a  collective,  Romans  were  fiercely  
independent,  but  as  individuals  they  were  fiercely  obedient  to  each  other.  They  owed  
this  second  characteristic  to  Numa.16  Machiavelli  underscores  the  degree  of  Roman  
interdependence  by  claiming,  “The  citizens  feared  to  break  an  oath  much  more  than  the  
laws.”  (D  I.11.ii)  Far  from  leading  to  lawlessness  on  the  part  of  the  Roman  people,  
Roman  religious  practices  made  “easier  whatever  enterprises  the  Senate  or  the  great  
men  of  Rome  might  plan  to  make.”  (D  I.11.i)  In  a  state  so  radically  divided  by  class,  
                                                                                                              
16  Vickie  Sullivan  takes  Machiavelli  to  be  blaming  Numa  for  downfall  of  the  Roman  empire  and  the  
oppression  of  the  average  roman  citizen  by  roman  elites:  “Numa’s  introduction  of  religion  made  it  possible  
for  the  patricians,  in  the  pursuit  of  their  own  class  interests,  to  use  fraudulent  appeals  to  the  divine  to  
manipulate  a  credulous  people.”  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  6.    
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what  could  be  more  important  than  a  willingness  to  abide  by  agreements  made?  
Machiavelli  celebrates  the  agonism  of  Roman  politics,  but  that  agonism  was  only  useful  
insofar  as  Rome  could  still  successfully  pursue  her  enterprises.  Here  Roman  religion  
supplied  the  necessary  social  glue:  “it  caused  good  orders;  good  orders  make  good  
fortune;  and  from  good  fortune  arose  the  happy  success  of  enterprises,”  which  we  know  
to  be  military  enterprises  in  Rome’s  case.17  (D  I.11.iv)  
So,  rather  than  an  interest  in  moral  perfection,  Machiavelli’s  concerns  over  
political  violence  in  general  and  oppression  in  particular,  drive  his  treatment  of  
religion.18  In  the  Art  of  War,  we  should  remember,  Machiavelli  praises  “ancient  lawgivers  
and  governors  of  kingdoms  and  republics  [who]  took  great  care…  …to  inspire  all  their  
subjects—but  particularly  their  soldiers—with  fidelity,  love  of  peace,  and  fear  of  god.”  
(AW  PR)  These  characteristics  are  essential  to  the  makeup  of  a  good  citizen-­‐‑soldier  and,  
by  extension,  to  the  possibility  of  a  good  citizen-­‐‑militia,  because  they  guarantee  the  
exercise  of  force  according  to  politically  desirable  norms.  In  Rome,  “fear  of  god”  was  the  
foundation  of  reciprocal  trust  between  citizens  because  it  guaranteed  oath-­‐‑keeping.  And  
nowhere  –  in  any  regime  –  is  reciprocal  trust  more  important  than  among  those  who  are  
                                                                                                              
17  We  also  know  it  to  be  the  non-­‐‑violent  settling  of  disputes  up  to  the  era  of  the  Gracchi.  Compare  that  to  the  
Florentine  experience  as  Machiavelli  depicts  it  in  books  1-­‐‑3  of  the  Florentine  Histories.  
18  Most  interpreters  of  Machiavelli  have  understood  religion  to  be  a  tool  of  politics.  See  for  example,  Pocock,  
The  Machiavellian  Moment,  192-­‐‑193;  Maurizio  Viroli,  “Machiavelli  and  the  Republican  Idea  of  Politics,”  156.  
None  have  gone  so  far,  however,  as  to  tie  it  specifically  to  a  tool  for  the  management  of  political  violence.  
For  the  contrasting  view  that  Numa’s  religious  innovation  actually  created  a  split  between  the  demands  of  
politics  and  those  of  religion,  see  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  58.    
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armed  and  between  those  who  are  armed  and  those  who  are  not.  Without  reciprocal  
trust,  states  are  forced  to  fall  back  on  sub-­‐‑optimal  mechanisms  of  behavioral  
enforcement.  In  such  cases  “it  must  be  either  that  the  kingdom  comes  to  ruin  or  that  is  
sustained  by  the  fear  of  a  prince,  which  supplies  the  defects  of  religion.”  (D  I.11.iv)  We  
know  from  elsewhere  in  Machiavelli’s  work  that  fear  is  an  effective  political  tool,  but  it  
is  nevertheless  suboptimal  because  it  relies  on  the  virtue  of  its  user.19  Moreover,  the  
heavy-­‐‑handed  use  of  fear  to  maintain  order  nullifies  the  primary  advantage  of  a  “free  
way  of  life,”  which  is  predicated  upon  individual  citizens  not  fearing  the  loss  of  
patrimony  and  wealth  accruing  from  industriousness.  (D  II.2.iii)  Machiavelli  sees  orders  
that  are  self-­‐‑sustaining  by  virtue  of  internalized  norms  as  far  better  than  those  that  
depend  exclusively  on  fear.20  (D  I.11.v)  Numa  receives  such  praise  from  Machiavelli  
because  he  engineered  such  a  self-­‐‑sustaining  order.    
   That  Numa  did  so  gives  Machiavelli  more  fodder  for  his  indictment  of  his  own  
times.  It  is  true  that  Numa’s  task  was  easier  in  early  Rome  than  it  would  have  been  in  
Florence  of  Machiavelli’s  day  owing  to  the  self-­‐‑styled  sophistication  and  refinement  of  
Machiavelli’s  contemporaries.  (D  I.11.v)  Nevertheless,  Machiavelli  cites  the  
accomplishments  of  Savonarola  as  evidence  for  the  remaining  possibility  of  religious  
persuasion.  (D  I.11.v)  In  light  of  that  remaining  possibility,  Machiavelli  excoriates  
                                                                                                              
19  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  77.  
20  Pace  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  188.    
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Christian  doctrine  because  it  “has  glorified  humble  and  contemplative  more  than  active  
men…  …and  if  our  religion  asks  that  you  have  strength  in  yourself,  it  wishes  you  to  be  
capable  more  of  suffering  than  doing  something  strong.”  (D  II.2.ii)  The  effect  of  this  set  
of  expectations  is  to  “have  rendered  the  world  weak  and  given  it  in  prey  to  criminal  
men,  who  can  manage  it  securely.”  (D  II.2.ii)  The  task  of  a  ‘New  Numa’  would  be  to  
reinterpret  Christianity  “according  to  virtue”  rather  than  “according  to  idleness,”  a  task  
which  Machiavelli  regards  as  plausible:  “For  if  they  considered  how  it  permits  us  the  
exaltation  and  defense  of  the  fatherland,  they  would  see  that  it  wishes  us  to  love  and  
honor  it  and  to  prepare  ourselves  to  be  such  that  we  can  defend  it.”21  (D  II.2.ii)  We  can  
safely  assume  the  scale  of  praise  and  blame  that  Machiavelli  lays  out  in  the  Discourses  
would  serve  as  a  helpful  guide  to  the  prospective  renovator  of  Christianity.  
   That  said,  Numa  –  not  Christ  –  stands  alone  as  an  orderer  of  a  religion.22  For  
Machiavelli,  the  brilliance  of  Numa  was  the  effect  he  had  on  violent  oppression  via  his  
use  of  “the  arts  of  peace.”  (D  I.11.i)  Without  Numa,  “who  pretended  to  be  intimate  with  
a  nymph  who  counseled  him  on  what  he  had  to  counsel  the  people,”  there  would  have  
been  no  “way  to  maintain  a  civilization”  among  such  “a  very  ferocious  people.”  (D  
I.11.i)  Of  course,  the  fact  that  Numa  committed  an  act  of  fraud  by  claiming  divine  
                                                                                                              
21  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  108.  
22  Jesus  Christ  is  only  mentioned  by  way  of  Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  Saint  Dominic’s  and  Saint  Francis’s  
respective  uses  of  the  life  of  Christ  as  a  model  for  their  followers.  Moses  –  who  Machiavelli  calls  a  founder  in  
the  Prince  –  is  not  treated  in  the  Discourses  as  a  head  or  orderer  of  a  religion,  but  rather  as  a  secular  founder  
(D  I.1.vi,  DI.9.iii,  DII.8.ii)  or  a  exemplar  for  reformers  of  republics.  (D  III.30.i)  
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influence  in  ordering  Roman  religious  practices  only  underscores  the  extent  to  which  
Machiavelli  is  really  characterizing  religion  as  a  tool  for  minimizing  violent  oppression.23  
Machiavelli  dedicates  lengthy  passages  to  the  Roman  military’s  use  of  the  auspices  to  
inspire  confidence  in  their  soldiers  or  justify  prudent  retreat.  Machiavelli  holds  out  fraud  
itself  as  a  glorious  way  to  win  a  military  engagement.  (D  III.40.i)  In  discussing  that  
manner  of  fraud,  Machiavelli  makes  a  telling  remark.  He  writes,  “I  do  not  understand  
that  fraud  to  be  glorious  which  makes  you  break  faith  given  and  pacts  made…  …but  I  
speak  of  fraud  that  is  used  with  the  enemy  who  does  not  trust  you  and  that  properly  
consists  in  managing  war.”  (D  III.40.i)  While  one  might  assume  that  this  precludes  
committing  fraud  against  ones  own  countrymen,  Machiavelli  might  pose  the  following  
questions  in  response.  Who  are  “the  enemy”  if  not  those  “who  have  rendered  the  world  
weak  and  given  it  prey  to  criminal  men?”  As  we  saw  in  The  Prince,  the  members  of  the  
latter  group  are  the  prince’s  ‘friends,’  who  would  multiply  violence  if  left  to  their  own  
devices.  Similarly,  In  the  Discourses,  who  must  Numa’s  contend  with  if  not  those  early  
Romans  who  were  so  “ferocious”  that  they  precluded  “civil  obedience?”  Numa  occupies  
a  place  of  privilege  in  the  Discourses  because  he  transformed  Rome  into  a  place  where  
ferocity  led  to  great  endeavors  abroad,  while  piety,  fidelity,  and  love  of  peace  led  to  a  
civil  way  of  life  at  home.24  As  Maurizio  Viroli  puts  the  matter,  “the  point  that  
                                                                                                              
23  For  a  supporting  view,  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  Empire,  83.  
24  For  a  discussion  of  the  fraudulent  use  of  necessity  in  ruling  republics,  see  Hörnqvist,  Machiavelli  and  
Empire,  95-­‐‑96.  
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Machiavelli  stresses  again  and  again  is  that  a  city  must  be  in  a  position  to  fight  to  protect  
its  liberty  and  that  both  citizens  and  rulers  must  go  to  war  in  order  to  have  peace  but  
should  not  disturb  peace  in  order  to  have  war.”25  Numa  saw  to  the  second  half  of  
Viroli’s  formulation.  Romulus,  we  shall  see,  saw  to  the  other.  
5.3 Romulus, violence, and the ordering of good laws 
Numa’s  place  of  privilege  in  the  Discourses,  however,  does  not  make  his  actions  
the  central  focus  or  even  the  first  figure  that  readers  of  the  Discourses  might  want  to  
imitate.  Despite  holding  the  second  and  third  ranks  of  praise,  readers  need  to  
understand  virtuous  political  and  military  action  because  it  holds  priority  over  the  
creation  or  renovation  of  religious  orders.  To  put  the  matter  another  way,  Rome  may  
have  been  more  obligated  to  Numa  –  especially  where  internal  concord  was  concerned  –  
but  Numa,  in  turn,  traded  upon  the  virtuous  action  of  Romulus.26  Numa  was  only  able  
to  “rule  Rome  for  many  years  with  the  art  of  peace”  because  “the  virtue  of  Romulus  was  
so  much  that  it  could  give  space”  for  Numa  to  be  “an  orderer  of  a  civil  way  of  life.”  (D  
I.19.i,  DI.19.iii)  In  so  many  ways,  Numa  relied  on  fortune  and  was  able  to  hold  Rome  on  
the  basis  of  what  he  had  been  given  by  his  predecessor.  In  contrast,  “he  who  is  like  
Romulus,  and  like  him  comes  armed  with  prudence  and  arms,  will  hold  it  in  every  
mode  unless  it  is  taken  from  him  by  an  obstinate  and  obsessive  force.”  (D  I.19.iv)  
                                                                                                              
25  Viroli,  “Machiavelli  and  the  Republican  Idea  of  Politics,”  159-­‐‑160.  
26  It  is,  as  a  result,  an  error  to  call  a  founder  an  “unmoved  mover.”  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  54  and  63.  
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Romulus  is  praiseworthy  and  worth  imitating  for  this  capacity  to  lay  the  foundation  for  
later  political  success.    
   It  is  therefore  understandable  that  Machiavelli  would  open  book  I  with  chapters  
on  the  “beginnings”  of  cities,  the  relationship  of  different  kinds  of  regimes  to  their  
beginnings,  and  the  causes  of  Rome’s  successful  development  into  a  “perfect”  regime.  
(D  I.1-­‐‑3)  If  Machiavelli  is  to  spark  a  new  beginning  in  politics  among  his  contemporaries,  
he  ought,  at  the  very  least,  show  them  how  to  initiate  new  beginnings.  Undertaking  a  
new  beginning,  like  undertaking  any  other  project,  requires  knowledge  of  both  means  
and  ends  –  knowledge,  in  other  words,  of  both  how  one  makes  a  good  beginning  and  
what  a  good  beginning  looks  like.  For  the  purposes  of  imitating  a  founder  like  Romulus,  
this  means  both  knowing  how  he  created  the  inheritance  that  he  left  to  his  successors  
like  Numa  and  what  that  inheritance  was.  The  need  for  this  knowledge  motivates  
Machiavelli’s  extended  treatment  of  foundings.27  For  our  purposes,  both  aspects  of  
founding  directly  concern  the  minimization  of  violent  oppression.  In  Romulus’s  case,  
understanding  the  means  of  his  founding  requires  an  analysis  of  the  “cruelties  well-­‐‑
used”  that  allowed  him  to  consolidate  power  and  understanding  the  substance  of  his  
founding  requires  an  analysis  of  the  core  Roman  institutions  he  created.  
     How  could  Machiavelli  praise  Romulus’s  means  such  that  he  profitably  inspired  
imitation?  Romulus  committed  fratricide.  What  sort  of  politics  would  be  engendered  by  
                                                                                                              
27  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  133.  
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the  imitation  of  such  an  action?  In  DI.9,  Machiavelli  takes  up  the  minority  opinion  that  
Romulus,  despite  his  most  memorable  act,  is  nevertheless  a  worthwhile  example  of  a  
“prudent  orderer  of  a  republic.”  (D  I.9.ii)  Machiavelli’s  effort  to  redeem  Romulus’s  
actions  in  founding  Rome  proceeds  along  two  lines,  one  concerning  the  necessity  of  
Romulus’s  tactics  and  the  relative  value  of  those  means  with  respect  to  his  ends.  The  
first  of  those  efforts  embodies  one  of  Machiavelli’s  most  prominent  leitmotifs:  the  
restriction  of  extraordinary  authority  to  “uno  solo.”  In  part,  this  restriction,  speaks  to  the  
nature  of  group  decision-­‐‑making.  Machiavelli  takes  it  as  a  given  that  groups  tend  to  
favor  the  status  quo,  because  they  are  generally  unable  to  agree  upon,  and  therefore  
unite  behind,  a  suitable  alternative  to  it.  (D  I.9.ii)  In  this  respect,  “uno  solo”  really  just  
represents  a  functional  alternative  for  making  and  executing  decisions  in  a  crisis.    
   But  why  excuse  such  disgusting  violence?  How  can  we  overlook  Romulus’s  
fratricide  (and  other  uses  of  violence)?  If  we  are  to  accept  Romulus  as  an  example,  we  
have  to  accept  his  uses  of  violence,  which  Machiavelli  regarded  as  part  and  parcel  to  the  
solitude  of  his  authority.  Machiavelli’s  second  line  of  effort  to  redeem  Romulus  casts  the  
use  of  political  violence  as  necessary  for  becoming  “uno  solo.”  This  necessity  does  not  
arise  from  the  nature  of  “the  many,”  which  functioned  as  the  counterpart  to  “uno  solo”  
in  Machiavelli’s  argument  about  group  decision-­‐‑making.  Rather,  the  necessity  to  use  
violence  arises  from  political  dynamics  spelled  out  by  Machiavelli’s  diverse  humors  
thesis.  The  humor  characteristic  to  the  elite  –  the  humor  to  oppress  –  creates  a  double  
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necessity  for  anyone  attempting  to  create  new  orders  with  an  eye  toward  the  common  
good.  The  creation  of  new  orders  that  promote  the  common  good  presupposes  that  the  
extant  order  is  corrupt.  In  a  chapter  detailing  the  pervasive  challenge  posed  by  the  
enviousness  of  the  great  toward  others  in  power,  Machiavelli  tells  us  that  in  such  cases  
of  corruption,  the  great  are  “men  who  are  used  to  living  in  a  corrupt  city,  where  the  
education  has  not  produced  any  goodness  in  them…  …and  to  obtain  their  wish  and  to  
satisfy  their  perversity  of  spirit,  they  would  be  content  to  see  the  ruin  of  their  
fatherland.”  (D  III.30.i)  Whoever  reads  “the  Bible  judiciously,”  Machiavelli  continues,  
will  understand  Moses’s  use  of  violence  in  light  of  a  bloody  effort  to  marginalize  that  
form  of  enviousness.  This  problem,  it  would  seem,  is  common  to  the  founding  moment  
as  well.  Corrupt  and  envious  elites  covet  the  kind  of  power  necessary  for  founding  and  
reforming.  Moreover,  such  elites  invariably  lose  out  in  orders  that  promote  the  common  
good.  In  The  Prince,  Machiavelli  underscores  the  danger  of  “introducing  new  orders.  For  
the  introducer  has  all  those  who  benefit  from  the  old  orders  as  enemies,  and  has  
lukewarm  defenders  in  all  those  who  might  benefit  from  the  new  orders.”  (P6.iv)  So  
attempts  to  found  a  virtuous  political  order  are  necessarily  fraught  with  the  emergence  
of  enemies  rather  than  allies.  This  perspective  makes  the  use  of  violence  much  easier  to  
justify  because  it  takes  the  use  of  violence  as  a  given  and  reframes  the  question  of  the  
use  of  violence  as  one  of  ends  rather  than  one  of  means.  
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Machiavelli  reduces  the  political  world  as  it  exists  in  the  flux  of  founding  or  
reform  to  two  kinds  of  users  of  violence:  “he  who  is  violent  to  spoil”  and  he  “who  is  
violent  to  mend.”  (D  I.9.ii)  Elsewhere  in  the  same  chapter  Machiavelli  tells  his  reader  
that  a  “a  prudent  orderer”  deserves  the  authority  of  “uno  solo”  because  “he  has  the  
intent  to  help  not  himself  but  the  common  good,  and  not  for  his  own  succession  but  for  
the  common  fatherland.”  (D  I.9.ii)  Romulus,  in  Machiavelli’s  mind,  certainly  fell  into  the  
latter  category.  Remus  falls  into  the  former  by  default.  But  even  if  Remus  had  no  
intention  to  use  violence  for  personal  gain  or  to  “spoil”  his  and  Romulus’s  political  
project,  the  utility  of  the  example  is  undiminished  for  Machiavelli’s  purposes  in  the  
Discourses,  which  is  to  rehabilitate  ancient  examples  as  models  for  imitation.28  So  
Machiavelli  does  not  indict  Remus  because  that  is  not  the  part  of  the  example  that  needs  
rehabilitation.  The  text  itself  presupposes  a  corrupt  political  era.  Machiavelli  does  not  
need  to  cast  Remus  as  a  villain  because,  in  Machiavelli’s  era,  there  were  villains  aplenty.  
Machiavelli  intended  for  his  new  modes  and  orders  to  bring  forth  new  political  heroes  
cast  in  the  mold  of  Romulus,  who  is  characterized  in  D  I.9  not  by  his  opposition  to  
Remus,  but  rather  by  his  willingness  to  use  “extraordinary  authority”  to  found  Rome.29  
To  use  an  analogy  from  the  world  of  sports:  Machiavelli  is  treating  Romulus  like  a  gold-­‐‑
medal  winner.  The  key  takeaway  from  a  gold-­‐‑medal  winner’s  performance  is  the  fact  
                                                                                                              
28  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics,  101.  
29  Pitkin,  Fortune  is  a  Woman,  76.  Pace  Sheldon  Wolin.  Politics  and  Vision,  205.  
  199  
that  he  or  she  took  the  top  prize,  not  the  fact  that  he  or  she  beat  some  specific  competitor  
or  even  the  entire  field  of  competitors.  
   In  that  same  vein,  Machiavelli  uses  Romulus  to  rehabilitate  the  idea  of  using  
extraordinary  means  to  found  a  virtuous  political  order.30  The  creation  of  such  orders  
should  be  the  overweening  concern  of  Machiavelli’s  contemporaries,  but  –  as  we  learned  
in  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  Christianity  of  the  day  –  care  for  the  soul  had  trumped  care  
for  worldly  politics.  One  could  say  that  Machiavelli’s  contemporaries  confused  the  story  
of  Romulus  and  Remus  with  the  story  of  Cain  and  Able.  The  difference  between  the  two  
was  the  founding  of  Rome.  So  while  both  involved  a  fratricide,  the  former  led  to  a  
virtuous  political  order.31  Moreover,  if  the  first  virtue  of  a  virtuous  political  order  is  that  
it  effectively  constrains  and  shapes  uses  of  violence  in  accordance  with  a  civil  way  of  
life,  then  the  very  terms  used  to  condemn  Romulus’s  act  simultaneously  exonerate  him  
by  virtue  of  the  outcome.  Machiavelli  writes,  “it  is  very  suitable  that  when  the  deed  
accuses  him,  the  effect  excuses  him;  and  when  the  effect  is  good,  as  was  that  of  Romulus,  
it  will  always  excuse  the  deed.”  (D  I.9.ii)  We  should  keep  in  mind  that  the  accusing  deed  
and  the  excusing  effect  are  commensurable.32  This  conceptual  move  may  be  Machiavelli’s  
                                                                                                              
30  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  128.  
31  One  reading  of  Machiavellian  virtú  understands  it  as  the  ability  to  turn  disorder  into  order  and  thereby  
create  stability  and  reduce  the  effects  of  fortuna.  For  example  See  Benner,  Machiavelli’s  Ethics  142,  162;  Pocock  
The  Machiavellian  Moment,  188.  
32  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  “A  Note  on  Machiavelli,”  128;  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  198.  
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most  important  move  in  the  Discourses.33  Politics  is  a  matter  of  dirty  hands.34  Those  who  
have  bad  ends  are  always  willing  to  use  bad  means  and  so  will  always  exacerbate  
problems  of  political  violence.  The  trick  is  motivating  those  who  have  good  ends  –  
perhaps  like  Zanobi  Boundelmonti  and  Cosimo  Rucellai,  to  whom  Machiavelli  dedicates  
the  work  –  to  behave  a  little  like  Romulus  and  not  shy  away  from  his  example  of  using  
any  means  necessary  to  pursue  admirable  ends.35  
   Part  of  the  concern  over  the  exemplary  nature  of  Romulus  act  falls  away,  in  
Machiavelli’s  view,  when  one  considers  that  the  political  upshot  of  Romulus’s  action  as  
a  whole  was  the  initiation  of  the  process  by  which  Rome’s  virtuous  political  order  
emerged.36  In  his  rehabilitation  of  Romulus  as  an  example  for  imitation,  Machiavelli  tells  
his  reader  that  he  is  contradicting  the  view  of  “many”  that  Romulus  sets  a  bad  example  
for  political  action  because  it  might  justify  committing  offenses  out  of  “ambition  and  the  
desire  to  command.”  (D  I.9.i)  If  one  can  justify  fratricide  with  the  pursuit  of  power,  then  
few  other  barriers  against  violence  –  if  any  –  remain.  However,  what  Machiavelli  
considers  virtuous  about  Romulus’s  actions  “is  demonstrated  by  his  having  at  once  
ordered  a  Senate  with  which  he  took  counsel  and  by  whose  opinions  he  decided.”  (D  
I.9.i)  Romulus  is  worth  imitating,  precisely  because  he  gave  up  his  extraordinary  
authority  after  founding  Rome  and  did  “not  leave  the  authority  he  took  as  an  
                                                                                                              
33  Pace  Skinner,  The  Foundations  of  Modern  Political  Thought,  157.  
34  Walzer,  “Political  Action:  the  Problem  of  Dirty  Hands,”  217-­‐‑237.  
35  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  168.  
36  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  188.  
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inheritance  to  another.”  (D  I.9.ii)  Those  who  would  use  Romulus  to  justify  offenses  in  
acquiring  power  ignore  the  fact  that  Romulus  did  not  simply  acquire  power  per  se;  
Romulus  acquired,  consolidated,  and  shaped  political  power  for  those  who  succeeded  
him.37  Moreover,  he  did  so  in  a  way  that  enabled  Numa  and  Brutus  to  take  the  steps  that  
they  did  to  minimize  violent  oppression.  
   Throughout  his  work,  but  in  the  Discourses  especially,  Machiavelli  discusses  
different  kinds  of  political  authorities  and  “modes.”  One  important  subspecies  is  
“extraordinary”  authority  and  modes.38  This  classification  serves  to  distinguish  between  
those  authorities  and  modes  that  are  not  typical  of  a  given  political  order  and  those  that  
are.  This  distinction  extends  to  the  use  of  violence  in  key  parts  of  Machiavelli’s  
discussion  of  Rome.  (D  III.3.iii,  DI.18.iv)  The  use  of  violence  can,  for  example,  be  
“ordered”  by  laws  or  institutions,  as  in  the  case  of  tribunes  –  or  it  can  fall  outside  them  
as  in  the  case  of  the  actions  that  Machiavelli  argues  that  his  old  patron,  Piero  Soderini,  
should  have  taken  to  consolidate  the  Florentine  republic.  In  all  cases,  there  seems  to  be  
an  implicit  understanding  that  extraordinary  violence,  as  Machiavelli  understands  it,  is  
powerful,  rarely  recommended,  and  extremely  dangerous,  but  sometimes  necessary  
when  consolidated  orders  are  absent  or  not  enough  to  deter  violent  oppression.  In  many  
ways,  Machiavelli  seems  to  share  the  wariness  of  excessive  uses  of  extraordinary  
                                                                                                              
37  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  196.  
38  Authorities:  DI.34.ii,  DIII.3.iii,  and  DIII.8.i;  Modes:  D1.4.i,  D1.7.i,  DI.7.iii,  DI.7.v,  DI.18.iv,  DI.37.iii,  DI.37.iii  
and  DIII.38.i.  
  202  
violence  that  motivates  “the  many”  who  condemn  Romulus  as  a  bad  example  because  
those  following  him  might  construe  his  “extraordinary  action”  as  precedent-­‐‑setting  for  
the  orders  that  follow.  In  all  likelihood,  Machiavelli  would  have  concurred  in  that  
condemnation  had  Romulus  failed  to  dictate  the  manner  in  which  the  power  he  had  
consolidated  could  be  used.  Machiavelli  notes  that  “he  who  considers  well  the  authority  
that  Romulus  reserved  for  himself  will  see  that  none  other  was  reserved  except  that  of  
commanding  the  armies  when  war  was  decided  on  and  of  convoking  the  Senate.”  (I.9.ii)  
That  Romulus’s  orders  (augmented  by  Numa’s)  “were  more  conformable  to  a  civil  and  
free  way  of  life  than  to  an  absolute  and  tyrannical  one,”  is  confirmed  in  Machiavelli’s  
view  when  “no  ancient  order  was  innovated,”  other  than  the  creation  of  the  consulship,  
during  the  transition  from  monarchy  to  republic.  (D  I.9.ii)  Herein  lies  the  crux  of  the  
Romulan  example.  The  effect  that  excuses  the  deed  that  accuses  Romulus  takes  the  form  
of  substituting  acquired,  inheritable  “ordinary”  authority  for  “extraordinary”  authority.  
   This  inheritable  “ordinary”  authority  is  the  foundation  of  the  Roman  edifice.  
Machiavelli’s  affirmation  of  the  orders  of  pre-­‐‑republican  Rome  as  “more  conformable  to  
a  civil  and  free  way  of  life”  specifies  the  goal  that  any  would-­‐‑be  imitator  of  Romulus  
should  have,  but  does  not  thoroughly  detail  the  contents  of  that  goal.  What  content  
should  orders  conformable  to  a  civil  and  free  way  of  life  have?  If  I  have  read  Machiavelli  
correctly,  the  first  virtue  of  such  orders  is  their  ability  to  minimize  violent  oppression,  
which  requires,  on  the  one  hand,  the  capacity  to  defend  sovereign  territory  and  deter  or  
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arrest  citizens  who  pose  threats  to  other  citizens  and,  on  the  other,  the  capacity  to  
constrain  those  who  are  armed  for  these  purposes  from  exercising  force  on  those  who  
are  under  their  protection.  When  Machiavelli  turns  to  the  mechanics  of  founding  in  the  
opening  chapter  of  the  Discourses  the  preeminent  measure  of  the  virtue  of  the  founder  is  
in  the  ordering  of  the  laws.39  And  the  preeminent  virtue  of  founding  laws  is  their  
capacity  to  “constrain  [idleness]  by  imposing  such  necessities  as  the  site  does  not  
provide.”  (D  I.1.4)  In  the  first  instance,  this  means  imposing  such  necessity  that  the  state  
can  defend  its  people.  Praiseworthy  ancient  regimes  “impos[ed]  such  a  necessity  to  
exercise  on  those  who  had  to  be  soldiers,  so  that  through  such  an  order  they  became  
better  soldiers.”  (D  I.1.4)  The  early  Roman  orders  excelled  in  the  outward  projection  of  
force,  thus  solving  the  first  requirement  mentioned  above.  Machiavelli  excuses  
Romulus’s  use  of  extraordinary  violence  because  he  used  his  acquired  authority  to  build  
a  political  edifice  that  was  valuable  by  virtue  of  “the  necessity  ordered  by  the  laws.”40  (D  
I.1.iv)  “Because  men  work  either  by  necessity  or  by  choice,  and  there  is  greater  virtue  to  
be  seen  where  choice  has  less  authority,”  laws  that  ‘order  necessity’  are  laws  that  
generate  virtue.  (D  I.1.iv)  To  put  the  matter  another  way,  Machiavelli  excuses  Romulus’s  
fratricide  because  Romulus  created  a  political  order  in  which  law  acted  as  the  necessity  
that  governed  violence.  Good  laws,  we  should  keep  in  mind,  are  artificial  constraints  
                                                                                                              
39  In  this  passage,  Machiavelli  mentions  both  “the  choice  of  the  site”  and  the  ordering  of  the  laws.  This  
choice  turns  upon  available  resources  of  a  given  physical  site  and  earns  precious  little  attention  from  
Machiavelli  in  the  rest  of  the  Discourses.    
40  This  phrase  actually  refers  to  Egyptian  orders.  But  it  is  apt  and  certainly  would  apply  to  Roman  ones.  
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that  produce  virtuous  outcomes.  For  Machiavelli,  the  more  that  states  can  subordinate  
the  use  of  violence  to  law,  the  better.  This  process  has  limits,  of  course,  and  Machiavelli’s  
recommendations  on  how  to  respond  to  those  limits  are  some  of  his  most  distinctive.  
That  said,  anyone  can  see,  and  Machiavelli  would  be  the  first  to  point  out,  that  a  regime  
in  which  violence  is  the  only  constraint  on  men’s  behavior  would  not  be  a  regime  
conformable  to  “a  civil  and  free  way  of  life.”  (D  I.9.ii)  
   Romulus  suits  Machiavelli’s  project  as  a  good  example  because  Romulus  was,  on  
the  one  hand,  capable  of  navigating  the  anomic  situation  prior  to  the  founding  for  which  
he  was  responsible.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  Romulus  ceded  almost  all  of  the  
extraordinary  authority  he  had  acquired  in  that  process,  thus  shifting  the  locus  of  
political  authority  to  other  parts  of  the  political  order.  The  chief  characteristic  of  that  
shift  was,  of  course,  the  inversion  of  the  relationship  between  violence  and  political  
authority  that  it  represented.  Prior  to  the  founding,  Romulus  acquired  political  authority  
by  using  violence.  After  the  founding,  the  use  of  violence  was  directed  and  shaped  by  
the  political  constraints  (i.e.,  “the  necessity  ordered  by  the  laws”)  placed  upon  it.    
5.4 Brutus, refounding, and reforming 
The  beginning  for  which  Romulus  was  responsible  was,  however,  just  a  
beginning  and  an  imperfect  one  at  that.  Machiavelli  distinguishes  Romulus  from  a  
notable  Greek  counterpart:  Lycurgus.  On  the  face  of  it,  Machiavelli  notes,  Lycurgus  
seems  like  a  much  better  object  of  study  for  those  who  would  learn  the  art  of  political  
  205  
innovation.  In  a  single  act  of  founding,  Lycurgus  created  a  political  order  that  was  a  
regional  hegemon  in  its  day  and  also  demonstrated  far  greater  longevity  than  the  
Roman  republic.  By  any  measure  that  Machiavelli  might  offer,  Lycurgus  was  a  better  
founder  than  Romulus.  In  fact,  Machiavelli  would  have  to  concede  that  Lycurgus  had  
more  virtue  than  Romulus  given  his  claim  that  the  virtue  of  the  founder  is  evident  in  the  
virtue  of  what  he  creates.  Machiavelli  says  of  Romulus’s  creation  that,  “first  orders  of  
Rome  were  defective.”  (D.I.2.vii)  Sparta  suffered  no  such  “defects.”    
   Still  one  can  defend  Machiavelli’s  focus  on  Romulus  on  two  grounds.  First,  
ignoring  Romulus  on  the  basis  of  his  defects  would  exclude  his  virtues  from  analysis.  
Machiavelli  thus  refuses  to  throw  the  baby  out  with  the  bathwater.  Second,  there  is  more  
to  learn  from  Romulus’s  founding  than  from  Lycurgus’s  founding,  owing  precisely  to  
the  defects  of  the  former.  “For  if  the  first  fortune  did  not  fall  to  Rome,  the  second  fell  to  
it…  …they  did  not  deviate  from  the  right  way  that  could  lead  them  to  perfection.”  
(D.I.2.vii)  The  Roman  case,  from  which  its  imperfect  founding  is  inextricable,  is  one  of  
successive  political  reforms  and  renovation.  Rome  was  quite  literally  not  built  in  a  day.  
It  is  thus  easy  to  imagine  that  this  characteristic  of  Roman  political  development  –  
reform  over  time  –  recommended  it  as  a  better  object  of  study  than  Sparta,  despite  
Sparta’s  perfect  founding.41  In  fact,  this  is  how  Machiavelli  characterizes  his  own  project  
in  the  Discourses.  It  is  one  of  an  imperfect  beginning,  one  that  “will  at  least  show  the  path  
                                                                                                              
41  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  190.  
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to  someone  who  with  more  virtue,  more  discourse  and  judgment,  will  be  able  to  fulfill  
this  intention  of  mine.”  (D  I.PR.i)  Rome  succeeded  precisely  because  those  with  “more  
virtue,  more  discourse,  and  more  judgment”  were  able  to  continue  along  the  path  that  
Romulus  initially  blazed.  In  this  respect,  the  Romulan  mode  of  founding  is  as  great  or  
greater  than  the  Lycurgan  mode.  If  by  “perfection  of  a  given  order”  we  take  Machiavelli  
to  mean  the  best  possible  order  for  a  given  people  and  location,  then  the  Romulan  mode  
can  approximate  the  Lycurgan  one  over  time.  If  by  “perfection  of  a  given  order”  we  take  
Machiavelli  to  mean  constant,  optimal  adjustments  to  a  changing  world  then  the  
Romulan  mode  can  actually  exceed  the  Lycurgan  one.  In  either  case,  only  study  of  
Romulus  can  impart  useful  knowledge  to  those  who  find  themselves  on  paths  started  by  
others  because  studying  the  art  of  reform  requires  properly  understanding  the  
imperfections  that  give  rise  to  it.  
   Machiavelli  credits  Romulus  with  creating  Rome’s  military  orders  and  the  
senate,  but  notes  that  these  were  incomplete.  (D.I.11.ii)  In  particular,  Numa’s  religious  
reforms  needed  to  augment  them  and  –  as  I  discussed  at  length  in  Chapter  4  –  so  did  the  
tribunes.  Both  of  these  reforms  served  to  limit  or  constrain  the  uses  of  violence  by  
Romans  against  other  Romans.  Romulus  satisfied  one  essential  requirement  for  
minimizing  violent  oppression  by  founding  an  order  that  could  defend  itself,  but  he  
only  partially  addressed  another  requirement  when  he  inverted  the  relationship  
between  institutional  constraints  and  the  use  of  violence.  He  needed  Numa  and  the  
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other  successive  reformers  to  bring  the  Roman  project  to  completion.  One  such  reformer  
was  Lucius  Junius  Brutus,  the  founder  of  the  republican  era  and  a  man  who  Machiavelli  
calls  “the  father  of  Roman  liberty.”  (D  III.1.vi)  This  characterization  would  seem  fairly  
straightforward  given  the  widespread  acknowledgment  of  Brutus  as  the  founder  of  the  
Roman  republic,  but  Machiavelli  has  already  conceded  “no  ancient  order  was  
innovated”  during  the  transition  from  the  monarchy  to  the  republic.  (D  I.9.ii)  Consular  
power  replaced  monarchic  power,  but  Machiavelli  does  not  consider  this  an  innovation.  
The  republic  did  not  reach  maturity  until  the  creation  of  the  tribunes  of  the  plebs,  who  
replaced  the  kings  as  a  check  on  the  ambitions  of  the  elites.  Nevertheless,  Machiavelli  
begins  his  review  of  “how  much  the  actions  of  particular  men  made  Rome  great  and  
caused  many  good  effects  in  that  city”  with  a  discussion  of  Brutus  and  his  role  in  
founding  and  consolidating  the  republic.  (D  III.1.vi)  Why  give  Brutus  such  pride  of  place  
when  he  does  not  appear  to  have  created  any  new  Roman  orders?  Why  call  Brutus  the  
“father  of  Roman  liberty”  when  it  appears  that  he  cannot  match  Romulus’s  military  
orders,  Numa’s  religious  orders,  or  the  tribunes  of  the  plebs?  The  answer  lies  in  the  
concept  of  precedent  and  a  tradition  of  Roman  politics  on  par,  in  Machiavelli’s  view,  
with  its  military  and  religious  orders.  Brutus  establishes  a  precedent  for  renewing  and  
revivifying  these  orders  and,  in  so  doing,  demonstrates  the  quintessential  political  action  
of  a  republic  and  the  best  way  republics  can  prevent  oppression  by  elites.  
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   After  expelling  the  Tarquins  from  Rome  following  the  uprising  stemming  from  
the  outrage  over  Sextus  Tarquinius’s  rape  of  Lucretia,  Brutus  presided  –  at  first  as  the  
leader  of  the  uprising  and  then  as  consul  –  over  the  consolidation  of  popular  rule.  In  that  
capacity,  Brutus  compelled  bystanders  at  Lucretia’s  suicide  to  “never  endure  that  in  the  
future  anyone  should  reign  in  Rome.”42  (D  III.2.i)  Later,  as  consul,  he  presided  over  the  
death  of  his  sons,  Titus  and  Tiberius,  for  their  participation  in  the  Tarquinian  
Conspiracy,  an  attempted  restoration  of  the  monarchy.  Machiavelli  brings  up  this  
episode  twice  in  the  Discourses  (D  I.16.iv-­‐‑v  and  DIII.3.i),  both  times  citing  it  as  an  
example  of  the  steps  that  every  fledgling  republic  must  take  in  order  to  consolidate  itself  
upon  transition  from  principality.  The  “sons  of  Brutus”  represent  the  humoral  elements  
of  the  prior  regime  that  satisfied  themselves  on  the  people,  obviously  at  the  expense  of  
the  people,  and  now  find  themselves  frustrated  in  their  desires  to  oppress.  Machiavelli  
indicts  the  sons  of  Brutus  for  “conspir[ing]  with  other  young  Romans  against  the  
fatherland  because  of  nothing  other  than  that  they  could  not  take  advantage  extraordinarily  
under  the  consuls  as  under  the  king,  so  that  the  freedom  of  the  people  appeared  to  have  
become  their  servitude.”  (D  I.16.iv,  emphasis  mine)  Brutus  becomes  the  “father  of  
Roman  liberty”  when  he  endorses,  via  his  conspicuous  presence,  the  execution  of  his  
own  sons  for  attempting  to  restore  their  elite  privileges.  The  fact  that  Machiavelli  
recommends  this  course  of  action  to  every  republic  indicates  that  he  sees  this  trade-­‐‑off  
                                                                                                              
42  Livy  reports  that  Brutus  later  made  the  people  at  large  swear  a  similar  oath.  Livy,  The  History  of  Rome,  85.  
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between  private  elite  advantage  and  popular  freedom  as  a  universal  one  related  to  the  
humoral  dynamics  of  every  state.  
   Republics  that  do  not  dedicate  themselves  to  the  continual  frustration  of  private,  
elite  advantage  fall  short  of  the  term  “free  state.”  Moreover,  republics  that  do  not  
marginalize  “those  who  are  enemies  to  that  new  order  [make]  a  state  of  short  life.”  (D  
I.16.iv)  Brutus  is  an  exemplary  figure  in  the  Discourses  and  Machiavelli  thinks  of  him  as  
the  founder  of  the  republic  because  the  virtue  of  his  political  actions  were  to  punish  (and  
thereby  frustrate)  the  satisfaction  and  attempted  satisfaction  of  private  elite  advantage.  
In  doing  so,  Brutus  forged  a  mold  for  frustrating  oppression  by  the  elite.  Given  
Machiavelli’s  humoral  framework,  we  can  think  of  three  kinds  of  intrastate  violence:  
intra-­‐‑elite,  elite  on  non-­‐‑elite,  and  non-­‐‑elite  on  elite.43  Given  Machiavelli’s  faith  in  the  
desires  and  habits  of  the  people  the  last  one  is  not  a  subject  of  concern,  especially  when  
subject  to  the  right  political  institutions.  In  such  cases,  Machiavelli  thinks  that  the  people  
will  judge  well  in  their  uses  of  violence.  But  the  other  two  remain  political  difficulties.  
Brutus  is  an  exemplar  because  he  demonstrates  how  the  one  may  be  used  to  solve  the  
other.44    
                                                                                                              
43  Violence  committed  by  average  citizens  against  other  average  citizens  certainly  represents  a  problem  of  
violence,  but  only  represents  a  problem  of  political  violence  insofar  as  state  institutions  are  responsible  for  
that  violence.  Machiavelli  does  not  take  dwell  on  this  issue,  probably  owing  to  his  faith  in  the  popular  
humor  against  domination  itself.  
44  Elites  who  would  “take  advantage  extraordinarily”  create  a  problem  that  overlaps  with  the  problem  of  
controlling  the  armed.  One  avenue  for  the  pursuit  of  such  advantages  is  the  cooptation  of  the  armed  as  a  
mechanism  of  coercion.  Machiavelli  would  certainly  see  any  systematic  and  widespread  use  of  an  armed  
force  to  oppress  the  people  as  doing  so  at  the  direction  of  a  political  or  military  head.  And  he  would  
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   Given  Machiavelli’s  already-­‐‑discussed  praise  of  the  tribunate,  it  should  come  as  
no  surprise  that  the  frustration  of  oppressive  elite  humors  characterizes  republics,  as  
Machiavelli  understands  them.  Brutus  is  nevertheless  a  surprising  exemplar  because  
Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  his  actions  makes  the  case  that  the  frustration  of  oppressive  
elite  humors  nevertheless  requires  elite  action  in  addition  to  popular  action  through  
institutions  like  the  tribunes  of  the  plebs.  Machiavelli  dedicates  book  III  of  the  Discourses  
to  a  discussion  of  how  the  actions  of  particular  citizens  redounded  to  the  greatness  of  
Rome.  Brutus  is  the  first  citizen  he  discusses,  both  in  order  and  importance.  Machiavelli  
prefaces  this  discussion,  however,  by  claiming  that  “nothing  is  more  necessary  in  a  
common  way  of  life,  whether  it  is  sect  or  kingdom  or  republic,  than  to  give  back  to  it  the  
reputation  it  had  in  its  beginnings,  and  to  contrive  that  it  be  either  good  orders  or  good  
men  that  produce  this  effect.”  (D  III.1.vi)  The  death  of  the  sons  of  Brutus,  Machiavelli  
concedes,  were  but  one  instance  of  the  Roman  republican  tradition  of  exemplary  trials  
and  punishments.  Machiavelli  cites  7  specific  “executions”  (“esecuzioni”)  of  Roman  
orders  (4  of  which  resulted  in  literal  executions)  which  “made  men  draw  back  toward  
the  mark”  of  Roman  virtue.  What  unites  these  events?  A  haphazard  reading  might  
mistake  the  outcome  of  the  first  5  “executions”  –  the  deaths  of  Brutus’s  sons,  of  the  
                                                                                                              
  
certainly  see  the  most  appropriate  solution  as  a  separation  of  that  head  from  that  body.  Brutus  is  an  
exemplar  of  how  intra-­‐‑elite  violence  may  be  used  as  a  bulwark  against  elite  on  non-­‐‑elite  violence.  
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decemvirs,  of  Maelius  the  grain  dealer,  of  Manlius  Capitolinus,  and  of  the  son  of  
Manlius  Torquatus  –  for  Machiavelli’s  meaning  of  the  word  execution.  However,  the  
inclusion  of  the  trial  of  the  Scipios  and  the  prosecution  of  Quintus  Fabius  by  Papirus  
Cursor,  neither  of  which  resulted  in  capital  punishment,  indicates  that  Machiavelli  is  
talking  about  the  execution  of  a  set  of  Roman  orders  rather  than  Roman  persons.  In  the  
third  paragraph  of  that  chapter,  Machiavelli  defines  that  set.  The  “orders  that  drew  the  
Roman  republic  back  toward  its  beginning  were  the  tribunes  of  the  plebs,  the  censors,  
and  all  the  other  laws  that  went  against  the  ambition  and  insolence  of  men.”  (D  III.1.iii)  So,  
when  Machiavelli  argues  that  Roman  elites  took  exemplary  actions  that  redounded  to  
the  greatness  of  Rome,  one  set  of  actions  he  has  in  mind  is  the  reassertion  of  the  orders  
that  go  “against  the  ambition  and  insolence  of  men,”  in  other  words  against  the  
tendency  of  unchecked  elite  humors  to  lead  to  the  oppression  of  the  people.45    
   Machiavelli’s  discussion  of  additional  cases  beyond  Rome  reiterates  his  praise  of  
Rome’s  periodic  reassertion  of  the  orders  that  checked  elite  humors.  First,  Machiavelli  
praises  saints  Dominic  and  Francis  for  giving  new  life  to  Christianity  by  reasserting  the  
life  of  Christ  as  a  model  for  Christian  piety.  But,  just  as  Machiavelli  praises  these  two  
“orderers  of  sects,”  he  condemns  them  for  not  creating  orders  that  would  punish  the  
insolence  of  the  “prelates  and  heads  of  the  religion”  and  thereby  leaving  those  heads  to  
“do  the  worst  they  can  because  they  do  not  fear  punishment.”  (D  III.1.iv)  A  second  
                                                                                                              
45  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes  10,  169;  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  33.  
  212  
example  –  this  time  of  successful  checks  on  elite  humors  –  is  France,  where  the  
Parlement  serves  the  function  of  punishing  the  ambitions  and  insolence  of  the  few  with  
its  executions  and  verdicts.  “Up  until  now  it  has  maintained  itself  by  having  been  an  
obstinate  executor  against  the  nobility  but  whenever  it  should  leave  any  of  them  
unpunished  and  they  should  come  to  multiply,  without  doubt  it  would  arise  either  that  
they  would  have  to  be  corrected  with  great  disorder  or  that  the  kingdom  would  be  
dissolved.”  (D  III.1.v)  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  Rome,  the  Franciscan  and  Dominican  
orders,  and  France  is  united  by  his  use  of  checks  on  elite  humors  as  a  standard  of  
assessment.  Dominic  and  Francis  fail  where  the  Parlement  excelled  and  Brutus  was  
unparalleled:  frustration  of  the  elite  humor.  Romulus  and  Numa  each  created  
institutions  that  empowered  Rome,  and  the  formation  of  the  tribunate  empowered  the  
plebs  against  the  Roman  elites  who  would  oppress  them,  but  it  was  Brutus’s  example  
that  established  a  tradition  of  intra-­‐‑elite  checks  and  spirited  executions  of  Roman  orders.  
Brutus  founded  a  model  for  greatness  that  depended  upon  maintenance  of  the  common  
good  and  resulted  in  service  to  the  people  rather  than  individual  success  and  resulted  in  
personal  advantage.46  Brutus,  in  short,  created  a  means  by  which  Romans  could  pursue  
praise  domestically  by  frustrating  attempts  at  oppression.  
                                                                                                              
46  Pace  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  127.  
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5.5 Speakers, Dictators and Generals. 
Of  course,  glorious  action  for  Roman  elites  was  not  limited  to  only  frustrating  
attempts  at  oppression  within  Rome;  they  exercised  other  forms  of  leadership,  especially  
in  defense  of  the  city.  This  brand  of  leadership  required,  in  Machiavelli’s  view,  virtuous  
use  of  the  art  of  war,  art  of  peace,  and  dictatorial  authority.47  All  three  activities  were  
necessary  for  Roman  elites  to  address  problems  of  political  violence  and  Machiavelli’s  
praise  of  all  three  speak  to  his  understanding  of  the  dynamics  of  republics.  
Founders  of  religious  and  political  bodies  occupy  the  first  two  ranks  of  praise  in  
the  hierarchy  that  Machiavelli  offers  in  DI.10.  Military  commanders  occupy  the  third  
rank.  For  Machiavelli,  military  command  is  unquestionably  the  function  of  a  republic’s  
few,  most  virtuous  citizens.48  Machiavelli  recommends  that  republics  furnish  their  own  
arms,  presumably  commanders  are  part  of  that  provision.49  (D  I.21)  That  provision  is  
not,  however,  micromanagement.  Once  command  is  given,  domestic  institutions  should  
not  interfere  with  the  decisions  of  their  commanders.  (D  II.33)  Presumably,  this  
injunction  to  trust  a  commander  is  predicated  upon  selecting  the  best  and  the  brightest  
for  command.  In  a  similar  vein,  Machiavelli  cautions  against  divided  command  in  the  
field.  (D  III.15)  In  all  cases,  there  is  a  common  dynamic  at  work:  Machiavelli  eschews  
group  decision-­‐‑making  in  favor  of  individual  command  in  cases  of  military  engagement.  
                                                                                                              
47  For  a  discussion  of  the  “all-­‐‑out”  nature  of  elite  action  in  defense  of  Rome,  see  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli;  
51,  Viroli  “Machiavelli  and  the  Republican  Idea  of  Politics,”  169;  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  203.  
48  Hulliung,  Citizen  Machiavelli,  43.  
49  Mallet,  “The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Warfare  in  Machiavelli’  s  Republic,”  174.  
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Individual  command,  in  turn,  depends  on  selecting  the  most  virtuous  Roman  citizens  
for  that  command.  We  should  not  confuse  his  kind  of  reliance  on  “the  few”  with  a  
limitation  of  command  to  Rome’s  economic  and  cultural  elite  (though  in  practice  
command  was  so  limited).  Machiavelli  notes  that  a  virtuous  commander  can  emerge  out  
of  the  ranks  of  an  army  that  does  not  have  one.  Indeed,  he  treats  the  military  as  one  of  
the  surest  means  of  social  mobility  for  someone  of  low  birth.50  In  The  Prince,  
Machiavelli’s  greatest  examples  all  start  as  foundlings.  (P  6)  Similarly,  Machiavelli  is  
careful  to  point  out  this  dynamic  at  work  in  his  Life  of  Castruccio  Castracani.51  This  
reliance  on  the  few  is  aristocratic  in  the  purest  sense.52  While  the  military  as  a  whole  
required  a  widespread,  generalized  virtue,  Machiavelli  saw  the  arts  of  war  as  
demanding  commanders  who  excelled  in  their  individual  virtues.  
That  said,  we  should  not  find  Machiavelli’s  praise  of  Roman  uses  of  the  arts  of  
peace  shocking.  Reckless  war-­‐‑making  spells  a  faster  end  to  a  state  than  a  strict  policy  of  
peace.  In  a  republic,  it  turns  out,  the  people  tend  to  err  where  an  undertaking  appears  
“great”  or  “spirited,”  despite  that  undertaking’s  posing  a  serious  risk  or  certain  loss  to  
the  regime.    “There  is  no  easier  way  to  make  a  republic  where  the  people  has  authority  
come  to  ruin  than  to  put  it  into  mighty  enterprises,  for  where  the  people  is  of  any  
moment,  they  are  always  accepted.”  (D  I.53.v)  Citizen-­‐‑militias  provide  no  counterweight  
                                                                                                              
50  Wolin,  Politics  and  Vision,  180.  
51  Machiavelli,  “Life  of  Castruccio  Castracani,”  555.  
52  Pace  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  130-­‐‑1.  
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to  wars  where  popular  fervor  for  a  particular  campaign  takes  root.  To  avoid  this  process,  
Machiavelli  notes  “nothing  is  so  apt  to  check  an  excited  multitude  as  is  the  reverence  for  
some  grave  man  of  authority  that  puts  himself  against  it.”  (D  I.54.i)  This  is  a  core  
function  of  elites  in  republics.53  Just  as  the  popular  authority  to  do  violence  undergirded  
the  political  powers  of  the  tribunes  and  so  provided  a  check  against  elite  ambition  and  
misuse  of  Roman  arms,  so  too  Machiavelli  recommends  that  those  elites  that  have  
acquired  political  authority  act  as  a  check  against  popular  enthusiasm  for  risky  
undertakings.54    
   Of  course,  even  a  perfectly  ordered  regime  faces  wholly  unanticipated,  externally  
generated  crises.  Without  legally  sanctioned,  broad  powers,  regimes  facing  
unanticipated  crises  will  be  forced  to  break  their  own  laws  “so  as  not  to  be  ruined.”  (D  
I.34.i)  In  such  instances,  Machiavelli  recommends  that  republics  imitate  the  Roman  
practice  of  creating  a  Dictator.55  “Dictatorial  Authority”  Machiavelli  writes  in  the  title  of  
chapter  34  of  book  I,  “Did  Good,  and  Not  Harm,  to  the  Roman  Republic.”  How  can  this  
be?  After  all,  Machiavelli  concedes  that  Caesar  used  the  dictatorship  as  a  veneer  for  his  
tyranny.56  (I.34.i)  Machiavelli’s  response  is  to  point  out  the  necessary  conditions  for  an  
                                                                                                              
53  Coby,  Machiavelli’s  Romans,  257.  
54  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  81-­‐‑5;  Strauss,  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli,  129;  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  
Three  Romes,  179.  
55  Harvey  Mansfield,  Machiavelli’s  New  Modes  and  Orders,  113.  
56  Mansfield  identifies  the  “ambition  of  the  plebs”  with  the  “ambition  of  the  Gracchi,  and  then  of  Caesar,  
who  descended  to  the  people  and  ascended  to  the  tyranny.”  Machiavelli’s  New  Modes  and  Orders,  121.  
Mansfield  is  only  right  in  the  instance  that  the  people  have  become  corrupt,  at  which  point  they  resemble  –  
humorally  speaking  –  the  elite.  
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institution  like  the  Dictatorship  to  transform  itself  into  tyranny.57  The  first  is  the  
corruption  of  the  regime  itself.  The  dictatorship  can  only  pose  a  threat  where  someone  
holding  an  office  like  the  dictatorship  already  has  “very  many  adherents  and  partisans,  
which  he  cannot  have  where  the  laws  are  observed.”  Only  then  can  that  office  serve  as  a  
launching  pad  into  a  full-­‐‑fledged  tyranny.  Dictators  who  lack  a  hard  core  of  support  (be  
those  linkages  clientelistic  or  ideological)  have  no  legs  to  stand  on  in  the  event  of  a  coup,  
even  if  it  is  by  legal  sleight  of  hand.  The  second  condition  concerns  the  composition  of  
the  dictatorship  itself.  “The  dictator  was  appointed  for  a  time,  and  not  perpetually…  
[and]  he  could  not  do  anything  that  might  diminish  the  state,  as  taking  away  authority  
from  the  Senate  or  from  the  people,  undoing  the  old  orders  of  the  city  and  making  new  
ones,  would  have  been.”  (D  I.34.ii)  Moreover,  two  largely-­‐‑overlapping  institutional  
limitations  on  the  Roman  dictatorship  acted  as  bulwarks  against  its  transformation  into  
a  vehicle  for  tyranny.  On  the  one  hand,  the  dictatorship  was  only  for  a  specific  
timeframe.  On  the  other,  the  dictatorship  could  not  make  changes  to  other  Roman  
institutions.  We  can  regard  these  two  as  overlapping  insofar  as  any  institution,  given  an  
open-­‐‑ended  timeframe  in  which  to  work  and  freed  from  competing  institutions  will  
expand,  de  facto,  into  the  spheres  of  other  institutions.  As  a  result  of  these  two  
limitations,  the  powers  of  each  dictator  were  broad  and,  for  a  circumscribed  timeframe,  
the  dictator  could  act  without  ordinary  constraints,  but  the  dictator  could  not  extend  or  
                                                                                                              
57  Skinner,  The  Foundations  of  Modern  Political  Thought,  179.  
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expand  his  power  beyond  the  already  prescribed  limits.  Machiavelli  does  not  regard  
these  kinds  of  powers  as  dangerous.  “Those  magistracies  who  make  themselves  by  
themselves—not  those  whom  the  people  makes—are  hurtful  to  freedom.”  (D  I.40.vi)  The  
decemvirate  falls  into  this  category,  as  would  the  unique  dictatorships  of  Sulla  (Dictator  
Legibus  Faciendis  et  Rei  Publicae  Constituendae,  “dictator  for  making  laws  and  for  settling  
the  constitution”)  and  Julius  Caesar  (Dictator  Perpetuo,  “dictator  in  perpetuity”).  Rome’s  
other  dictatorships  –  most  commonly  created  for  the  specific  purpose  of  conducting  war  
–  did  not.  
   Dictatorship,  military  command,  and  serving  as  a  brake  on  popular  enthusiasm  
for  risky  wars  do  not  appear  to  be  united  in  Machiavelli’s  thinking  by  anything  other  
than  the  fact  that  they  were  often  the  responsibility  of  leading  Roman  citizens.  That  
appearance  turns  out  to  be  wrong  when  each  of  these  tasks  is  viewed  from  the  
perspective  of  preventing  violent  oppression.  The  dictatorship  was  an  institution  that  
enabled  rapid  and  flexible  responses  to  unanticipated,  and  usually  military,  crises.58  The  
same  logic  for  example,  undergirded  the  passage  of  the  USA  PATRIOT  act  in  October  of  
2001.  Defenders  of  the  act  credit  it  with  prevention  of  terrorist  attacks  on  American  
civilians.  Critics  charge  it  with  civil  liberties  infringement  and  an  operational  secrecy  
anathema  to  liberal  democracy.  Machiavelli,  if  I  have  read  him  correctly,  might  offer  
                                                                                                              
58  Michael  Mallet  notes  that  this  is  at  the  center  of  Machiavelli’s  view  of  praiseworthy  states,  “States  had  to  
be  strong  to  survive,  strength  meant  good  military  institutions  and  resolute  decision-­‐‑making,  these  
depended  on  princes  and  people.”  Mallet,  “The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Warfare  in  Machiavelli’  s  Republic,”  
174.
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concessions  to  principals  on  both  sides  of  the  debate.  On  the  one  hand,  creating  crisis-­‐‑
related  powers  both  allows  a  regime  to  respond  to  emerging  threats  both  rapidly  and  
flexibly  while  still  upholding  the  integrity  of  its  other  institutions  by  obviating  extra-­‐‑
legal  action.  Machiavelli  regards  the  dictatorship,  at  least  up  to  the  Punic  Wars,  as  a  
praiseworthy  example  of  this  kind  of  response  to  crises.  On  the  other  hand,  Machiavelli  
would  condemn  the  repeated  extension  of  the  USA  PATRIOT  act  –  and  thus  the  
“magistracies”  created  by  it  –  as  well  as  the  use  of  the  act  by  existing  agencies  to  expand  
their  activities  without  public  debate  and  authorization.  These  two  de  facto  
characteristics  of  the  act,  which  extended  life  and  independent  expansion  by  affected  
magistracies,  run  afoul  of  the  kinds  of  boundaries  that  Machiavelli  regarded  as  essential  
to  the  virtuous  functioning  of  crisis  institutions  such  as  the  dictatorship.  
   This  task  of  finding  the  balance  between  the  underutilization  and  overutilization  
of  force  (or  security-­‐‑related  activities  backed  up  by  the  threat  of  force)  likewise  links  
Machiavelli’s  praise  of  Rome’s  reliance  on  her  elites  to  serve  as  commanders  in  military  
engagement  and  to  advocate  caution  in  the  face  of  popular  enthusiasm  for  some  war  or  
other  military  action.  Rome’s  extraordinary  military  success  stemmed  not  just  from  the  
virtue  of  the  rank-­‐‑and-­‐‑file  of  her  military,  but  also  from  the  prudence,  daring,  and  
creativity  of  her  commanders.  It  also  stemmed  from  Rome’s  avoidance  of  
overcommitting  to  war,  part  of  which  Machiavelli  attributes  to  elite  checks  on  popular  
enthusiasm  for  some  war  or  other  military  action  that  posed  a  danger  to  the  regime  as  a  
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whole.  While  both  of  these  features  of  the  Roman  use  of  political  violence  are  partly  
traceable  to  popular  participation  in  the  citizen-­‐‑militia,  which  I  discussed  at  length  in  
chapters  1  and  2,  Machiavelli  praises  Rome  for  her  use  of  elites  in  concert  with  that  
popular  participation.  
5.6: Motivations and Rewards 
Given  the  elite  appetite  for  oppression,  how  can  a  republic  rely  upon  elites  to  
serve  the  public  good  and  not  just  pursue  their  own  interests?  This  problem  may  be  the  
most  vexing  one  that  any  republic  faces.  By  contrast,  a  prince  immediately  and  directly  
serves  his  own  interests  by  allying  himself  with  the  people  over  and  against  other  elites  
in  the  principality.  A  prince  secures  himself  by  empowering  the  people  through  the  
citizen-­‐‑militia.  But  what  do  elites  in  republics  get  by  following  in  the  footsteps  of  a  
Scipio  or  Horatius  Clocus?  Virtuous  Roman  elites  took  tremendous  personal  risks  in  
service  of  Rome,  whether  that  service  entailed  military  action  abroad  or  policing  their  
corrupt  peers  at  home.  Indeed,  Machiavelli  rejects  myriad  sources  of  personal  security  
for  elites  in  republics.  Fortresses,  Machiavelli  tells  his  reader,  are  “more  harmful  than  
useful.”  (D  II.24.t)  They  encourage  abuses  towards  subjects  without  enhancing  the  
security  of  the  state.59  Machiavelli  likewise  condemns  allowing  a  large  portion  of  elites  in  
                                                                                                              
59  “They  make  you  more  audacious  and  more  violent  towards  your  subjects.  Then  there  is  not  the  security  
inside  that  them  that  you  persuade  yourself  of,  since  all  the  forces  and  all  the  violence  that  are  used  to  hold  a  
people  are  null  except  for  two:  either  you  are  always  able  to  put  an  army  in  the  field,  as  the  Romans  were;  or  
you  disperse  eliminate,  disorder,  and  disunite  them  in  such  a  mode  that  they  cannot  get  together  to  hurt  
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a  republic  to  acquire  so  much  wealth  that  they  can  “live  idly  in  abundance  from  the  
returns  of  their  possessions  without  having  any  care  either  for  cultivation  or  for  other  
necessary  trouble  in  living.”  (D  I.55.iii)  Machiavelli  calls  these  “gentlemen”  
“pernicious,”  “hostile  to  every  civilization,”  and  “sources  of  excessive  ambition,”  
especially  where  such  wealth  is  combined  with  the  possession  of  a  fortress  or  castle.  
These  covetous  individuals  acquire  for  themselves,  rather  than  for  the  commonwealth  or  
their  fellow  citizens.  In  living  “idly,”  gentlemen  do  nothing  to  enhance  the  martial  
capacity  of  the  state.  Wealthy  citizens,  moreover,  have  the  means  to  recruit  political  
clients,  paving  the  way  to  destructive  factionalism.60  They  are  thus  the  surest  means  for  
preparing  the  ground  for  a  would-­‐‑be  tyrant  in  addition  to  enervating  and  weakening  
republics,  making  them  prone  to  conquest.  (I.55.v)  Citizens  who  lead  via  harsh  methods,  
like  Manlius  Torquatus,  pose  no  such  threats  because  they  are,  to  quote  Vickie  Sullivan  
“neither  liberal  nor  lovable,  and  cannot  generate  followers  who  adore  them.”61  Love  of  
individual  leading  citizens  is  dangerous  in  all  of  its  forms.  Machiavelli  even  goes  so  far  
as  to  counsel  against  a  ‘karma  bank’  model  for  political  elites.  Prior  service,  no  matter  
how  exceptional,  can  neither  excuse  nor  exonerate  present  failures.  A  virtuous  past  
                                                                                                              
  
you.”  (D  II.24.i)  For  a  discussion  of  Florentine  uses  of  fortification,  see  Mallet  “The  Theory  and  Practice  of  
Warfare  in  Machiavelli’  s  Republic,”  176-­‐‑7.  
60  Pocock,  The  Machiavellian  Moment  209-­‐‑210;  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes  73,  83;  Wolin,  Politics  and  
Vision,  181.  
61  Sullivan,  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes,  153.  
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ought  to  be  no  shield  to  present  vice;  otherwise  it  too,  could  become  a  means  to  tyranny  
(D  I.24.i)  
All  well-­‐‑ordered  republics  must  close-­‐‑off  paths  that  elites  perceive  as  secure  but  
are  actually  destructive  to  the  regime  as  a  whole.  Doing  so  leaves  the  natural  ambition  in  
the  hearts  of  the  elite  only  one  outlet:  continual  virtuous  service  to  the  regime.  A  well-­‐‑
ordered  regime,  moreover,  must  make  this  outlet  an  attractive  one.  In  III.28,  Machiavelli  
tells  his  reader  that  “a  republic  without  reputed  citizens  cannot  stand,  nor  can  it  be  
governed  well  in  any  mode.”  To  satisfy  a  republic’s  need  of  virtuous  elites,  “one  ought  
to  open  to  citizens  the  way  to  this  honor  and  to  put  up  rewards  for  both  counsel  and  
works  so  that  they  have  to  be  honored  and  satisfied  with  them.”  (D  III.28)  Glory  is  a  
dominant  theme  in  the  Discourses,  far  more  than  in  The  Prince.  In  a  well-­‐‑ordered  
republic,  glory  and  praise  replace  money  and  power  as  the  goods  over  which  elites  
ought  to  compete.  To  return  to  a  discussion  of  the  use  of  the  dictatorship,  Machiavelli  
observes  that  Roman  elites  during  the  uncorrupted  republican  era  “that  when  one  came  
to  the  dictatorship  he  carried  away  from  it  the  greater  glory  the  sooner  he  laid  it  down.”  (D  
I.31.ii,  emphasis  mine)  Swift  and  decisive  use  of  official  powers  earns  glory  and  that  
glory  is  enhanced  by  the  timely  resignation  of  those  powers.  Machiavelli  praises  Rome  
for  creating  a  trade-­‐‑off  between  the  ongoing  possession  of  power  and  individual  glory.  
   Machiavelli  takes  Rome  as  proof  positive  that  elite  ambitions,  sufficiently  
“beaten  down  in  a  city  by  various  ways  and  by  various  modes”  can  safely  latch  onto  
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glory,  rather  than  their  default  target  of  oppression.  Machiavelli  is  confident  that  this  
can  be  so  because  he  has  a  negative  feedback  loop  in  mind.  Elites  can  satisfy  ambition  of  
one  kind  by  frustrating  ambition  of  another  kind  in  their  fellows.  One  way  to  view  the  
matter  is  to  think  of  intra-­‐‑elite  policing  as  intra-­‐‑elite  oppression.  Elites  have  the  chance  
to  oppress,  but  their  targets  are  other  oppressors  and  honor  is  their  reward.  With  this  
feedback  loop  in  mind  the  goal  of  founders  and  reformers,  who  in  turn  earn  their  share  
of  glory,  is  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  political  orders  that  similarly  channel  elite  
ambition  toward  glory  rather  than  more  destructive  objects.62  Then,  and  only  then,  can  
political  elites  play  the  role  that  Machiavelli  appoints  to  them:  one  half  of  the  agonistic  
partnership  that  he  deems  necessary  for  minimizing  violent  oppression.  
5.7 The people’s elite 
Far  from  completely  shifting  responsibility  for  political  violence  from  the  elites  to  
the  people,  republics  rely  on  their  leading  citizens  to  both  shape  and  defend  the  orders  
that  are  decisive  for  preventing  violent  oppression.  In  the  Discourses,  Machiavelli  holds  
out  Numa,  Romulus,  and  Brutus  (among  many  others)  as  models  of  imitation  for  those  
citizens  endowed  with  enough  talents  and  resources  to  breathe  new  life  into  Italian  
politics.  In  doing  so,  Machiavelli  provides  a  register  for  virtuous  action  according  to  
which  elites  ought  to  receive  praise.  This  conceptual  move  is  central  to  Machiavelli’s  
project  because  he  understands  praise  and  blame  to  be  strong  motivators,  especially  
                                                                                                              
62  Skinner,  The  Foundations  of  Modern  Political  Thought,  180.  
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among  elites  in  republics.  Indeed,  glory  appears  to  be  the  only  reward  that  a  well-­‐‑
ordered  regime  can  offer  safely  to  its  most  virtuous  citizens  in  return  for  their  public  
service.  Whether  by  way  of  founding  a  regime,  reforming  a  regime,  or  defending  a  
regime,  elites  receive  praise,  rather  than  wealth,  power,  or  personal  security  in  return  for  
their  virtuous  actions.  As  such,  they  provide  the  necessary  complement  to  the  people,  
who  make  up  the  body  of  the  citizen-­‐‑militia,  render  judgment  over  the  actions  of  
political  elites,  and  retain  authority  over  the  use  of  political  violence.  The  “new  modes  
and  orders”  that  Machiavelli  develops  in  the  Discourses  define  that  relationship  and  
thereby  provide  a  model  of  politics  in  which  the  natural  talents  and  capacities  of  
political  elites  are  accentuated  and  their  destructive  impulses  are  kept  in  check,  which  in  
turn  redounds  to  the  well-­‐‑being  of  the  regime  and  its  people’s  desire  for  non-­‐‑oppression.  
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Conclusion 
Machiavelli’s  thought  is  relevant  to  any  regime  –  democratic  or  autocratic  –  that  
faces  existential  threats  because  conquest  means  the  almost  certain  oppression  of  the  
regime’s  citizens.  Machiavelli  is  similarly  relevant  where  some  citizens  oppress  each  
other.  We  can  see  why  Machiavelli  confronted  problems  such  as  these  simply  by  
thinking  about  Florence  of  his  day,  a  city  that  he  “loved  more  than  [his]  soul.”1  For  all  of  
Florence’s  banking,  artistic,  and  intellectual  wealth,  most  of  her  citizens  enjoyed  little  
security  and  suffered  a  great  deal  of  oppression.  Florence  could  not  project  power  
abroad  and  so  was  adrift  in  the  stormy  interstate  system  of  15th  century  Italy,  subject  to  
the  whims  of  Fortuna.2  Internally  powerful  families  vied  for  control  of  the  city,  using  
destructive  tactics  such  as  assassination,  bribery,  and  theft  of  elections.  And  the  way  
they  exercised  power  –  with  cruelty  toward  their  enemies,  enemies’  clients,  and  the  
people  at  large  –  caused  more  suffering  than  their  attempts  to  gain  that  power.  
   Florence  was  neither  the  first  nor  the  last  place  to  experience  such  politics.  From  
Corcyra  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  to  Somalia  of  today,  shattered  authority  and  
oppressive  practices  crop  up  again  and  again.3  As  a  result,  Machiavelli  too  becomes  
relevant  again  and  again.  Thus  far,  I  have  detailed  Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  the  
                                                                                                              
1  Machiavelli,  “Letter  to  Francesco  Vettori,  April  16,  1527,”  1010.  
2  Najemy,  A  History  of  Florence,  Chapter  7.  
3  Thucydides,  The  History  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  Book  3,  Chapters  82-­‐‑84;  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  The  
World  Factbook:  Somalia.  Updated  March  11,  2014,  Retrieved  March  14,  2014.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐‑world-­‐‑factbook/geos/so.html  
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problem  of  violent  oppression  in  principalities  and  republics  alike.  In  the  remaining  
pages,  I  shall  recapitulate  my  observations  and  address  some  of  the  ways  in  which  
Machiavelli’s  ideas  apply  to  the  autocracies  and  democracies  of  today.  I  shall  also  point  
out  some  questions  for  future  research  as  I  go.  
   I  began  my  study  with  one  of  Machiavelli’s  late  –  and  in  his  day  most  famous  –  
works:  The  Art  of  War.  For  Machiavelli,  the  problem  of  oppression  coincides  with  the  
problem  of  violent  oppression.  His  concerns  with  economic  inequality,  religious  biases,  
and  social  practices  all  turned  back  upon  the  effect  they  have  on  violent  oppression.  
Given  this  overweening  concern,  it  makes  sense  to  begin  a  study  of  Machiavelli  by  
examining  his  confrontation  with  the  problem  of  reconciling  military  and  civil  life,  
which  he  does  in  The  Art  of  War  more  than  in  any  other  text.  The  Art  of  War  is  not  just  
about  tactics,  it  is  a  treatise  on  making  military  and  political  strength  coincide  with  each  
other.  Political  and  military  strength  must  coincide  because  every  state  needs  sufficiently  
capable  mechanisms  of  violence  that  can  protect  it  from  invasion  from  abroad  (i.e.,  
armies)  and  marginalize  would  be  oppressors  at  home  (i.e.,  police  forces).  But  who  shall  
guard  the  guardians  from  becoming  oppressors  themselves?  For  Machiavelli,  only  a  
citizen-­‐‑militia,  made  up  of  citizen-­‐‑soldiers  can  satisfy  both  concerns.  Citizens-­‐‑soldiers,  
driven  by  their  desire  for  non-­‐‑oppression  and  their  constitutive,  private  attachments,  
will  fight  vigorously  in  defense  of  themselves  and  their  fellow  citizens.  They  will  be  
similarly  unmotivated  to  engage  in  projects  of  oppression.  Every  regime,  in  
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Machiavelli’s  view,  should  make  use  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia,  rather  than  mercenary  or  
auxiliary  armies.  Mercenaries  will  care  for  fighting  more  as  their  profession  than  as  a  
means  to  preventing  oppression.  And  auxiliaries  will  care  more  for  the  concerns  of  their  
native  lands  than  any  projects  in  which  someone  else  involves  them.  
   Machiavelli’s  blanket  injunction  against  citizen  professionalization  in  war-­‐‑
making  raises  doubts  about  the  “all  volunteer”  model  used  by  the  United  States  and  
other  countries  around  the  world.  In  the  United  States,  we  celebrate  the  professionalism  
of  our  men  and  women  in  uniform.  For  Samuel  Huntington,  that  professionalism  
guarantees  that  the  US  military  will  not  engage  in  projects  of  oppression  and  that  it  is  
capable  of  accomplishing  whatever  undertaking  civilian  leadership  places  before  it.4  
What  should  we  do,  however,  if  Huntington  is  wrong  and  Machiavelli  is  right  that  
military  professionalism  will  cause  the  identity  of  the  soldier  to  supplant  the  identity  of  
the  citizen  among  the  rank  and  file?5  Machiavelli’s  analysis  of  militaries  in  general  and  
Rome’s  military  in  particular  suggest  two  courses  of  action.  First,  Machiavelli  identifies  
the  republican  period  up  to  the  Punic  Wars  as  the  golden  era  of  Roman  politics.  Rome’s  
virtue  was  ultimately  corrupted  by  Rome’s  imperial  agenda  after  those  wars.  
Campaigns  became  so  long  that  they  corrupted  the  military.  The  US,  and  global  powers  
like  it,  might  take  heed  of  the  deleterious  effects  that  efforts  to  project  power  beyond  
                                                                                                              
4    Samuel  Huntington,  The  Soldier  and  the  State;  the  Theory  and  Politics  of  Civil-­‐‑Military  Relations.  (Cambridge:  
Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University  Press,  1957)  viii  
5  Commanders  are  another  matter  altogether  for  Machiavelli.  
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regional  spheres  have  on  military  institutions  in  general  and  rank-­‐‑and-­‐‑file  soldiers  in  
particular.  They  then  might  try  to  limit  those  effects  by  scaling  back  attempts  to  project  
power  globally  and  settle  for  the  kind  of  regional  hegemony  Rome  enjoyed  up  to  the  
Punic  Wars.  The  second  course  of  action  that  Machiavelli  might  recommend  would  be  
scaling-­‐‑up  the  mechanisms  these  powers  have  in  place  that  facilitate  the  transition  from  
military  to  civilian  life.  Members  of  a  citizen-­‐‑militia  fight  out  of  a  sense  of  duty  as  well  as  
whatever  private  attachments  await  them  after  the  campaign.  Programs  like  the  
Montgomery  G.I.  Bill  certainly  augment  those  private  attachments.  Machiavelli  would  
celebrate  this  program  and  urge  militaries  to  put  just  as  much  thinking  and  just  as  many  
resources  into  the  process  of  demobilization  and  training  for  civilian  life  as  they  do  into  
the  process  of  mobilization  and  training  for  war.  
   Machiavelli  similarly  urges  commanders  to  interrupt  the  formation  of  linkages  
within  the  military  along  ethnic,  religious,  and  kinship  lines.  Students  of  genocide  know  
all  too  well  the  ease  with  which  a  political  entrepreneur  can  motivate  an  armed  group  to  
wipe  out  an  unarmed  one.6  Machiavelli  seems  to  be  aware  of  this  problem,  but  also  
seems  to  underestimate  it.  In  his  view,  it  is  always  a  member  of  the  elite  who  foments  
and  militarizes  political  cleavages.  (See,  for  example:  AW  I,  41;  FH  III.5;  P  7.iv;  D  I.8.iii)  
Ethnic,  linguistic,  and  religious  cleavages  may  however,  run  deeper  than  he  estimates  
                                                                                                              
6  Marie-­‐‑Joëlle  Zahar,  “Handling  Spoilers  and  the  Prospect  of  Violence,”  in  The  Slippery  Slope  to  Genocide:  
Reducing  Identity  Conflicts  and  Preventing  Mass  Murder,  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2012),  174.  
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and  exist  independently  of  the  machinations  of  oppression-­‐‑oriented  elites.7  If  that  is  the  
case,  then  we  must  go  beyond  Machiavelli’s  ideas  in  the  Art  of  War  and  study  
mechanisms  for  preventing  armed  forces  from  becoming  tools  of  ethnic  cleansing,  geno-­‐‑,  
and  religiocide.  
   After  all,  Machiavelli  relies  heavily  upon  the  positive  effects  he  envisions  citizen-­‐‑
militia’s  having  on  all  kinds  of  regime  types.  In  chapter  2,  I  observed  that  the  citizen-­‐‑
militia  is  the  crux  of  the  bargain  he  offers  to  princes.  By  arming  the  people,  Machiavelli  
suggests,  the  prince  arms  himself.  By  empowering  the  people,  the  prince  empowers  the  
principality  as  a  whole.  By  securing  the  people  from  oppression,  the  prince  secures  his  
place  in  the  principality.    
   When  princes  strike  this  bargain,  Machiavelli  suggests,  everybody  is  better  off.  
This  suggestion  gives  us  a  standard  by  which  we  can  evaluate  existing  autocracies.  If  we  
accept  Machiavelli’s  emphasis  on  non-­‐‑oppression,  then  we  have  ground  for  elevating  
autocracies  that  take  the  Machiavellian  bargain  and  arm  their  people  as  a  whole  over  
those  that  do  not  and  instead  rely  on  oppressive  strategies  for  retaining  power,  such  as  
invasive  security  apparatuses,  the  fomentation  of  internal  conflict,  and  programmatic  
murder  of  rival  groups.  While  I  agree  with  the  near-­‐‑global  consensus  in  favor  of  
democracy,  I  concede  that  Machiavelli’s  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  
oppression  and  regime-­‐‑type  makes  a  case  for  leaving  stable,  popular  autocracies  in  place  
                                                                                                              
7  Henry  Hale,  “Explaining  Ethnicity,”  Comparative  Political  Studies  37,  (2004),  459-­‐‑463  
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until  the  conditions  are  ripe  for  a  peaceful  transition  to  democracy.  If  the  choice  were  
one  between  supporting  an  autocracy  that  satisfies  the  popular  humor  for  non-­‐‑
oppression  and  a  conflict-­‐‑ridden  transitional  regime,  Machiavelli  would  urge  support  
for  the  former.  
   The  trouble  is  that  we  so  rarely  see  stable  autocracies  that  satisfy  the  humor  for  
non-­‐‑oppression.  ‘Enlightened  Tyrants’  are  rare  to  the  point  of  being  chimerical.  
Machiavelli  himself  observes  this  tendency  when  he  writes,  “one  will  find  that  it  very  
rarely  happens  that  someone  good  wishes  to  become  prince  by  bad  ways,  even  though  
his  end  be  good,  and  that  someone  wicked,  having  become  prince,  wishes  to  work  well.”  
(D  I.18.iv)  Autocrats,  it  would  seem,  tend  to  not  have  public  service  in  mind  when  they  
pursue  and  maintain  their  power.  Of  course,  Machiavelli  adds  glory  to  the  bargain  in  
The  Prince  with  his  choice  of  the  four  founder-­‐‑liberators  in  chapter  6,  and  his  critiques  of  
Agathocles  and  Severus  in  chapters  8  and  19  respectively.  But  even  with  glory  added  as  
a  reward  for  virtuous  autocracy,  I  doubt  the  efficacy  of  this  motivational  tactic  in  the  
case  of  autocrats.  Moreover,  we  have  evidence  to  suggest  that  projects  of  oppression  
may  in  fact  make  autocrats  all  the  more  secure  in  their  rule  and  thus  so  much  more  
attractive  to  them.8  We  do,  however,  have  reason  to  believe  that  income  might  stay  the  
hands  of  autocrats  and  their  lieutenants,  even  if  it  cannot  motivate  public-­‐‑spirited  
                                                                                                              
8  Barbara  Harff,  “No  Lessons  Learned  from  the  Holocaust?  Assessing  Risks  of  Genocide  and  Political  Mass  
Murder  since  1955,”  American  Political  Science  Review,  97  (2003),  64.  
Wintrobe,  Political  Economy  of  Dictatorship,  58-­‐‑68.  
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behavior.9  Perhaps  a  modern  Machiavellian  might  make  a  bargain  along  those  lines.  
Either  way,  we  must  conduct  more  research  into  the  psychology  and  decision-­‐‑making  
habits  of  autocrats.  Such  research  seems  profoundly  difficult,  but  nothing  could  be  
closer  to  Machiavelli’s  heart  than  that  which  is  profoundly  difficult.  
One  such  profoundly  difficult  task  was  the  subject  of  chapter  3:  the  strategies  a  
prince  must  pursue  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos  and  lawfulness  out  of  lawlessness.  
Taking  non-­‐‑oppression  to  be  Machiavelli’s  central  value  dramatically  changes  the  way  
we  must  read  The  Prince.  The  prince  has  to  use  cruelties  “well”  to  contend  with  
oppression-­‐‑oriented  elites  and  consolidate  political  authority.  He  must  also  practice  
hypocrisy  in  order  to  prevent  force  and  fraud  from  becoming  the  norm  in  his  
principality.  For  Machiavelli,  the  goodness  of  non-­‐‑oppression  justifies  the  use  of  these  
evils.  Borgia’s  attempt  to  liberate  the  Romagna  and  create  a  civil  way  of  life  there  
justifies,  for  Machiavelli,  his  incredible  use  of  force,  fraud,  and  hypocrisy.  
   So  once  again  we  see  that  Machiavelli  gives  us  reason  to  say  that  some  
autocracies  are  better  than  others.  Just  as  those  that  arm  their  people  as  a  whole  are  
praiseworthy  in  comparison  to  those  that  use  invasive  security  apparatuses,  the  
fomentation  of  internal  conflict,  and  the  programmatic  murder  of  rival  groups  to  
maintain  power,  those  autocrats  who  use  cruelties  such  as  force,  fraud,  and  hypocrisy  
“well”  are  better  than  those  that  do  not.  Of  course,  cruelties  “well-­‐‑used”  are  those  that  
                                                                                                              
9  Olson,  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development,”  569;  Bates,  When  Things  Fell  Apart,  15-­‐‑29.  
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satisfy  the  popular  humor  for  non-­‐‑oppression,  rather  than  the  avariciousness,  
ideological  or  religious  agenda,  or  petty  vengefulness  of  power-­‐‑holders,  each  of  which  is  
a  form  of  the  elite  humor  for  oppression.  One  might  reasonably  say  that  Machiavelli  
would  care  more  about  the  character  of  the  autocrat  than  the  fact  that  he  rules  an  
autocracy.  He  would  encourage  us  to  take  the  following  line  of  thought:  First  ask,  “Are  
cruelties  growing  with  time?  Or  are  they  in  the  past?”  If  they  are  in  the  past,  
reconciliation  between  groups  in  the  principality  may  be  a  better  strategy  than  engaging  
in  tit  for  tat  punishment.  For  Machiavelli,  ongoing  and  future  cruelties  –  like  those  that  
characterized  daily  life  in  totalitarian  regimes  –  makes  a  regime  “wretched.”  Prudence,  
on  the  other  hand,  impels  one  toward  the  status  quo  in  regimes  that  satisfy  the  popular  
humor,  whether  those  regimes  are  autocratic  or  not.  
   Machiavelli’s  political  outlook  raises  the  question  of  which  goods  are  most  
central  to  a  dignified  human  life.  Does  the  value  of  democracy  and  democratic  
participation  trump  the  value  of  satisfying  the  humor  for  non-­‐‑oppression?  Should  
citizens  in  autocracies  that  satisfy  the  popular  humor  still  agitate  for  democracy,  even  at  
the  risk  of  dangerous  political  crises?  Violently?  What  about  non-­‐‑violently?  Machiavelli  
might  suggest  that  ballots  are  not  worth  risking  bullets.  As  committed  democrats  we  
should  ask  if  he  is  right.  I  have  serious  doubts  about  Machiavelli’s  perspective,  but  the  
problem  I  have  just  been  discussing  is  a  perennial  one  and  its  perennial  nature  speaks  to  
the  endurance  of  Machiavelli’s  thought.  
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Moreover,  it  is  difficult  to  see  Machiavelli  as  thinking  of  autocracies  as  anything  
other  than  a  second-­‐‑best  solution.  The  regime  that  captured  his  imagination  was  a  
republic.  Machiavelli  saw  in  the  Roman  Republic  an  unparalleled  example  of  political  
virtue  and  in  its  history  an  unparalleled  tool  for  inspiring  political  virtue  in  others.  If  
Machiavelli  challenges  us  democrats  in  the  way  we  ought  to  think  about  autocracies,  he  
challenges  us  even  more  in  the  way  we  ought  to  think  about  democracies.  In  particular,  
he  challenges  us  to  think  seriously  about  non-­‐‑electoral  mechanisms  for  preventing  
oppression.  Machiavelli  loved  Rome  because  no  state  better  prevented  the  oppression  of  
its  citizens.  Rome  externalized  the  ambitions  of  her  elites  and  the  talents  of  her  citizens  
via  the  use  of  the  citizen  army.  So  long  as  the  army  was  a  vehicle  for  defending  Rome,  
and  not  for  empowering  oppression-­‐‑oriented  elites,  it  was  a  great  source  of  protection  
from  oppression.  But  military  arrangements  were  not  enough  for  Rome,  nor  are  they  
enough  for  us.  Rome  recruited  her  citizens  to  police  her  elites  through  institutions  such  
as  the  tribunate.  The  tribunate,  backed  by  the  people’s  authority  to  do  violence,  ensured  
that  the  people  had  a  voice  uncorrupted  by  socioeconomic  inequality  in  Rome  and  
ensured,  as  much  as  possible,  the  continuation  of  Rome’s  virtue-­‐‑creating  political  
agonism.  
Machiavelli’s  treatment  of  the  Roman  republic  thus  suggests  that  reduction  of  
democracy  to  elections  or  even  polyarchy  is  too  extreme.  Machiavelli  would  look  for  
class-­‐‑based  agonism  in  every  praiseworthy  democracy.  He  would  also  look  for  efforts  to  
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endow  major  institutions  –  like  the  armed  forces  –  with  popular  influences.  Democracies  
that  do  not  exhibit  class-­‐‑based  agonism  and  take  care  to  keep  major  institutions  popular  
will  resemble,  in  his  eyes,  the  republics  of  Sparta  and  Venice.  Machiavelli  admires  such  
regimes  after  a  fashion,  but  they  do  not  capture  his  imagination  like  Rome.  The  greatest  
regimes  for  him  would  be  democracies  that  accentuate  internal  political  conflict  without  
falling  into  civil  strife  and  that  ensure  that  the  people  and  the  elites  work  together,  albeit  
agonistically.  
The  critiques  that  Machiavelli  might  make  of  modern  democracies  raise  the  
question  of  what  institutional  steps  modern  democracies  can  take  to  meet  those  
critiques.  In  the  US,  I  mentioned  some  of  the  steps  that  the  army  might  take  above.  John  
McCormick,  in  Machiavellian  Democracy,  outlines  a  proposal  for  a  “People’s  Tribunate,”  
according  to  which  a  group  of  non-­‐‑elite  American  citizens  participate  in  a  College  of  
Tribunes  which  has  a  variety  of  legislative  and  veto  powers.10  It  is  a  fascinating  proposal  
and  worth  serious  consideration,  but  it  fundamentally  misunderstands  Machiavelli’s  
own  approach  to  republican  innovation.  Rome  was  so  successful,  in  Machiavelli’s  view,  
because  it  continually  returned  to  its  own  foundings  (of  the  city  itself  and  the  republic)  
for  inspiration  during  periods  of  renewal.  Any  proposal  that  would  renew  a  democracy  
along  Machiavellian  lines  should  look  to  the  founding  of  that  democracy  for  inspiration.  
                                                                                                              
10  McCormick,  Machiavellian  Democracy,  178-­‐‑188.  
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If  the  United  States  is  to  reinvigorate  its  democracy  in  a  way  that  Machiavelli  might  find  
praiseworthy,  any  institutional  innovations  should  come  out  of  the  American  founding.  
Policing  elites  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  spirit  of  McCormick’s  “People’s  
Tribunate”  is  a  good  place  to  start,  but  Machiavelli  would  also  caution  us  to  give  elites  a  
free  hand  to  act  even  as  we  “[beat]  down  [their  ambitions]  by  various  ways  and  various  
modes.”  (D  I.37.iii)  For  Machiavelli,  republics  rely  on  ‘princes’  (i.e.,  virtuous  republican  
elites)  for  myriad  services.  ‘Princes’  found  republics,  innovate  in  them,  reform  them,  
command  armies  when  necessary,  caution  peace  where  appropriate,  step  in  during  crisis  
situations  and,  most  importantly,  police  each  other.  To  tie  the  hands  of  republican  elites  
would  be  to  neutralize  one  of  a  virtuous  republic’s  greatest  strengths:  “infinite  most  
virtuous  princes  who  are  in  succession  to  one  another.”  
So,  just  as  Machiavelli  would  encourage  modern  democracies  to  empower  their  
people  to  police  their  elites,  he  would  simultaneously  encourage  them  to  ensure  that  
those  elites  enjoy  the  latitude  necessary  to  accomplish  the  tasks  that  the  state  requires  of  
them.  Democracies  are  not  immune  from  experiencing  crises  and  requiring  institutional  
innovation.  Democracies  cannot  make  a  law  for  every  experience  they  might  face  in  the  
future.  Fortuna  sees  to  that.  To  that  end,  Machiavelli  would  discourage  democracies  
from  taking  broad,  emergency  powers  off  the  table  and  refusing  to  renovate  existing  
orders.  Eschewing  the  former  invites  impotence  in  the  face  of  unforeseen  disaster  and  
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eschewing  the  latter  locks  a  democracy  into  a  set  of  orders  that  cannot  change  with  the  
times.  Both  hasten  the  end  of  the  state.  
That  said,  does  Machiavelli  provide  us  with  a  sufficiently  robust  theory  of  
democratic  leadership?  Can  republican  ‘princes’  turn  profitably  to  Machiavelli’s  work  
for  guidance?  The  short  answer  is  both  yes  and  no.  I  say  “yes”  insofar  as  there  is  much  
insight  in  Machiavelli  for  ways  to  prevent  violent  oppression.  I  say  “no”  insofar  as  we  
cannot  limit  our  vision  of  oppression  to  violent  oppression.  It  is  true  that  Machiavelli  is  
critical  of  economic  inequality,  but  that  is  only  because  it  weakens  a  state.  Machiavelli  is  
less  interested  in  economic  oppression  per  se.  The  same  goes  for  religious,  sexual,  
cultural  and  other  forms  of  oppression  that  are  not  physically  violent.  Can  we  
“renovate”  Machiavelli’s  thinking  on  violent  oppression  to  tackle  these  other  forms  of  
oppression?  Possibly,  but  that  is  a  question  for  further  study.  
It  is  a  question,  moreover,  that  Machiavelli  would  invite.  He  regarded  his  own  
project  as  laying  groundwork  –  a  founding  if  you  will.  (D  II.PR.3)  Machiavelli  developed  
a  political  theory  to  tackle  violent  oppression  in  principalities  and  republics  alike.  If  we  
‘renovate’  that  theory  to  apply  to  the  autocracies  and  democracies  of  today,  I  cannot  
help  but  think  that  he  would  approve.  Moreover,  if  we  ‘renovate’  his  notion  of  
oppression  to  apply  to  the  myriad  forms  of  it  that  we  continually  uncover,  again  I  
cannot  help  but  think  that  he  would  approve.  Whether  we  consider  his  theory  of  politics  
to  be  a  science  or  an  art,  we  must  acknowledge  that  he  developed  it  so  that  those  who  
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love  their  “patrias”  more  than  their  souls  would  have  the  conceptual  tools  to  fight  the  
oppression  of  their  fellow  citizens.  That  fight  is  an  ongoing  one  and  the  development  of  
those  conceptual  tools  must  be  ongoing  as  well.  Machiavelli  looked  to  others  to  carry  his  
project  forward  when  he  could  not.  (D  I.PR.i)  I  have  tried  to  do  my  part,  but  now,  like  
the  Florentine,  I  too  look  to  others  “with  more  virtue,  more  discourse  and  judgment,”  to  
answer  the  questions  that  I  cannot.  (D  I.PR.i)  
  237  
Works Cited 
Althusser,  Louis.  Machiavelli  and  Us.  New  York:  Verso,  1999.  
Arendt,  Hannah.  On  Violence.  New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace,  Jovanovich,  1970.  
Aristotle.  The  Nichomachean  Ethics.  Translated  by  J.  A.  K.  Thomson.  New  York,  NY:  
Penguin,  1976.  
Barlow,  J.J.  “The  Fox  and  the  Lion:  Machiavelli  Replies  to  Cicero.”  History  of  Political  
Thought  20,  No.  4  (January,  1999),  627-­‐‑645.  
Bates,  Robert.  When  Things  Fell  Apart:  State  Failure  in  Late-­‐‑Century  Africa.  New  York:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  2008.  
Benner,  Erica.  Machiavelli’s  Ethics.  Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  2009.  
Boesche,  Roger.  Theories  of  Tyranny,  from  Plato  to  Arendt.  University  Park,  PA:  
Pennsylvania  State  University  Press,  1996.  
Burke,  Peter.  “The  Renaissance  dialogue.”  Renaissance  Studies.  3  (1989):  1-­‐‑12.  
Butterfield,  Herbert.  The  Statecraft  of  Machiavelli.  New  York:  Macmillan,  1956.  
Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius.  De  officiis.  Translated  by  Walter  Miller.  London:  W.  Heinemann,  
1913.  
Coby,  Patrick.  1999.  Machiavelli’s  Romans:  Liberty  and  Greatness  in  the  Discourses  on  Livy.  
Lanham,  Md:  Lexington  Books.    
Colish,  Marcia.  “Cicero’s  De  Officiis  and  Machiavelli’s  Prince.”  Sixteenth  Century  Journal,  
9,  no.  4  (Winter,  1978),  81-­‐‑93.  
———  “Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War:  A  Reconsideration.”  Renaissance  Quarterly.  51  (1998):  
1151-­‐‑1168.  
Cox,  Virginia.  “Rhetoric  and  Ethics  in  Machiavelli.”  In  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  
Machiavelli,  edited  by  John  Najemy,  173-­‐‑189.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  
Press,  2010.  
Davenport,  Christian.  “State  Repression  and  Political  Order.”  Annual  Review  of  Political  
Science  10  (June  2007):  1-­‐‑24.  
  238  
De  Grazia,  Sebastian.  Machiavelli  in  Hell.  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press.  1989.  
Demack,  Ian.  The  Modern  Machiavelli:  the  Seven  Principles  for  of  Power  in  Business.  Crows  
Nest,  N.S.W.:  Allen  &  Unwin,  2002.  
Dietz,  Mary  G.  1986.  “Trapping  The  Prince:  Machiavelli  and  the  Politics  of  Deception.”  
The  American  Political  Science  Review  80,  no.  3  (September  1986):  777-­‐‑799.  
Erasmus,  Desiderius.  The  Education  of  a  Christian  Prince.  Translated  by  Michael  J.  Heath.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1997.    
Evans,  Suzanne.  Machiavelli  for  Moms:  Maxims  on  the  Effective  Governance  of  Children.  New  
York:  Simon  &  Schuster,  2013.  
Fanon,  Frantz.  The  Wretched  of  the  Earth.  Translated  by  Constance  Farrington.  New  York,  
Grove  Press,  1968.  
Fein,  Helen.  “More  Murder  in  the  Middle:  Life-­‐‑Integrity  Violations  and  Democracy  in  
the  World,  1987.”  Human  Rights  Quarterly.  17,  no.  1  (February  1995):  170-­‐‑191.  
Fontana,  Ben.  “Sallust  and  the  Politics  of  Machiavelli.”  History  of  Political  Thought.  24,  no.  
1  (January  2003):  86-­‐‑108.  
Forde,  Steven.  “Varieties  of  Realism:  Thucydides  and  Machiavelli.”  The  Journal  of  Politics.  
54,  no.  2  (May  1992):  372-­‐‑393.  
———    “International  Realism  and  the  Science  of  Politics:  Thucydides,  Machiavelli,  and  
Neorealism.”  International  Studies  Quarterly.  39,  no.  2  (June  1995):  141-­‐‑160.  
Gandhi,  Jennifer.  Political  Institutions  under  Dictatorship.  New  York:  Cambridge  
University  Press,  2008.  
Garver,  Eugene.  Machiavelli  and  the  History  of  Prudence.  Madison:  University  of  
Wisconsin  Press,  1987.  
Gilbert,  Felix.  “Machiavelli’s  Istorie  Fiorentine:  An  Essay  in  Interpretation.”  in  History,  
Choice,  and  Commitment.  Cambridge,  MA:  Belknap  Press,  1977.  
———  “Machiavelli:  the  Renaissance  of  The  Art  of  War”  in  Makers  of  modern  strategy:  
from  Machiavelli  to  the  nuclear  age.  Edited  by  Peter  Paret.  Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  
University  Press,  1986.  
  239  
Gillespie,  Michael.  Theological  Origins  of  Modernity.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  
2008.  
Goodin,  Robert.  “Designing  constitutions:  the  political  constitution  of  a  mixed  
commonwealth,”  Political  Studies.  44,  no.  3  (August  1996):  635–46.  
———  “Cross-­‐‑cutting  cleavages  and  social  conflict”,  British  Journal  of  Political  Science,  5  
(1975),  516-­‐‑9    
Gramsci,  Antonio.  Selections  from  the  Prison  Notebooks.  New  York:  International  
Publishers,  1972.  
Grant,  Ruth.  Hypocrisy  and  integrity:  Machiavelli,  Rousseau,  and  the  Ethics  of  Politics  
Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1997.  
Greif,  Avner.  Institutions  and  the  Path  to  the  Modern  Economy:  Lessons  from  Medieval  Trade.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2006.  
Hale,  Henry.  “Explaining  Ethnicity.”  Comparative  Political  Studies  37,  no.  4  (May  2004):  
459-­‐‑463  
Hamilton,  Alexander,  James  Madison,  and  John  Jay.  The  Federalist  Papers.  Edited  by  
Clinton  Rossiter.  New  York,  N.Y.:  Signet  Classic,  2003.  
Harff,  Barbara.  “No  Lessons  Learned  from  the  Holocaust?  Assessing  Risks  of  Genocide  
and  Political  Mass  Murder  since  1955.”  American  Political  Science  Review  97,  no.1  
(February  2003):  57-­‐‑73.  
Hildinger,  Erik.  Swords  Against  the  Senate.  Cambridge,  MA:  Da  Capo,  2002,  Kindle  
edition.  
Hörnqvist,  Mikael,  “Perché  non  si  usa  allegare  i  Romani:  Machiavelli  and  the  Florentine  
Militia  of  1506,”  Renaissance  Quarterly  55,  no.  1  (Spring  2002):  148-­‐‑191.  
———  Machiavelli  and  Empire.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2004.  
———  “Machiavelli’s  military  project  and  the  Art  of  War”  in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  




Horowitz,  Donald.  A  Democratic  South  Africa?:  Constitutional  Engineering  in  a  Divided  
Society.  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1991.  
Hulliung,  Mark.  Citizen  Machiavelli.  Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1983.  
Hume,  David.  “Idea  of  a  Perfect  Commonwealth,”  in  Essays  Moral,  Political  and  Literary.  
Edited  by  T.H.  Green  and  T.H.  Grose.  London:  Longmans,  Green,  1882.  
Huntington,  Samuel.  The  Soldier  and  the  State;  the  Theory  and  Politics  of  Civil-­‐‑Military  
Relations.  Cambridge:  Belknap  Press  of  Harvard  University  Press,  1957.  
Kleinerman,  Benjamin.  “Can  the  Prince  Really  Be  Tamed?  Executive  Prerogative,  
Popular  Apathy,  and  the  Constitutional  Frame  in  Locke’s  Second  Treatise.”  
American  Political  Science  Review  101,  no.2  (February  2007):  209-­‐‑222.  
Knight,  Jack.  Institutions  and  Social  Conflict.  Cambridge  [England]:  Cambridge  University  
Press,  1992.  
Ledeen,  Michael  Arthur.  Machiavelli  on  Modern  Leadership:  Why  Machiavelli’s  Iron  Rules  are  
as  Timely  and  Important  Today  as  Five  Centuries  ago.  New  York:  Truman  Talley  
Books,  1999.  
Lijphart,  Arend.  Democracy  in  Plural  Societies:  A  Comparative  Exploration.  Yale  University  
Press,  New  Haven,  1977.  
Lintott,  Andrew.  The  Constitution  of  the  Roman  Republic.  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1999)    
Livy.  The  History  of  Rome,  Books  1-­‐‑5.  Translated  by  Valerie  Warrior.  Indianapolis,  IN:  
Hackett  Pub,  2006.  
Locke,  John.  Two  Treatises  of  Government.  Edited  by  Peter  Laslett.  Cambridge  [England]:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  1988.  
Lohmann,  Susanne.  “The  Dynamics  of  Informational  Cascades:  The  Monday  
Demonstrations  in  Leipzig,  East  Germany,  1989-­‐‑91.”  World  Politics  47,  no.  1  
(October  1994):  42-­‐‑101.  
Lovett,  Frank.  A  General  Theory  of  Domination  and  Justice.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  
Press,  2010.  
Lukes,  Timothy  J.  “Lionizing  Machiavelli.”  American  Political  Science  Review  95,  no.  03  
(September  2001):  561-­‐‑575.  
  241  
Machiavelli,  Niccolò.  The  Prince.  Translated  By  Harvey  Mansfield.  Chicago:  University  
of  Chicago  Press,  1985.  
———  Florentine  Histories.  Translated  by  Laura  Banfield  and  Harvey  Mansfield.  
Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1988.  
———  “Letter  to  Francesco  Vettori,  April  16,  1527.”  In  Machiavelli:  Chief  Works  and  
Others,  Vol.  2,  Edited  and  translated  by  Allan  Gilbert,  1010.  Durham:  Duke  
University  Press,  1989.    
———  “Letter  to  Guicciardini,  Oct  21,  1525.”  In  Niccolò  Machiavelli,  Chief  Works,  and  
Others,  vol.  2.  Edited  and  translated  by  Allan  Gilbert,  984-­‐‑987.  Durham:  Duke  
University  Press,  1989.    
———  “Life  of  Castruccio  Castracani.”  In  Chief  Works,  and  Others,  vol.  2.  Edited  and  
translated  by  Allan  Gilbert,  553-­‐‑560.  Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  1989.    
———  Discourses  on  Livy.  Translated  by  Harvey  Mansfield,  and  Nathan  Tarcov.  
Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1996.  
———  The  Art  of  War.  Translated  by  Ellis  Farnsworth.  New  York:  The  Library  of  Liberal  
Arts,  2001.  
Mansfield,  Harvey.  “Machiavelli’s  Political  Science.”  American  Political  Science  Review  75,  
no.  2  (June  1981):  293-­‐‑305.  
———  Taming  the  Prince:  the  Ambivalence  of  Modern  Executive  Power.  New  York:  Free  
Press,  1989.  
———  Machiavelli’s  Virtue.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1996.  
———  Machiavelli’s  New  Modes  and  Orders,  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  2001.    
Marx,  Karl.  “The  Communist  Manifesto.”  In  The  Marx  Engels  Reader.  Edited  by  Robert  
Tucker,  469-­‐‑500.  New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  and  Company,  1978.    
Mallett,  Michael  Edward.  Mercenaries  and  their  Masters;  Warfare  in  Renaissance  Italy.  
Totowa,  N.J.:  Rowman  and  Littlefield,  1974.  
———  “The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Warfare  in  Machiavelli’  s  Republic”  in  Machiavelli  
and  Republicanism,  edited  by  Gisela  Bock,  Quentin  Skinner  and  Maurizio  Viroli,  
173-­‐‑180.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1990.  
  242  
Mattingly,  Garrett.  “Machiavelli’s  ‘Prince’:  Political  Science  or  Political  Satire?”  The  
American  Scholar  27,  no.  4  (Autumn,  1958):  482-­‐‑491.    
McCormick,  John.  Machiavellian  Democracy.  Cambridge,  England:  Cambridge  University  
Press,  2011.  
———  “Machiavellian  Democracy:  Controlling  Elites  with  Ferocious  Populism.”  
American  Political  Science  Review  95,  no.  02  (June  2001),  297-­‐‑313.  
Mearshimer,  John.  “The  False  Promise  of  International  Institutions”.  International  
Security  19,  no.  3  (Winter  1994/5):  5-­‐‑49.    
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  Maurice,  “A  Note  on  Machiavelli.”  In  The  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  Reader.  Edited  
by  Ted  Toadvine  and  Leonard  Lawlor,  123-­‐‑134.  Evanston,  Ill:  Northwestern  
University  Press,  2007.  
Mouffe,  Chantal.  The  Return  of  the  Political.  London:  Verso,  1993.  
Müller-­‐‑Enbergs,  Helmut:  Die  inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiter.  In:  BStU:  Anatomie  der  
Staatssicherheit  –  Geschichte,  Struktur,  Methoden,  Berlin:  2008,  35–38  
Najemy,  John.  A  History  of  Florence  1200-­‐‑1575.  Malden,  MA:  Blackwell  Pub.,  2006.  
Nederman,  Cary.  “Machiavelli  and  moral  character:  principality,  republic  and  the  
psychology  of  virtú”.  History  of  Political  Thought  21,  no.  3  (Autumn  2000):  349-­‐‑364.  
———  “Niccolò  Machiavelli”,  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  Edited  by  Edward  
N.  Zalta,  Last  Modified  September  8,  2009.  Last  Accessed  March  16,  2014.  URL  =  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/machiavelli/  
North,  Douglass,  John  Wallis,  and  Barry  Weingast.  Violence  and  Social  Orders:  A  
Conceptual  Framework  for  Interpreting  Recorded  Human  History.  Cambridge:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  2009.  
Oman,  Charles.  The  Art  of  War  in  the  Middle  Ages.  New  York:  Ben  Franklin,  1959.  
Olson,  Mancur.  The  logic  of  Collective  Action:  Public  Goods  and  the  Theory  of  Groups.  
Cambridge,  Mass:  Harvard  University  Press,  1965.  
———  “Dictatorship,  Democracy,  and  Development.”  The  American  Political  Science  
Review  87,  no.  3  (September  1993):  567-­‐‑576.  
Parel,  Anthony.  The  Machiavellian  Cosmos.  New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1992.  
  243  
Pettit,  Phillip.  Republicanism:  a  Theory  of  Freedom  and  Government.  Oxford,  U.K.:  
Clarendon  Press.  1997.  
Pierskalla,  Jan.  “Protest,  Deterrence,  and  Escalation:  The  Strategic  Calculus  of  
Government  Repression.”  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution.  54,  no.  1  (February  2010):  
117-­‐‑145.  
Pitkin,  Hanna.  Fortune  is  a  Woman:  Gender  and  Politics  in  the  Thought  of  Niccolò  Machiavelli.  
Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1984.  
Plato.  The  Republic.  Translated  by  Allan  Bloom.  New  York:  Basic  Books,  1991.    
Pocock,  J.  G.  A.  The  Machiavellian  Moment:  Florentine  Political  Thought  and  the  Atlantic  
Republican  Tradition.  Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press.  1975.  
Polybius,  The  Histories.  Translated  by  W.  R.  Paton.  New  York  :  G.P.  Putnam’s  Sons,  1922.  
Rebhorn,  Wayne,  “Machiavelli’s  Prince  in  the  epic  tradition,”  in  The  Cambridge  
Companion  to  Machiavelli,  ed.  John  Najemy,  80-­‐‑95.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  
University  Press,  2010.  
Scharfstein,  Ben-­‐‑Ami.  Amoral  Politics  the  Persistent  Truth  of  Machiavellism.  Albany:  State  
University  of  New  York  Press,  1995.  
Skinner,  Quentin.  The  Foundations  of  Modern  Political  Thought.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  
University  Press,  1978.  
———  “Machiavelli’s  Discoursi  and  the  Pre-­‐‑Humanist  origins  of  Republican  Ideas.”  In  
Machiavelli  and  Republicanism.  Edited  by  Gisela  Bock,  Quentin  Skinner  and  
Maurizio  Viroli,  121-­‐‑142.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1990.  
———  “The  Idea  of  Negative  Liberty.”  In  Philosophy  in  History:  Essays  on  the  
Historiography  of  Philosophy.  Edited  by  Richard  Rorty,  J.  B.  Schneewind,  and  
Quentin  Skinner,  193-­‐‑224.  Cambridge  [Cambridgeshire]:  Cambridge  University  
Press,  1984.  
Spinoza,  Baruch.  Political  Treatise.  Translated  by  Samuel  Shirley,  Indianapolis:  Hackett  
Publishing  Company,  2000.  
Stedmen,  Stephen.  “Spoiler  Problems  in  Peace  Processes.”  International  Security.  22,  no.  2  
(Fall  1997):  5-­‐‑53  
  244  
Sullivan,  Vickie  B.  Machiavelli,  Hobbes,  and  the  Formation  of  a  Liberal  Republicanism  in  
England.  Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press.  2004  
———  Machiavelli’s  Three  Romes:  Religion,  Human  Liberty,  and  Politics  Reformed.  DeKalb,  
Ill:  Northern  Illinois  University  Press,  1996  
Strauss,  Leo.  Thoughts  on  Machiavelli.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1978.  
———  “Three  Waves  of  Modernity,”  in  An  Introduction  to  Political  Philosophy:  Ten  Essays  
By  Leo  Strauss.  Edited  by  Hilail  Gildin.  Detroit:  Wayne  State  University  Press,  1989.  
  
Tilly,  Charles.  Warmaking  and  Statemaking  as  Organized  Crime.  Ann  Arbor,  Mich:  Center  
for  Research  on  Social  Organization,  1982.  
Thucydides,  History  of  the  Peloponnesian  War.  Translated  by  M.  I.  Finley.  
Harmondsworth,  Eng:  Penguin  Books,  1972.  
Viroli,  Maurizio.  “Machiavelli  and  the  Republican  Idea  of  Politics.”  in  Machiavelli  and  
Republicanism,  edited  by  Gisela  Bock,  Quentin  Skinner  and  Maurizio  Viroli,  143-­‐‑
172.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1990.  
———Machiavelli.  New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998.  
Von  Vacano,  Diego.  The  Art  of  Power:  Machiavelli,  Nietzsche,  and  the  Making  of  Aesthetic  
Political  Theory.  Lanham,  MD:  Lexington  Books,  2007.  
Waltz,  Kenneth.  Theory  of  International  Politics.  Reading,  MA:  Addison-­‐‑Wesley,  1979.  
Walzer,  Michael.  “Political  Action:  the  Problem  of  Dirty  Hands”.  Philosophy  and  Public  
Affairs  2,  no.  2  (Winter  1973):  217-­‐‑237.  
———  Just  and  Unjust  Wars:  a  Moral  Argument  with  Historical  Illustrations.  New  York:  
Basic  Books,  1977.  
Weber,  Max,  Max  Weber’s  Complete  Writings  on  Academic  and  Political  Vocations.  Edited  by  
John  Dreijmanis.  Translated  by  Gordon  C.  Wells.  New  York:  Algora  Publishers,  
2008.  
Wiethoff,  William.  “’The  Martial  ‘Virtue’  of  Rhetoric  in  Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War.”  
Quarterly  Journal  of  Speech  64,  no.  3  (1978):  304-­‐‑12.    
Winter,  Yves.  “Plebian  Politics:  Machiavelli  and  the  Ciompi  Uprising.”  Political  Theory  
40,  no.  6  (December  2012):  736-­‐‑766.  
  245  
Wintrobe,  Ronald.  1998.  The  Political  Economy  of  Dictatorship.  Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  
University  Press.  
Wolin,  Sheldon.  S.  Politics  and  Vision;  Continuity  and  Innovation  in  Western  Political  
thought.  Boston:  Little,  Brown,  1960.  
Wood,  Neal.  “Introduction”  in  the  Art  of  War,  By  Niccolò  Machiavelli.  New  York:  Da  
Capo  Press,  2001.  Ix-­‐‑lxxx  
Xenophon,  Cyropaedia.  Translated  by  Walter  Miller.  London:  W.  Heinemann,  1914.  
Zahar,  Marie-­‐‑Joëlle  “Handling  Spoilers  and  the  Prospect  of  Vioence,”  in  The  Slippery  
Slope  to  Genocide:  Reducing  Identity  Conflicts  and  Preventing  Mass  Murder.    Edited  
by  William  Zartman,  Mark  Anstey,  and  Paul  Meerts,  173-­‐‑194.  New  York:  Oxford  
University  Press,  2012.  





William  Wittels  graduated,  summa  cum  laude,  from  Tufts  University  in  May  of  
2005  with  a  B.A.  in  Political  Science.  He  received  his  M.A.  in  Political  Science  from  Duke  
University  in  May  of  2010.  While  at  Duke  he  was  an  Ann  and  Robert  Bass  Teaching  
Fellow,  a  Graduate  Fellow  of  the  Kenan  Institute  for  Ethics,  a  Research  Fellow  of  the  
Duke  Center  for  European  Studies,  and  a  fellow  of  the  Earhart  Foundation.  He  also  
received  a  certificate  in  teaching  politics,  a  James  H.  Hallowell  award,  and  a  D.I.P.E.  
research  grant  from  the  Department  of  Political  Science.  He  was  born  in  Philadelphia,  
PA  on  February  16,  1983.  
  
